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VOLUME 52 1975 NUMBER 1
PREFACE
With this issue the Denver Law Journal inaugurates a publi-
cation policy of utilizing the first issue of each year for a survey
and analysis of decisions handed down by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The cases included in this
first issue were selected from opinions filed between September
1, 1973 and August 31, 1974. Since the court has no official annual
term, this period was selected merely to accomodate our own staff
availability. Not all of the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit
during the term were included in this survey. Each opinion is first
classified into one of 11 major topic areas. Within those catagories
the most significant decisions are analyzed in some depth in indi-
vidual comments; opinions of less significance are treated more
briefly in the introductory notes to each section; other cases are
omitted entirely.
This annual feature represents an undertaking beyond the
traditional scope of the Journal's publication routine. Therefore,
we take this opportunity to recognize a number of persons whose
assistance and encouragement were invaluable to the completion
of this issue. Our special appreciation goes to Chief Judge David
T. Lewis and the other judges of the Tenth Circuit for their sup-
port and cooperation; to Howard K. Phillips, Clerk of the Court,
Chief Deputy Clerk Robert L. Hoecker, and members of their
staff for providing us with copies of the opinions filed by the court
and with valuable research assistance; and to all of the staff
personnel of the Tenth Circuit who contributed to our effort. Two
men who deserve particular recognition because of their excep-
tional enthusiasm and assistance are Robert B. Yegge, Dean of




JUDGE ORIE L. PHILLIPS
DEDICATION
THE HONORABLE ORIE L. PHILLIPS
By ROBERT B. YEGGE*
With this issue, the Denver Law Journal begins an annual
survey of the opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit. As the manuscript was being delivered to the
printers, the legal community lost one of the first judges of the
circuit, who served on the court for 45 years and who served as
its Chief Judge for 15 of those years. In honored memory of him,
this first issue of the Annual Tenth Circuit Survey is dedicated
to The Honorable Orie L. Phillips.
While Orie L. Phillips received his legal education at the
University of Michigan, his affiliations with the University of
Denver College of Law were strong indeed. He took a vital interest
in the College as an advisor, lecturer, and he was elected to the
Board of Trustees of the University of Denver on June 2, 1952. He
served on the Board of Trustees as Vice President from June 6,
1955, until May 8, 1959. In May 1962, he was chosen as one of only
a few persons with the designation Honorary Trustee in recogni-
tion of his distinguished past service on the Board; he served as
an Honorary Trustee until his death on November 13, 1974.
The judicial accomplishments of Chief Judge Phillips are
singular. He was a distinguished jurist; his sound and wise opin-
ions remain guidelines in most areas of law. And, as an adminis-
trator of the judicial system, he is one of the giants. Earlier in his
judicial career, he established principles of judicial administra-
tion both for the Tenth Circuit and for the nation.
Orie Phillips was a renaissance man. His life and works,
which are testimony to this accolade, are spread upon the records
of his court-the Tenth Circuit-in the following resolution
adopted by the Tenth Circuit and read at his memorial service
by Chief Judge David T. Lewis.
* Dean, University of Denver College of Law
RESOLUTION
With overwhelming sorrow the Court notes the death of
Judge Orie L. Phillips on November 13, 1974, in Naples, Florida,
after a short illness. Judge Phillips was born November 20, 1885,
in Illinois. After receiving a J.D. degree from the University of
Michigan, he moved to New Mexico in 1910 and in the same year
married Helen M. Bissell who died in 1968. They had no children.
He practiced law in Raton, New Mexico, and for four years was
a member of the state senate.
In 1923 he was appointed United States District Judge for
the District of New Mexico and served until 1929 when he became
a United States Circuit Judge for the newly created Tenth Judi-
cial Circuit. In 1931 he moved to Denver to assist Chief Judge
Robert E. Lewis in the administration of the court. He served as
chief judge of the circuit from 1940 to 1955 when he took senior
status. He continued to participate actively in court affairs and
at the time of his last illness was working on cases which had been
assigned to him.
Because of his interest in legal education, Judge Phillips
taught as a visiting professor at several law schools. He was active
in professional organizations including the American Bar Asso-
ciation, which in 1950 awarded him its medal for conspicuous
service, and the American Law Institute which honored him by
appointment to its governing council. A long-time member of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Judge Phillips served
on many of its cormmittees and chaired several of them. He had
a strong influence in the deliberations and activities of the Judi-
cial Conference. Many of the improvements which the Confer-
ence has made in judicial administration resulted from his ef-
forts. During his long career Judge Phillips was a leader in the
legal profession and a devoted supporter of the federal judicial
system.
Judge Phillips loved the outdoor life and perhaps was happi-
est when either fishing or hunting. Skillful in each activity, he
could hook the wary trout and bring down the jumping antelope
in circumstances which would have defeated the less adroit.
The impact which Judge Phillips had on the Court of Ap-
peals of the Tenth Circuit cannot be overly emphasized. For
twenty-four years he fashioned its course through the myriad of
problems which arose. His skill in organization and his abounding
energy effectively aided the court in the successful adoption and
TENTH CIRCUIT RESOLUTION
use of many innovations which subsequently were accepted in
other circuits.
Judge Phillips was an outstanding judge whose judicial work
deservedly gained national recognition. Thoroughly trained in the
law he kept abreast of recurring judicial and statutory changes.
Often he astounded his associates by his ability to produce a
pertinent decision which he would identify not only by title but
also by volume and page of the published reports. His first con-
cern in any case was with the facts which he zealously searched
out of even the longest and most complex record. He was a fair
and careful judge who patiently listened to and considered every
side of every case. His wise and courageous decisions brought him
the respect of both lawyers and litigants. With a quick and inci-
sive mind he swiftly reached the heart of a controversy and prided
himself in the prompt disposition of the court's work. His superla-
tive production of scholarly opinions won the admiration of his
associates and solidified his recognized position as leader of the
court. With devotion and dedication he served not only the people
of the Tenth Circuit but also those of the United States.
In the annals of the court on which he served for so many
years his position of preeminence goes unchallenged. His asso-
ciates all honor him as a man and as a judge and cherish their
many memories of him.
BE IT RESOLVED that the foregoing summation of the life
and accomplishments of Judge Orie L. Phillips is adopted by the
court as an expression of its pride in, and regard for, its departed
member. He is truly an immortal of the Tenth Circuit.
IT IS ORDERED that this resolution be spread on the re-
cords of the court.













By JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
The interests of the Denver Law Journal in the work of the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is very welcome. The work
of that court, like that of the other ten courts of appeals, is play-
ing an increasingly important role in the development of the law
in this country. On the one hand, its caseload has grown substan-
tially along with the entire body of federal law, both statutory and
constitutional. On the other hand, because there are finite limits
on the number of cases the Supreme Court has been able to hear
and decide, the courts of appeals are for all practical purposes the
last word in a growing proportion of the many cases arising under
federal statutes or the Federal Constitution. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the performance of these courts is attracting a
great deal of scholarly interest.
The Journal's annual review will provide a valuable resource




By CHIEF JUDGE DAVID T. LEWIS
On behalf of the judges of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, I express our appreciation to the Denver
Law Journal for initiating an annual report and analysis of our
cases. The undertaking is an ambitious one and its continuing
value is entirely dependent on the scholarly care and conscien-
tious study that the faculty and participating students reflect in
their work effort. Appellate judges recognize early in their careers
that destructive dissents are the easiest of all legal writing and
that fair, constructive dissent is perhaps the most difficult of our
tasks. As a consequence of this experience and the fact that mem-
bers of our court do not consider themselves as being in competi-
tion with each other, the so-called "bitter dissent" is unknown in
the Tenth Circuit. I would hope, of course, that the Journal will
recognize that its contribution to the growth of the law should lie
in a positive approach and will avoid, as the court itself does, the
academic cheap hit. This does not mean that the court wants or
expects an alter ego in the Journal. Our judges are seldom, per-
haps never, completely satisfied with their decisions and the
Journal can certainly spotlight the areas for improvement. Per-
haps the ideal function of this report and analysis would be to
keep the court neither complacent nor irritated, simply alert.
The position of a circuit judge is the least comfortable in the
Federal Judicial System. The Supreme Court, by definition,
makes no mistakes and the trial judge can take some comfort in
the knowledge that his mistakes can be reviewed and perhaps
corrected. Our mistakes are seldom corrected-only annotated.
And we must live with them, sometimes with belated recognition
of error. The Journal can serve well in hastening that recognition
or in helping the court to eliminate some mistakes altogether.
We wish, however, that we could present our cases to the
Journal from a substantially better working background. During
my federaejudicial tenure the judge power of the Tenth Circuit
has increased from five to seven judges. During that same period
the caseload has risen from 250 cases per year to approximately
1000 cases. In addition to this startling and staggering increase
in workload the Tenth Circuit has been further faced with pro-
longed loss of judge power during the late 1960's and early 1970's
through vacancies. During one period the court had but 4 judges,
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and for several years had vacancy days exceeding 650. Necessity
mandated adjustment through adoption of limited summary pro-
cedures, extensive preargument screening of cases, restricted
time for oral argument, and other such innovations. But no
amount of internal change can keep abreast of a mushrooming
caseload, part of a national increase of 73 percent in caseload
since June 30, 1968, with no increase in authorized judge power.
Nor is such change conducive to judicial writing at its best. The
Ivory Tower has become a production line. We wish it were other-
wise.
We welcome the basic undertaking of the Journal and pledge
our continued cooperation to its efforts.
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
By JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN*
The federal courts of appeals are intermediate appellate
courts. Standing between the trial courts and the Supreme Court
of the United States, they are virtually unknown to the mass of
the public and even to many lawyers. The Supreme Court Jus-
tices and the trial judges get all of the publicity. Occasionally you
see hidden in the back pages of a newspaper, among the obituar-
ies or the want-ads, an item which says that the Tenth Circuit
has affirmed the conviction of some unfortunate. Rarely is any-
thing said about the composition of the court. Perhaps that is just
as well. It assures anonymity, a protection which most circuit
judges cherish. However, you should not downgrade the court of
appeals. The Supreme Court reverses only about 1 percent of its
decisions. For practical purposes in mine-run litigation, the court
of appeals is a court of last resort.
When the Founding Fathers set up the federal court struc-
ture in the First Judiciary Act, they created a system which has
remained stable both at the apex and the bottom. The problem
then and now has been in the middle. The original circuit courts
were unsatisfactory, partly because lawyers were unhappy with a
system in which a trial judge sat on an appellate court to review
a decision which he had made. This anomaly was removed by the
Evarts Act, and at the turn of the century there were nine circuits
plus the District of Columbia. One of these, the Eighth, included
13 states and extended from Minnesota on the north to Arkansas
on the south, and from Iowa on the east to Utah on the west. A
movement was undertaken to lop off the six western states of
Oklahoma, Kansas, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah.
After considerable political maneuvering, Congress passed the
needed legislation in 1929.
The statute provided for four circuit judges. Judges Robert
E. Lewis of Colorado and John H. Cotterall of Oklahoma were
members of the Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit and were
transferred to the new Tenth. United States District Judges Orie
L. Phillips of New Mexico and George T. McDermott of Kansas
*Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
This article is an expurgated revision of a talk made by Judge Breitenstein on July
5, 1974, to the Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference at Jackson Lake Lodge, Wyoming.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
were elevated to the rank of circuit judges to fill out the new
court.
Obviously, a court must have lawyers to tell it what the law
is, or is hoped to be. The creation of a Tenth Circuit bar was of
first importance. On its own motion, the court admitted to prac-
tice Julius C. Gunter, who is described in the court records as
"sometime a Justice of the Supreme Court of Colorado and some-
time governor of the State of Colorado." On the motion of Gover-
nor Gunter, the court then admitted 74 lawyers from Colorado
and 3 from Wyoming.
The Tenth Circuit had a built-in backlog because the Eighth
Circuit transferred to it 90 cases arising in the 6 states which the
Eighth lost. The first case filed directly in the Tenth was
Howbert, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Spencer Penrose, and
the second was one by Mr. Penrose against Mr. Howbert. The
matter is of some note because Mr. Penrose, a man strongly op-
posed to the federal income tax laws, was the builder, and until
his death the owner, of the Broadmoor Hotel which, because of
its many cultural advantages, is the site of the annual convention
of the Colorado Bar Association. In fiscal 1930, 197 cases were
filed in the new court. It is a fair comment that the work of the
judges proceeded at a leisurely pace with adequate time for con-
templation.
The first chief judge of the circuit was Robert E. Lewis of
Colorado, a handsome, austere, and scholarly gentleman who
both looked and acted like a judge. When he presided in the chill
atmosphere of the old Denver appellate courtroom with its im-
pressive marble columns, heavy purple draperies, and massive
bench, many lawyers just plain had the living daylights scared
out of them. An architectural peculiarity added at times to a
lawyer's discomfiture. The podium where the lawyers stood when
addressing the court was about 6 inches above the floor level. Woe
be to the lawyer who forgot the riser. Many stumbled and at least
one fell to the foot of the bench.
The tenure of Judge Cotterall was cut short by his death in
1933. His successor, Sam G. Bratton of New Mexico, sat on the
court as an active judge for 32 years, and for nearly 5 years was
its chief judge. Before his appointment to the court, Judge Brat-
ton had been a state trial judge, a justice of the New Mexico
Supreme Court, and a United States Senator. Judging runs in the
Bratton family. Sam's son, Howard, is now a United States Dis-
trict Judge for the District of New Mexico. Sam Bratton was an
VOL. 52
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imposing figure. His reddish hair, florid complexion, and stately
tread served as props for an oratorical ability which endeared him
to all.
Judge McDermott, a member of the original court, had per-
haps the sharpest mind of all who have sat on the court. His
mental processes always ran in high gear. His acerbic wit was
both the delight and the fright of his associates and of the lawyers
who appeared before him. Unfortunately, his judicial career was
cut short by his untimely death in 1937.
The next court member was Robert Lee Williams of Okla-
homa, who was promoted from the United States District Court.
His short stay of 2 years is particularly notable because of a great
contribution which he made to the federal judiciary. Judge Wil-
liams was probably the wealthiest man ever to sit on the court.
However, he carefully refrained from spending more than abso-
lutely necessary on his personal attire. He was no Beau Brummel.
In those days when the court rose for its noon recess, it was
the custom for the judges to proceed with stately mien and unc-
tuous pomposity to the Denver Club for lunch. At the time an
effort was under way in Congress to obtain a muchly deserved pay
raise for federal judges. Then as now, Congress was unsympath-
etic. One of the opponents was Senator Lawrence C. Phipps of
Colorado, himself a very wealthy man. One day at lunch, Judge
Phillips espied the Senator and had one of those inspirations
which come on occasion to brilliant minds. It happened that
Judge Williams was then looking particularly untidy. Judge Phil-
lips asked Judge Williams if he would like to meet the Senator.
Appropriate introductions were made. The Senator, taken aback
at the appearance of this federal circuit judge, later told his com-
panions that he had decided to withdraw his opposition to the pay
raise because if the judges did not receive enough to afford a
better appearance than that of Judge Williams, a raise in salary
was both necessary and desirable. The raise eventually went
through.
After Judge Williams came Walter E. Huxman, a former
Governor of Kansas. He was an accomplished story teller. For
years at the sparkle hour which regularly followed a hard day of
judging, he and Judge Bratton would regale their associates with
anecdotes, yams, and reminiscences which should have been, but
never were, recorded. The two had an unending feud on two im-
portant subjects. The first had to do with protocol. Bratton had
been a United States Senator and Huxman a state governor. The
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issue was which office rated higher on the prestige scale. Once the
dispute was aired at a collation attended by Chief Justice War-
ren, who opted for the office of state governor. Perhaps he was
influenced by the fact that he had been a state governor.
The other controversy was over religion. Huxman was a
member of the Christian Church and Bratton of the Methodist.
Apparently, the two creeds had areas of incompatability. Those
differences were not clear to the other court members but the
contestants debated them at length with much theological skill.
One thing is certain. Neither judge took an ecumenical approach.
It should be noted that of the 18 who have sat on the court,
the available, but possibly unreliable, information is that the
Episcopalians and Methodists are tied in the number of adher-
ents. This little known fact is of obscure significance.
In fiscal 1940 the filings were down to 186, less than they had
been 10 years before. This may have been one of the good results
of the depression days. People did not have enough money to take
appeals. The 1940's brought important changes to the court. Rob-
ert E. Lewis retired and was succeeded as a court member by
Alfred P. Murrah of Oklahoma who was promoted from his office
as federal District judge. Orie L. Phillips became chief judge.
Judge Phillips had moved from New Mexico to Denver in
1931 to assist Judge Lewis in administering the court. Until he
took senior status at the first of 1956, Judge Phillips ran the court
with a whim of iron. He was the chief judge. Everyone knew it
and respected him. The many honors which Judge Phillips re-
ceived are well known. It is enough to say that he, more than any
other, guided the court through the vicissitudes of the years.
Judge Phillips was an active federal judge for 32 years and chief
judge for 14 years. Until the age of 88, he still sat on the court
and contributed to the disposition of its work load.
The Court survived World War II with its incidental prob-
lems of price control, rent control, and rationing, but before the
end of the decade the omnipresent figure of politics raised its ugly
head. The Judicial Conference of the United States decided that
the court needed another judge. Judges Phillips, Bratton, Rex-
man, and Murrah had been getting along pretty well and were
uncertain about the proposal. A presidential election was in the
offing and the pollsters favored Tom Dewey over Harry Truman.
Judge Phillips, then the only Republican member of the court,
assured his brethren that in the event of Republican success, he
would be in a position reasonably to assure the appointment of
VOL. 52
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an acceptable and competent man. With that assurance, the
judges approved the proposal and a fifth judgeship was created.
But Truman won the election and there was great consternation.
Some may recall a 1949 convocation of the circuit bar at the
University Club in Denver for the unveiling of a portrait of Judge
Phillips. John Simms of Albuquerque, the master of ceremonies,
enlightened the evening with his incomparable wit. The occasion
is important because that evening the members of the court met
a chap named John C. Pickett of Cheyenne who was sponsored
by an influential Wyoming Senator for the new judgeship. Your
imagination does not have to wander far to conjure up the scru-
tiny which the court members gave this upstart Pickett. But
Pickett, a man among men, passed muster and in 1949 became
the fifth member of the court.
John Pickett may not have been a summa cum laude from
an Ivy League school but he had the ability, when occasion de-
manded, to bring the court from the ivory towers of scholastic
pedantry to the realities of just decisions affecting everyday peo-
ple. He taught his associates that even federal appellate courts
should be concerned, at least at times, with the practicalities of
life. And he brought to the court a distinction of which no other
circuit may boast. The Tenth alone has had among its members
a man who, as a major league pitcher, once struck out the mighty
Babe Ruth.
At this point recognition should be given the fact that al-
though the court and its members are truly nonpartisan, national
politics do play some part in the selection of federal judges. Of
the 18 men who have sat on the court, 11 have been Democrats
and 7 Republicans. The numbers are roughly proportionate to the
number of years each party has been in control nationally during
the life of the court. Also the geographical distribution of the
judges should be noted. Colorado and Oklahoma have each con-
tributed four, Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming three, and
Utah one. This may reflect not only national politics but also the
relative bargaining powers of particular United States Senators
when a court vacancy occurred.
In 1950, the court had 195 filings, less than those in 1930, but
changes were on the way and soon the days of unhurried contem-
plation were over. Prisoner petitions arrived in great number, and
the court became plagued with petitions for review of decisions
of federal agencies. An obscure statute provides that when more
than one petition is brought to review agency action, the circuit
1975
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in which the first petition is filed has jurisdiction over all peti-
tions attacking the same order. One result has been an unseemly
race to the courthouse, with the circuit receiving the first petition
having the bad luck. Once the luck of the Tenth turned sour when
the first petition was filed in it less than 2 minutes after the
agency opinion was announced in Washington. The situation be-
came so tense that clerks noted the filing time not only in days,
hours, and minutes, but also in seconds. On one occasion the first
petition for review was filed in another circuit 35 seconds before
a like petition was filed in the lucky Tenth.
The decade brought personnel changes. The illustrious car-
eer of Judge Phillips as chief judge ended and Judge Bratton took
over court leadership in 1956. He ably guided the court until 1959
when age and a statute ending the tenure of chief judges at 70
years caught up with him. Judge Murrah succeeded him as chief
judge. There were two other changes in court membership. David
T. Lewis, a Utah district judge, succeeded Judge Phillips, and
Jean S. Breitenstein, a federal district judge for Colorado, suc-
ceeded Judge Huxman.
The filings in fiscal 1960 were 321, more than double that in
1950, and during Judge Murrah's tenure the increase continued.
From the beginning of the court through fiscal 1968, 10,199 cases
were filed. In the next 5 years over 4,700 were filed. Hard work
alone would not take care of the increase. Under the leadership
of Judge Murrah, a number of innovations were made, some of
which were received by the lawyers with less than enthusiasm.
One case brightened the troubles of the sixties. In a scholarly
opinion, the author of which shall remain nameless, the court
decreed that a beaver was a security within the purview of the
Securities and Exchange Act. This anomalous result may not be
too startling from a purely legalistic standpoint, but note should
be made of one bit of evidence which no doubt influenced the
court. The basic idea of the scheme was that you would buy two
beavers and then there would be more beavers and more beavers
from which valuable pelts could be obtained. The difficulty was
that the prospectus did not disclose one highly pertinent fact. The
evidence showed that beavers and humans share one characteris-
tic, unknown to other living creatures. Members of these two
species make love not just for procreation but most often for
recreation.
The sixties brought changes in court personnel. Congress cre-
ated a sixth judgeship which was filled in 1961 by the elevation
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of Judge Delmas C. Hill of Kansas to the circuit from the post of
United States District Judge which he had held for over 12 years.
Then we have a series of successions which might, but probably
should not, be referred to in the biblical manner of Noah begat
Shem. In bureaucratic lingo the word is not begat but vice. When
a new appointment is made, the musty records read "Smith Vice
Jones deceased." We first have Oliver Seth of New Mexico vice
Bratton and then John J. Hickey of Wyoming vice Pickett. Judge
Seth, a gentleman and a scholar, came to the court from a suc-
cessful law practice in New Mexico. Judge Hickey of Wyoming
had been a State Governor and United States Senator before his
appointment to the court. He was a blythe spirit who often dis-
pelled a thick cloud of gloom with a pertinent witticism.
In 1968, Congress created a seventh judgeship for the Tenth
and William J. Holloway, a practicing attorney and member of a
prominent Oklahoma family, was appointed to the court. After
serving 33 years as a federal judge and 11 years as chief judge,
Judge Murrah took senior status in 1970. He then became Direc-
tor of the Federal Judicial Center. When the duties of that office
permit, he returns to the Tenth to sit with his former colleagues.
David T. Lewis became chief judge in 1970, and the court
filings soared to 736. No determination has been made whether
any relationship existed between the change in chief judge and
the increase in filings. In any event, the year 1970 brought a series
of vices. There was Robert R. McWilliams of Colorado vice Brei-
tenstein, James E. Barrett of Wyoming vice Hickey, and William
E. Doyle of Colorado vice Murrah. Judge McWilliams had been
a state trial judge, and an associate justice and chief justice of the
Colorado Supreme Court. Judge Barrett, the son of an illustrious
Wyoming family, came to the court from the office of state attor-
ney general. Judge Doyle's long judicial experience included serv-
ice as a state trial judge, as a justice of the state supreme court,
and as a federal district judge for Colorado.
Judge Lewis had to rewrite the playbook to make the best use
of the capabilities of the new players and to adjust to the new
playing conditions. The court now unwillingly finds itself running
the schools, the penal institutions, and the labor unions. It has
become the guardian of civil rights and the protector of the envi-
ronment. It is concerned with social security, equal employment
opportunity, fair labor standards, and truth-in-lending. The
cases which it reviews may concern less than $100 or hundreds of
millions of dollars. And the traditional work of criminal appeals,
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post-conviction prisoner petitions, patent cases, and diversity lit-
igation is still with it. Judge Lewis and his team have met the
challenge.
Every circuit has a circuit justice. He is a member of the
Supreme Court assigned to the circuit to perform a variety of
duties. The Tenth has had nine circuit justices of whom three
came from within the circuit. Mr. Justice Van Devanter of Wyo-
ming served for over 8 years and Mr. Justice Rutledge of Colorado
for about 5 years. Since 1962 the Tenth has been particularly
blessed by the designation of Mr. Justice Byron White of Colo-
rado as circuit justice. It may be that when he first assumed that
office there was a minor resentment in Utah by the oldtimers who
remember the 1937 football game between the University of Utah
and the University of Colorado, but the Justice's participation in
that contest is now forgiven.
This brings us up to date. The Tenth Circuit has exercised
its authority through 18 men who may be characterized as unre-
generate individualists. They are hard workers who develop
strong opinions which they do not hesitate to express and main-
tain. Herein lies the strength of the system. From diversified
backgrounds of education and experience, they represent a com-
posite of the circuit and know its problems. At the same time, the
court during its 45-year life has been free from cliques and
schisms. The bitter dissent is unknown in the Tenth. Except for
occasional divisions in specific cases, the court members are in
truth all for one, and one for all.
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CHIEF JUDGE DAVID T. LEWIS
CHIEF JUDGE DAVID T. LEWIS
Following six years of judicial experience as a trial judge in
the State of Utah David T. Lewis was appointed to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1956 by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Judge Lewis is the first and only Utahn to serve upon
the court and has been its Chief Judge since 1970. He is also the
first chairman of the newly organized Conference of Circuit Chief
Judges having been elected to that position in 1974 by the Chief
Judges of the eleven circuits of the nation.
Judge Lewis was born in Salt Lake City on April 25, 1912,
and obtained his elementary education in the public schools.
Working his way through the University of Utah and its College
of Law he received his B.A. degree in 1934 and J.D. in 1937. He
was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree in 1970 and is a
member of the Order of Coif and Phi Delta Phi.
During 1944-45 Judge Lewis served in the Criminal Investi-
gation Division of the United States Army and during 1947-48 as
a member of the Utah Legislature. He is a member of the Utah,
Colorado, American, and Federal Bar Associations and the World
Assembly of Judges.
Judge and Mrs. Lewis reside in Salt Lake City and have
three sons.
SENIOR JUDGE ALFRED P. MURRAH
SENIOR JUDGE ALFRED P. MURRAH
Judge Alfred P. Murrah was appointed to the United States
District Court for the District of Oklahoma in 1937 at the age of
32. He was elevated to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1940, and became its Chief Judge in 1959. On
May 1, 1970, Judge Murrah was appointed Director of the Federal
Judicial Center in Washington, D.C. He continues to serve the
Tenth Circuit as Senior Judge and is available for assignments.
Judge Murrah was born in Indian Territory (now the State
of Oklahoma) in 1904. He is a graduate of the University of
Oklahoma Law School where he received his LL.B. degree in
1928. In 1954, Judge Murrah received an Honorary Doctor of
Laws Degree from the Oklahoma City University; in 1965, he
was awarded an Honorary Doctor of Law Degree from the
William Mitchell College of Law; and in 1968, he received an
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Juridical Science from Suffolk
University.
A member of the Order of Coif and the Phi Alpha Delta Legal
Fraternity (former Supreme Justice), Judge Murrah serves as
Chairman of the Law Center Commission of the Oklahoma Uni-
versity. He is a Trustee of the Southern Methodist University and
a Trustee of the Hatton W. Sumners Foundation of Texas, which
has established scholarships at the Southern Methodist Univer-
sity Law School.
SENIOR JUDGE JOHN C. PICKETT
SENIOR JUDGE JOHN C. PICKETT
Judge John C. Pickett was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on October 13, 1949, and
entered on duty October 24, 1949. He took senior judge status on
January 1, 1966.
He received his LL.B. degree from the University of Ne-
braska in 1922. During World War I he served as a Second Lieu-
tenant. From 1935 until 1949 Judge Pickett was Assistant United
States Attorney for the District of Wyoming; in 1949, he was
United States Attorney. He was a member of the Judicial Confer-
ence in 1959. Judge Pickett also served as Chairman of the Judi-
cial Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules and as a
member of the Committee on the Administration of the Criminal
Law from 1961 until 1969. He is a member of the American Bar
Association.
Judge Pickett is married to the former Lura M. Pratt and has
two sons, Richard F. and Robert J.; Judge and Mrs. Pickett
reside in Cheyenne, Wyoming.
SENIOR JUDGE JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN
SENIOR JUDGE JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN
Judge Jean S. Breitenstein was born in Keokuk, Iowa, July
18, 1900, and in 1907 came with his parents to Boulder, Colorado,
where he attended public schools. During World War I he was an
army private. After graduation from the University of Colorado,
where he received the A.B. in 1922 and the LL.B. in 1924, he
served as a Colorado Assistant Attorney General from 1925 until
1929 and as an Assistant United States Attorney from 1930 until
1933. Between 1933 and 1954 he practiced law in Denver and
represented Colorado in various water controversies.
In 1954 he became a United States District Judge and was
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in 1957. He took senior status in 1970. He has served on
several committees of the Colorado Supreme Court and of the
Judicial Conference of the United States. Judge Breitenstein is a
member of the Denver Law Club, Denver, Colorado, which he
served as president in 1952-53, and a member of the American
Bar Association.
A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the Coif, and Phi
Alpha Delta, Judge Breitenstein holds LL.D. degrees from the
University of Colorado and the University of Denver. He is a
Mason (33rd degree), an Episcopalian, and a Republican. Judge
and Mrs. Breitenstein have lived in Denver since 1925 and have




Judge Oliver Seth was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by President John F. Kennedy
in 1962. He came to the court from a general practice in Santa
Fe, New Mexico. Judge Seth had been admitted to practice in
New Mexico in 1940; was drafted into the Army for World War
II in the same year, and was discharged in 1946. He then resumed
the practice of law in Santa Fe, and married Jean MacGillivray
in 1946. Judge and Mrs. Seth have two daughters, Sandy who
lives in Taos, and Laurie who is a student at the University of
New Mexico.
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico where his father prac-
ticed law. He attended the public schools in Santa Fe, and grad-
uated from Stanford University and Yale Law School. He is a
former member of the Board of Regents of the Museum of New
Mexico and a member of other museum and archaeological or-
ganizations.
JUDGE WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY
JUDGE WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY
Judge William J. Holloway was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1968 by Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson. He came to the court from a general
practice in Oklahoma City.
The son of the late Governor and Mrs. William J. Holloway
of Oklahoma, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo, Oklahoma, in
1923. The family moved to Oklahoma City in 1927 pnd Judge
Holloway received his elementary education in the Oklahoma
City public schools. After commencing study at the University
of Oklahoma, he entered military service in 1943 and was dis-
charged as a First Lieutenant, Infantry, in 1946. He received a
bachelor of arts degree at the University in 1947 where he was
elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He then attended Harvard Law
School where he received a bachelor of laws degree in 1950.
He commenced law practice in Oklahoma City and then
served in 1951 and 1952 as an attorney in the General Litigation
Section, Claims Division of the Department of Justice in Wash-
ington, D.C. He returned to Oklahoma City and was in general
practice there again from 1952 until 1968.
Judge Holloway married Miss Helen Hoehn of Enid, Okla-
homa, in 1963 and they have a son, William J., the III, and a
daughter, Eleanor Gentry. Judge Holloway is a member of the
United Methodist Church and of Phi Gamma Delta fraternity.
JUDGE ROBERT H. McWILLIAMS
JUDGE ROBERT H. McWILLIAMS
Judge Robert H. McWilliams was sworn in as a Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Novem-
ber 5, 1970. Prior to his appointment he was serving as Chief
Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina, Kansas, on April 27,
1916, and moved to Denver, Colorado, in 1927, where he has
resided ever since. He attended Denver public schools and re-
ceived an A.B. degree from the University of Denver in 1938, and
an LL.B. degree in 1941. He received an Honorary Doctor of Law
degree from the University of Denver in 1971.
During World War II, Judge McWilliams served in the
United States Army, assigned to the Office of Strategic Services
in the China Theater. He has successively served as municipal
judge, a state trial judge, and was a member of the Colorado
Supreme Court for ten years prior to his appointment to the
Court of Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the Colorado and Ameri-
can Bar Associations, the American Judicature Society, and has
served on the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association.
He is a member of Kappa Sigma, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi
Delta Phi, Phi Beta Kappa, and is a member and past president
of the Denver Rotary Club and the Denver Gyro Club. Judge and
Mrs. McWilliams reside in Denver, Colorado, and have one son.
JUDGE WILLIAM E. DOYLE
JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
Judge James E. Barrett was appointed United States Circuit
Judge for the Tenth Circuit on April 23, 1971 and entered on duty
May 4, 1971. Prior to his appointment Judge Barrett had been
involved in private practice in Lusk, Wyoming, and had served
as County and Prosecuting Attorney for Niobrara County; Town
Attorney for the towns of Lusk and Manville; and attorney for the
Niobrara County Consolidated School District. In 1967 he was
appointed by Governor Stanley K. Hathaway to serve as Wyo-
ming Attorney General and he remained in that position until
1971.
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett, who served as Wyo-
ming's Congressman, Governor, and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett
was born April 8, 1922, in Lusk, Wyoming where he received his
primary and secondary education. He attended the University of
Wyoming for two years prior to his service in the Army during
World War II. After his discharge he attended the Catholic Uni-
versity of America in Washington, D.C. and in 1949, he received
his LL.B. degree from the University of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett served as President of the Wyoming County
and Prosecuting Attorneys Association for two years. He belonged
to and was active in many community organizations including
the Lusk Lions Club; Lusk Chamber of Commerce; American
Legion; VFW; Chairman, Niobrara Chapter, National Founda-
tion and March of Dimes; Director, Niobrara Chapter of the
American Red Cross; and as Trustee, St. Leo's Catholic Church
of Lusk. He is presently a member of the American Bar Associa-
tion, the American Judicature Society, the American Probate
Lawyers, the Wyoming Bar Association, and the Laramie County
Bar Association.
Judge Barrett is married to the former Carmel Ann Martinez
and has three children: Ann Barrett Sandahl, Richard J., and
John D.
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JUDGE WILLIAM E. DOYLE
JUDGE WILLIAM E. DOYLE
Following ten years as a United States District Judge for the
District of Colorado, Judge William E. Doyle was appointed in
1971 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Doyle also served on the Colorado state district court in
1948 and 1949 and was a Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court
from 1959 until 1961.
Judge Doyle was born in Denver, Colorado, on February 5,
1911, and obtained his elementary and secondary education in
the public school system. He attended the University of Colorado
and received a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science there
in 1941. He received his LL.B. and J.D. degrees from George
Washington University. He served as Deputy District Attorney
for Denver from 1938 until 1941 and as Chief Deputy until 1952.
He also maintained a private individual practice in Denver dur-
ing 1941-43 and 1946-58. During World War II, Judge Doyle
served overseas from 1943 until 1945.
Judge Doyle has been a Visiting Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado and a Professor of Law at the Westminster
College of Law in Denver. He is presently an Adjunct Professor
at the University of Denver College of Law. He is a member of
the Council of Judges; the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency; Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee to Im-
plement the Magistrates Act; and a member of the committee to
plan Seminars for Newly Appointed Federal Judges and the panel
to conduct Seminars for Newly Appointed Federal Judges. He is
an honorary member of the Order of the Coif and the Order of St.
Ives, and a member of Pi Sigma Alpha Honorary Political Science
Fraternity.
Judge and Mrs. Doyle reside in Denver, Colorado, and have
a son, Michael, and a daughter, Susan.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
During this term the Tenth Circuit considered cases involv-
ing procedural aspects of administrative law,' the court's scope of
review of agency decisions,2 and the interpretation and applica-
tion of several state and federal statutes.1 The most significant
decision in the area of administrative law and procedure was
Nickol v. United States,' in which the circuit held that when a
district court reviews an agency determination for substantial
evidence, and there is no conflict in the evidence, a motion for
summary judgment may not be granted. This decision is dis-
cussed more extensively below because the Tenth Circuit is the
first federal court to apply this rule.
Excepting the decision reached in Nickol, administrative law
and procedure questions were resolved by the Tenth Circuit in
accord with other federal courts and generally no striking addi-
tions to the law have been made. In United States v. Smith5 the
court followed both*Tenth Circuit' and Supreme Court7 precedent
in upholding the use of information obtained through an adminis-
trative summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service, in good
faith and prior to recommendation for criminal prosecution,' as
Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1974); Fisher v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 484 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Smith, 484 F.2d 8
(10th Cir. 1973); Spencer v. Seamans, Civil No. 72-1509 (10th Cir., filed Dec. 7, 1973).
2 Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974); Amoco Prod. Co. v. FPC,
491 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1973); Angel v. Butz, 487 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 967 (1974).
Baldridge v. Hadley, 491 F.2d 859 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974);
United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1973); Preux v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 484 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
4 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).
1 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973). Smith, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7205 (1970), filed a
withholding exemption certificate with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) claiming ten
exemptions, then immediately informed the IRS that he was entitled to only two exemp-
tions. The IRS, utilizing an administrative summons, initiated an investigation which
resulted in the criminal prosecution of Smith for supplying his employer with a false or
fradulent withholding certificate.
'United States v. Richardson, 469 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1972).
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). The Supreme Court in Donaldson
distinguished as dictum the statement in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), that
administrative summonses may not be issued for the purpose of obtaining evidence for
criminal prosecution, on the basis that the authority for that statement-Boren v. Tucker,
239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956)-dealt with pending criminal charges or investigations solely
for criminal prosecution.
I These are the standards for use in criminal prosecution of information obtained by
administrative summons. The court nevertheless stressed that the judiciary should dis-
courage the gathering of evidence for criminal prosecution by means of administrative
summonses. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The Tenth Circuit
also followed established precedent' in Spencer v. Seamans' in
affirming the district court's refusal to overturn an administra-
tive order having substantial support in the record.
The court conventionally disposed of federal procedure ques-
tions arising in the context of administrative law. In Fisher v.
Civil Service Commission" the court applied the rule"2 followed
by the Second'3 and the Fifth 4 Circuits that when a party at-
tempts to invoke federal jurisdiction and his constitutional claim
is returned to the state court upon the federal court's abstention,
the federal court will not rehear any claims which have been fully,
freely, and without reservation litigated in state court. Following
an Eighth Circuit decision on similar facts,'" the Tenth Circuit
held in Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States'" that in a suit
originally involving claims for injunctive and restitutionary relief,
it is unnecessary on remand for a three-judge court'" to hear the
claim for money damages if the claim for injunctive relief has
been mooted.'8
I Vigil v. Post Office Dep't, 406 F.2d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 1969); Bishop v. McKee, 400
F.2d 87, 88 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 385 U.S. 57
(1966); United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963); Municipal Distrib.
Group v. FPC, 467 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
," Civil No. 72-1509 (10th Cir., filed Dec. 7, 1973). Spencer pleaded guilty to a charge
of aggravated assault, but denied allegations that the assault involved homosexual con-
duct. He was subsequently administratively removed from his civil service position with
the U.S. Air Force. Both the conviction of aggravated assault and Spencer's alleged
homosexual conduct were cited as reasons for his removal; however, upon review the
Secretary of the Air Force sustained the removal solely on the basis of the aggravated
assault. Claiming that his administrative hearing was tainted by references to his alleged
homosexuality, the petitioner appealed to the district court which upheld his removal on
the grounds that conviction of assault was sufficient to support the administrative finding.
484 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1973).
" This rule was first enunciated in England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964) and was cited in Fisher as controlling.
3 Lecci v. Cohn, 493 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 444 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1971); Rankin v. Florida,
418 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1969).
11 Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971).
'e 490 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1974).
The applicable statutes are 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1970), giving federal district courts
power over any civil action to enjoin an ICC order; id. § 2325 (1970), requiring a determi-
nation by a three-judge district court (under section 2284) before the granting of an
injunction to restrain the enforcement of an ICC order; and id. § 2284 (1970), setting forth
the procedure for and composition of the three-judge court.
For further discussion of the requirement of a three-judge court, see the discussion of
Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1974), which appears in the Federal Practice
and Procedure section infra.
1s The court determined that when a motor carrier's rate increase was cancelled by
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In two cases in which the scope of the court's review of agency
action was considered, the court applied the usual rules concern-
ing review of adjudication and of rulemaking. In Amoco Produc-
tion Co. v. FPC, 10 the Tenth Circuit interpreted an FPC opinion
2'
which had, inter alia, established rate adjustments for substan-
tial off-lease gathering of natural gas.2 Under the authority of the
Natural Gas Act,23 the Commission had revised previous mini-
mum and maximum rates for wellhead gas sales and for gas sales
made after substantial off-lease gathering. 2' Opinion 586 specifi-
cally provided that parties bound by contract prices below the
upwardly-revised minimum prices could apply for rate increases.
Phillips, a substantial off-lease gatherer, had applied for and re-
ceived a rate increase. Amoco, from which Phillips made well-
head purchases of gas under a previously existing contract, then
filed for rate increases in its wellhead sales to Phillips. Observing
that Opinion 586 had established a maximum substantial off-
lease gathering charge, 5 Amoco asserted that Phillips' rate in-
crease obligated Phillips to pay to Amoco that total price minus
the gathering charge, despite the fact that the Amoco-Phillips
contract specified a lower wellhead sale price. The FPC rejected
the ICC and then superseded by other valid rate increases, the only remaining claim by
shippers for allegedly excessive interim rates collected under the cancelled rate increase
were claims for money damages and therefore need only be heard by one-judge rather than
a three-judge court. Pursuant to the ICC's cancellation of the rate increase, the motor
carriers sought to enjoin the cancellation and were granted a temporary restraining order
by a three-judge district court. The district court then remanded to the ICC, which
affirmed its cancellation on the grounds that the motor carriers had failed to sustain their
burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the rate increases. The shippers appealed
directly to the Supreme Court which dismissed the case as moot and the motor carriers
then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which did not deal with the shipper's restitutionary
claim. The shippers filed another appeal to the Supreme Court and a protective appeal
in the Tenth Circuit, which the circuit court undertook upon the Supreme Court's dis-
missal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. Holding that the judgement of the three-judge
court was final and thus appealable, the Tenth Circuit remanded to a one-judge district
court the claim for money damages, to be determined on the basis of the reasonableness
of the superseded rate increase while it was in effect.
" The third case which considers scope of review is Nickol v. United States, discussed
below, in which the court formulates and applies a new rule.
491 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1973).
" 44 FPC 761 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Opinion 586].
" Substantial off-lease gathering is the off-lease transportation of gas together with
the compression, treatment, and liquid hydrocarbon extraction incident thereto. The
substantial off-lease gatherer is, in fact, a middleman.
n 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1970).
U Rates set in this proceeding were applicable in the Hugoton-Anadarko area only.
See Opinion 586.
The charge was 2.5c per McF.
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Amoco's request, holding that Opinion 586 did not require such
a result because the gathering charge did not constitute a maxi-
mum price differential between the wellhead rate and the resale
price after substantial off-lease gathering." The Tenth Circuit
sustained the FPC's action, noting the propriety of its deference
to the agency's expertise. 2 The court reviewed the entire rate
scheme set forth in Opinion 586 and construed the scheme as
requiring computation of maximum prices after off-lease gather-
ing by adding the gathering allowance to the maximum wellhead
sale rate rather than to the actual wellhead contract price. 8 Other
issues considered by the court were resolved in accordance with
the agency's decision .
2
In Angel v. Butz,30 the Tenth Circuit followed a discernible
trend of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court3' and other circuits3 12
in its interpretation of section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 3 However, it became the first court to apply that
n 491 F.2d at 918.
" Id. at 920.
nId. at 921.
" Amoco's second argument, that denial of the increase was a violation of the Natural
Gas Act, which requires all rates to be "just and reasonable" (15 U.S.C. § 717c), was
dismissed because Amoco had no standing to litigate the reasonableness of contract rates
between Phillips and its buyer.
The court also considered the question of the proper criteria for the FPC's determina-
tion of a fair rate of return. Following the lead of the Ninth Circuit in its interpretation
of Opinion 586 in In re Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Case, 466 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1972),
the court supported generalized area rate ceilings irrespective of the efficiency of opera-
tions of individual companies. The position stressed by the court, that area ratemaking
need not guarantee a fixed profit to a specific company on a particular cost basis, is in
line with decisions in other circuits which have considered the issue. See In re Hugoton-
Anadarko Area Rate Case, 466 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1972); Southern La. Rate Case v. FPC,
428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970); Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC, 305
F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 916 (1963). This position stressed by the
Tenth Circuit also followed the logic of Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 424 F.2d 411 (10th
Cir. 1969), which held that, concerning an individual company, the FPC did not err in
basing gas price rates on the company's cost of services. The controlling case on this point
is Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), which held that the FPC need
not guarantee an individual company a fixed rate of return on its cost basis.
- 487 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 967 (1974).
" Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (where there is substantial evidence
supporting the reasonableness of a legislative action, courts will not invalidate that action
on the basis of alleged improper motive for the legislation).
" Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965); Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1965). Both cases held that when rulemaking is not on the record the Secretary is not
limited to the formally presented evidence, but can rely on his own expertise and investi-
gative results.
" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
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interpretation to administrative rulemaking.3 ' Under section 706,
a court reviewing an administrative action must set aside such
action if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law." The
Secretary of Agriculture is empowered, under the Sugar Act of
1948, to set wages annually for sugar beet workers. 36 Claiming
that the Secretary's refusal to consider the workers' demands for
improved labor conditions was arbitrary, capricious, and an
abuse of discretion, the workers sought a judgment declaring the
wage regulations to be invalid. The district court denied the
workers' claim and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.3 7 The Secretary
stated that he believed the Sugar Act did not authorize him to
entertain such labor demands and that he thought the demands
impractical and undesirable. Assuming without holding that the
Secretary's statement of his own authority was improper, the
Tenth Circuit held that the agency ruling must nevertheless
stand if there were some basis in fact for the Secretary's finding
that the demands were impractical and undesirable.3 Holding
that in the exercise of rulemaking power, an agency's action for
an improper reason will not necessarily be struck down if there
are also proper reasons for the action, the court determined that
the Secretary's finding that the demands were impractical and
undesirable constituted such proper reason for his action .
3
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Baldridge v. Hadley, 491 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Baldridge v. Hadley, ,0 a case of first impression, the Tenth
Circuit limited the government's remedies for violations of the
Cropland Adjustment Program" and regulations promulgated
The application of the section to administrative rulemaking is consistent with the
reasoning of Atwood's Transport Lines, Inc. v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 168, aff'd, 373
U.S. 377 (1962), which held that rules and regulations promulgated by government estab-
lishments pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law and are subject
to the same tests as statutes.
s 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
" 7 U.S.C. § 1131(c)(1) (1970). In so doing, the Secretary is required to make an
investigation and to give notice and opportunity for public hearing before making a deter-
mination whether rates are reasonable. The statute does not require rulemaking to be on
the record; however, the hearing is not an adversary proceeding and is supplemented by
further investigation by the Secretary.
37 487 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1973).
a Id. at 262.
a Id.
- 491 F.2d 859 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2608 (1974).
,1 Food and Agricultural Act of 1965, 7 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970).
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thereunder. 2 Baldridge had engaged in a land transfer scheme
which resulted in his collection of sums of money under the Pro-
gram far in excess of the maximum sum permitted by the regula-
tion.43 The government proceeded against Baldridge under the
applicable administrative regulations, which provide that if the
Secretary of Agriculture determines that a producer has substan-
tially violated the contract, all contract rights will terminate and
payments will forfeit to the government with interest." Baldridge
appealed this decision to the district court, whereupon the Gov-
ernment counterclaimed for double damages under the False
Claims Act.15 The district court denied the double damages, rea-
soning that since the Government had elected to proceed admin-
istratively there could be no supplemental remedy under the
False Claims Act. The Tenth Circuit upheld this ruling, compar-
ing the available statutory remedies to the mutually exclusive
common law remedies of recision and damages. Having elected
to pursue the administrative remedy analogous to recision," the
Government was foreclosed from also claiming the alternative
remedy of damages.'7
B. United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1973)
In United States v. Ray,"5 the Tenth Circuit rejected defen-
dant's constitutional claims regarding an administrative sanc-
tion. William Ray was convicted for failure to tag abandoned
dead fowl as required under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act" and
regulations promulgated thereunder 0 On appeal, Ray claimed
that the wording of the regulation 5l indicated that failure to tag
was unlawful only if the bird was left in the custody of another
person. The court rejected this argument, adopting the Seventh
Circuit's approach to construction of administrative regula-
tions:5 2 the court, as in construing statutes, should look first to the
"2 7 C.F.R. §§ 751.101 to .142 (Supp. 1974).
43 21 Fed. Reg. 6296, 8793 (1956) indicates that the total amount payable annually
to any one participant shall not exceed $5000.
" 491 F.2d at 862, citing 21 Fed. Reg. 6297 (1956).
0 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) provides that any person not in the United States military
making a false or fraudulent claim against the United States shall pay a fine plus double
the amount of the Government's actual damages.
, 491 F.2d at 866.
, See note 45 supra.
' 488 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1973).
'5 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1970).
5 50 C.F.R. § 10.36 (1970).
31 Id.
12 488 F.2d at 18, citing Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969).
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language, and if the language is clear then no further interpreta-
tion is required. The language of the regulation, the court found,
was clear and certain.
53
Ray further claimed that the regulation violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment because it did not require that
there be specific criminal intent. The court adopted a rule ap-
plied by the Eighth Circuit relating to the requirement of specific
intent and applied it to administrative regulation: where the
standard imposed by the statute is reasonable and is normally
followed, where the penalty is minor, where conviction is not
stigmatizing, and where the crime is not a common law offense,
specific intent need not be proven as an element of the crime.5'
C. Seneca Nursing Home v. Kansas State Board of Social
Welfare, 490 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Seneca Nursing Home v. Kansas State Board of Social
Welfare,5 the court construed a state statute" as requiring pro-
mulgation of the Social Services staff manual. 7 The statute re-
quired promulgation of "every statement of general policy and
every interpretation of a statute specifically adopted by an
agency to govern its enforcement of administration of legisla-
tion. ' 58 The district court held that because the staff manual
contained agency rules and regulations, promulgation was re-
quired under the statute. The Tenth Circuit affirmed59 and in
doing so became the first federal appellate court to construe a
state statute of this nature. Although relief was granted on the
basis of state law, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction because plaintiff's state claims were pen-
dent to at least two federal claims. 0
D. Preux v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 484 F.2d
396 (10th Cir. 1973)
In Preux v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,"' the
Tenth Circuit interpreted a provision of the Aliens and National-
488 F.2d at 18.
M 488 F.2d at 19, citing Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960).
490 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 72 (1974).
SKAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-415(4) (1973).
'7 490 F.2d at 1326.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-416, -421 (1973).
490 F.2d 1324.
" Id. at 1327-29.
5' 484 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1973).
1975
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ity Act"2 which provides a waiver of deportation of aliens who
have procured entry into the United States by fraud or misrepre-
sentation. 3 Deportation proceedings were instituted against
Monique Preux, who had entered the United States, given birth
to a child, returned to her native Belgium, and then reentered the
United States with a visitor's visa. Upon its expiration, she
claimed the right to remain in the United States under the Aliens
and Nationality Act because her child was a United States citi-
zen." Preux claimed that because she had a concealed intent not
to leave the country upon the expiration of the visa, its procure-
ment constituted fraud and misrepresentation within section
1251(f) of the Act. The court rejected this argument. Following
similar interpretations of this provision by the Ninth65 and Sev-
enth6 Circuits, the Tenth Circuit ruled that for section 1251(f) to
apply, the fraud asserted must be relevant to the charge for which
deportation is sought and is not established by mere misrepresen-
tation in obtaining the visa. 7 Thus, waiver of deportation is avail-
able only if the charge results directly from the misrepresen-
tation.
Lynne M. Ford
II. THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974)
INTRODUCTION
The federal rule of civil procedure which permits a trial court
12 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
a 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) provides that
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within
the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of
entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other
documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresen-
tation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry
who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
" 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970). 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) provides that
the following shall be citizens of the United States at birth:
(1) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof ....
1 484 F.2d at 397, citing Cabuco-Flores v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 477
F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1973).
" 484 F.2d at 397, citing Milande v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 484 F.2d
744 (7th Cir. 1973).
484 F.2d at 397, citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214
(1966).
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to grant a motion for summary judgment' is designed to effec-
tuate prompt disposition of actions in which there are no genuine
issues as to material facts.' Courts have often considered whether
this summary disposition of a case may be utilized by a district
court reviewing an administrative decision for substantial evi-
dence3 and have consistently found the procedure to be a proper
one.' However, in Nickol v. United States' the Tenth Circuit
limited the granting of a motion for summary judgment in an
administrative review. Where the issue before the district court
is whether or not the administrative determination is supported
by substantial evidence, and "there is 'substantial controversy' as
to the 'material facts,' the district court is precluded from enter-
ing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 type of 'summary judgment.' ""
Because a motion for summary judgment may only be
granted if there are no genuine issues as to material facts,7 this
holding may appear to be obvious and unnecessary. However, it
is the opinion of several authorities8 that whether there is sub-
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 permits either party to move for summary judgment upon all or
part of a claim:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
2 Pyle, An Appraisal of Summary Judgment Practice Under Rule 56 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 31 Miss. L.J. 147, 1-3 (1960).
' The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of an administrative
decision "except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). The reviewing
court is compelled to set aside agency actions which are found to be "unsupported by
substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute .... Id. § 706(2)(E).
' Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972);
White v. Udall, 404 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1968); Henrikson v. Udall, 350 F.2d 949 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 940 (1966); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.
1964); Adams v. United States, 318 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1963); Todaro v. Pederson, 205 F.
Supp. 612 (N.D. Ohio 1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 377 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891
(1962); Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. m. 1960); Midwest Farmers,
Inc. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 91 (D. Minn. 1945).
501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1391. A week after this decision was filed, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its
holding in Heber Valley Milk Co. v. Butz, 503 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1974). On review of a
milk order of the Secretary of Agriculture, the district court granted the Secretary's
motion for summary judgment. Because there was a substantial controversy as to the
material facts, under the authority of the Nickol decision, the Tenth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case for further proceedings. See text accompanying notes 20-22 infra.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See note 1 supra.
Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l Bank, 484 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
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stantial evidence to support the administrative decision is only a
question of law. Thus, there can be no issue of fact before the
reviewing court, and, therefore, so long as the movant is entitled
to judgment in his favor, summary judgment is proper. The
theory behind the Tenth Circuit holding is that the resolution of
the sufficiency of the evidence issue involves a review of the facts,
and if they are in controversy, then a "finding" and identification
of facts by the district court is required. Thus, the facts being in
issue, summary judgment is improper.
I. Nickol v. United States
W. G. Nickol and his wife filed a placer mining claim for
building and stone materials' which was denied by the adminis-
trative law judge on the ground that no valuable mineral deposit
had been discovered. 0 Under the authority of the Administrative
Procedure Act," the Nickols appealed this adverse decision to the
district court for a determination of whether the agency decision
was supported by substantial evidence. 2 The court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment, and the Nickols
appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision
to the lower court.
Recognizing that some cases do hold that review for substan-
tial evidence is "only a question of law,"' 3 the court nevertheless
emphasized that the very purpose of review is "to examine the
94 S. Ct. 1609 (1974); Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
859 (1972); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964); Fields v. Hannegan, 162
F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Multiple Use, Inc. v. Morton, 353 F. Supp. 184 (D. Ariz. 1972);
Todaro v. Pederson, 205 F. Supp. 612 (N.D. Ohio 1961), a/I'd, 305 F.2d 377 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254 (N.D.
111. 1960); Midwest Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 91 (D. Minn. 1945); 6 J.
MooRE, MooE's FEDERAnL PRACTICE 56.17[3] (2d ed. 1974).
1 The claim was filed under the authority of the organic statute of the Department
of the Interior which provides: "Any person authorized to enter lands under the mining
laws of the United States may enter lands that are chiefly valuable for building stone
under the provisions of the law in relation to placer mineral claims." 30 U.S.C. § 161
(1970).
10 Brief for Appellant at 2, Nickol v. United States, No. 74-1011, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th
Cir. 1974).
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-76 (1970). See note 3 supra.
* The organic statute of the Department of the Interior requires that hearings and
appeals be conducted according to the rules of the Department. 30 U.S.C. § 613(c) (1970).
The regulations of the Board of Land Appeals, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Depart-
ment of the Interior provide that hearings are to be recorded verbatim. 43 C.F.R. § 4.23
(1973). Since a hearing on the record is required, section 554 and, consequently, sections
556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act are applicable. Thus, under section
706(2)(E) of the Act, the agency decision may be reviewed for substantial evidence. 5
U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557, 706 (1970). See note 3 supra.
11 See cases cited note 8 supra.
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facts in the record."'" The court distinguished the cases cited to
it on the grounds that there were no conflicts as to the facts or
that the appellate court had reviewed the record on its own. 5 In
Nickol the facts were divergent and controverted, and thus, in
order to provide meaningful review, the Tenth Circuit held it
essential that the appellate court know how the lower court had
reached its determination, that is, what were the operative facts
to which the law was applied.'" A review of the record leading to
a de novo determination, the court stated, is improper for an
appellate court to perform but without any reasoning from the
district court, the circuit court would be obliged to undertake just
such a review.' 7 Therefore, the district court, in reviewing the
administrative record, under the statutory scheme, must evalu-
ate the testimony, resolve the conflicts, and examine the facts as
if the matter were "tried" in that court.'8
Although the court advanced scant support for its ruling,"
the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the Nickol holding in Heber Valley
Milk Co. v. Butz. 21 While no further foundation was provided, the
court more clearly articulated its position that
" 501 F.2d at 1390.
" Id. at 1391. Of the Ninth Circuit cases considered by the court, in one there were
no conflicts as to the facts. Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964). In the
others the Ninth Circuit made its own review of the record and found summary judgment
proper. Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972);
White v. Udall, 404 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1968); Henrikson v. Udall, 350 F.2d 949 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966).
11 501 F.2d at 1391.
17 Id.
I d.
" The court cites Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
rev'g 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir.), aft'g 309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) for the proposi-
tion that the reviewing court must engage in a substantial inquiry as to the facts. 501 F.2d
at 1391. In the Overton Park case the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's affirma-
tion of the lower court's granting of the motion for summary judgment by the Secretary
of Transportation. Although this particular agency action was not subject to the substan-
tial evidence test, the Court stated, nevertheless, that section 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act requires the court to engage in substantial inquiry. 401 U.S. at 415. It
should be noted here that the Nickols also appealed the agency decision on the ground
that it was "clearly erroneous as a matter of law," which is within the ambit of section
706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 501 F.2d at 1390. Although neither the
district nor the circuit court discussed this issue, the Overton Park case would also require
that a searching and careful inquiry be made to determine whether agency action is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See 401 U.S. at 416. The Tenth Circuit also quotes C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 99 at 443 (1970) to support the theory that there can be no
broad rule as to when summary judgment is appropriate. 501 F.2d at 1392.
" 503 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1974). See note 6 supra.
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it is the duty of the trial court to examine the record as made before
the administrative agency, and then to "find," and to identify, the
"facts" which it deems to be supportive of the agency's order, if such
be the trial court's resolution of the matter."
A mere showing that the judge considered the record and con-
cluded that there was evidence to support the agency decision is
not enough; the trial court itself must make a finding and identi-
fication of facts.
22
The decisions in both cases hold that summary judgment is
improper in those situations where there is a conflict as to the
facts. Yet, the court in Nickol indicated that the granting of a
motion for summary judgment would be appropriate in those
cases where, assuming the movant is entitled to judgment,21 there
I1 ld. at 97.
I ld. One of the Nickols' assertions on appeal was that the district court did not
examine the administrative record because it had been officially sealed. Brief for Appel-
lant at 2, Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974). The government count-
ered that argument by noting that both parties had, in the lower court, made numerous
references to the transcript and that government counsel found the record "taped in an
envelope, not 'sealed.'" Brief for Appellees at 4, n.1, Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d
1389 (10th Cir. 1974). In the Nickol case the court made no finding as to whether or not
the record was, in fact, examined. It noted, however, in the Heber Valley case that: "In
the present case, unlike Nickol, there is nothing in the record before us to indicate that
the trial judge before granting summary judgment had himself examined the record
.... " 503 F.2d at 98. Thus, even in those situations where the court has examined the
record, that court must find and identify the supporting facts.
0 To be entitled to judgment, the movant, if he is seeking the affirmation of the
agency decision, must establish that there is substantial evidence to support the decision.
If the movant is seeking the reversal of the agency determination, he must show that it is
unsupported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined as "more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938). See also NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 206 U.S. 292 (1939).
The Supreme Court has held that the power of review by the district court is limited if
there is substantial evidence, such evidence being adequate for a reasonable mind to
accept as supporting a conclusion. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607,
618-21 (1965). Lower courts have followed this standard to varying degrees. See, e.g.,
Henrikson v. Udall, 350 F.2d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966);
Lewes Dairy, Inc. v. Freeman, 401 F.2d 308, 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929
(1969); Consolidated Royal Chemical Corp. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1951);
Standard Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1954). The Tenth Circuit has held
that "[t]he court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning which
of various rational but opposed inferences should be drawn from this evidence." Hyatt v.
United States, 276 F.2d 308, 312 (10th Cir. 1960). If the decision is supported on the record,
no purpose is served by reviewing in detail the evidence before the administrative agency.
More recently, the court has stated that findings of fact are not to be disturbed by the
reviewing court if there is substantial evidence to support them. Travis v. Richardson, 434
F.2d 225, 227 (10th Cir. 1970). See also Jones v. Finch, 416 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1969);
Gardner v. Bishop, 362 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1966). The result is that even if evidence is
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are no conflicts. 4
II. IMPLICATION OF THE DECISION
The Nickol and Heber Valley decisions have not increased
the power and function of the district court as the appellees have
contended." Instead, the power of the court to grant a summary
judgment motion in specific cases has been limited in an attempt
to assure the appellate court that there will be a delineation of
the district court's reasoning.
Whether or not the district court's review for substantial
evidence is a matter of law26 is not an issue. The very purpose of
such review is to examine the facts in the record." In those cases
where the findings of the agency are to be accepted, the court is
not relieved of its duty to examine the evidence to ascertain the
existence of substantial evidence." When there is a significant
controversy in the evidence there is a "genuine issue as to a mate-
rial fact," and, therefore, the court may not grant a motion for
summary judgment.21 Otherwise, the possibility increases that
conflicting, there may easily be sufficient evidence to support the decision, and the district
court, therefore, must affirm.
U "Thus if there are no conflicts, there is no problem presented. ... 501 F.2d at
1391.
The lack of discussion by the court on this point raises a serious question. The
Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) states
that section 706 (of the Administrative Procedure Act) requires that court to engage in a
substantial inquiry:
Even though there is no de novo review in this case and the Secretary's
approval of the route of 1-40 does not have ultimately to meet the
substantial-evidence test, the generally applicable standards of § 706 require
the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly, the Secre-
tary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. But that presump-
tion is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, indepth review.
401 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit cites Overton Park, also a summary judgment case, to support its
requirement for an inquiry into the facts when evidence is controverted. See note 19 supra.
The strong language of the Supreme Court, however, may imply that that same type of
inquiry is mandatory in all section 706 review, and therefore, under no circumstances can
a district court grant a motion for summary judgment when it is conducting any section
706 review.
2 Appellee's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2,
Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).
2' See note 8 supra.
21 Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1974).
n Foote Bros. Gear & Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 802, 803-04 (7th Cir. 1941).
" FED. R. Ctv. P. 56(c). For cases which similarly interpret this rule, see Elgin, J. &
E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945); Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S.
620 (1944); Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l Bank, 484 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1973); Brother-
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the guaranteed right of review30 may be denied. In the Heber
Valley case such a situation arose; the court noted that there was
no indication that the trial judge had, in fact, even examined the
record.3'
Since the Tenth Circuit nowhere states that summary judg-
ment is inappropriate in all cases, it is necessary for the attorney
appealing an administrative decision to find genuine conflicts in
the facts and to bring them to the attention of the court in order
to insure that the right to review is not terminated by summary
judgment. Once portions of the transcript are cited by the parties,
the court is under a duty to review them.2 Thus, if divergent and
controverted facts and testimony are indicated to the court, the
appellant has guaranteed for himself an initial review of the re-
cord, culminating in an identification of those facts which either
support or contradict the agency decision, and thereby providing
the circuit court with a record for it to review. In that situation
the district court is prohibited from granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment for either party.
Moreover, under the authority of Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 13 since a summary judgment motion may not
be granted when a party raises questions of arbitrariness, abuse
of discretion, and errors of law on appeal,34 if the appellant raises
such questions, summary judgment cannot foreclose his right to
review. .
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit in the Nickol and Heber Valley cases has
made no new sweeping changes in the law. It has articulated a
rule which has long needed enunciation. As the court indicated,
"[t]he opinion does not refer to the scope of review by the dis-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Louisville & N.R.R., 211 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Ala. 1962); Poss
v. Christenberry, 179 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Miller v. United States, 54 F.R.D.
471 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See also United States v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 287 F.2d 601 (10th
Cir. 1961) in which summary judgment was held improper where there was a good faith
dispute as to the intent of the parties.
3* OKC Corp. v. FTC, 455 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1972); Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883
(10th Cir. 1967); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975
(1967); Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966); Adams v. Witmer, 271
F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958).
31 503 F.2d at 97. See also note 22 supra.
" "In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party . 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
- 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
" See notes 19 & 24 supra.
VOL.. 52
1975 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 53
trict courts."" They must only ascertain what is the substantial
evidence and make a record in order that the circuit court can
then provide normal appellate review. As a result of this ruling
the district court is forced to deny a motion for summary judg-
ment in those cases where there is a good faith controversy as to
the facts, and the parties are assured proper review in the district
and circuit courts.
Judith D. Levine




Adolph Coors Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 497 F.2d 1178
(10th Cir. 1974)
By FRED C. BRIGMAN, JR.*
The only significant antitrust case decided by the Tenth Cir-
cuit during 1974 was Adolph Coors Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission.' Coors was an appeal by the Adolph Coors Company
from a cease and desist order of the Federal Trade Commission,
which had found Coors in violation, as a matter of law, of section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' Section 5 broadly pro-
scribes "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" in interstate commerce. As in Coors, the section
has often been interpreted to prohibit price fixing' and exclusive
dealing arrangements.' The court reluctantly followed the land-
mark holding of the Supreme Court in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.,5 which was based on section 1 of the Sherman
Act,' but adds dictum in criticism of that opinion. The court in
Coors suggested but does not hold that the Schwinn rule, under
which territorial restrictions on resale are per se unlawful once a
manufacturer parts with title, "should yield to situations where
a unique product requires territorial restrictions to remain in
business."' In those latter situations, the court advises, the
Supreme Court should develop a rule-of-reason exception.
Coors is the fourth largest brewer in the United States.
Among the nation's 70 manufacturers of beer, Coors alone ships
all of its beer from one plant and employs a brewing process which
*Vice-president and General Counsel, Bionic Sciences Corporation, Boulder, Colo-
rado; A.B., 1943, Southwestern University; LL.B., 1949, The University of Texas.
1 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 0000 (U.S. Jan.
13, 1975)(No. 74-128).
2 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
1 See, e.g., National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965);
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1947); Eugene Dietzgen Co. v.
FTC, 142 F.2d 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944); Shakespeare Co. v. FTC,
50 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1931).
' See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC,
442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971); Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
497 F.2d at 1187.
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requires refrigerated marketing. Because of the delicacy of its
product, the court found, Coors necessarily must strictly monitor
refrigeration controls and expeditious marketing techniques after
each shipment of beer leaves its plant. Coors employs 35 area
representatives to help market its products. Area representatives
are responsible for working with 166 independent distributors and
one wholly-owned subsidiary distributor is assigned a territory
within which to market Coors beer.
At the time of the cease and desist order, it was Coors' policy
to encourage "pricing integrity," or a program of price mainte-
nance, in the wholesaling of its products by its distributors. Al-
though the Coors Policy Manual allowed Coors and its agents the
right to suggest minimum wholesale prices only and repudiated
the use of threats, coercion, or intimidation of wholesalers and
retailers, the Commission examined several present and former
Coors distributors who testified to the effect that Coors, its offi-
cials, and area representatives set the prices at which distributors
were to sell Coors beer. Since there are about 7000 applicants for
distributorships, the court found, any distributor not conforming
to the pricing policy could be replaced. Coors' contracts with its
distributors provided for termination by Coors on 5-days' notice
for cause and 30-days' notice without cause. The Commission
found that Coors had used the threat of speedy termination to
force the distributors into anticompetitive price fixing. The court
held that there was substantial evidence in the record to support
the Commission's finding of fact.8 Commission findings of en-
forced retail price fixing by Coors were similarly upheld by the
court.
Equally clear to the Tenth Circuit were Coors' efforts, in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, to
exclude from competition other light draught beer manufacturers
by requiring in fact that tavern owners purchase Coors draught
beer exclusively. Coors admitted that under its distributor con-
tracts its distributors were restricted to vertically imposed territo-
ries which Coors could alter at will. The manufacturer argued,
however, that these territorial restrictions were reasonable and
legal. The Commission had found vertical territorial divisions to
be illegal per se. Based on Schwinn,9 the court upheld that deter-
, See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
' The Supreme Court there held that
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with
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mination' ° but not without some apparent dissatisfaction. Seem-
ingly convinced that Coors' unique manufacturing process might
justify reasonable territorial limitations in its distribution," the
court observed that
speed of delivery, quality control of the product, refrigerated deliv-
ery, and condition of the Coors product at the time of delivery may
justify restraints on trade that would be unreasonable when applied
to marketing standardized products. . . .Perhaps the Supreme
Court may see the wisdom of grafting an exception to the per se rule
when a product is unique and where the manufacturer can justify
its territorial restraints under the rule of reason.'
2
Because both price fixing'3 and vertical and horizontal territorial
divisions'4 have repeatedly been held illegal per se under section
1 of the Sherman Act or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, it does not appear that Coors is the appropriate case to
appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that a "rule of rea-
son" should be ingrafted on those holdings. The technological
problems inherent in distributing Coors' products over wider geo-
graphical areas do not appear so insurmountable as to warrant a
judicial analysis of the reasonableness of Coors' territorial divi-
sions.
The cease and desist order issued by the Federal Trade Com-
mission contained 13 operative paragraphs. The first 11 para-
graphs restrained Coors from fixing prices for distributors or re-
tailers, from enforcing any territorial restrictions, from restricting
competition between and among distributors and retailers, from
dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or
persons to whom the product may be transferred-whether by explicit agree-
ment or by silent combination or understanding with his vendee-is a per
se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
,0 The court noted that less restrictive alternatives were available to Coors. If quality
control was Coors' objective in assigning territories, "Coors may still condition its sales
to distributors and others upon maintenance of procedures necessary to control the quality
of the product." 497 F.2d at 1187. Violation of such conditions would thus presumably
become the basis for a contract termination with cause.
The court noted:
Thus we are foreclosed from considering the reasonableness of the restriction
or its business justification. We are cognizant of the unpredictability which
is created in relationship to the Coors operation.
Id.
12 Id.
11 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
", United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, (1967); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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interfering with distributors or retailers handling other beers, and
from cancelling or threatening to cancel any distributor's contract
or refusing to sell them beer because of past or future violations
of price or territorial restrictions. Paragraph "12" increased the
contract periods of notice of termination to 60 days in case of
termination for cause and to 180 days in case of termination
without cause. Paragraph "13" ordered Coors to provide for arbi-
tration in the city in which the distributor resided in cases of any
announced termination to determine whether the termination
was made in good faith.
The majority of the court affirmed the Commission's order
as to the first 11 paragraphs, but overruled paragraphs "12" and
"13" on the grounds that the termination provisions of Coors and
its distributors were a matter of private contract. Since the Com-
mission found that Coors used the threat of speedy termination
of the contract to force its distributors into anticompetitive be-
havior, and since the court held that there was substantial evi-
dence in the record to support the Commission's finding, it would
seem that the Commission's wide remedial discretion"s should
have supported its entire order. As the dissenting opinion states:
The Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy
deemed adequate to cope with unlawful practices in this area of
trade and commerce. See Siegel v. Federal Trade Commission, 327
U.S. 608, 611, 66 S. Ct. 758, 90 L. Ed. 88. The Courts interfere only
where there is no reasonable relation between the remedy and the
violation. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 381
U.S. 357, 377, 85 S. Ct. 1498, 14 L.Ed. 2d 443. And orders affecting
contractual relationships have been upheld where unlawful prac-
tices involved subtle pressures and threats of termination of dealer's
licenses. Id. at 374-375. On this record and the findings I would
uphold as reasonable the Commission's choice of a remedy to cope
with the unlawful practices."
The difficulties encountered by Coors in its attempt to
enforce a lawful price-maintenance program without being found
guilty of price fixing illustrate once again the continued erosion
of the Colgate doctrine. 7 They also point up the necessity for
" See FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967); Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Jacob Siegel Co. v.
FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
16 497 F.2d at 1190, citing Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 374-75 (1965).
Cf. Arthur Murray Studio v. FTC, 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Regents v. Carroll,
338 U.S. 586, 600-02 (1950).
'1 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). An early antitrust case,
Colgate originally stood for the broad principle that in the absence of an intent to create
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manufacturers unable to avail themselves of the fair trade excep-
tions 8 contained in the Sherman Act and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act to avoid any attempt to fix prices or impose territorial
restrictions upon the resale of its products. Coors is another ex-
ample of the necessity for continuous internal monitoring of anti-
competitive activities. It would be surprising, given the strength
of the Commission's evidence of price fixing and territorial re-
strictions, if Coors were the case that persuades the Supreme
Court to overrule or limit its decisions in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.,'5 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission,20 and Texaco v. Federal Trade Commission.2'
or maintain a monopoly, a manufacturer may publicize expected resale prices for its goods
and then refuse to deal with wholesalers and retailers which do not conform. Distinguished
and criticized repeatedly since 1919, Colgate was cited somewhat differently in Schwinn,
where it was said to support only the rule that "a manufacturer of product other and
equivalent brands of which are readily available in the market may select his customers,
and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his
goods." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967). For a detailed
history of the Colgate doctrine, see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960).
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a)(2) (1970).
" 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
381 U.S. 587 (1965).




This section comments briefly on Tenth Circuit cases apply-
ing the law of bankruptcy, the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), corporations, and creditor-debtor relations. Except
that most were occasioned by a business failure, the cases have
little in common, and their significance is otherwise limited. Nar-
row but interesting questions of law are approached with caution.
Opportunities to make new law are generally avoided by the
court. The holding and principal consequences of each case are
discussed in the text. Extended comment on the court's analysis
is usually reserved for the notes.
I. BANKRUPTCY
A. Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp., 492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974)
Although unusual in its facts, Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp.'
reaffirmed the familiar rule that a bankruptcy court does not
have summary jurisdiction over property of a debtor which, on
the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or other asser-
tion of jurisdiction, is held adversely to the bankrupt estate un-
less the adverse claimant consents.' Here the debtor, a Colorado
corporation, was the owner of certain oil and gas leaseholds situ-
ated in Wyoming. The property over which the Colorado bank-
ruptcy court asserted summary jurisdiction was all of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of production from one of these leaseholds, in
which the debtor owned a 25 percent working interest. These
funds were held by an Ohio corporation which had purchased the
production in Wyoming, presumably before the filing of the peti-
tion, and had then resold it. Subject to offsets for production
costs, the proceeds were allocable among the debtor and the hold-
ers of the remaining 75 percent working interest, residents of New
York. Following the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, but be-
fore the trustee obtained a Turnover Order, the owners of the 75
percent working interest brought an action against the Ohio cor-
poration in a Wyoming state court for an accounting of the pro-
ceeds.
Distinguishing the production proceeds from the debtor's
492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974).
In re Rosser, 101 F. 562 (8th Cir. 1900); 2 COLLIE ON BANKRUPrCY 23.04[2],
.06[1], .10[21 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as CoLLM]. The basic
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is defined in section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
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leasehold interest,3 the court found that, at the time of the bank-
ruptcy court's assertion of jurisdiction, the funds were held by the
Ohio corporation, which it characterized as a "third person."' To
the extent that the proceeds were subject to the adverse claims
of the New York owners of the 75 percent working interest, the
court concluded they were not the "property of the debtor" within
the meaning of section 111 of the Bankruptcy Act. Plenary juris-
diction was therefore a prerequisite to an adjudication of rights
in the proceeds, and since the Wyoming state court had obtained
constructive possession of the proceeds through valid proceedings
prior to the Turnover Order, the jurisdiction of the state court
became exclusive.6 Accordingly, the appellate court suggested
that the bankruptcy court should consider directing the trustee
to appear in the Wyoming state court proceedings and to initiate
such ancillary proceedings as might be necessary to determine the
claimed rights of the debtor in the proceeds from production of
other leaseholds.
7
1 492 F.2d at 977. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCALL CODE § 2-107(1), which defines the sale
of severed minerals as a sale of goods, and thus of a property interest separate from the
land. The court in Sherr thus impliedly overrules Davidson v. Schofield, 153 F.2d 7 (10th
Cir. 1946). On virtually identical facts, the circuit court there rejected an objection to the
bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction over adverse claims of title to production pro-
ceeds, in the possession of a third party, from an oil leasehold in which the adverse
claimant held an undivided one-half interest. It gave as a reason for its rejection the fact
that, on the date of the filing of the petition, the property, if not the proceeds, was in the
constructive possession of the debtor.
1 492 F.2d at 977. This is one of the few subtle issues of law raised by Sherr. The court
hedges on whether the crude oil purchaser, which was little more than a stakeholder,
should be viewed as an "adverse claimant," or whether the subjection of the proceeds in
its possession to the adverse claims of the owners of the 75 percent working interest was
sufficient to deny summary adjudication. Although several courts have suggested that the
third party-possessor must be the claimant, In re United General Wood Products Corp.,
483 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973) (where debtor factored accounts receivable with financial
institution, bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction to adjudicate claims to funds in
possession of factor which asserted no claim to them, notwithstanding adverse claims of
Government, which had served notice of tax levy on debtor prior to filing of petition in
bankruptcy); 2 CoLLIER 23.04[2], the court in Sherr seems to argue that the crude
purchaser, in assuming a duty to collect and remit the proceeds of sale to the owners of
the working interest, acted in some sense as the agent of each claimant, and that in that
event it should be viewed as an adverse claimant in itself. See Buss v. Long Island Storage
Warehouse Co., 64 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1933) (summary jurisdiction will not lie against
warehouseman who, at the time of bankruptcy of buyer, held goods subject to competing
claims of buyer and seller); 2 COLLIER 23.06[1].
11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
492 F.2d at 977-78; Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165, 175 (1902); 2 COLLIER 23.17.
492 F.2d at 977.
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B. In re Public Leasing Corp., 488 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1973)
In re Public Leasing Corp. 8 consolidated two unrelated bank-
ruptcy cases on appeal. In the first, a creditor bank asserted a
contractual right to deduct attorney's fees from the sale proceeds
of certain reclaimed collateral. Although the debtor had origi-
nally filed a petition for reorganization, the bank and other se-
cured creditors successfully moved for an involuntary adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy. Counsel for the receiver, relying on the only
Tenth Circuit decision on point,' argued that a creditor has a
provable claim only for those services rendered prior to the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy, and that therefore the bank's right
to deduct attorney's fees from the proceeds extended only to those
services performed before the filing of the reorganization petition.
The court declined to reexamine the rationale of its earlier
decision, the importance of which has been blunted, since the
1938 amendment of section 63a, by the admission to proof of
"claims based upon contingent debts and contingent contractual
liabilities.' 0 Instead, the court held simply that a "reorganiza-
tion" is not a "bankruptcy,"" and that therefore the bank had a
provable claim for attorney's services rendered until the adjudi-
cation in bankruptcy. By that time, the debtor was clearly in
default, and the bank had "properly and necessarily employed
attorneys" in its effort to reclaim. 2 Although approving the
claim, and despite the fact that the parties had stipulated to the
reasonableness of the attorney's fee requested, the court re-
manded for a determination of the proper amount.
3
The second case affirmed the validity, under section 9-204(5)
of the UCC, 4 of cross-collateralization clauses in security agree-
488 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1973).
American Nat'l Bank v. Bartlett, 40 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1930).
13A COLLI 63.1513]; see 11 U.S.C. § 103a(8) (1970). The argument, of course,
is that, apart from the question of reasonableness, the amount of a debt for attorney's fees
is generally fixed by contract and therefore liquidated, but the fact of the need for his
services may be contingent upon such occurrences as the allowance of reclamation. Under
the more liberal post-1938 interpretation of section 63a, attorney's fees may be regarded
as a provable claim even where the services are not provided until after the adjudication.
See Hartman v. Utley, 335 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1964); Blackford v. Commercial Credit
Corp., 263 F.2d 97, 115 (5th Cir. 1959); In re Crowder, 301 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 (E.D. Ark.
1969).
488 F.2d at 1373.
" Id. at 1374.
" Id. See Webster Drilling Co. v. Walker, 286 F.2d 114, 117 (10th Cir. 1961); Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank v. Bartlett, 40 F.2d 21, 25 (10th Cir. 1930); 13A CoLwLER 63.15[3].
11 All Code citations in this section, unless otherwise noted, are to the official version
of the UmNFoRM COMMMCIAL CODE.
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ments. Thus, a secured creditor was permitted to apply the sale
price of certain reclaimed collateral against all cross-
collateralized obligations of the debtor. 5
C. E. F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974)
E. F. Corp. v. Smith6 made several striking additions to the
law of bankruptcy and secured transactions. The Tenth Circuit
concluded that an accounting firm gave no "value," as defined
in UCC section 1-201(44),17 when it took a $40,000 note, secured
by a mortgage and other security interests, from a client-debtor
partly for an antecedent debt of $8,000 and partly because
"[future] accounting services were contemplated."18 Value, the
court held, was given only later when the services were actually
and "voluntarily" performed. Since the debtor filed a petition in
bankruptcy 6 months after the transaction but within 4 months
of the performing of the services, the accounting firm was denied
the status of a secured creditor, and its claim on the note as to
the new services was barred under section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act 9 as a preference.
In thus holding, the court notes but does not apply UCC
section 1-201(44)(d), which states that value may be given "in
return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract." 2 In contract law, of course, a promise is sufficient consid-
eration for a promise, 21 and the only other case in point has specif-
ically held that the section 1-201(44) definition of "value" does
include a promise. 22 Although the accounting firm's contempla-
15 When the debtor sold certain pieces of financed equipment and remitted the bal-
ances owing to the creditor, the creditor's release of its security interest as to those items
was regarded by the court as the accommodation of a valuable customer, and not as the
waiver of the creditor's cross-collateralization rights. 488 F.2d at 1378.
496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974).
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(44) states that:
[A] person gives "value" for rights if he acquires them
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit . . . or
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support
a simple contract.
496 F.2d at 828.
1' 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1968). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-303(1), 9-203(1) as
amended.
2 496 F.2d at 830.
SI United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 299 (1942).
21 In re Nicolosi, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 111 (S.D. Ohio 1966). In that case, the court said:
The Uniform Commercial Code definition of "value" (because of the code
purpose of being so broad as to not derogate from the ideal ubiquitous
secured creditor), very definitely covers a promise for a promise.
Id. at 113. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(44) (b), 3-303(b), which conceiva-
bly may also apply.
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tion of future services may well have amounted to a promise,23 the
court does not consider this factual issue. Instead, it disposes of
the separate issue as to whether or not the creditor gave any
"binding commitment" in return for the note and mortgage, 4 and
it draws a sharp distinction between personal services and loans
as claims which a creditor may be permitted to secure as against
a trustee in bankruptcy. In broad language, the court states:
We see no conflict between this result and the holdings in the ac-
counts receivable and after-acquired inventory cases [in which
money had been loaned, or a commitment made to advance in the
future, against after-acquired assets of the bankrupt]. In those
cases, the benefit had been received by the bankrupt before the four-
month cutoff. In the instant case it had not. To permit relation back
of a claim for voluntary personal services within the four-month
period would provide a loop hole which, in our opinion, was not
intended by either the Bankruptcy Act or the Uniform Commercial
Code. Secured status was properly denied for the amount due on
account of the personal services in question. "
There is no basis in law or policy for such a distinction, which has
the effect of denying the literal meaning of section 1-201(44)(d)
and of excluding from the class of secured parties all creditors
other than lenders. Such a conclusion could not have been in-
tended by the court, which may wish to reexamine its major
holding and the dicta on which it apparently was based.
One other bankruptcy question was decided by the Tenth
Circuit in E. F. Corp. The court held that where a corporate
director had no knowledge of the unauthorized giving of a mort-
gage on the corporation's assets, his ratification of all actions
taken by the officers and directors was ineffective, and the mort-
gage was therefore invalid.2" Moreover, the corporation could not
0 It is difficult to conclude that some agreement as to the future work was not made,
for the note given was for five times the amount of the unpaid portion of the antecedent
debt, and equalled the sum of the unpaid portion and both bills for future services. 496
F.2d at 828. Indeed, the court states that the note was given "[piursuant to a demand
for security on the old debt and for the future work." (Emphasis added) Id. The court's
references to the "voluntary" nature of the creditor's expenditure of $20,000 in new ac-
counting services are thus presumably inapt, Id. at 831. So too is its characterization of
the transaction as one involving "future advances." Id. at 830. The decision does suggest
a certain terminological confusion. Twice the court refers to financing statements as
"financial statements." Id. at 831.
1' "The only claim of value here is that of a binding commitment to render future
accounting services." Id. Conceivably, the section 1-201(44)(d) claim was not pursued by
the creditor's attorneys, who were also parties to the action. In any event, section 1-
201(44)(a) refers specifically to a commitment "to extend credit" and, therefore, would





be estopped from denying the validity of the mortgage since no
benefits had flowed to it and, if they had, they would have been
accepted without knowledge.Y When the corporation later, within
the 4 months prior to the filing of its petition in bankruptcy, gave
to the mortgagee a note which, in the words of the court, was
"allegedly secured under the future advance clause of the . . .
mortgage, 28 the transfer "had nothing to relate back to" 9 and
was therefore voidable as a preference.
The court's reference to future advances appears to be inap-
propriate, as there is no indication in the opinion that the credi-
tors, who were attorneys retained by the bankrupt, had per-
formed services for it, or had contracted to do so, within the 4-
month period prior to the filing of the petition. It would necessar-
ily have been such services, or some other value passing from the
creditors to the bankrupt, and not a note passing from the bank-
rupt to the creditors, which might properly be characterized as a
"future advance." Even if the mortgage had been valid, therefore,
there could have been no relation back of note to mortgage. There
ie a more critical problem with the court's reasoning, however.
The incurring of the new obligation was not a parting with or
encumbering of the corporation's property. Consequently, it was
not a preferential transfer, as the term "transfer" is defined in
section 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act.3 " At best the giving of the
note constituted a fraudulent transfer,'3 with different conse-
quences and elements of proof.
Finally, the court held that when the accounting firm, to
improve its position as a secured creditor of the bankrupt, pur-
chased an assignment of yet another note and mortgage of the
bankrupt, with knowledge that the note was past due, it had
notice of the infirmity, was therefore not a holder in due course
under UCC section 3-302(1)(c), and could not recover on the in-
21 Id. at 829-30.
2 Id. at 830.
2, Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1966). That section defines "transfer" as
the sale and every other and different mode, direct or indirect, of disposing
of or parting with property or with an interest therein or with the possession
thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest therein . . . as a
conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbr-
ance, gift, security, or otherwise. . ..
" 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2) (1953). By definition, a fraudulent transfer includes the incur-
ring of an obligation.
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strument, presumably because it became subject to the personal
defense of invalidity.
32
II. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Port City State Bank v. American National Bank, 486 F.2d
196 (10th Cir. 1973)
Port City State Bank v. American National Bank3 3 construed
UCC section 4-108(2).34 The point at issue was whether the failure
of a payor bank's computer excused a late return3 of two disho-
nored checks. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court's find-
ing of justifiable delay, predicated on both an "emergency condi-
tion" and a "circumstance beyond the control of the bank," was
"in no way erroneous. ' '3 In support of its holding, the court as-
serted that the "statute is clear and unambiguous on its face,
'3 7
and that the views of the district court judge should carry "ex-
traordinary peruasive weight on appeal" because he was a resi-
dent of the state where the controversy arose.
38
While the equities may have favored the payor bank,3 Port
City State Bank is nevertheless a remarkably expansive reading
of section 4-108(2). An equipment failure is not typically regarded
as force majeure or an "Act of God,"' 0 and it is hardly accurate
to conclude that the computer failure was entirely "beyond the
control of the bank." Certainly the computer equipment was se-
lected by it for its use, was within its custody and physical con-
u 496 F.2d at 830. The invalidity of this third mortgage is not discussed in the
opinion, but it may be assumed that it too was executed by two of the corporation's
directors without the knowledge or knowing ratification of the third.
- 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-108(2) reads as follows:
Delay by collecting bank or payor bank beyond time limits prescribed or
permitted by this Act or by instructions is excused if caused by interruption
of communication facilities, suspension of payments by another bank, war,
emergency conditions or other circumstances beyond the control of the bank
provided it exercises such diligence as the circumstances require.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-302.
486 F.2d at 200.
37 Id.
n Id.
n Apparently a rural financial institution, the payor bank would have been accounta-
ble under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-302 for over $192,000 in late returns had the
delay not been excused. No policy basis requires its accountability, particularly in view
of its admitted diligence in seeking to correct the failure. 486 F.2d at 200.
" See, e.g., Gulf Oil v. Lemmons, 198 Okla. 596, 181 P.2d 568 (1947) (Act of God
means some inevitable accident which could not have been prevented by human care,
skill, and foresight, but which results exclusively from nature's cause, such as lightning,
tempest, and floods).
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trol, and was subject to maintenance by its operatives." If the risk
of "products liability" under article 4 is to be borne by the bank-
ing system as a whole, then it would seem that breakdowns of less
sophisticated pieces of equipment and other minor "emergen-
cies" should also act to excuse collecting and payor banks from
adherence to the time limits imposed. Whether such a conclusion
is consistent with efficient collections is questionable.
B. Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114
(10th Cir. 1974)
In Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp.,42 the
court affirmed the jurisdiction of the New Mexico district court,
as against an Oklahoma reorganization court, to determine ad-
verse claims of right in certain crude oil and its proceeds. These
were in the possession of a common carrier in New Mexico at the
time that the Oklahoma buyer was adjudicated bankrupt. In so
concluding, the circuit court relied upon two alternative theories.
First, it held that when the buyer "refused to accept" the carrier's
"tender" of oil conditioned upon the discharge of its lien for prior
deliveries, any title to the oil existing in the buyer revested, under
UCC section 2-401(4), 3 in the sellers." The reorganization court
thus could have no subsequent jurisdiction over the property or
its proceeds since, under section 111 of the Bankruptcy Act," they
were not "property of the debtor" at the time of the assertion of
jurisdiction." Second, the court held that, even if the buyer could
be described as having taken title to the oil, the sellers had validly
exercised their rights of stoppage in transitu, under UCC sections
" Cf. Sun River Cattle Co., Inc. v. Miner's Bank of Montana, 31 St. Rep. 44, 13 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1117, aff'd on rehearing, 521 P.2d 679 (Mont. 1974), in which a bank's normal
operating procedure of transporting checks by truck to a computer center three hours from
the bank was held insufficient, under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-108, to demonstrate
such diligence as the circumstances required where the truck and computer both malfunc-
tioned, resulting in late returns. But see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-108, Official
Comment 3, which includes, among the listed examples of emergency conditions and other
circumstances beyond the control of the bank, "abnormal operating conditions such as
substantial increased volume or substantial shortages of personnel during war or emer-
gency situations." Under appropriate circumstances, and properly plead, this might seem
to excuse the "abnormal operating condition" of a computer failure.
42 490 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1974).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401(4) reads:
A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the goods,
whether or not justified, ... revests title to the goods in the seller . ...
" 490 F.2d at 117.
- 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
" Cf. Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp., 492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974), text accompanying
notes 1-7 supra, which was decided on a similar theory.
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2-702(1) and 2-705, and reclamation, under section 2-702(2).'" In
support of this theory, the court observed that the 10-day period
following delivery within which demand for reclamation ordinar-
ily must be made'" did not apply since evidence of the buyer's
insolvency'-the dishonoring on account of insufficient funds of
a check it had issued to the sellers-also constituted a written
"misrepresentation of solvency" under UCC section 2-702(2).10
Although the holding appears just, the language of the deci-
sion raises certain questions. For example, there is no UCC provi-
sion entitling a seller or carrier, absent prior agreement,"' to con-
dition delivery of goods to even an insolvent buyer on payment
of an indebtedness on other contracts.52 Moreover, it has been
held that nonpayment alone is not a basis under section 2-401(4)
for a revesting of title in the seller. 3 Therefore, only if the buyer's
"rejection or other refusal""' extended specifically to receipt of
the goods, and not to the condition attached to their delivery, is
the court's revesting-of-title theory founded on Code law.5
" 490 F.2d at 117. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(2) reads:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after
the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the partic-
ular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limita-
tion does not apply ....
Because the New Mexico version of section 2-702(3) does not contain the words "lien
creditor," N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-2-702(3) (1962), no issue of bankruptcy law was raised
in Amoco. See In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974), discussed
in text accompanying notes 60-79, infra.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(2).
- Id. § 1-201(23).
490 F.2d at 117.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401(1).
52 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(1) allows such a condition only as to the deliv-
ery at hand and to "payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract."
(Emphasis added). Cf. § 2-507, which is similarly restricted. This codifies the right of a
common carrier at common law to a specific lien on goods involved in one transaction or
consignment only. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Leisk, 133 F.2d 79,81 (5th Cir. 1943); Hammer
Lumber Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 179 N.C. 359, 102 S.E. 508 (1920). At common law,
where a carrier delivered goods without collecting payment for charges against them, the
carrier's lien was waived. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 66 Ark. 266, 266 S.W.
82 (1924); 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 330 (1939). Of course, Amoco may have had a contract right
to assert and enforce its lien for charges incurred in connection with prior deliveries
against the crude oil presently in its possession, but this would not have justified the Code
interpretation expressed by the court.
" Jordan v. Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 156 N.W.2d 778 (1968); Underwood v. Common-
wealth, 390 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). Cf. Metropolitan Auto Sales Corp. v. Kone-
ski, 252 Md. 145, 249 A.2d 141 (1969).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401(4).
' On this point, the decision is equivocal. The court's recitation of the facts states
that "[ojn February 10, 1972, . . .Admiral [the buyer] refused to pay the lien claim
1975
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Similarly, the sellers' reclamation rights depend upon the
court's finding that a dishonored check, without more, consti-
tutes a written misrepresentation of solvency, and for this rule
there is no support in the case law.58 Theo. Hamm Brewing Co.
v. First Trust & Savings Bank,57 cited as authority by the court,
held instead that, under Illinois law, checks cannot be regarded
as a representation of solvency unless the seller treats them as
such, as in relying on them in its dealings with the buyer. Hamm
is thus typical of recent cases" which have read a common law
element of reliance into section 2-702(2). However, the Tenth
Circuit in Amoco did not consider the extent, if any, to which the
crude oil sellers, in making their February 1 shipment, relied
upon the buyer's check in payment of its December purchases."
and refused to accept the oil .... " (Emphasis added) 490 F.2d at 116. Other references
in the opinion, however, fail to make clear whether the buyer's refusal to accept delivery
of the goods was discrete and separate from its refusal to pay the lien claim. For instance,
the court concludes that "Admiral, when it refused on February 10, 1972, to accept the
tender of the crude oil from Amoco [the carrier] conditioned upon payment by Admiral
of Amoco's common carrier lien, caused thereby title to revest, if indeed it ever passed to
Admiral, in the oil producing sellers." Id. at 117 (emphasis added). More importantly,
since the crude oil was never transported to the buyer, but rather was held in storage at
or near the point of receipt from the sellers, id. at 114 and 116, it is unlikely that the buyer
was ever in a position, under section 2-401(4), to refuse to "receive or retain the goods
• or, in the paraphrase of the court, "to accept the tender . I... d  See UNIFoaM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(1)(c), which defines "receipt" as "taking physical possession."
" Neither the Code nor the Official Comments define what is meant by a "written
misrepresentation." Note that the sellers' reclamation rights also depend upon the court's
implicit, and perhaps mistaken, finding that the buyer had received the goods. See notes
47 and 55 supra.
'7 104 111. App. 2d 190, 242 N.E.2d 911 (1968).
5 In re Fairfield Elevator Co., Inc., 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 96 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (disho-
nored check may be a representation of solvency within the meaning of section 2-702(2),
but under Iowa law the payee must rely thereon as a representation of solvency with the
prudence of an ordinary businessman); In re Hardin, 485 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1972); In re
Haugabook Auto Co., Inc., 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1095 (M.D. Ga. 1971). Except for the
financial statement, the most generally accepted form of representation, In re Bel Air
Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1971), courts have been reluctant to bring other
writings within the language of the Code. See In re Regency Furniture, Inc., 7 UCC Rep.
Serv. 1381 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (purchase order indicating payment terms did not constitute
written representation of solvency by buyer); In re Units, Inc., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 46 (D.
Conn. 1965) (letter from bankrupt admitting it was unable to pay its bills as they matured,
and referring to its unbalanced inventory and a temporary bind, did not constitute a
written representation of solvency).
" Only the court's argument that the sellers had validly exercised their rights of
stoppage in transitu seems immune from criticism. In that event, however, despite Official
Comment 6 to section 2-705, it is unclear that title would have revested in the sellers so
as to deny the Oklahoma reorganization court's jurisdiction over the oil and its proceeds.
Official Comment 6, which has never been construed, states that:
After an effective stoppage under this section the seller's rights in the goods
are the same if he had never made a delivery.
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C. In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.
1974)
In re Colacci's of America, Inc.,60 joins the handful of federal
court cases6' which have considered the interrelation of section 2-
702(2) of the UCC,62 defining a defrauded seller's right of reclama-
tion, and section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,63 giving a trustee in
bankruptcy the power to avoid preferential transfers. Numerous
commentaries 4 have analyzed the inclusion in the official version
of section 2-702(3) of the term "lien creditor," 5 which appears to
make illusory the right of reclamation by bringing the provisions
of section 2-702 squarely into conflict with those of the Bank-
ruptcy Act." The court in Colacci's, in a well-written opinion,
avoids these theoretical problems by finding that no conflict be-
tween seller and trustee arose because no effective reclamation
ever was asserted.
The facts of the case illustrate the plight of the slothful seller.
Bar Control of Colorado sold restaurant equipment to Colacci's.
The terms agreed to were cash on delivery. After the equipment
490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974).
" In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d
820 (3d Cir. 1960); In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1968).
11 The court considers the Colorado version of this section, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
155-2-702 (Supp. 1965).
- 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
" See Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH. L. REv.
1281 n.2 (1967).
" Sixteen states, not including Colorado, have amended their versions of the Official
Code to delete the words "lien creditor" from section 2-702(3). 5C HART & WILL,
BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE T-39 (1973).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702 allows sellers, "subject to the rights of a...
lien creditor under this article (section 2-403)," upon discovery of the borrower's receipt
of goods on credit while insolvent, and on demand made within 10 days after receipt of
the goods, to reclaim them. Section 2-403 states that the rights of lien creditors are
governed by article 9. Section 9-301(3) defines "lien creditor" to include a trustee in
bankruptcy. Section 606 of the Bankruptcy Act empowers the trustee in bankruptcy to
avoid preferences made at a time when the transferee had reasonable cause to believe the
debtor to be insolvent. A preference is described in subdivision a(1) as a transfer of "any
property of a debtor" to a creditor for an antecedent debt suffered by such debtor while
insolvent and within 4 months before the filing by or against him of a petition in bank-
ruptcy. Transfers, defined in section 1(30) of the Act, need not be voluntary. Whether or
not property is "of a debtor" is determined by reference to state law, in particular to
section 2-401 of the UCC, which holds that title to goods under contract of sale passes to
the buyer at the time of delivery. Transfer of goods under section 60(2) of the Bankruptcy
Act occurs when the actual transfer becomes perfected as against subsequent lienors, or
immediately before the filing of the petition, whichever first occurs. A reclamation which
occurs at any time prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is therefore voidable as a
preference unless the seller's interest is superior to the rights of subsequent lienors.
1975
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had been delivered and installed, Colacci's agent revealed that
the restaurant could not pay for it. He said that Colacci's would
have the money in a couple of days. Bar Control's president re-
turned frequently and remonstrated over a period of months with
Colacci's, but was unsuccessful in obtaining payment. Finally,
following the formation of a creditors' committee, Bar Control
ordered the equipment removed. At the time of the removal,
Colacci's was clearly insolvent.
What began as a cash sale became, in the court's opinion, a
credit transaction. The buyer's conditional right to retain the
goods67 was waived when the seller failed to "follow up" his
rights." Among these was the right to retake the goods, for even
as a cash sale the "provision of [section 2-702] for a ten-day limit
within which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to
an insolvent buyer is also applicable here."6 Not later than 10
days after delivery, therefore, the seller having made no effort to
regain possession, title to the bar equipment vested in the buyer. 0
Consent to retention of the equipment without payment, the
court suggests, amounted to an extension of credit." In that
event, section 2-702(2) was directly applicable," and Bar Control
needed only to demonstrate the effectiveness of its demand,
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-507(2).
U Id., Official Comment 3. "Follow up" is defined by the court in Colacci's as a
"regaining of possession or a bona fide attempt to do so." 490 F.2d at 1121.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 507(2), Official Comment 3. Note that the language
of this Comment is an inaccurate paraphrase of § 2-702(2).
," See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401.
' See 490 F.2d at 1121. The court does not draw this connection explicitly, but it is
consistent with the provision of section 2-511, Official Comment 6 that the acceptance of
a check postdated by even one day is equivalent to a credit transaction. Case law, however,
is unclear on the effect of a deferral of payment in altering the terms of an agreed-upon
cash sale. One federal court, adopting the law of a jurisdiction which had enacted the
UCC, has concluded that "the fact that the delivery and payment were not exactly
simultaneous does not affect the nature of the transaction where the parties intended to
accomplish a cash sale." In re Smithdale Industries, 219 F. Supp. 862, 864 (E.D. Tenn.
1963). See also Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1951). But see In re Helms
Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 843 (W.D. Va. 1968). Here the parties' course of dealing,
which included a rejection in fact of the only method of cash payment discussed, appears
to support the court's conclusion that the seller acquiesced in a modification of the con-
tract of sale and thereby became a creditor.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(2) reads in part:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent, he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days
after the receipt. . . . Except as provided in this subsection, the seller may
not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent
misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
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within the 10 days after receipt, to reclaim. 3 Neither Colorado
nor any other state having defined "demand" in this context,7'
the court merely concludes that Bar Control's demands, if any,
during the first 10 days after receipt were to obtain payment
rather than to regain possession. 5 Therefore, no effective recla-
mation could have occurred, and the subsequent retaking consti-
tuted a preference voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy."
Notwithstanding the court's cautious approach, Bar Con-
trol's last argument is disposed of in language suggesting that,
even if a valid reclamation had occurred, it would have been
subject to avoidance. Bar Control asserted that, by retaking the
equipment, it had "cancelled" the sale agreement pursuant to
section 2-703(f). To this argument, the court countered:
The "cancellation" by retaking the goods could not be effective
because whatever the action is called, it was still a "transfer" within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act "for or on account of an antece-
dent debt" within four months of the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion."
After Colacci's, therefore, Colorado sellers not obtaining cash
on delivery would appear hard pressed to avail themselves as
against a trustee in bankruptcy of section 2-702(2) unless the
Tenth Circuit chooses to adopt the doctrine of In re Helms Veneer
Corp.7" There the seller obtained payment on a sale of $5,084 by
accepting a check, subsequently dishonored, for $4,000 and a
promise of future payment of the balance. The court concluded
that if the intent of the parties was to accomplish a cash transac-
tion, acceptance of a check in part payment did not convert it
into a credit sale.7" Whether and how far this doctrine might be
extended-absent convincing evidence that a credit transaction
was intended, could acceptance of $10 from an insolvent debtor
with a promise of the remaining $99,990 suffice?-is problemati-
cal.
3 Id.
7' 490 F.2d at 1121.
11 Id. The court also concludes, without necessity, that as a creditor Bar Control failed
to "follow up" its rights in the meaning of section 2-507, Official Comment 3.
,1 490 F.2d at 1121.
77 Id.
,1 287 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1968).
71 Id. at 844-45.
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IlI. CORPORATIONS
National Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Farrier
486 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1973)
The decision in National Equipment Leasing Corp. v.
Farriers in effect pierced a corporate veil. In reversing the district
court's entry of partial summary judgment against the appellant,
the Tenth Circuit implied that a leasing company was entitled to
recover on a claim under a lease agreement against the successor
of the lessee where a wholly-owned subsidiary of the successor,
two weeks after the dissolution of the lessee, adopted the lessee's
name and executed 10 of 12 schedules of leased equipment. The
schedules, the court found, had been appended to and incorpo-
rated by reference in the original lease contract.
In an opaque opinion, the court concluded that the successor
was bound on the underlying contract; that the schedules, while
not executed by the parties to the contract, as required therein,
created no liabilities apart from the contract; that the subsidiary
had held itself out as the lessee, and the leasing company, in
executing the schedules and extending credit, had relied on the
subsidiary's apparent identity as the original contracting party;
that the subsidiary had intended to become a party to the con-
tract; and that the parent-successor had affirmed its contract
obligations by attempting unlawfully to delegate them to the
subsidiary.
Much of the court's analysis may be misplaced. Perhaps the
appended schedules created no new liabilities,8" but they clearly
defined the successor's limits of liability under the contract. Just
as clearly, they were not in fact executed by both of the contract-
ing parties, their successors, or assigns."2 It is a questionable con-
486 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1973).
" See Guerini Stone Co. v. Carlin, 240 U.S. 264, 277 (1916); Rehart v. Clark, 448 F.2d
170 (9th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Grand Fraternity, 255 F. 929, 932 (8th Cir. 1919); Shanks
v. Wilson, 86 F. Supp. 789, 795 (S.D.W. Va. 1949). Although these cases stand generally
for the rule that exhibits are binding upon the parties only to the extent required by the
terms of the contract in which they are incorporated, "[tihe mere statement that the
exhibit is 'made a part' of the contract is not controlling." Johnson v. Grand Fraternity,
supra, at 933.
n "The lease agreement provided that the schedules made pursuant to the agreement
would ' . . . be attached hereto and to become a part hereof as same are executed from
time to time by the parties hereto.'" 486 F.2d at 260 (emphasis added). However, the
successor's subsidiary executed them. Moreover, because the court concluded that the
successor's attempted delegation of contract duties was unlawful, see text accompanying
note 89, infra, the subsidiary could not have been the successor's assignee.
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tract construction which ignores the expressed intent of the par-
ties813 to conclude that the successor is liable because appended
schedules are not contracts in themselves.84 By this logic, a mere
interloper, without even apparent authority, might effectively
bind a contracting party through the execution of an incorporated
document specifying key contract terms.
Similarly, the actions of the subsidiary in assuming the
identity of the lessee, or in evidencing its intention to become a
party to the contract,8s and of the leasing company in relying
thereon might be grounds to estop the subsidiary from denying
its liability under the contract." However, this would not be con-
sistent with the holding. To find the parent-successor liable, it
must be argued either that the subsidiary had no power or inten-
tion to act pursuant to the contract or that the exercise of any
such power operated by law to obligate the parent-successor.87
Because the court opts for a no-new-contract argument, 8 its dis-
cussion of what would be the basis for an estoppel is dicta.
The critical point in the court's analysis, therefore, is its
assertion that the change of the subsidiary's name demonstrates
the attempt of the parent-successor to delegate its contract du-
ties. Such a delegation, the court rightly concludes, was ineffec-
tive absent the consent of the leasing company.89 Having pre-
U See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Means, 382 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1967); Tenneco Oil Co.
v. Gaffney, 369 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1966); Texaco, Inc. v. Holsinger, 336 F.2d 230 (10th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); Century Refining Co. v. Hall, 316 F.2d 15
(10th Cir. 1963); Roosevelt Materials Co. v. Nolan Bros., Inc., 264 F.2d 807 (10th Cir.
1959).
" Whether the schedules were appendices or contracts is not dispositive of the issues.
Having concluded they were "amendments," the court might have considered whether or
not they were valid or enforceable. Here the expressed intention of the parties to the
contract was to limit the validity of schedules to those "executed . . . by the parties
hereto." The court considered the legal effect of the schedules only to establish that the
successor was the real party in interest.
1 As an evidentiary matter, the portion of each schedule quoted by the court hardly
appears to demonstrate that intent. More importantly, since the subsidiary was not a
party to the action, establishing intent in it to be bound serves no purpose within the
court's analysis of parent-successor liability.
" See Hillyer v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 348 F.2d 613, 623 (10th Cir. 1965); Glenn
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 5, 7 (10th Cir. 1965); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1958); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Buster, 241
F.2d 178, 183 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1957); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 218 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955); Yates v.
American Republics Corp., 163 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1947).
" This would follow, for example, if it could be shown that the subsidiary, in execut-
ing each schedule, had acted as the parent-successor's agent. Such an argument, however,
would raise troublesome questions of fact and law not addressed by the court.
See note 84 supra.
486 F.2d at 262, citing Saxe v. Feinstein, 366 Pa. 473, 77 A.2d 419 (1951). See also
1975
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viously determined that no separate contract liabilities had been
created in the subsidiary by virtue of its execution of the sched-
ules, the court thus concludes that the successor "remained obli-
gated for performance of all duties bargained for under the lease
agreement."o
These analytical difficulties might have been avoided had
the court been in a position to acknowledge the independent ac-
tion of the subsidiary in executing each schedule but to invoke
explicitly the instrumentality rule to bind the parent-successor
on any obligations thereby created or defined." As developed in
the Tenth Circuit, the rule makes a parent corporation responsi-
ble for the obligations of its subsidiary when "the subsidiary has
become its mere instrumentality." 2 Three elements must be
present to find "mere instrumentality": control, fraud or wrong,
and unjust loss or injury to the claimant." Control and injury
were apparent in National Equipment, and although fraud or
wrong was implied by the court as the reason for the name
change, there is no question that that element also was capable
of proof. Not only is there support in the case law for a finding of
fraud on the facts presented, 94 but at the time of the name change
and at all times during the proceeding, the use of the name of a
defunct corporation by its former shareholders doing business in
Texas was a violation of the Texas penal code. 5 As the last share-
Chappel v. Winslow, 144 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1944); Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp.-v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 658 (1939);
Thomas-Bonner Co. v. Hooven, Owens & Renthschler Co., 284 F. 386 (6th Cir. 1922). Until
now, the familiar rule that a personal service contract may not be assigned without the
consent of the obligee has apparently not been adopted or applied in the Tenth Circuit.
w 486 F.2d at 262.
"l The elements of the instrumentality rules were not plead by the appellant's attor-
neys.
" Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 96 F.2d 693, 704 (10th Cir. 1938), rev 'd on other
grounds, 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
* Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160 (7th Cir. 1963).
* See Associated Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P.2d 940 (1933)
("similarity in names of 'Seiberling Rubber Company' and 'The Seiberling Rubber Com-
pany,' and commingling of business operations, is a fraud upon plaintiff suing on a guar-
anty contract, entitling plaintiff to treat the two corporations as a single entity"); Graves
v. District Grand Lodge, 161 Ga. 110, 129 S.E. 783 (1925); Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Central
Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Mich. 554, 267 N.W. 733 (1936); Grand Temple and Tabernacle v.
Independent Order, 44 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1932).
" The former penal code read:
In all cases in which the charter or right to do business of any private corpo-
ration heretofore or hereafter chartered under the laws of this State. . . shall
have been or shall hereafter be forfeited it shall be unlawful for any person
or persons who .were or shall be stockholders or officers of such corporation
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holder of the dissolved lessee, therefore, the successor corporation
may have committed a criminal wrong if it continued to "do
business" in Texas under the lessee's name.
The holding in National Equipment turned on an unstated
recognition of inequity. Had this recognition been defined in
terms of the subsidiary's instrumentality, the court might have




Stevens v. Rock Springs National Bank, 497 F.2d 307
(10th Cir. 1974)
Littlefield v. Flanagan, 498 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1974)
The Tenth Circuit considered the Truth in Lending Act" in
two 1974 cases. Each sought to define the time of a violation of
the Act's disclosure requirements such as to commence the run-
ning of the statute of limitations on civil actions. 7 In Stevens v.
Rock Springs National Bank,"' the court implied that a general
disclosure violation may occur, and the 1-year statute of limita-
tions contained in section 1640(e) of the Act may begin to run,"
only upon the execution of the credit contract. Neither the Act
nor Regulation Z defines "violation" or when a violation occurs,
but the court pointed out'00 that both mandate that the required
disclosures be made before each credit transaction is "consum-
at the time of such forfeiture to do business within this State in or under the
corporate name of such corporation ....
Vernon's Ann. P.C., Art. 141 (repealed by Acts 1973, 63d Leg., p. 991, ch. 399, § 3(a),
effective January 1, 1974).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1974). For further
discussion of the Truth in Lending Act see 1 CCH CoNsUMER CREDrr GulmE 1001-3995
(1971); 1 P-H CONSUMER AND COMMECAL CEDrr-INSTALLMENT SALES TT 9001-10,211
(1964). For a helpful appendix of all Truth in Lending Act cases, indexed by issue through
the publication date of the article, see Garwood, Truth in Lending-a Regulator's View,
29 Bus. LAWYER 193, 201 (1973).
'1 The Truth in Lending Act contains two penalty provisions: 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970)
establishes a general civil remedy of damages and attorney's fees; 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970)
provides for rescission of certain real property transactions. For a discussion of these
remedies see Truth in Lending Act-Civil Liability, 11 ALR Fed. 815 (1972).
- 497 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1974).
" The subsection in full reads:
(e) Any action under this section may be brought in any United States
district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction within one year
from the date of the occurrence of the violation.
'® 497 F.2d at 310.
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mated."'' If disclosures must be made prior to consummation
but otherwise at no particular time, then consummation must be
the earliest that a violation can occur. The District of Columbia
Circuit has so held.
02
This does not define the time of a violation or rule out the
possibility of a continuing disclosure violation. The Sixth Circuit
confronted this issue in Wachtel v. West, 03 where the complaint
was filed 18 months after the execution of the credit contract. The
court in Wachtel decided that a continuing violation is not con-
templated for section 1640 damages, 0 4 and that the action there-
fore was barred. The Tenth Circuit in Stevens"5 agreed with the
analysis of Wachtel, and concluded that a violation occurs at one
specific time from which the statute will run.'
Although it appears reasonable to infer that the "specific
time" of a violation is simultaneous with the execution of the
credit contract, the Tenth Circuit did not expressly reach that
conclusion. The court merely states "[W]e must hold that . . .
no violation can occur until such a credit contract is executed."'
This seems to imply that the violation could occur at a later time.
That no such implication was intended is borne out by the court's
adjudication of the Stevens' claim. 08 The court agreed with the
"I Disclosures must be made "before the credit is extended," 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b)
(1970), or "before the transaction is consummated," 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1974). Consum-
mation is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(cc) (1974) as follows:
A transaction shall be considered consummated at the time a contractual
relationship is created between a creditor and a customer irrespective of the
time of performance of either party.
In Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp., 477 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The plaintiff-
consumer argued that the required disclosures ought to be made in advance of a real estate
closing to give the consumer time to shop for better terms. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff had a reasonable policy argument but
concluded that the Act did not require disclosures at any particular time prior to closing.
Thus disclosure could be made in the last instant before the parties completed the closing.
In 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1973).
"0 Id. at 1064-65, where the Sixth Circuit states:
It thus appears that a credit transaction which requires disclosures under the
Act is completed when the lender and borrower contract for the extension of
credit. The disclosures must be made sometime before this event occurs. If
the disclosures are not made, this violation of the Act occurs, at the latest,
when the parties perform their contract. The provisions with respect to the
right of rescission seem to contemplate a continuing violation when the dis-
closures are not made, but such is not the case when damages are sought.
IN 497 F.2d at 309. The court specifically refrained from adopting the Sixth Circuit's
reference to the date of "performance" as the date of violation.
106 Id.
"I Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
11 The Hinkles, the other named plaintiffs, executed their credit contract less than
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district court that the 1-year period had run as to the Stevens
barring their action, which was filed 20 months after the execu-
tion of their credit contract. This suggests that the violation, as
to the Stevens, occurred when the credit contract was executed.
Support for this interpretation is contained in Littlefield v.
Flanagan,'" handed down a few weeks later, where the court de-
cided that Stevens disposed of the section 1640 claim of Little-
field because "the action was brought more than one year after
the consummation of the transaction.
'" 110
Littlefield, now superceded by statute, was a case of first
impression at the federal appellate level. The issue was whether
an action for rescission under section 1635"' was barred by the 1-
year statute of limitations contained in section 1640(e). The court
decided that since the 1-year statute of limitations in section
1640(e) was limited to "[any action under this section," and
since the rescission remedy in section 1635 was not limited by the
section's own terms if proper disclosures were not made,"' the
violation remained a continuing one until the required disclosures
were made."' The holding followed logically from the wording and
structure of the statute, but it created an uncertainty regarding
possible unexpired rights of rescission with the further conse-
quence that the titles to many residential real estate properties
might have become clouded."'
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System early
recognized the merchantability of title problem the statute pre-
sented and recommended to Congress that the right to rescind be
limited to 3 years."' Congress enacted the recommendation, along
with a number of other amendments to the Truth in Lending Act,
and the President signed the measure into law on October 28,
one year before the action was filed. The circuit court therefore reversed the district court's
dismissal of their action and remanded for further proceedings.
498 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1974).
110 Id. at 1136.
m For further details on rescission see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1974); CCH
CoNsUi.m CREDIT GUIDE: J 1800-80 (1971).
" Subsection 1635(a) gives the obligor the right to rescind
until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the
transaction or the delivery of the disclosures required under this section and
all other material disclosures required under this part, whichever is later
11 Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1973) (dictum).
"I FRB, Annual Report to Congress on Truth in Lending for the Year 1973, in 271




1974.1li Effective that date, the statute of limitations for section
1635 became 3 years from the consummation of the transaction
or the sale of the property, whichever happens first."7 Presently,
then, the time of a Truth in Lending Act violation should be the
same for sections 1635 and 1640; that is, a violation will occur, if
at all, at the consummation. of the credit transaction."'
James D. Geyer
V. BRIEFLY NOTED
In Amerine National Corp. v. Denver Feed Co. ,"' the court
properly found that an agreement for the sale of turkeys, where
its express terms were in dispute, should be construed in the
context of a well-established course of dealing between the par-
ties.
The opinion in Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Invest-
ment Co. 20 rejected a shotgun assault on the nonpayment by
mortgage lenders of interest on funds escrowed to pay taxes and
similar charges.' 2' Acknowledging the extensive recent litigation
of this point, 22 however, the court reversed the lower court's
granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dant lenders and remanded for further discovery on an anti-trust
claim.
" Pub. L. No. 93-495 (Oct. 28, 1974).
"7 The amendment to section 1635, a new subsection, reads as follows:
(f) An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of
consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever
occurs earlier, notwithstanding the fact that the disclosures required under
this section or any other material disclosures required under this chapter
have not been delivered to the obligor.
m Real estate closings may be a possible exception. Section 209 of the 1974 amend-
ments (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1631), effective October 28, 1975, gives the Federal Reserve
Board the authority to require disclosures earlier than the closing, thereby making possi-
ble a violation before consummation.
493 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1974).
' 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974).
"2 The complaint alleged breach of trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Truth
in Lending Act, and violation of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 591.
'2 Id. at 592.
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Considerations of constitutional law play a significant role in
the organic growth of the law. Those considerations have been
primarily responsible for identifying and defining the scope of
individual liberties and for delineating the powers and obligations
of government.
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
responded to a number of cases which dealt with personal free-
doms. Some involved direct and explicit impingements upon the
rights of a few individuals; others involved the evaluation and
reconciliation of larger societal values and interests. The court
extended constitutional protection to a group of college instruc-
tors whose contracts were not renewed because of personality
conflicts with the school administration' and to five anti-war
demonstrators whose freedom of expression had been circum-
scribed.2 Another of the continuing assaults on a woman's quali-
fied right to elect to have an abortion was resolved favorably for
the three women plaintiffs.' And the Tenth Circuit remanded
three obscenity decisions4 to the trial court for reconsideration in
light of Miller v. California.5
Of particular significance are the decisions evaluating rela-
tively recent attempts to redefine the rights of large groups of
Americans. The Tenth Circuit's decision requiring a New Mexico
school district to provide its Spanish surnamed students with
bilingual education' is one of the first judicial responses to the
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court of less than a year ago man-
dating similar action in a California school district.7 The court
also considered one of the growing number of assaults being made
against charitable service organizations which restrict member-
ship only to males.8
Both the extent and the limitation of governmental powers
were scrutinized by the court in other cases. The constitutional
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973).
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Ewing, 491 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harding,
491 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1973).
413 U.S. 15 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881.
* Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d
883 (10th Cir. 1974).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
validity of the Denver sign code was resolved to uphold the mu-
nicipal action, but the court recognized that the exercise of that
governmental function and right was not without limitation., The
role of judicial review in military actions provided two important
decisions for the inservice conscientious objector."
The construction of the Constitution and the resolution of
constitutional issues and questions are "always open to discus-
sion when [they are] supposed to have been founded in error."'"
The sophisticated growth of our fundamental law is nurtured and
sustained by that discussion.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974)
This controversy, involving first amendment rights, arose by
virtue of the dismissal of 14 employees from the Oklahoma Col-
lege of Liberal Arts.' Prior to these dismissals, the college had
undergone serious difficulties including divisions among the fac-
ulty, financial troubles, a decline in enrollment, and the place-
ment of the school on probation as an accredited institution.! The
former president left because of these problems and the new pres-
ident, Dr. Bruce Carter, was hired to improve a situation which
he described as "very bad, very critical."'
To accomplish this task, Carter decided to retain only those
employees whom he felt the administration could "live with" and
not rehire those "who were devisive [sic] . . . who would not
cooperate . . . who would not work" with him and the adminis-
tration.' He identified 11 faculty members and 3 administrative
officials as being divisive and recommended to the Board of Re-
gents that the contracts of the 14 not be renewed. After the Board
accepted this recommendation, the dismissed employees initi-
ated an action in federal district court.
5
1 Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973).
0 Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974) and Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307
(10th Cir. 1973).
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting).
The college is a state operated institution controlled by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§§ 3601-06 (1972). Located at Chickasha, it was originally accredited in 1920 and, with
913 students, the primary area of study at the college is teacher education. AaEoucAN
COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, ACCREDITED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1969-1970, at 86
(1969).
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1109 (10th Cir. 1974) (Seth, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1099 (Appendix).
Id. at 1100 (Appendix).
The claims were brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970) which provides
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In their complaint, the employees alleged that the termina-
tions were improper in that they resulted from the exercise by the
plaintiffs of their first amendment rights of expression and asso-
ciation. The district court ruled against the dismissed employees,
holding that the terminations were unconnected with the employ-
ees' exercise of first amendment rights.6
I. THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed the trial court with Chief Judge Lewis and Judges Seth
and Barrett dissenting.7 Judge Doyle, writing for the majority,
found that because the district court "adopted the conclusion of
President Carter that the plaintiffs were 'divisive' and that this
was the cause of the conflict and the firings,"' the findings of the
trial court "must be considered out of harmony with the evidence
and clearly erroneous." 9
According to the majority, the reason for the dismissal was
not the plaintiffs' divisiveness, but rather their refusal to conform
to the loyalty and obedience demanded from them by Dr. Carter.
The court said:
Dr. Carter demanded absolute loyalty, required faculty members to
come in and visit with him, prohibited their discussing problems of
the college among themselves and prohibited their having informal
discussions with students, for if they did any of these things they
were considered by Carter to be "divisive." . . . Thus, we conclude
that, in exercising their right to freely associate with others and to
criticize the administration . . .and in refusing to submit to the
exercise of control over them, the plaintiffs were fired. 0
Because the classification of the plaintiffs as divisive was so arbi-
trary," their dismissal on that basis was a violation of their first
amendment rights."
for declaratory relief, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides relief for deprivation of
civil rights under color of state law.
1 501 F.2d at 1092. The dismissal of one of the employees, Professor Rampey, was held
by the district court to be improper because he had acquired tenure and was entitled to a
hearing. Id. at 19 n.5. The other professors did not acquire tenure because it was abolished
by the Board of Regents in May 1972. In abolishing tenure, the Board was acting against
the intention of the legislature which contemplated that the Board would "[e]stablish
and maintain plans for tenure. . . of employees at the Oklahoma College of Liberal Arts."
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 3606(k) (1972).
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974).
I d. at 1097.
I ld. at 1099. In his dissent, Judge Barrett strongly disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. See note 23 infra.
,0 Id. at 1096 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1099.
In Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1966), the plaintiff was dis-
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The first amendment rights that were infringed upon by the
dismissals were not, however, clearly identified by the court. Be-
cause the majority believed that the impermissible restrictions on
these rights resulted from the attempted domination by Dr.
Carter over the fired employees, it ruled that "the right to be free
from this kind of personality control is a constitutionally pro-
tected right under the First Amendment since it is a species of
expression."13 The firings, which were based on the employees'
exercise of their right to be free from personality control, infringed
upon their first amendment rights and were, therefore, invalid. 4
II. FIsRT AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN Rampey
In Rampey, the court identifies freedom from personality
control as a constitutionally protected form of expression. In so
concluding, has the court created a new first amendment right
from freedom of expression? What limitations are placed by the
court on freedom from personality control? Has it expanded the
protection heretofore afforded nontenured teachers?
A. Freedom of Expression and Association in Relation to Free-
dom from Personality Control
1. Freedom of Expression
Judge Seth, in his dissent, objects to the majority's conclu-
sion that first amendment rights are involved in Rampey. His
criticism of the majority is based on the court's inability to point
to "specific incidents or criticism [or a] specific exercise of free
speech."' 5 The dismissed employees did allege, however, a link
between their termination and a press conference held two days
prior to the announcement of the nonrenewal of their contracts."
In respect to this allegation, Rampey is similar to other cases
charged, in part, because of her "disagreements with her Principal." The court said that
the dismissal on this basis was improper, but the reason given was not the infringement
of first amendment rights, even though the dismissal was caused by her civil rights activi-
ties. Instead, the court invalidated the dismissal because it was arbitrary and capricious.
" Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974).
" The court cited Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), as support for the
proposition that a person cannot be fired for reasons that infringe his constitutionally
protected rights. Even though there was a showing that first amendment rights were
impaired by the dismissals, the court did not consider the possibility that a hearing might
be required before the employment of the teachers was terminated. For a discussion of
how Sindermann, when read with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), might
require such a hearing, see Shulman, Employment of Nontenured Faculty: Some Implica-
tions of Roth and Sindermann, 51 DENvER L.J. 215 (1974).
Is Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1107 (10th Cir. 1974) (Seth, J., dissenting).
"6 Brief for Appellant at 14, Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974).
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involving dismissed teachers in which there is an attempt to es-
tablish an unconstitutional nexus between the dismissals and
specific exercises of the right of expression." A failure to establish
a link of this nature has been sufficient to sustain the nonrenewal
of the contract." In Moore v. Winfield City Board of Education,"
for example, the plaintiff alleged that her termination was the
result of a speech she made criticizing the school board; this
speech "emerged as the principal issue" in the case. 0 The court
concluded in Moore that the nonrenewal of her contract was not
motivated by this speech and the other reasons advanced for the
termination of her employment were sufficient to sustain the
school's action.
2'
The plaintiffs in Rampey failed to establish a link between
their press conference and the nonrenewal of their contracts. 22
Despite this failure, the Tenth Circuit did not sustain the dis-
missals.23 Instead the court looked beyond a single incident to a
series of incidents involving expression. These incidents, taken
individually, would not constitute expression, but by joining
these separate incidents of "dissent, criticism or disagreement"
" See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (public criticisms of Regents'
policies and testimony before a legislative hearing); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968) (letter critical of school board written to newspaper); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d
334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2604 (1973) (teacher involvement in political
activities); Gieringer v. Center School Dist., 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 832 (1973) (impromptu report critical of administration); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d
928 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1972) (criticism of curriculum); Hostrop v. Board
of Educ., 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973) (public circulation
of confidential memo); Russo v. Center School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 932 (1972) (symbolic protest of the Viet Nam war); Duke v. North Texas State
University, 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973) (public criticism
of school); Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130
(1973) (participation in anti-Viet Nam war rallies).
18 See, e.g., Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974).
19 452 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1971).
11 Id. at 727.
11 Id.
22 Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1091 (10th Cir. 1974). It was clear from testimony
given at trial that the list of those who would not be rehired was compiled 2 days prior to
the day the press conference was held.
23 It was on this point that Judge Barrett strongly disagreed with the majority. He
felt that the only first amendment issue Rampey raised was whether the plaintiffs were
dismissed because of the press conference. Since it was clear from the evidence that the
press conference was not the cause, Judge Barrett thought that the trial court's findings
should be sustained in that they were not clearly erroneous. In his opinion, the majority
was substituting its conclusion as to how the trial court should have decided the case. To
do this, Judge Barrett said, was a clear abuse of the role of an appellate court. See Zenith
Co. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364 (1948).
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together, the court found an infringement of first amendment
rights.2" The infringement was not upon the right of expression
per se, but rather upon a "species of expression.""5 This species
of expression was identified by the court as freedom from person-
ality control.
2. Freedom of Association
The court suggests in Rampey that the plaintiffs were fired,
in part, for "exercising their right to freely associate with oth-
ers." 2 The court points out that Carter "considered that the
group as a whole was 'divisive' because they associated together"
and they refused to join certain teacher organizations which
Carter asked them to join."
Freedom of association, which is a form of expression pro-
tected by the first amendment, 8 is usually asserted to protect
organizations from state interference, 2 individuals who belong to
certain organizations,30 and the right of individuals to organize for
political purposes.3' In McLaughlin v. Tilendis,32 for example, the
Eighth Circuit did not sustain the nonrenewal of a teacher's con-
tract because the action, which was based on his association with
a union, was found to be an unconstitutional infringement of his
first amendment rights.3
The rights of association involved in Rampey are not so clear.
There was no formal organization to which the 14 belonged, but
rather there was a vague assertion by Dr. Carter that the fired
employees tended to associate only with each other. Similarly,
the dismissed employees were classified as divisive not because
they joined an organization, but rather because they refused to
join the ones Carter wished them to associate with. The court is




n Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
n See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
' See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
31 See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972).
- 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). For other cases involving a teacher's right of associa-
tion, see Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Doherty v.




protecting freedom of association, but the form of association
protected is a freedom to refuse "to conform to . . .patterns and
molds" imposed upon one 4.3 Therefore, freedom from personality
control seems to contain elements of freedom of association.
B. Limitations on Freedom from Personality Control
The majority in Rampey recognizes that freedom from per-
sonality control is not an absolute right and is subject to the
balancing test of Pickering v. Board of Education.35 In Pickering,
which involved the dismissal of a teacher for writing a letter to a
newspaper, the Court balanced the "conflicting claims of First
Amendment protection and the need for orderly school adminis-
tration.""6 In doing so, the following factors were considered by
the Court: the need to maintain discipline and harmony among
coworkers; the need for confidentiality in a relationship between
a teacher and an administrator; the personal loyalty and confid-
ence needed for the proper functioning of the school; the danger
that conflict and controversy would embroil the school; and the
possibility that the teacher's exercise of first amendment rights
would impede his performance in the classroom or interfere with
the operation of the school generally.
37
In Rampey the court considered some of the tests identified
in Pickering. The majority found that there was "no evidence
that the appellants constituted any threat to the operation of the
college; ' 3 there was no "threat to the valid authority of President
Carter; '39 and there was no need for "personal loyalty or devo-
tion" in this case.' 0 In balancing the teachers' interest in freedom
from personality control against the state's interest in the orderly
administration of the school, the Rampey court did not consider
the need to maintain discipline or harmony among coworkers or
the extent of the controversy that was embroiling the campus.
The reason why these factors were not considered is not stated;"
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974).
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
M Id. at 569.
For an application of the balancing test outlined in Pickering, see Clark v. Holmes,
474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Duke v. North Texas State
University, 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974).
"Id.
aId.
" But in Moore v. Winfield City Bd. of Educ., 452 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1971), the court
held that, even if speech had played a part in the teacher's dismissal, the constitutionally
protected right to comment on school activities was limited and was to be balanced
against orderly school administration.
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but because freedom from personality control by its nature cre-
ates controversy and disharmony, it may be the court felt that
these factors should not be weighed against the individual's right
to be free from control of his personality.
III. CONCLUSION
Freedom from personality control, as defined by the Tenth
Circuit in Rampey v. Allen, is a first amendment right derived
from the constitutional protection afforded to association and
expression. The boundaries of this new species of expression are
vague, but they appear to encompass the forms of expresssion and
association that arise in the ordinary, day-to-day interaction of
individuals working together.4 2 The protection given by this right
is broader than that afforded by expression or association alone.
In cases arising before other circuits, a showing of an unconstitu-
tional link between the dismissal and a specific incident involving
expression was required before the court would reverse the action
of the school.43 Rampey does not require this type of link. Rather
than having to show a specific incident that caused the nonrene-
wal, the plaintiff need show only a series of separate events which,
taken together, evidence an atomosphere that repressed the indi-
vidual's right to be free from personality control.
The security of professors and teachers at public schools is
enhanced by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Rampey because
these members of the academic community need no longer fear
that their contracts will not be renewed because of a personality
conflict with their superior. This broad protection, however, may
not be as salutary as it appears. The Rampey decision ignores the
interest of the state in operating "a college in a manner in which
its elected and appointed officials think will best serve its state
interests." 4 The protection given to the employees, moreover,
may effectively limit the discretion of school administrators to
42 In his dissent, Judge Seth questions whether freedom from personality control
should be given constitutional protection:
The majority is substituting tenure reasons for a constitutional right. This
is innovative and would perhaps serve a worthwhile purpose. It could serve
as a protection against terminations based on "inability to conform to the
image of the president" of the school .... This type of protection from
"personality control" has a great deal to recommend it, and it would appear
that the various state tenure laws have something like this in view. Thus
perhaps we should subscribe to such a concept, but I am unable to fit it into
the protections afforded by the First Amendment to the Constitution . . ..
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1107 (10th Cir. 1974) (Seth, J., dissenting).
43 See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
"' Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1110 (10th Cir. 1974) (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
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select what they consider to be the best possible staff if personal-
ity conflict can be alleged to frustrate justified nonrenewal of
contracts.
B. United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Gourley 5 arose from the conviction of five
anti-war demonstrators who, after being issued "bar letters" by
the commander of the Air Force Academy, reentered the base in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382.46 The crucial question considered
by the Tenth Circuit was whether the five defendants could chal-
lenge their convictions on the grounds that the issuance of the bar
letters infringed their constitutional rights of free speech.
To resolve this issue, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
holding in Flowers v. United States." In that case a leafleteer was
convicted for entering a military base after a letter barring his
entry had been issued. In reversing his conviction, the Court said:
Whatever power the authorities may have to restrict general access
to a military facility . . . here the fort commander chose not to
exclude the public from the street where petitioner was arrested
Under such circumstances the military has abandoned any
claim that it has special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes
leaflets on the avenue. The base commandant can no more order
petitioner off this public street because he was distributing leaflets
than could the city police order any leafleteer off any public street
The First Amendment protects petitioner from the application
of § 1382 under conditions like those of this case.'"
A challenge to a conviction under section 1382 could be based on
the validity of the bar letter issued by the commander of the base.
To be constitutional, the bar letters restricting entry to the mili-
tary base can be issued only if the base is one closed to the public
and, in cases applying Flowers, this is the critical issue."
45 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973).
41 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970) provides in part:
Whoever reenters or is found within any . . . reservation, post, fort,
arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been removed therefrom
or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge
thereof-
Shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.
' 407 U.S. 197 (1972).
Id. at 198.
" See, e.g., Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973); McGaw v. Farrow, 472
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In Gourley the Tenth Circuit found that even though "the
Academy [had been] declared a closed base," the open nature
of the areas where the defendants were arrested-the football
stadium and the Academy Chapel-outweighed this formal dec-
laration and the Academy was open to the public 1° Because of
this, "the letters [could not] serve as a basis for the charges" and
the convictions were reversed.'
Charles P. Leder
II. EQUAL PROTECTION-BILINGUAL EDUCATION
Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,
499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974)
In 1972 the Federal District Court for New Mexico found that
a school district which failed to teach English to non-English
speaking Spanish surnamed students' had violated the students'
equal protection right and statutory right' to be free from discrim-
ination in a program receiving federal financial assistance. As a
remedy the court ordered bilingual-bicultural education.3
Significantly, plaintiffs in Serna v. Portales Municipal
F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1973); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir.), application for stay of
judgment denied, 409 U.S. 971 (1972).
'o United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1973).
' Id. at 788.
As used by the district court and the court of appeals, "Spanish surnamed" refers
to Mexican Americans or Chicanos. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICAN
EDUCATION STUDY, ETHNIC ISOLATION OF MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE PUBuc SCHOOLS oF THE
SOUTHWEST, REPORT I at 7 n.1 (1971).
As of 1972 there were 5.3 million Mexican Americans in the United States, 87 percent
of whom lived in the 5 Southwestern States of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico,
and Texas. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES:
MARCH 1972 AND 1971, P-20, No. 250 at 1 (1973).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970):
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
T. ANDERSON & M. BOYER, 1 BILINGUAL SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (1970)
(prepared under contract with HEW):
[W]hat is bilingual schooling? We take as our working definition that . . .
"Bilingual education is instruction in two languages and the use of those two
languages as mediums of instruction for any part or all of the school curricu-
lum. Study of the history and culture associated with a student's mother
tongue is considered an integral part of bilingual education."
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Schools4 did not allege de jure segregation,5 and no such finding
was made. Prior to this case, no school district had been ordered
to implement bilingual-bicultural education absent a finding of
de jure segregation.'
Spanish surnamed students accounted for 26 percent of the
enrollment in the Portales school system.7 Many of these students
spoke Spanish at home and had an English language deficiency
when they entered school.' Classroom instruction in Portales
schools was conducted solely in English.
As a group, Spanish surnamed students scored lower on
achievement tests, given solely in English, than did their Anglo
classmates. In the elementary school with an 86 percent Spanish
surnamed enrollment, these students fell increasingly further
behind their Anglo classmates on intelligence quotient tests as
they moved from the first to the fifth grades. As these disparities
grew, so did disparities in attendance and dropout rates. These
were undisputed facts.'
Prior to this suit, the defendant school district had not taken
any steps to meet the special educational needs of these stu-
499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974), aff'g in part 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972).
It is the similarity of these programs which is the crux of plaintiffs' claim of
inequality of educational opportunity.
351 F. Supp. at 1281.
1 As part of a desegregation plan to dismantle de jure segregated schools, bilingual-
bicultural education was ordered in United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex.
1970), modified, 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971),
application for stay denied, sub nom. Edgar v. United States, 404 U.S. 1206 (1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); connected cases, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd,
466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972); 356 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1250 (5th
Cir. 1974).
1 At the elementary school level, 34 percent of all students were Spanish surnamed.
In one elementary school, 86 percent of the enrollment was Spanish surnamed. In the other
3 elementary schools, 78 to 88 percent of the students were Anglos. Junior high enrollment
was 29 percent Spanish surnamed. Only 17 percent of the high school students were
Spanish surnamed. 499 F.2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir. 1974).
The term "limited English-speaking ability", when used with refer-
ence to an individual, means-
(B) individuals who come from environments where a language other
than English is dominant. . . and, by reason thereof, have difficulty speak-
ing and understanding instruction in the English language.
Bilingual Education Act § 703(a)(1), Act of August 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 105,
88 Stat. 484, amending 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970). [This amendment was enacted subse-
quent to the decision by the court of appeals in Serna. It evidences greater congressional
commitment to bilingual education than the 1968 Act. Unless otherwise noted, all refer-
ences are to the 1968 Act as existing at the time of the decision by the court of appeals.]
1 499 F.2d at 1149-50.
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dents.10 The defendant was a recipient of federal financial assis-
tance. Based upon this evidence, the district court found a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause and a violation of section 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
The defendant's appeal in Serna was pending when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Lau v. Nichols." Chinese speaking stu-
dents in Lau had alleged equal protection and section 601 viola-
tions identical to those of plaintiffs in Serna. In finding a section
601 violation, the Supreme Court observed that failure to teach
the English language to non-English speaking students, while all
courses were taught in English, had the "effect" of discrimination
"even though no purposeful design [to discriminate] is pres-
ent.' 3 Having found a statutuory right and violation, the Su-
preme Court declined to consider the alleged equal protection
violation."'
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Serna adopted the
20 The defendant had not accepted state funds for bilingual education nor had it
applied for funds under the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970).
" Mexican Americans are an identifiable group for purposes of discrimination prohib-
ited on the basis of race, color, or national origin. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S.
189, 197 (1973); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S.D.
Tex. 1970).
12 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
I3 ld. at 568.
' There apparently was some confusion as to whether the constitutional authority for
Congress to enact section 601 was founded on the equal protection clause or on the general
welfare clause. The amicus curiae brief of the United States argued:
Title VI, although written in equal protection terms, is neither depen-
dent upon, nor necessarily coincident with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather it is grounded on the general authority
of the federal government to place reasonable restrictions upon the use of
federal funds by the recipients.
Thus, the application of Title VI here does not depend upon the outcome
of the equal protection analysis. Pursuant to the power of Congress to "pro-
vide (in its expenditures) for the * * * general Welfare of the United States
* * " (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 1), enhanced like all other
congressional powers by Article I's "necessary and proper" clause, the stat-
ute independently proscribes the conduct challenged by the petitioners and
provides a discrete basis for injunctive relief.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)
(footnote omitted).
In fact this appears to be the approach adopted by Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for
the Court in Lau:
The Federal Government has power to fix the terms on which its money
allotments to the States shall be disbursed. Whatever may be the limits of
that power, they have not been reached here.
414 U.S. at 569 (citations omitted).
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same approach in reviewing the district court's decision.' 5 The
court of appeals' decision was limited to finding a section 601
violation with no comment being made on the equal protection
argument. This limitation had no adverse effect upon the relief
granted.
Four primary issues were considered by the court of appeals
in Serna.'6 First, the defendant argued that its failure to provide
compensatory English instruction to Spanish surnamed non-
English speaking students did not violate the students' equal
protection right. Second, it was argued that such conduct by the
defendant did not violate the students' section 601 right. Third,
the defendant contended, assuming some right had been violated,
that the district court had exceeded its authority in the relief
granted. Fourth, as amicus curiae, the New Mexico State Board
of Education asked if a decision favorable to the plaintiffs would
require bilingual-bicultural education whenever there was one
student in a school district who did not understand English.
I. EQuAL PROTECTION
Most of the legal literature examining the rights of non-
English speaking students has focused on the equal protection
argument. The underlying assumption is that an equal protection
right, if recognized, would offer the greatest protection. 7 Not-
withstanding the merits of this argument, it would seem that the
Supreme Court foreclosed this approach in Lau. Equal protection
clearly was before the Court, and just as clearly the Court avoided
it.
At the present time, it seems that equal protection is not
favored by the Supreme Court as a means for exploring or finding
"new" fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. In
499 F.2d at 1153.
"The defendant also challenged the plaintiffs' standing and suitability as class ac-
tion representatives. Both of these issues were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. 499 F.2d
at 1152.
" Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. L. L. REv. 52 (1974); Sugarman & Widess, Equal Protection for Non-
English-Speaking School Children: Lau v. Nichols, 62 CALF. L. Rsv. 157 (1974); Note,
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-School District's Failure to Teach Chinese
Speaking Students the English Language Does Not Constitute a Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, 2 FORDHAM URmAN L.J. 122 (1974); Note, The Constitutional Right of
Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 943 (1974);
Comment, Breaking the Language Barrier: New Rights for California's Linguistic
Minorities, 5 PAC. L.J. 648 (1974). See also for an overview of English language legislation,
Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NoT DAME LAw. 7
(1969).
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DeFunis v. Odegaard5 the Court avoided a difficult equal protec-
tion challenge by an unsuccessful white applicant to a law
school's minority admission standards.19 Since the applicant,
after having been conditionally admitted to the law school, was
about to graduate when the merits of his case reached the Court,
the Court declined to decide the issue on the theory of mootness.
As in Lau, the Court was avoiding an equal protection problem.
Equal protection suffered more serious setbacks in other Court
decisions holding education, 20 housing, 2' and welfare 22 not to be
fundamental rights. Against this history, it could be argued that
the result in Lau might have been different had it been consid-
ered solely on an equal protection theory.
Keyes v. School District No. 113 is the Court's most definitive
recent decision on school segregation. On an equal protection
theory the Court employed an "intent" or "purpose" to segregate
test for de jure segregation.24 By contrast, the Court utilized an
"effect" test for discrimination under a statute in Lau.
It is premature to consider whether in fact there is a substan-
tive difference in these tests. The Court may be employing differ-
ent words to avoid the appearance of using the same standard to
determine whether state action "causes" a result. However, if the
choice in words reflects different standards, then it would seem
less onerous to prove a section 601 violation under the "effect"
test. "Motivation" is more difficult to prove than the "result."
The court of appeals in Serna, relying on Lau, found it un-
necessary to consider the equal protection issue since it was able
to affirm the section 601 violation.
" 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
19 Note, Ameliorative Racial Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause: De-
Funis v. Odegaard, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1126.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Two facts distin-
guish Rodriguez from Serna and Lau. In Serna and Lau the failure to teach English to
non-English speaking students accomplished the "absolute deprivation" which the Court
did not find in the state's financing scheme in Rodriguez. Id. at 20-25. Second, while the
Court in Rodriguez said that the wealth-poverty dichotomy is not a suspect classification,
it is clear that the suspect classification based on race, color, or national origin was present
in Serna and Lau.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
" 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
We emphasize that the differentiating factor between dejure segregation and
so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann [402 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1971)] is purpose or intent to segregate.
413 U.S. at 208.
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1I. SECTION 601 AND THE HEW GUIDELINES
Section 601 contains a general prohibition against discrimi-
nation." Under section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Con-
gress authorized departments and agencies granting financial
assistance to issue rules, regulations, and orders of general appli-
cation to effectuate section 601.26
Pursuant to this authority, the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare issued guidelines for compliance with Title
VI which provide:
A recipient . . . may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination . . . or have the effect of defeating or substantially
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as re-
spect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin."
Specific forms of discrimination are prohibited by these guide-
lines. The guidelines further provide that "[tihe enumeration of
specific forms of prohibited discrimination . . . does not limit the
generality of the prohibition .... "28
Failure to provide compensatory English instruction to non-
English speaking minority students clearly has the "effect" of
defeating the accomplishment of an educational program. HEW's
1970 May 25th Memorandum so informed school districts receiv-
ing federal aid.n
In Lau the Supreme Court specifically relied upon these
guidelines and the May 25th Memorandum in evaluating the
school district's conduct. 30 Courts had previously relied upon the
guidelines in de jure school segregation cases.' Although such
review and approval had not previously included the application
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
" Id. § 2000d-1.
Nondiscrimination Under Programs Receiving Federal Financial Assistance
Through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Effectuation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1973).
n Id. § 80.3(b)(5).
" As part of their compliance, school districts were informed by HEW that they
should take remedial steps to overcome English language deficiencies among minority
students; discontinue the assignment of these students to classes for the mentally retarded
on the basis of tests measuring English language skills; and design tracking and ability
grouping, where necessary, to meet language problems as quickly as possible and not to
design such programs as permanent tracks. Identification of Discrimination and Denial
of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970).
414 U.S. 567-69.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd
en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1001 (1967).
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of the May 25th Memorandum or the guidelines in the context of
language discrimination, there is a presumption that such rules
and regulations are valid.3" Recipients of financial assistance give
an assurance, moreover, that they will comply with the guidelines
and "all requirements imposed by or pursuant to" the guide-
lines .33
Against this background, thc court of appeals considered the
defendant's appeal in Serna. The defendant had not designed a
program to meet the special educational needs of non-English
speaking Spanish surnamed students; and these students were
not benefiting from the educational program being offered to the
same extent as their Anglo classmates. The program had the
"effect" of discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin. The district court's finding of a section 601 violation was,
therefore, affirmed. 4
III. THE REMEDY: Too MUCH OR Too LrrrLE?
Although Lau recognized the right to some form of relief, it
did not articulate what that relief should be. Future litigation will
most likely focus on this problem. Serna is significant in that it
provides a beginning for consideration of this problem.
The remedial plan submitted by the defendant in Serna
called for bilingual education for some, but not all, non-English
speaking students.35 This plan was found to be inadequate and
the district court then fashioned a broader remedy. At the ele-
mentary school, with an 86 percent Spanish surnamed enroll-
ment, all students in grades 1-3 were to receive 60 minutes of
bilingual-bicultural instruction per day, and all students in
grades 4-6 were to receive 45 minutes of such instruction per day.
Spanish surnamed students at the other 3 elementary schools
32 The critical question is, therefore, whether the regulations and guidelines
promulgated by HEW go beyond the authority of § 601. Last Term . . . we
held that the validity of a regulation promulgated under a general authori-
zation provision such as § 602 of [Title] VI "will be sustained so long as it
is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.'" I think
the guidelines here fairly meet that test.
414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes and citations omitted).
" 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(a)(1) (1973).
" 499 F.2d at 1153-54.
" Since the district court had also found that the defendant had discriminated
against Mexican American teachers in employment, the defendant promised in this plan
to hire "qualified" Spanish surnamed teachers as vacancies permitted. 499 F.2d at 1152.
At trial, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof on employment discrimination
against Mexican Americans in non-teaching positions. 351 F. Supp. at 1283.
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were to receive 30 minutes of such instruction per day.36 Junior
high students were to be tested for English language deficiencies
with bilingual instruction to be made available on the basis of
need. Ethnic studies were to be retained and expanded at the
high school. 3 The defendant was further ordered to consider these
changes as minimum curriculum modifications .3  Finally, the
defendant was ordered to seek funding for these programs from
available state and federal sources.
39
On appeal the defendant argued that the district court's
order was an "unwarranted and improper judicial interference in
the internal affairs of the Portales school district."10 In view of the
defendant's past neglect of the plaintiffs' special educational
needs and evidence received by the trial court that the defen-
dant's proposed remedy was only a "token plan that would not
benefit appellees," the court of appeals affirmed the remedy."
Under these circumstances, the court of appeals felt that "the
trial court had a duty to fashion a program which would provide
adequate relief ... "42
A serious question exists, however, as to whether in fact the
trial court fully discharged that duty. For 30 to 60 minutes of each
day non-English speaking children are admitted to the educa-
tional process.' But then what? The program reverts to a lan-
guage these children do not understand. Additionally, which
courses are taught during the bilingual-bicultural component of
each day's instruction? More important, which courses are not
taught during this remedial period?" There is a danger that a
limited remedy such as this might heighten a non-English speak-
U This program was to be open to Anglo students as funding and personnel permitted.
499 F.2d at 1151.
" The court's plan called upon the defendant to make a special effort to hire qualified
bilingual teachers as vacancies occurred. 499 F.2d at 1151-52.
n A recalcitrant defendant is more likely to look upon the court's minimums as its
maximums.
n Supra note 10.
499 F.2d at 1154.
4 Id.
,2 Id. (emphasis added).
' Neither the district court nor the court of appeals explains why some non-English
speaking children receive more bilingual instruction than others.
" "[A] child is not to receive instruction in any substantive courses in a language
which prevents his/her effective participation in any such course . . . ." This is part of
the consent decree entered, subsequent to Lau, in a suit brought by Puerto Ricans against
the New York City school system. ASPIRA of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 72-
4002 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1974).
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ing child's frustration with the school system. The remedy here
afforded would seem only a slight improvement over that which
these children previously faced.
In Lau the Supreme Court favorably relied upon a 1968 HEW
guideline: "[Situdents of a particular race, color, or national
origin are not [to be] denied the opportunity [to] obtain the
education generally obtained by other students in the [school]
system."" Although it is difficult to understand how 30 to 60
minutes of bilingual instruction per day satisfy this requirement,
the court of appeals was convinced that the remedy was "just,
equitable and feasible."" Furthermore, there is a latent danger
in providing a remedy in cases of this kind that non-English
speaking students will be segregated from their English speaking
classmates47 in violation of Brown v. Board of Education." These
and other problems remain unresolved.'
IV. THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF STUDENTS FOR A SECTION 601
VIOLATION
As amicus curiae, the New Mexico State Board of Education
asked if a decision favorable to the plaintiffs would require bilin-
gual education whenever there was one student in a school dis-
trict who did not speak English. Relying on Mr. Justice Black-
mun's concurring opinion in Lau,50 the court of appeals at-
tempted to dispel the spectre of impending financial doom raised
by the State: "[O]nly when a substantial group is being de-
prived of a meaningful education will a Title VI violation exist."',
What constitutes a "substantial group"? Lau involved 1,800
Chinese students in a school district of approximately 100,000
11 Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 8, 33 Fed. Reg. 4955, 4956 (1968).
' 499 F.2d at 1154.
"[SItudents receiving instruction will spend maximum time with other children
so as to avoid isolation and segregation from their peers." ASPIRA of N.Y., Inc. v. Board
of Educ., Civil No. 72-4002 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1974).
, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" Finally, there is the problem of properly defining the group discriminated against.
Classification by surname is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive of the disadvantaged
group. Some Spanish speaking persons have non-Spanish surnames. And many Spanish
surnamed persons are not English language deficient. Classification solely on the basis of
surname, as in Serna, is not precise. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN
IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 1972 AND 1971 at 5-6 (1973).
414 U.S. at 572.
499 F.2d at 1154.
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students." Plaintiffs in Serna accounted for 26 percent of the
district's enrollment. Neither case mentions any more on this
subject but that these numbers are sufficient for a section 601
violation.
HEW's May 25th Memorandum was distributed to school
districts with 5 percent or more minority students.53 Five percent
might, then, be one standard for identifying a "substantial
group." Plaintiffs would not have prevailed in Lau, however,
under such a standard.
Alaska and Massachusetts have mandatory bilingual educa-
tion statutes that appear to offer more useful standards in this
respect. In Massachusetts any school district with 20 or more
students speaking a single language, other than English, must
offer bilingual-bicultural education. A similar requirement is
imposed by the Alaska statute for any one school with 15 or more
such students." The thrust of both statutes is to provide
bilingual-bicultural education when there are enough students to
justify the cost of hiring a bilingual teacher and the acquisition
of bilingual education material. 56
This standard, or one closely approximating it, should satisfy
the "substantial group" threshold. Contrary arguments urging a
higher threshold should bear a very heavy burden of persuasion."
V. CONCLUSION
In Lau the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a sta-
tutory right to bilingual education. The appropriate remedy for
" Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1973).
" U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TOWARD QUALrrY EDUCATION FOR MEXICAN AMERI-
CANS: MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY, REPORT VI at 50 (1974).
11 Transitional Bilingual Education Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, §§ 1-9
(Supp. 1974). See also for a model act with comments based on the Massachusetts statute,
Kobrick, A Model Act Providing for Transitional Bilingual Education Programs in Public
Schools, 9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 260 (1972).
0 ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 14.08.160 to .170 (Supp. 1974). The Alaska statute is less well
suited for most states in that many Alaskan Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts live in commun-
ities with only one school. The Alaska statute meets this need. Both Serna and Lau
consider this problem, however, in terms of the number of such students in a school
district.
1 The added costs of such a program can, in part, be offset by federal aid. Bilingual
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970), as amended, Act of August 21, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-380, § 105, 88 Stat. 484.
1, A related problem involves the availability of bilingual teachers. If there are not
enough such teachers to meet the need in a state, then it might be proper to urge the state




a violation of that right was not there determined. The signifi-
cance of the Serna decision for courts and school districts alike is
that it provides a beginning for consideration of that problem.
Michael P. O'Connell
III. EQUAL PROTECTION-ABORTIONS
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974)
I. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
Paul S. Rose, Executive Director of the Utah State Depart-
ment of Social Services, established an informal policy which
proscribed expenditure of Medicaid funds for abortions unless the
abortion was "therapeutic," which he defined as "one necessary
to save the life of the expectant mother or to prevent serious and
permanent impairment to her physical health, and none other."'
Although this policy was not reduced to writing, it was strictly
followed. Jane Doe, Jane Roe, and Jane Poe each sought an abor-
tion at the University of Utah Hospital. Although all were eligible
for categorical assistance under Medicaid and each proposed
abortion was approved as medically appropriate by the hospital
staff, the staff was aware of Rose's policy, which would have
prevented reimbursement. The women brought a class action
against Rose, seeking a declaration that his policy was illegal and
an injunction preventing its enforcement. At the time suit was
brought, two of the women were in their second trimester of preg-
nancy and one was in her first.
The trial court temporarily enjoined the enforcement of
Rose's policy and the women underwent abortions. Subsequently,
the parties agreed to a stipulation of the facts, and both moved
for summary judgment based upon the stipulation. The plain-
tiffs' motion was granted and the defendant's denied, the trial
court finding that each plaintiff had a constitutionally protected
right to an abortion, and that the plaintiffs would be denied equal
protection of the laws if the defendant were allowed to discrimi-
nate between "therapeutic" and "non-therapeutic" abortions. In
addition, the trial court found that the defendant was without
statutory authority to deny "non-therapeutic" abortions.2 Rose
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1113 (10th Cir. 1974).
This finding was based primarily upon the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1396a(a)(10), (13) (1974) and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396d(a)(1), (5) (1974).
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was permanently enjoined from conditioning payment upon his
prior approval and from restricting payment to "therapeutic"
abortions.
Rose appealed, arguing that the right to welfare was solely a
statutory right and that, since no statute had been violated, no
constitutional issue had been raised. He maintained that even if
the issue did involve a constitutional question, a state may select
the type of medical services for which it desires matching federal
funds as long as it does so on a rational basis. A limited state
budget and the incentive for proper birth control methods were
cited as the state's rationale.3 Rose considered an abortion to be
medically "non-necessary" in the same sense that cosmetic sur-
gery is not medically required.4
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the
trial court's decision. Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court prefers
a statutory rather than a constitutional resolution of welfare con-
troversies,5 the Tenth Circuit nevertheless disposed of the case on
constitutional grounds, prefering not to make a strained interpre-
tation of the applicable state and federal statutes which were
silent as to abortion. Rather, the court found that the policy was
neither mandated nor prohibited by statute.
With respect to the constitutional issue the court noted that,
although a state need not choose to participate in a federal wel-
fare program, if it does elect to do so it must act consistently with
federal statutes and regulations.' Any program, however funded,
must conform to the requirements of the Constitution.7 At the
same time, a welfare regulation "which is 'rationally based and
free from invidious discrimination' will not offend the Constitu-
tion and is to be given effect." ' The Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Roe v. Wade' and its companion case of Doe v.
Brief for Appellant at 12-14, Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974).
I d. at 8-9.
Wyman v. Rothstein, 398 U.S. 275 (1970).
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
499 F.2d at 1115.
410 U.S. 113 (1973), rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959. The basic principles of Roe v.
Wade are that in the first trimester of pregnancy the abortion decision must be left
entirely to the pregnant woman and her attending physician. After the first trimester, the
state may regulate abortion to the extent that the regulations are reasonably related to
maternal health. After viability (24th to 28th week) the state's interest in protecting the
fetus becomes compelling and abortion may be regulated or proscribed, except where it
is medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 164-65. The
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Bolton10 established that the constitutional right of privacy in-
cludes a qualified right to elect an abortion." Any regulation of
this "fundamental right" requires that a "compelling state inter-
est" be demonstrated." In Doe v. Rose the state could not claim
such an interest because Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County3
had demonstrated that conservation of the taxpayers' purse is not
sufficient to meet the "compelling state interest" standard. 4
The court found support for its decision in the analagous
cases of Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital5 and Klein v. Nas-
sau County Medical Center." In Hathaway, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that consensual sterilization involved a
fundamental right and that consequently a city hospital must
demonstrate a compelling rationale in order to prohibit that oper-
ation while permitting other procedures of no greater risk or de-
mand on staff. In Klein, a three-judge court held that a policy
limiting the use of Medicaid funds to therapeutic abortions per-
formed within the initial 24 weeks of pregnancy denied indigent
women equal protection of the laws. If the state were to pay for
Supreme Court's decision in this case was greeted with both enthusiasm and criticism.
For discussions of the decision, see, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and
the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1974); Wheeler & Kovar, Roe v. Wade: The
Right of Privacy Revisited, 21 KAN. L. Rzv. 527 (1973); Comment, In Defense of Liberty:
A Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1973); Note, Implications of the
Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLum. L. REv. 237
(1974).
o 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
* The Constitution does not expressly mention the right of privacy. Past decisions,
however, have made it clear that personal rights which are "fundamental" or "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" are protected by the Constitution. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973). For the classic development of the right of privacy, see Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a case involving contra-
ception. The right has also been recognized in the following areas: Contraception- Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Activities relating to marriage-Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Procreation-Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Child rearing
and education-Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Roe v. Wade extends this
right to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
1 410 U.S. at 155.
" 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
' Even if the more lenient "rational basis" test were used, conservation of the taxpay-
ers' purse would not justify the denial of abortions to indigents because the state would
then face the more expensive alternative of providing the medical care associated with
childbirth. See, e.g., Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 501
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
" 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in
Klein and remanded for reconsideration in light of Wade and Bolton, 412 U.S. 925 (1973),




the expenses of full-term delivery, but not for the cost of an abor-
tion, an indigent would have no choice but to bear the child, while
someone financially independent would have either alternative.
In Doe v. Rampton,'7 a Utah statute prohibiting, inter alia, the
use of state funds for non-therapeutic abortions was invalidated
because it would limit the exercise of the right to an abortion in
all trimesters, for reasons having no apparent connection with the
health of the mother or child. In the instant case, the court rea-
soned that if such a statute was invalid, an informal policy to the
same effect must also be invalid.'8
II. OTHER ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT ABORTIONS
Undoubtedly the court's decision will be unpopular with the
70 percent of Utah's population who are of the Mormon faith"
and oppose abortion on moral grounds.20 Anti-abortion sentiment
is not limited to Utah, however, and efforts have been made
throughout the nation to restrict or discourage abortions. For
example, family members have interfered with a woman's deci-
sion to obtain an abortion. Hospitals have refused to perform the
operation, and legislation has been passed in an attempt to make
abortions difficult or impossible to obtain.
A. Family Members-Consent by the Father of Child or by
Parents of Minor Mother
When deciding Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court found it
' 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
Although the court did not feel it necessary to deal with Rose's contention that an
abortion is a "non-necessary" medical procedure, plaintiffs' attorney relied upon Klein v.
Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), to show that the
condition of pregnancy does require medical treatment, whether by abortion or by the care
associated with childbirth. Brief for Appellees at 12, Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir.
1974). In Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974), the court ruled invalid a state
regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department which conditioned Medicaid payments
upon medical certification by the attending physician and the Chief of Obstetrics and
Gynecology in accredited hospitals that the "abortion is recommended as medically or
psychiatrically necessary .... " Id. at 727 n.1. The Norton court concluded that:
While the constitutional right to have an abortion does not necessarily carry
with it a constitutional right to a free abortion, a statute that provides
payment to the needy for medical expenses would encounter constitutional
obstacles if it were construed to weight the choice of a pregnant woman
against electing the abortion that is her constitutional right to choose. Gov-
ernment is not required by the Constitution to pay for any medical service,
but once it decides to provide payments, it must not unduly disadvantage
those who exercise a constitutional right.
Id. at 730.
" 27 ENCYCLOPE=IA AMmuCANA 833 (Int'l ed. 1972).
0 See, e.g., 9 THE PRIESTHOOD BuLLEIN, no. 1, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints (Feb. 1973).
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unnecessary to determine what rights, if any, parents and hus-
bands might have in the abortion decision.2 Other courts have,
therefore, been confronted with that determination. In Coe v.
Gerstein 2 the court reasoned that because the state cannot inter-
fere, until the compelling point, with the mother's right of privacy
even to protect the fetus' right to life, it could not interfere on
behalf of the husband's or parents' interest in the fetus. Likewise,
since it cannot interfere to protect the mother's health until the
second trimester, it cannot do so to protect another's interest in
her health. In other words, the state ought not be able to delegate
to others a power which it cannot itself exercise. Coe did not
negate the possibility that a statute might be written which
would distinguish a third party's interests from those of maternal
health and potential life, but it seems unlikely that third party
interests could outweigh the fundamental right of privacy which
is the basis of a woman's right to choose abortion. In Doe. v.
Rampton23 the District Court for the District of Utah invalidated
a section of the Utah statutes which required the pre-abortion
consent of the father or parents-depending upon the mother's
marital status-on the grounds that such a requirement sub-
jected the exercise of the individual right of privacy to consent of
others in all stages of pregnancy. It appears that the Tenth Cir-
cuit is in agreement with other circuits when protecting a
woman's right of election from infringement by family members. 2
B. Hospitals-Public and Private
It is clear that public hospitals must provide facilities for
abortions,2 and that private or denominational hospitals may
refuse to do so.26 The distinction between a public and private
", 410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
2 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See also Note, The Right of a Husband or a
Minor's Parent to Participate in the Abortion Decision, 28 U. Mmi L. REv. 251 (1973).
23 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
2, In Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974), a mother was allowed to abort without
her husband's approval. In Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974), an unmarried putative father was unable to enjoin an abor-
tion. See also Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental
Consent, 60 VA. L. Rv. 305 (1974).
21 Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973) established that
the issue of consensual sterilization involved a fundamental right and could not be prohib-
ited by a hospital when other procedures of similar complication were allowed. On the
strength of Hathaway, it was ruled in Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932 (D.
Minn. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), that a municipal hospital was obliged
to allow abortions and to provide facilities for those who wished to perform them. Accord,
Doe v. Hale Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 970 (D. Mass.), afl'd, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974).
" Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973).
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hospital is not so clear. Factors such as the availability of other
hospitals in the area which provide abortion facilities, tax bene-
fits given to hospitals, and the receipt of federal funds such as
those provided by the Hill-Burton Act" might influence a court
in determining whether a given hospital is operating under the
color of state law, and therefore subject to the restrictions of the
fourteenth amendment. 8 At the same time, no single factor is
likely to be controlling, and it appears that courts will continue
to decide each case on an individual basis unless more definite
guidelines are furnished by the Supreme Court.
C. Legislation-State and Federal
State legislatures have attempted to restrict abortions by
defining the point at which viability occurs," by limiting the
advertisement of abortions, 30 and by placing burdensome report-
ing or procedural requirements on the operation.3 ' Few of these
attempts have been successful when tested in court."2 A Utah
statute effective April 4, 1974, requires, inter alia, that the physi-
cian give prior notice to the mother's husband or parents, if possi-
ble. 33 It also requires that the mother be informed of adoption
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970).
n In Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973), it was ruled that
the receipt of Hill-Burton funds does not force a private hospital to permit abortions, but
in Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974), a case
involving a physician's right to hospital privileges, the court ruled that the receipt of such
funds did subject the hospital to the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment. Earlier
racial segregation cases also demonstrated a willingness to construe a hospital's activities
as being under the color of state action. See, e.g., Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir.
1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). But see
Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" Doe v. Israel, 482 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2406 (1974);
Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974).
" Associated Students v. Attorney General, 368 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Doe v.
Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719 (N.D.
Okla. 1973).
1, Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp.
1008 (D. Minn. 1974); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); State v. Jacobus,
75 Misc. 2d 840, 348 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1973). But see Friendship Medical Center,
Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 367 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
n See notes 29-31 supra. An interesting exception is Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213
Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972). Here a physician was convicted for violating a statute
prohibiting the advertisement of abortions. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
for reconsideration in light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 413 U.S. 909 (1973). Upon
reconsideration, the Virginia court found nothing in Roe and Doe to prohibit the regula-
tion of commercial advertising in the medical-health field and affirmed the conviction.
214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). Recently the Supreme Court has noted probable
jurisdiction and may rule on the matter. Bigelow v. Virginia, 43 U.S.L.W. 3068 (U.S. Aug.
13, 1974) (No. 73-1309).
3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (Supp. 1973).
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services available and of the details of the abortion procedure
itself,34 as well as requiring the doctor to complete a lengthy re-
port.35 It is not unlikely that some of these provisions will be
tested in Tenth Circuit courts."
The U.S. Senate recently amended an appropriations bill to
proscribe the use of Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare funds for abortions. 7 If this measure becomes law, it could
effect a substantial change in abortion law, but would first un-
doubtedly face a severe constitutional test in light of the Supreme
Court's firm position on abortion.
38
III. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, there have
been many attempts to restrict its application. The Court's ruling
was clear, however, and the lower courts have been consistent in
upholding the right of a woman and her physician to make the
abortion decision without undue state interference. Doe v. Rose
lends the strength and prestige of a U.S. Court of Appeals deci-
sion to the mounting volume of case law supporting that right.
In this case the indigent woman's right to choose between bearing
a child and obtaining an abortion, without overwhelming finan-
cial pressure in favor of the state's preferred choice, was pro-
tected.
Dennis E. House
- Id. § 76-7-305.
- Id. § 76-7-315.
" Compare these restrictions to those invalidated in Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F.
Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974).
31 S. amend. 1859, 120 Cong. Rec. 16832 (1974), amending H.R. 15580, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974):
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act ["Departments of
Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1975"] shall
be used in any manner directly or indirectly to pay for or encourage the
performances of abortions except such abortions as are necessary to save the
life of a mother.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court stated that although
Congress may enact legislation which is necessary and appropriate to enforce the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, it may not dilute those
rights. It has been said that equal protection does apply to welfare rights. Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION-SEX DISCRIMINATION
Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974)
Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States
Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974)
The Tenth Circuit considered two cases involving sex dis-
crimination and the equal protection clause of the Federal Con-
stitution. In one the court found that state law denied to women
the same substantive tort rights afforded to men. In the second,
the court held that the systematic policy of excluding women
from membership in a charitable service organization did not
violate the fourteenth amendment.
In Duncan v. General Motors Corp.,' the husband of the
plaintiff was seriously injured and permanently disabled when
the car which he was driving collided with a truck tractor on an
Oklahoma highway. Suit against the manufacturer of the auto-
mobile was instituted to recover damages for an alleged breach
of implied warranty of fitness for a defectively manufactured
braking system and to recover for loss of the husband's consor-
tium.
Although the wife argued that the married women's rights
act of Oklahoma,' which had been adopted between the accident
and the commencement of the suit and which allowed wives to
recover, should govern procedural matters and ought to be ap-
plied retroactively,3 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma disagreed and dismissed the ac-
tion, finding that the pre-act common law which denied wives the
right to sue for loss of consortium was conclusive of the plaintiff's
substantive rights.'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, joining a growing
number of jurisdictions which have judicially extended to women
the right to recover for loss of consortium.' Judge Hill, writing for
the majority, found that:
I 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15 (Supp. 1974).
499 F.2d at 836-37.
Suit was instituted on April 23, 1973; the amendment to the women's rights act
allowing wives to sue for loss of consortium became effective April 27, 1973. Before the
amendment, the common law denied a wife the right to recover for loss of consortium. Id.
at 835-36.
, A wife's right to recover for loss of consortium was recognized in Hitaffer v. Argonne
Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Since then, the right has been acknowledged by court
decisions in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 900 (1971).
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[W]here state law is challenged for federal constitutional reasons,
as it is here, federal law governs and not state substantive law ....
We are therefore not bound to adhere to Oklahoma law if we deter-
mine it to be unconstitutional.'
The court concluded that the Oklahoma law offended not
only the test of "patently arbitrary"7 and invidious discrimina-
tion under decisions like Reed v. Reed,s but the court also be-
lieved that it offended the position taken by four Justices in
Frontiero v. Richardson' that classifications based upon sex ought
to be subject to more searching judicial scrutiny. 10
The second significant decision handed down by the Tenth
Circuit during the past year was Junior Chamber of Commerce
of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees," an action arising
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 2 The Junior Chamber
of Commerce of Rochester, New York, and its individual mem-
bers were joined by other chapters of the national organization
and their individual members in this action against the United
States Jaycees and several federal officials. The plaintiffs alleged
that the United States Jaycees, in excluding women from mem-
bership in any Jaycees organization, had violated the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution in
wrongfully depriving plaintiffs of membership." The bylaws of
the United States Jaycees restrict membership to males. The
Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester had previously admit-
ted women as members and was thereupon expelled from the
United States Jaycees. Individual members of the Rochester
chapter were denied affiliation with the national organization and
were thereby denied the opportunity to participate in programs
which included utilization of federal funds. The plaintiffs noted
that the United States Jaycees and its chapters received tax ben-
499 F.2d at 837-38 (citations omitted).
Id. at 838.
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
499 F.2d at 838.
495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1974).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
" 495 F.2d at 884.
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efits and federal grants and contracts," and they noted that in
some cases federal funds were awarded to state agencies which in
turn made grants to the local Jaycees for use in their projects.'5
Federal officers were named as defendants on the grounds that
the granting of tax exemptions and federal funds to a group which
discriminates was improper. Judge Doyle, writing for the major-
ity, noted that a "memorandum admitted into evidence showed
that government funds distributed by the United States Jaycees
amounted to approximately $985,000."' This sum accounted "for
almost forty per cent of the national budget"" of the national
organization.
The district court ruled that the federal question was so in-
substantial as to fail to state a claim, noting that no direct rela-
tionship between the discriminatory membership policy and the
distribution of government funds was alleged.' 8 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit recognized that the plaintiffs were excluded from
membership purely on the basis of sex and that state or federal
discrimination on that basis was improper." But the court found
no official action under section 1983 to warrant invocation of the
fourteenth amendment's protection. In ruling for the defendants,
the United States Jaycees, the court held:
The Constitution applies if the private action complained of is in
essence the action of the government . . .. [Pllaintiffs say that
the state must, consistent with the Constitution, refrain from deal-
ing with discriminators regardless of whether the discrimination is
related to the alleged state action. We disagree."0
In failing to find the requisite state action, the court consid-
ered the decisions in Moose Lodge v. Irvis2' and in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority." In Moose Lodge, the Supreme
Court held that the state's grant of a liquor license and its con-
comitant regulation were not sufficient to implicate the state in
the racially discriminatory guest policies of the Lodge and specifi-
" Id. The tax benefits are conferred by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 170 &
501. Section 170 deals with allowances of deduction for charitable contributions, and
section 501 treats exemption from taxation for qualifying organizations.
495 F.2d at 886-87.
Id. at 884.
7 Brief for Appellants at 18, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v.
United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974).
495 F.2d at 884-85.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 887.
21 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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cally held that "[h]owever detailed this type of regulation may
be in some particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or
encourage racial discrimination."2 The Tenth Circuit concluded,
therefore, that "there must be a sufficient nexus between the
discrimination and the alleged state action in order to render the
activity a constitutional violation."2 In Burton a private restaur-
ant which practiced racial discrimination was leased from a mu-
nicipal parking authority and was operated adjacent to a public
parking lot for the convenience of the public. There the Supreme
Court found the requisite state action, but the Court cautioned
that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attrib-
uted its true significance.""
Two important Tenth Circuit precedents upon which the
court relied were Ward v. St. Anthony Hospital"5 and Browns v.
Mitchell" in which the "court [had] adopted a more restricted
view of what is state action. ' 28 In Ward the Tenth Circuit held
that a small percentage of governmental funding for a hospital
did not subject the hospital to a civil rights action since "the facts
failed to establish that the State of Colorado had any part in the
alleged deprivation." The court held in Browns that policies of
private organizations do not furnish the requisite state action
even though such organizations receive tax benefits. While the
granting of government funds or the granting of tax exemptions
alone in these cases fails to transform the acts of a private organi-
zation into acts under color of state law, similar situations have
been dealt with differently in other circuits. °
In the Jaycees case, the Tenth Circuit was concerned with
the lack of nexus, i.e., the absence of a connection between the
state action and the alleged deprivation. The fact of exemption
407 U.S. at 176-77.
z 495 F.2d at 888.
365 U.S. at 722.
476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973).
409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
n 495 F.2d at 887.
v Id.
3 In McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971), the court found that eviction
from a housing facility on land purchased from a city redevelopment authority was state
action because the government retained the right to oversee administration of the prop-
erty. However, in Weigand v. Afton View Apartments, 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973), an
attempt at summary eviction from a privately owned and operated apartment house was
held not to be state action although the house was federally financed and was conse-
quently taxed at a lesser rate than similar buildings not so funded.
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from federal taxation did not furnish the requisite nexus. Simi-
larly, a landowner in Walz v. Tax Commission' sought to enjoin
the New York City Tax Commission from granting exemptions to
religious organizations on the ground that such exemptions vio-
lated the establishment clause of the first amendment. Chief Jus-
tice Burger declared:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the gov-
ernment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply
abstains from demanding that the church support the state....
There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and the establish-
ment of religion.3 "
However, the increasing importance of tax exemptions in an
overall scheme of governmental involvement in private activity
is becoming more pronounced.3 More recent attitudes toward tax
exemptions bode ill for a summary treatment of the issue and
suggest that the explanation that "we're not giving, we're simply
not taking away" has fewer adherents than it has enjoyed in the
past."
Governmental grants-in-aid and governmental contracts
have, at times, been found to furnish the appropriate nexus:
The allocation of government aid to a private activity is another
type of state involvement which invariably constitutes state support
of the challenged activity. However, aid is distinct from a power-
grant in that it merely supports private parties in the exercise of
rights they would possess absent the aid; powers behind such activi-
ties do not derive solely from government. Such state involvement
is, therefore, somewhat less efficaciously supportive of a putative
infringement than are power grants. Nonetheless, private parties
should not be allowed to use government resources in ways that
would be unconstitutional for the state itself. u
The very real question is whether the government should be the
insurer of the "goodness" of its beneficiaries. In the Jaycees
31 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 676.
See Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972);
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Pitts v. Department of Revenue,
333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970)
(preliminary injunction), on final injunction sub nom. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). But
see McCoy v. Schultz, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 858 (D.D.C. 1973).
u Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal
Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972). See generally Comment, Tax Incentives As State
Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 414 (1973).
3 Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 672 (1974).
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case, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the
state must refrain from dealing with discriminators whether or
not the discrimination relates to the alleged state action.3
In our case ... the question is whether the United States is obli-
gated to see to it that the United States Jaycees' conduct shall be
exemplary quite apart from its administering of programs and gov-
ernmental funds. No case has been cited which extends to this
length.37
The plaintiffs argued that it should not be unreasonable to
ask the government to require that the very structure of an aspir-
ing governmental beneficiary not include discrimination:
An incidental financial contribution to a private institution may not
necessarily approve of a specific procedure or policy in a particular
situation of which the government was not even aware at the time
assistance was given. To hold that the state is responsible for every
such improper procedure would require daily supervision of each
institution receiving funds. This is not the case where there is an
established policy of discrimination which is a well known charac-
teristic of the institution.u
Notwithstanding the large percentage of federal money in the
organization's budget 39 and the favorable tax treatment received
by the Jaycees, the Tenth Circuit found an absence of nexus
between the governmental action and the declared national pol-
icy of the Junior Chamber of Commerce to admit only males to
membership. The facts and circumstances of each similar case
are of critical importance and the balance may shift as the facts
and the circumstances seem different to the courts.
Laura Vogelgesang
" See text accompanying note 20, supra.
" 495 F.2d at 888.
" Brief for Appellants at 36, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v.
United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
11 Brief for Federal Appellees at 9, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc.
v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974): "Applicants for sponsorship of
the federal projects must demonstrate that they are truly nonprofit, and that they are
capable of successfully developing the program; the membership policies of sponsoring
groups are not the object of inquiry." There is no nexus here, but the result of Pitts v.
Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 670 (E.D. Wis. 1971) was an order to "impose
upon the defendants the duty of questioning organizations claiming an exemption about





A. Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118
(10th Cir. 1973)
In 1971, the City and County of Denver amended its zoning
ordinance to restrict the types of advertising and display signs
that could be located in certain zoning districts. Nonconforming
signs, presently located in those areas, were to be eliminated over
a period of from 2 to 5 years, depending upon the replacement
cost of the sign. Those with higher replacement costs were given
a longer period of time.' In addition, flashing, fluctuating, ani-
mated, or portable signs were allowed 30 days to comply with the
ordinance irrespective of their cost.'
The constitutional validity of that amendment to the zoning
ordinance was challenged in Art Neon Co. v. City and County of
Denver.3 The action was brought by companies engaged in the
installation, sale, and lease of signs and advertising displays and
by retail businesses who owned or leased signs. Plaintiffs con-
tended that the "Permitted Signs" section violated article I, sec-
tion 10 of the United States Constitution (an impairment of con-
tracts); the fifth amendment (a taking of private property with-
out just compensation); the first amendment (a restriction on
freedom of expression); and the fourteenth amendment (a denial
of equal protection and of due process).'
The district court considered whether the termination proce-
dures prescribed by the ordinance were a valid exercise of the
police power or whether they were a taking of private property
without just compensation. The trial court held that the sign
ordinance "[d]id not provide for the payment of just compensa-
DENvER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE § 613 (1971).
§ 613.5-5(4) [Termination of Non-Conforming Signs] BY Amortization.
The right to maintain a non-conforming sign shall terminate in accor-
dance with the following schedule:
Any sign which on the date the Shall be terminated within the
sign became non-conforming following period after the sign
would cost the following amount became non-conforming:
to replace:
$0 to $3,000 ........................................... 2 years
3,001 to 6,000 .......................................... 3 years
6,001 to 15,000 ......................................... 4 years
15,001 or m ore ......................................... 5 years
Id. § 613.5-5(4)(a).
488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir.) rev'g 357 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973).
488 F.2d at 120.
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tion" 5 and that, therefore, the ordinance violated the fifth amend-
ment.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and found the sign
ordinance to be a proper exercise of the police power. However,
the court concluded that the so-called "amortization" periods
based on the replacement cost of the signs were unreasonable and
held valid only the 5-year period for elimination of the noncon-
forming signs.
The problem of the nonconforming use has been character-
ized as one of the fundamental problems facing zoning decisions.'
"A nonconforming use is a lawful use existing on the effective
date of the zoning restriction and continuing since that time in
nonconformance to the ordinance." 7 Nonconforming uses gener-
ally are not allowed to be enlarged, expanded, or altered; neither
may the use be resumed after abandonment or destruction.
Methods most commonly employed to terminate uses include:
exercising the power of eminent domain; allowing the use to
wither away; restricting expansion, repair, and resumption of use;
monetary inducements to move; and amortization.8 All but the
last have been accepted by the courts, and all but the last are
generally ineffective.'
Amortization is a technical term used to describe a period
over which an owner may depreciate his investment.10 The Den-
' 357 F. Supp. at 481.
' In Wasinger v. Miller, 154 Colo. 61, 66, 388 P.2d 250, 253 (1964), the court stated:
"In fact, non-conforming uses represent conditions which should be reduced to conformity
as speedily as is compatible with justice." And in Grant v. Mayor & City Council, 212
Md. 301, 302, 129 A.2d 363, 365 (1957) the court found that:
Nonconforming uses have not disappeared. . . because the general reg-
ulation of future uses and changes . . . have put the latter in an intrenched
position often with a value that is great-and grows-because of the artificial
monopoly given it by the law. Indeed, there is general agreement that the
fundamental problem facing zoning is the inability to eliminate the noncon-
forming use.
City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 453, 274 P.2d 34, 40 (1954).
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1134 (1968); Note, Zoning: Amortization of Nonconforming
Uses for Aesthetic Purposes, 39 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 179 (1971).
Note, supra note 8.
" Four cases involving amortization ordinances have been appealed to the Supreme
Court, but all have been denied: Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950); National Advertising Co. v. County of Monte-
rey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 33, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577, appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1970);
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280
U.S. 556 (1929); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972), appeal
dismissed. 411 U.S. 901 (1973).
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ver sign ordinance referred to the graduated periods for termina-
tion dependent upon sign cost as a method of amortization.
[Blut in reality it is no more than notice to the owner and user of
the sign that they have a period of time to make whatever adjust-
ments or other arrangements they can. This is probably not a proper
use of the word "amortization," and so used it contains no connota-
tion of compensation or a requirement therefor."
In determining the constitutionality of amortization ordi-
nances, courts look to the reasonableness of the ordinance and of
the period for termination which are generally ascertained by
balancing the public gain against the private harm. For example,
in Harbison v. City of Buffalo 2 the New York Court of Appeals
held that these factors were to be considered in terminating non-
conforming uses: the nature of the surrounding neighborhood, the
value and the condition of any improvements, the nearest reloca-
tion area, the cost of relocation, and any other costs which would
place a burden on the property owner. In City of Los Angeles v.
Gage the court said:
The distinction between an ordinance restricting future uses
and one requiring the termination of present uses within a reasona-
ble period of time is merely one degree, and constitutionality de-
pends on the relative importance to be given to the public gain and
to the private loss."
The factors to which the Gage court looked in considering the
reasonableness of the ordinance included: was the owner allowed
time to make plans to offset at least partially his losses, was the
loss extended over a period of years, and did the owner enjoy a
monopolistic position as long as he was allowed to remain?
In Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minne-
tonka 5 the court looked to the value of the property interest at
the end of the period or, in the alternative, to the value of the
freedom from new competition for the statutory period to deter-
mine if it equalled the value of the property interest then remain-
ing at the end of the period. 6
1 488 F.2d at 121.
12 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
'= 127 Cal. App. 2d 538, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
" Id. at 460, 274 P.2d at 44.
281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
" Where the issue is decided by balancing the public good and the private harm, it
is common for the court to grant the ordinance a presumption of validity, place the burden
on the other party to show that it is not reasonable, and resolve whether that burden was
met by looking to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Standard Oil Co. v.
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In Art Neon Co. the court observed that the legislative deter-
mination to terminate nonconforming uses is reached by balanc-
ing the burden placed on the individual against the public good
to be gained." Such a determination has a presumption of valid-
ity and "must only meet the test of 'reasonableness,' that is, the
plan for termination must be 'reasonable.' "s The factors to
which the court looked to verify the reasonableness of the ordi-
nance included: the nature of the nonconforming use, the charac-
ter of the structure, the location, the part of the individual's total
business affected, salvage value, depreciation for income tax and
other purposes, and any monopolistic advantage resulting from
similar new structures being prohibited in the same area." Apply-
ing these factors to the Denver ordinance, the court concluded
that it was "basically reasonable. 2 0 Unlike the ordinance in
Naegele v. Minnetonka, the Tenth Circuit held it not necessary
that "the nonconforming property concerned have no value at the
termination date."
2
The period for termination of flashing signs was found to be
reasonable. The fact that their effectiveness was greatly reduced
was balanced by the extreme character of the signs and their
relation to the public safety. But the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the different "amortization" categories for other signs having
different replacement costs were unreasonable:
The replacement cost of the signs is not related to any of the relevant
factors in the reasonableness tests, and presents no valid basis for
different treatment of different signs ranging from three to five
years. It has no bearing on the landowner's problems, nor on the sign
owner's situation nor on the city's position. The most that can be
said for replacement cost is that it could indicate, as of the date
used, the size or complexity of the sign, but this is no real help.
When the categories so constructed are removed, we are left with the
City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950); National Advertising Co. v. County of
Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962); Board of Supervisors v. Miller,
170 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1969); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.
1972); City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959). Other cases have
taken into account the size of the investment involved, Village of Larchmont v. Sutton,
30 Misc. 2d 245, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1961), and have looked to the Internal
Revenue Service amortization rules to gauge the reasonableness of the time period, Na-
tional Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 33, 83 Cal. Rptr.
577 (1970).




21 Id. at 121.
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five-year maximum period for removal of all nonconforming signs in
the ordinance, and this period ... is a valid one."
The Tenth Circuit found that the sign ordinance did not
constitute a taking of private property without just compensa-
tion. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 Mr. Justice Holmes
observed "that while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. '2 4
The difference between a valid regulation and a taking is one of
degree and not of kind, and is decided by balancing the loss to
the individual property owner against the value of the regulation
to the public.25
In his dissent to Pennsylvania Coal, Mr. Justice Brandeis
argued that the difference should be one of kind and not of degree.
For the police power to be valid, it must be grounded upon a
rational basis for a valid public purpose and it must be an appro-
priate means to achieve a public goal. In Brandeis' view, the
validity of the regulation under the due process clause should be
based on the nature of the public purposes to be served and on
the existence of a reasonable basis for the regulation. In contrast,
Holmes based the validity on the amount of injury done to the
individual. 2 In Hadacheck v. Sebastian27 the Court said that
while the police power may "seem harsh in its exercise . . . the
2 Id. at 122.
- 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
21 Id. at 415.
21 Justice Holmes' opinion has been strongly criticized. See Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Stever, Land Use Controls, Takings,
and the Police Power-A Discussion of the Myth, 15 N.H.B.J. 149 (1974). However, one
of the leading cases finding an amortization ordinance unreasonable, Hoffman v. Kinealy,
389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965), relied on language from Pennsylvania Coal in support of its
decision. In this case the ordinance required all land used for open storage to be discontin-
ued within 6 years. The court followed the dissent in Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d
553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958), holding that the ordinance constituted a
taking without just compensation and quoted from Pennsylvania Coal:
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.
260 U.S. at 416. The Hoffman decision has been criticized for its narrow view of the police
power. See, e.g., LaChapelle v. Town of Goffstown, 107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967);
Note, Municipal Corporations-Zoning-Termination of Nonconforming Uses, 45 NEB. L.
REV. 636 (1966); Note, Zoning-Amortization Technique for Eliminating Nonconforming
Uses Constitutes Taking of Private Property for Public Use Without Just Compensation,
44 TExAs L. REv. 368 (1965); Note, Zoning-Nonconforming Uses-Amortization Theory
of Abatement of Nonconforming Uses Violates Missouri Constitution, 11 ViL. L. R'v. 189
(1965).
" See Stever, supra note 25.
- 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation
upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be
asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. '28
The Tenth Circuit noted that the sign restrictions were an
integral part of the "aim or purpose of zoning," which in itself
has been recognized as a valid exercise of the police power.3 Of
particular importance to the court was the fact that the sign
ordinance "[d]id not prohibit the use of signs, but require[d]
conformance to specified types in specified places." 31 Since the
regulation did not absolutely prohibit advertising displays, it was
not a taking without just compensation. "It [was] of general
application under a plan adjusted to different conditions in each
zone, and not directed to particular tracts or signs. It [was] a
bona fide use restriction.
'3 2
Lawrence R. Kueter
B. C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974)
In 1965, plaintiff-appellant was issued a building permit for
the construction of condominium units. A short time thereafter,
the intended use was made nonconforming by an amendment to
the zoning regulations of Pitkin County, Colorado. With less than
a fifth of the proposed units completed, financial difficulties arose
which required appellant to cease construction in 1966. The
building inspector denied appellant's application for a new build-
ing permit to resume construction in 1971 because the original
permit had expired and the condominium units were noncon-
forming. On appeal the board of adjustment affirmed the denial.
Appellant sought a declaratory judgment and damages or an in-
junction in the federal district court. The trial court rendered
judgment for appellee finding that appellant had abandoned the
project.
In affirming, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the doctrine of relation back effecting a revalidation of the origi-
nal building permit was not within the contemplation of section
n Id. at 410.
n 488 F.2d at 123.
" Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11 488 F.2d at 123.
n Id.
3 C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974).
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302(d) of the Uniform Building Code dealing with expired build-
ing permits.34 The court found that any new building permit ne-
cessitated by expiration of the old permit was subject to current
zoning regulations.3
In answer to appellant's argument that there must exist in-
tent to abandon, the court distinguished between ordinances such
as the Pitkin County zoning regulation which predicated aban-
donment of a nonconforming use on the discontinuance of a use
for a stated period of time, and those which failed to specify a
time limit. In the former, the finding of intent is unnecessary; in
the latter, intent is an essential element.
36
Even though appellant was deprived of all reasonable use of
his undeveloped land because he had originally and voluntarily
recorded a condominium declaration, this did not constitute a
taking under the due process and just compensation clauses of the
state and federal constitutions. 3 The court reiterated the general
principle that a "landowner cannot create his own hardship and
then require that zoning regulations be changed to meet that
hardship. '3 Similarly, the court found that equitable estoppel




Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1973)
Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974)
In recent years the courts have been called upon to review an
increasing number of conscientious objector cases which arise in
the military.' With the termination of the draft and the move to
a volunteer army, conscientious objection is now limited to a class
of persons who are presently serving in the armed services. To
qualify as an inservice conscientious objector, one must prove
that his beliefs surfaced due to some known or unknown incident
" Id. at 837.
5Id.
"Id.
' Id. at 838.
"Id.
Id.
Zillman, In-Service Conscientious Objection: Courts, Boards and the Basis in Fact,
10 SAN DiEo L. REV. 108, 110 n.7 (1972).
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while he was in the military, i.e., his views must have "crystal-
lized."'
The Tenth Circuit reviewed two Air Force conscientious
objector cases, Smith v. Laird3 and Cole v. Clements' during the
past year. These inservice claims, as are all other inservice consci-
entious objector claims, were processed pursuant to Department
of Defense Directive No. 1300.65 and its implementing service
regulations. Since these cases arose in the Air Force, the proce-
dures for conscientious objector discharge were provided by Air
Force Regulation 35-24. Pursuant to these regulations, both Cap-
tain (Doctor) Smith and Airman Cole applied to their respective
commanders and alleged the required "crystallization" for dis-
charge After application, each serviceman was interviewed by a
I See Polsky v. Wetherill, 455 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1972) for what has been
described as a classic example of "crystallization" after entering military service.
486 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1973).
494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974).
32 C.F.R. § 75 (1974). See Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED. 15, 31 (1972).
32 C.F.R. § 888e (1974). Pursuant to this regulation, an applicant must meet three
tests to establish a prima facie case of conscientious objection. He must: (1) be opposed
to war in any form; (2) ground his objection on religious principles as enunciated in Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965);
and (3) be sincere in his beliefs. This test is mandated by the regulations. 32 C.F.R. §
888e.10 (1974). See also Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971).
1 In his application, Airman Cole asserted that the incident which caused his change
of heart was his realization that he was learning to equip aircraft with conventional
weapons and not just nuclear weapons. Cole stated that he had not objected to equipping
aircraft with nuclear bombs because in his own mind he doubted that nuclear warheads
would ever be employed, but that he could not bring himself to place conventional weap-
ons on aircraft knowing that some day they might be put into actual use. 494 F.2d at 145.
Initially, these views seem contradictory or at least difficult to attribute to a conscientious
objector. Apparently these statements were Cole's description of the "incident" which
crystallized his views, after which Cole would work with neither kind of bomb-nuclear
nor conventional.
Captain Smith's crystallization occurred under different circumstances. His medical
education had been financed by the Air Force and he was engaged in a government-
sponsored internship in pediatrics when he was notified in April 1971 that he was to be
assigned to a normal Air Force active duty station and not pediatrics. Captain Smith
asserted that:
[Tihe motivating force behind my application for Conscientious Objector
status was a direct result of my belief in the sacredness of the Human Spirit
. . .[because] . ..I had to a great degree dealt with my beliefs and their
consequences by denying their meaning, rationalizing that as a pediatrician
I would not really be fulfilling a military role . ..and would thus be
able to serve out my obligation . . . . [Upon notification of my new posi-
tion], I fully realized that . .. I would clearly be performing a military
function. . . . [T]hus I would be playing a definite part in supporting the
violation of the Human Spirit.
486 F.2d at 312 (footnote omitted).
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psychiatrist,8 a chaplain,' and a hearing or investigating officer.' 0
In Cole's case, all interviewers agreed that he was sincere in his
beliefs about conscientious objection. Smith's interviewers were
likewise impressed with his sincerity; however, the hearing officer
recommended approval of the application in Smith but recom-
mended denial in Cole. 2 After the interview reports were com-
pleted, each applicant was allowed 15 days by regulation in which
to submit a rebuttal.'3 Smith filed a comprehensive rebuttal" but
Cole did not." Each applicant's file was then forwarded to the
local staff judge advocate for legal review. The judge advocate
recommended that both applications be denied." The files then
proceeded upward within their respective chains of command,
being denied at every level." The applications were finally and
formally denied at the highest level.'" Petitions for writ of habeas
corpus relief followed the final military decision.
The federal courts, including the Tenth Circuit, apply the
"basis in fact" test to review military decisions." This scope of
review, described as "the narrowest known to law,"0 means that
a military decision will be upheld if there is any factual basis to
support it.
Cole's writ was denied by the District Court for the District
The psychiatrist examines for the presence of any psychiatric disorder which would
warrant treatment or disposition through medical channels. 32 C.F.R. § 888e.20 (1974).
1 A chaplain critiques and comments on the nature and basis of the applicant's
sincerity and depth of convictions. Id.
1* The investigating officer conducts a hearing and ascertains and assembles all rele-
vant facts and creates a comprehensive record to facilitate an informed decision by higher
authority. Id. § 888e.22(b).
494 F.2d at 142.
" 486 F.2d at 310-11.
" 32 C.F.R. § 888e.24(f) (1974).
" 486 F.2d at 311.
' There was no need for Cole to file a rebuttal since there was no adverse information
to rebut. All interviewers had found him to be sincere.
1 Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141, 142 (10th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307,
309 (10th Cir. 1973).
" 494 F.2d at 143; 486 F.2d at 309.
,S Cole's application was finally denied by Headquarters-United States Air Force.
494 F.2d at 143. Since Smith was an officer, his application was finally denied by the
Secretary of the Air Force. See 32 C.F.R. § 888e.28 (1974).
" This test was first applied in Gilliam v. Reaves, 263 F. Supp. 378, 384 (W.D. La.
1966) to inservice conscientious objector cases as an outgrowth of the test used in selective
service cases announced in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). For a compre-
hensive list of courts applying this test, see Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED. 15, 92-93 (1972).
N Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957). See also Bishop v.
United States, 412 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1969).
1975
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of Colorado2 and Smith's writ was granted by the District Court
for the District of New Mexico with the proviso that he serve the
remainder of his active duty commitment by performing civilian
alternative service.
22
On appeal, the "basis in fact" issue was reviewed in both
cases. 23 Captain Smith appealed from the portion of the district
court's order making his discharge conditional upon completion
of alternative service. 24 Cole raised a procedural due process ques-
tion based upon Air Force Regulation 35-24.25
I. BASIS IN FACT
In Smith the Tenth Circuit found that there was no basis in
fact to deny Captain Smith's claim. 26 The court reviewed the
hearing officer's report which had recommended disapproval of
the application on two grounds: first, Captain Smith took his
oath of office on the same day that he notified the Air Force of
his intention to seek classification as a conscientious objector;
and second, Captain Smith delayed in applying for discharge
when he was informed that he would not be assigned to practice
in pediatrics. Smith entered active duty and enrolled in medical
school in the fall of 1967; in the spring of 1971, he was informed
that he was ineligible for a sponsored residency in pediatrics; in
the fall of 1971 he took his oath as a member of the Air Force
Medical Corps in which he was to be assigned as a Flight Surgeon
or a General Medical Officer.27
The court found that both the oath and the delay were insuf-
21 494 F.2d at 142.
22 486 F.2d at 309.
23 The government raised the issue in Smith, 486 F.2d at 309-14, and Cole raised it
in his case, 494 F.2d at 145.
", The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, in treating the
alternative service issue in Smith, attempted to balance the equities: Captain Smith's
sincere desire to leave the Air Force was weighed against the Air Force's desire to see that
its investment in Smith's medical education not be wasted. The Tenth Circuit found that
there was no statutory authority for imposing a condition upon release of an inservice
conscientious objector who has served more than 180 days. The court held:
[The decision to impose conditions, if any, on the discharge of in-service
conscientious objectors, including those who have had a portion or all of their
education paid for by the armed forces, is a question which should be re-
solved in the Congress . . ..
486 F.2d at 314. Accordingly, the alternative service requirement ordered by the district
court was reversed. Id. at 315.
2 494 F.2d at 142-44.
28 486 F.2d at 313.
" Id. at 308-09.
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ficient grounds upon which to base a finding of insincerity; and
although the oath and application were "superficially inconsist-
ent action," both grounds were adequately explained in Smith's
rebuttal letter.
28
The government argued that due weight must be given to the
fact that eight Air Force command-level officers had reviewed
Smith's application and recommended denial. The court re-
sponded:
We deem of more importance, however, the reports of those who
actually interviewed Captain Smith and had an opportunity to ob-
serve his demeanor
2'
The treatment in Cole of the reviewing officer's comments
appears to be inconsistent with the treatment in Smith. In Cole,
Judge McWilliams, writing for the court, relied upon the reason-
ing of the judge advocate's report which had questioned Cole's
sincerity. 0 He did not rely on the reports of the interviewers
which had been considered determinative of sincerity in Smith.
This is surprising since only two of three interviewers found Cap-
tain Smith to be sincere while all three found Airman Cole to be
sincere. 3' The judge advocate's report, which Cole had no oppor-
tunity to rebut, was similar to the command-level reports disre-
garded in Smith; it was based upon the record and not on a
personal interview with Cole. Judge McWilliams, in denying
Cole's writ of habeas corpus, concluded that Cole's aversion to
war was more a passing result of his wife's influence than a per-
manent change in Cole's beliefs.
32
Id. at 311.
Id. at 313 (footnote omitted). The court added:
The review was conducted by career officers who had no personal con-
tact with Captain Smith. Their recommendations that Doctor Smith's appli-
cation be denied were based upon inferences drawn from an inanimate re-
cord, and all such recommendations were based not upon hard, reliable
provable facts but rather upon disbelief as to his sincerity, or the alleged
inconsistencies pointed out by the investigating officer ....
Id. at 313 n.13.
1 494 F.2d at 145. Cf. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 397 (1953); United
States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 1969).
The hearing officer recommended Cole for discharge. 494 F.2d at 142.
22 Id. at 145. Generally, the influence of a wife has not been sufficient to support a
"basis in fact" finding. In Cohen v. Laird, 315 F. Supp. 1265 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd 439 F.2d
866 (4th Cir. 1971), five inservice conscientious objector cases were joined. In the only
habeas corpus petition granted, serviceman Green asserted "that, with his marriage, his
religious impulse quickened and his unalterable opposition to participation in war crystal-
lized." Id. at 1276. The court, despite this pronouncement by the serviceman, noted that
"petitioner was influenced by and was expressing the opinions of his wife. [However, the]
Board completely disregarded, and took no note of, the reports of the chaplain, the psychi-
1975
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Since the issue in both cases was the determination of sincer-
ity and since it has been recognized that those having personal
contact with the applicant are in the best position to judge sincer-
ity, as suggested in Smith, the Smith decision seems to be consis-
tent while the Cole decision seems to be inconsistent with control-
ling precedent.'
II. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
The second issue which the court reviewed in Cole was the
due process question. Cole based his claim on Air Force Regula-
tion 35-24, paragraph 13:
Any additional information other than the official service record of
the applicant considered by [Headquarters-United States Air
Force] which is adverse to the applicant, and which the applicant
has not had an opportunity to comment upon or refute, will be made
a part of the record and the applicant will be given a 15-day oppor-
tunity from date of receipt of the additional information to comment
upon or refute the material before a final decision is made. The
reasons for an adverse decision will be made a part of the record and
will be provided to the individual."
Cole argued that he was entitled to examine the negative
recommendations of the command-level reviewers since these
reports contributed new information to the file which he had not
had an opportunity to rebut before the final decision was made
by Headquarters-United States Air Force. He alleged, therefore,
that the failure to provide this opportunity was a denial of proce-
dural due process.3
Judge McWilliams responded to this argument by adopting
the district court's analysis of the regulation:
atrist and the . . .hearing officer ...." Id. at 1278. The court held that there was no
basis in fact to deny serviceman Green's conscientious objection claim. The similarity of
facts between Cohen and Cole is striking. In both cases command-level reviewers ignored
the positive recommendations of the interviewers and mistakenly attached significance to
the influence of petitioners' wives. Cf. Emerson v. McKean, 322 F. Supp. 251, 256 (N.D.
Ala. 1971) (petitioner's family concerns were questioned).
S3 See, e.g., Ferrand v. Seamans, 488 F.2d 1386, 1390 (2d Cir. 1973); Rastin v. Laird,
445 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751,
755 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Tobias v. Laird, 413 F.2d 936, 937-38 (4th Cir.
1969); Chamoy v. Schlesinger, 371 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D. Hawaii 1974); Taylor v. Chaffee,
327 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Talford v. Seaman, 306 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.
Md. 1969); Reitemeyer v. McCrea, 302 F. Supp. 1210, 1221 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd sub horn.
Quaglia v. Boswell, 423 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir. 1970).
" 32 C.F.R. § 888e.28 (1974).
3 Brief for Appellant at 6, Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974).
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This difference in semantics [between information and reasons]
demonstrates that the choice of terms is not accidental. Information
is certainly different from reasons, and therefore . . . [Cole] should
be and was afforded an opportunity to rebut any factual matter in
the file but does not have the right to comment on and rebut the
reasoning giving rise to each conclusion made at various levels of
command.u
The court distinguished on their facts the two cases relied
upon by the appellant, Gonzales v. United States7 and Crotty v.
Kelly.38 The Cole court observed that Gonzales dealt with a rec-
ommendation which became the factual basis for the final deci-
sion denying a selective service applicant conscientious objector
status, but the disputed recommendation in Cole was one made
only in the chain of command decisional process and contained
no new factual matter.39 Judge McWilliams concluded that the
command decision had complied with Air Force regulations and
that due process requirements had been fulfilled.' 0
In focusing on the factual differences, however, the court
misconceived the significance and import of Gonzales. Gonzales
recognized, as implicit in the selective service regulations, the
applicant's right to be aware of any adverse information which
might be considered by the final decisionmaker." Although
Gonzales involved a selective service applicant, its holding has
been applied not only to different military regulations in both
" 494 F.2d at 144.
31 348 U.S. 407 (1955). Gonzales involved a registrant who had sought a conscientious
objector exemption from his local draft board. After his draft board denied his claim, the
registrant appealed. Under the procedure then applicable, the appeal board consulted the
Department of Justice which conducted an investigation and recommended denial of the
conscientious objector classification. The appeal board accepted and relied upon the rec-
ommendation. The registrant never saw the adverse Department of Justice report. He
then appealed to the courts on due process grounds. See also Simmons v. United States,
348 U.S. 397 (1955); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
443 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1971).
494 F.2d at 144.
a Id.
" Mr. Justice Clark observed it is
[i]mplicit in the Act and Regulations-viewed against our underlying con-
cepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play-that a copy of the recom-
mendation of the Department [of Justice] be furnished the registrant at the
time it is forwarded to the Appeal Board, and that he be afforded an oppor-
tunity to reply.
348 U.S. 407, 412 (1955) (footnote omitted). He then concluded:
[Tihe right to file a statement before the Appeal Board includes the right
to file a meaningful statement, one based on all the facts in the file and made




selective service'2 and inservice conscientious objector cases, '3 but
also to hearings under the Federal Food and Cosmetic Act," to
discharge from the Michigan State Civil Service,' 5 to motions for
preliminary injunction for violations of the Sherman Act," and to
a motion for review of construction subsidy awards by the Mari-
time Subsidy Board of the Maritime Administration."
Judge McWilliams indicated that Crotty did not apply be-
cause the inservice conscientious objector applicant in Crotty had
not been given a copy of the interviewing officers' reports, which
had been supplied to Cole."8 However, by focusing on these fac-
tual differences, the court overlooked several facets of the Crotty
decision. Judge Coffin in Crotty emphasized the final nature of
the Conscientious Objector Review Board. This Board was the
final decisionmaker (as the appeal board in Gonzales and Head-
quarters-United States Air Force in Cole) which should have
access to all available information, including the applicant's re-
sponses to unfavorable recommendations." Judge Coffin also ac-
knowledged the policy of fundamental fairness implicit in the
Gonzales decision:
42 E.g., United States v. Thompson, 431 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Cabbage, 430 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.
1969); United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
" Crotty v. Kelly, 443 F.2d 214 (lst Cir. 1971); Violi v. Reese, 343 F. Supp. 462 (E.D.
Pa. 1972); Finley v. Drew, 337 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd 455 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1972);
cf. Rohe v. Froehlke, 500 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1974) (reservist called to active duty for
accumulation of unexcused absences from unit training assemblies successfully relied
upon Gonzales). But see O'Mara v. Zebrowski, 447 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1971); Caruso v.
Toothaker, 331 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (reservists' reliance upon Gonzales was
unsuccessful).
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 464 F.2d 1068, 1072 n.6 (3d Cir. 1972).
Viculin v. Department of Civil Service, 386 Mich. 375, 192 N.W.2d 449, 462 (1971).
, Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Org., Inc., 446 F.2d 353, 356 (5th
Cir. 1971).
11 Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 568, 585 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
But see O'Dwyer v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 575, 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 862
(1959) (unsuccessful effort to inspect revenue agent's reports) and Pearce v. United States,
262 F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1958) (unsuccessful effort to inspect probation report).
, 494 F.2d at 144.
, Crotty v. Kelly, 443 F.2d 214, 216 (1st Cir. 1971). Judge Coffin in Crotty suggested
that:
The Army procedure is more final than the Appeal Board procedure in
Gonzales. There, at least, there was some provision for "rehearing" because
the registrant could examine his file, including the Department's recommen-
dation, after the Board's disapproval and could seek a re-opening if he found
erroneous information. No similar provision exists in the military procedures
Id. at 216 n.1.
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The reasoning of that opinion [Gonzales] was not based upon the
intricacies of the particular regulations under scrutiny but was
based upon "underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic
fair play."
The Crotty court not only adopted the rationale of Gonzales
but extended it, recognizing a trend for broader availability of
adverse information.5' Crotty, decided under Department of De-
fense Directive No. 1300.6, obliged the military to provide a copy
of the interviewing officers' reports where there had been no duty
before.5" The court in Crotty found "implicit in the regulation"
the due process requirement that applicants be given an oppor-
tunity to rebut adverse interview reports. Cole, decided under the
revised directive of 1971 in which the military was compelled to
disclose these adverse interview reports to the applicant, pro-
vided an opportunity to find "implicit in the regulation" the right
of the applicant to review command level recommendations as
well.
Another view of the Cole fact pattern and of Air Force Regu-
lation 35-24 paragraph 13 is suggested by a recent Eighth Circuit
decision, Chilgren v. Schlesinger.5 3 In Chilgren the due process
and basis in fact issues were juxtaposed to raise this question: If
the command-level reviewers did not provide adverse factual in-
formation, as was argued by the government in the due process
portion of its brief,5" and if all interview reports were favorable,
what basis in fact was there to deny the conscientious objector
claim? All of the information prior to the command-level review
Id. at 217.
', United States v. Fisher, 442 F.2d 109, 116 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cum-
mins, 425 F.2d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 489
(1969).
52 Crotty was decided under Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (1969) where
there was no duty to disclose interviewing officers' reports. The applicable section in the
revised directive is found at 32 C.F.R. § 888e.24(f) (1974).
- 499 F.2d 204, 208 (8th Cir. 1974):
It is argued, on the one hand, that the Air Force was not required to furnish
the record to [Chilgren] because it contained no adverse information; yet,
on the other hand, [the government] argue[s] that there was a basis in fact
in that same record which justified reversal of hearing officers' recommenda-
tions in [Chilgren's] favor. We fail to see how such a basis in fact could be
found in a record containing no adverse information.
" Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974). The
government argued that:
[AIIl the recommendations of the entire chain of command were merely
comments of the file as the applicant had prepared it .... They contained
no new information and consisted solely in critical evaluation of matters
known to the applicant.
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was favorable to Airman Cole. Since there was no adverse factual
information in Cole's file, there could be no adverse decision.
III. CONCLUSION
The Cole decision appears to be inconsistent with current
precedent. The court's review of the "basis in fact" for denial of
the application in Cole is in conflict with the review in Smith
where the application was granted. Additionally, the decision in
Cole seems to be inconsistent with the due process policy of fun-
damental fairness in Gonzales and Crotty.
E. Stephen Temko
VII. AMERICAN INDIANS
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,
490 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma' the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the third and final stage of a dispute which
had involved 6 years of litigation.
Initially, the Cherokees, and the Choctaws and Chickasaws
as intervenors, brought suit against the State of Oklahoma and
holders of various leases on mineral rights to the bed of the Ar-
kansas River.' Because of the shift in the flow of the river, valua-
ble sand, gravel, oil, and gas deposits were exposed. The Indian
tribes claimed that the riverbed lands had been conveyed to them
by the United States; they sought both an accounting of lease
monies and an injunction.' The State counterclaimed for a decree
to quiet title in Oklahoma.4 The trial court and the Tenth Circuit
rendered judgment for the State. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.
The second phase arose on remand to the trial court. The
parties disagreed over whether the Supreme Court had decided
present title to the riverbed or only past title.' The trial court held
that the Supreme Court had determined present title. The parties
also disagreed over the amount of damages to be paid, some con-
490 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1974).
Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 402 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 742.
4Id.
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, rehearing denied, 398 U.S. 945 (1970).
Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 461 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1972).
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tending that they were entitled to the value of the minerals taken
and others contending that they were entitled to the amount of
the lease payments. Total receipts in lease payments collected by
the State totalled $786,541.67. The trial court held that Okla-
homa should account for all of the lease, rental, and royalty pay-
ments received.! These findings were affirmed by the Tenth Cir-
cuit.,
The last phase involved a dispute over the payment of inter-
est on these funds. Pursuant to the Oklahoma constitution,' the
lease payments had been placed in the permanent school trust
fund. The principal could not be invaded, but the interest or
income could be and was paid periodically to school districts
throughout the State.'" The amount of interest claimed to have
been earned and to be due to the Indian tribes was $212,423.83."
The trial court disallowed the claim for interest. On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit recognized the issue implicit in the dispute: "The
problem faced by the trial court . . . is . . . [that] the monies
for which an accounting was sought were no longer in existence,
having been expended by the State pursuant to constitutional
mandate."'" The Tenth Circuit concluded, based upon the appl-
icable Oklahoma law, that "the trial court's action disallowing
interest under all the circumstances was equitable, and not
clearly erroneous" in this "difficult situation.'
3
VIII. DUE PROCESS-MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
Abeyta v. Town of Taos,
499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974)
Several employees of the Taos, New Mexico police depart-
ment were dismissed in 1972 when the department was reorgan-
ized. Each dismissal was based upon specific allegations of mis-
feasance. In Abeyta v. Town of Taos,' the discharged employees
Id. at 677.
Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 461 F.2d 674 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039
(1972).
* OKLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 3.
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 490 F.2d 521, 523-24 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 524.
" Id. at 526.
,3 Id. at 527.
499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974).
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sought reinstatements and back wages. The District Court for the
District of New Mexico denied relief to all but one of the employ-
ees.
2
On appeal, the first issue raised by the plaintiffs challenged
the procedure followed by the town council in approving the dis-
missals. Taos had a mayor-council form of government with four
council positions. The mayor had no statutory authority to vote
in council deliberations except in the event of a tie vote by the
council.3 A New Mexico statute provided that a municipal em-
ployee could be discharged only by a majority vote of all council
members.' In the case of one plaintiff, two council members and
the mayor voted for his dismissal, one council member voted
against, and the fourth council member was absent at the time
of the vote. Since not all of the council members had participated
in the vote which did not result in a tie, the vote of the mayor
was improper.' Notwithstanding this defect, the district court
refused to order reinstatement and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the town council could properly
discharge the plaintiff regardless of the vote of the absent council-
man. If, at the next meeting, that councilman were to vote for
dismissal, the statutory majority for dismissal would be realized.
If he were to vote for retention, a tie vote would result and the
mayor could then properly exercise his right to break the tie in
favor of dismissal. Therefore, the court observed that the prayed-
for relief "would be ephemeral at best."6
Plaintiffs' second and major contention on appeal was that
their employment was a "property" interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause which required a
hearing on their dismissals. The court responded with the general
rule that public employees do not have a property interest in their
employment.' Exceptions to this general rule exist in cases where
2 By order of the district court, affirmed on appeal, a woman clerical employee was
reinstated with back wages. She had received a termination letter from the police chief
which stated that there was no place in the department for a woman. In a letter to the
police commission, the police chief cited the following reasons for her dismissal: job
related incompetence, sexual misconduct with male members of the department, and
failure to turn over traffic fines received by her to the police magistrate. Since these
allegations injured her reputation, it was held that failure to hold a hearing on her dis-
missal was a violation of due process under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 325-26.
1 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-3 (1953).
4 Id. § 14-10-6(D)(1).
' 499 F.2d at 328.
*Id.
Id. at 327. See generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Lontine v. VanCleave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973).
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the employees hold contracts for continuing employment, for ex-
ample, tenured teachers.' In this case, however, the court noted
that the plaintiffs had no contract with the town and no agree-
ment as to any term of employment. Consequently, their employ-
ment was "terminable at will."' Since due process did not attach
to such employment as a property interest, the town had not
violated any constitutional right in failing to hold a hearing on
the dismissals.'"
Plaintiffs also argued that the town's allegations of misfeas-
ance as grounds for dismissal had damaged their reputations and
chances for obtaining new employment. Although some of the
charges involved gross and possibly criminal misconduct," the
court of appeals dismissed this argument on the theory that the
charges did not allege dishonesty or immorality.'2 The court
stated that the plaintiffs had produced "no evidence whatsoever
to support this argument."
'' 3
As their fourth and final point of appeal, plaintiffs alleged
that they were dismissed for exercising their right of free speech
in sending a grievance letter to the police chief. Inasmuch as
specific grounds of misfeasance had been set forth in terminating
each plaintiff's employment, the court of appeals found this argu-
ment to be without merit."
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972):
A person's interest in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process pur-
poses if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support
his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972):
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it.
499 F.2d at 327. Accord, 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTs 292-93 (Supp. 1971).
ID Due process rights affecting public employees may arise by virtue of other circum-
stances. Supra note 2.
1, Among the charges were the following: shooting at a police car, shooting out win-
dows in town, lack of judgment in confidential matters, mistreatment of persons arrested
for traffic violations, and disobeying orders. 499 F.2d at 326 nn. 1 & 2.
,I Compare the allegations supra note 2 with those supra note 11.
,3 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that some plaintiffs had already found
new employment. Those who had not, the court further noted, were unwilling to seek
employment away from Taos. 499 F.2d at 327-28.
" Id. at 328. Specifically excepted from this finding was the plaintiff referred to in
note 2 supra.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I. SELF-INCRIMINATION
In Holloway v. United States' the Tenth Circuit held that a
defendant's incriminating statements made three or four hours
after being advised of his Miranda rights2 were the result of a
voluntary and intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination. At the time of arrest defendant exercised his right
to remain silent but later initiated a conversation with an agent.
The circuit court did not consider lapse of time a significant
factor in the determination of whether or not there was a valid
waiver.' The court treated all of defendant's statements as part
of one conversation and held that because he initiated it, his
statements came within the rule that spontaneous utterances are
admissible.4 From the facts it appears that there were two conver-
sations and that the second was an interrogation rather than part
of the conversation initiated by defendant. His answers, however,
were admissible under the rule that once warnings are given and
understood, repeated warnings are not necessary prior to subse-
quent interrogation.5
United States v. Pommerening' involved convictions for
bribing a government official and for perjury before a grand jury.
Claiming to have been "prime targets" of the grand jury investi-
gation defendants argued that they should have been warned of
their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination before
testifying. The court disposed of this claim by finding that defen-
dants were not in fact the target of the grand jury investigation.
The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to a
grand jury proceeding.7 While a grand jury witness cannot in the
495 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Accord, United States v. Manar, 454 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Osterburg, 423 F.2d 704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 914 (1970); Maguire v. United
States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969).
See, e.g., United States v. Gaynor, 472 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Trosper, 450 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bourrassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); United States v. Duke, 369 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 934 (1967).
1 See Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1968); Maguire v. United States,
396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969); United States v. Kinsey,
352 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
500 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1974).
E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892); United States v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 836 (1957).
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federal system claim a privilege against testifying,' he may refuse
to answer a question which would tend to incriminate him' unless
he has been granted immunity.'" The general rule is that a grand
jury witness is not entitled to be warned of his constitutional right
not to answer particular questions, but himself bears the burden
of asserting that right." The Tenth Circuit applied this rule in
Pommerening, holding that there was no duty to warn the defen-
dants "in absence of any indication that it [the grand jury]
might bring charges against them."'" The court left open the
question of the right of an individual who is the target of the
grand jury investigation to be warned of his privilege against self-
incrimination, a question that has been the subject of much dis-
cussion and controversy among the circuits.' 3
The court also ruled that even if defendants were entitled to
warnings, failure to give them would not have barred their convic-
tion for perjury. It is settled that the privilege against self-
incrimination relates to past crimes-not to present or future
acts."
By ruling not only on the issue of defendants' right to
United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972);
United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966);
United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
836 (1957).
10 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441 (1972); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967).
" United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972);
Robinson v. United States, 401 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. DiMichele, 375
F.2d 959 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d
113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
12 500 F.2d at 99.
" United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967), and Stanley v. United
States, 245 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1957), both held that a "virtual defendant," unlike a "mere
witness," must be advised of his right to refuse to answer incriminating statements and
that anything he says can be used against him. United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972), and United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955), expressly left this question open. In the latter
the Second Circuit noted district courts' rulings that warnings are required and strongly
recommended that warnings be given where indictment of the witness is a possibility.
Apparently since Scully such witnesses are given Miranda warnings in the Second Circuit.
See, e.g., United States v. Binder, 453 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 920
(1972); United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971);
United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958).
," See, e.g., Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911); Robinson v. United
States, 401 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965).
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Miranda warnings, but also on the question of their right to be
warned of their rights to remain silent and to the assistance of
counsel, the Tenth Circuit showed its awareness that a conclusion
that Miranda is inapplicable to a grand jury situation 5 does not
answer the question whether or not it is necessary to warn certain
witnesses of their privilege against self-incrimination."6
A second case in which the Tenth Circuit ruled on the necess-
ity of warning individuals of their privilege against self-
incrimination was United States v. Bettenhausen.'7 In that case
the defendant complained that the advisement of his rights given
by a special agent of the IRS at a tax investigation interview was
inadequate in violation both of IRS published procedures and of
Miranda. The court held Miranda inapplicable in this case and
held that when ruling on the adequacy of warnings under an IRS
procedure the burden is on the defendant to show noncompliance.
The question of the applicability of Miranda to a tax investi-
gation has been the subject of much discussion and litigation.
In 1967 and 1968 the IRS published procedures to insure the
uniform practice of advising individuals of their privilege to re-
main silent. 9 The more recent and detailed publication stated:
At the initial meeting with a taxpayer, a Special Agent is now re-
quired to identify himself, describe his function, and advise the
taxpayer that anything he says may be used against him. The Spe-
cial Agent will also tell the taxpayer that he cannot be compelled
to incriminate himself by answering any questions or producing any
15 See United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917
(1972) (noting that there is no "custodial interrogation" as required by Miranda); Com-
monwealth v. Columbia Inv. Corp., 325 A.2d 289, 295-96 (1974) (holding Miranda inappl-
icable to a grand jury proceeding because there is no right to the presence of an attorney
and no right to remain silent, as expressed in Miranda warnings).
' See pre-Miranda cases considering witnesses' rights to warnings, e.g., Stanley v.
United States, 245 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1957); United States v. Scully, 255 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
499 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1974).
' See United States v. Brevik, 422 F.2d 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 943
(1970); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1021 (1971) (and cases cited therein); Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969) (and cases cited therein); United States v. Wainwright,
284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968); United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill.
1967); Duke, Prosecutions For Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a
Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966); Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Tax-
payer in a Fraud Investigation, 44 TAXES 660 (1966); Note, Extending Miranda to Admin-
istrative Investigations, 56 VA. L. Rev. 690 (1970).
" IRS News Release No. 897, October 3, 1967, reprinted in 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. 6832.
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documents, and that he has the right to seek the assistance of any
attorney before responding."
The publication of this warning procedure greatly diminished the
significance of the question of the applicability of Miranda to a
tax investigation2 because the procedure provided what on its
face would seem to be a complete substitute for Miranda warn-
ings."2 Since the IRS initiated these procedures, all of the cir-
cuits23 except the Seventh 4 have ruled that Miranda is inapplica-
ble to a general tax investigation interview. Only if the interview
is held in a custodial situation are Miranda rights required.2 5 The
court in Bettenhausen found no coercion or meaningful restraint
on defendant's freedom of action that would bring Miranda into
play.
The court might still have found that defendant was denied
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination had it ap-
plied the rule of Miranda and placed the burden on the govern-
ment to show compliance with warning requirements. Instead,
the court said that because this case involved an administrative
2 IRS News Release No. 949, November 26, 1968, reprinted in 7 CCH 1969 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. 6946.
11 See United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111, 1117 n.13 (7th Cir. 1969), where the
court, aware of the new IRS procedures, stated that the impact of its holding that Miranda
warnings are required was thus diminished.
n But see Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34, 39 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 943 (1969), where the court said without explanation that the IRS procedures were a
"step forward," but they "fall short ... of extending to the taxpayer the protections set
forth in Escobedo and Miranda."
0 See United States v. Brevik, 422 F.2d 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 943
(1970); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1021 (1971), (and cases cited therein); Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969), (and cases cited therein).
24 United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
5 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d
415 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d
1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v. Brevik, 422 F.2d 449
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 943 (1970). The Tenth Circuit joined in this holding of
the limited applicability of Miranda to tax investigations in Hensley v. United States, 406
F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1968). Strangely, though, there is the following statement in the 1971
case United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1971):
The better reasoned cases hold that a warning in accordance with Escobedo
v. Illinois [378 U.S. 478 (1964)] and Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436
(1966)] must be given to the taxpayer by either the revenue agent or the
special intelligence agent at the inception of the first contact with the tax-
payer following transfer of the case to the Intelligence Division.
Id. at 422 (dictum). The court cited United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir.
1969); United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968); and United States
v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. 111. 1967), which hold that Miranda rights are
required at a tax investigation.
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procedure, not a custodial interrogation, the defendant had the
burden of showing noncompliance, and the noncompliance must
be "substantial.""8 The court noted that the record did not show
"the nature or extent of what part of the prescribed warning was
not given" and concluded that the defendant had failed to carry
this burden.
Courts have enforced the IRS warning requirements by ex-
cluding from evidence statements obtained in violation of the
published procedures.28 Because of its allocation of the burden of
proof in Bettenhausen, the Tenth Circuit did not reach the ques-
tion of the effect of a violation of the warning procedures. Its
ruling reduces the scope of these procedures so that they are less
than a complete substitute for Miranda. Contrary to the pre-
sumption against waiver where Miranda applies, where the IRS
procedures are applicable, there is a presumption that an individ-
ual was properly warned of his rights and intelligently waived
them.
In Pauldino v. United States21 the defendant, convicted of
traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in
gambling activities, challenged as a violation of his privilege
against self-incrimination, the admission into evidence of his
1966 tax return to establish his occupation as a gambler. The
issue faced by the court, as phrased by the Ninth Circuit, was,
"to what extent and under what circumstances may incriminat-
ing information supplied by a taxpayer . . . be used against the
taxpayer in a criminal prosecution unrelated to the income tax
laws."
30
The court relied on cases upholding the use of tax returns in
evidence at trials of tax crimes 3' and non-tax crimes,32 and made
" The court relied on Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), and United
States v. Bland, 458 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). In Bland, the
court placed the burden on the defendant to show misconduct by an agent at a time when
the only duty of an IRS agent was not to use misrepresentation or deception.
11 499 F.2d at 1231.
n United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Heffner, 420
F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969); cf. United States v. Bembridge, 458 F.2d 1262 (1st Cir. 1972).
See also cases enforcing other administrative regulations, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S.
535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaugh-
nessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
500 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1974).
Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed,
43 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Aug. 9,1974) (No. 74-100).
SI United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
918 (1972).
' Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974), revg 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.
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no distinction between the two. The court held that while Paul-
dino could have claimed the privilege when he filed his tax re-
turn,3 his failure to do so was a waiver of that privilege, and he
could not claim the privilege retroactively.
In one of the recent cases relied on by the court in Pauldino
the Ninth Circuit, before reversing itself on rehearing, did distin-
guish between use of tax returns as evidence in trials of tax crimes
and non-tax crimes. In Garner v. United States34 that circuit
originally ruled that a tax return was not admissible in a trial of
a non-tax crime. In the 1949 case Stillman v. United States35 the
Ninth Circuit held a tax return admissible as evidence of a non-
tax crime under an "implied waiver" theory. However, in the
original Garner opinion the court effectively overruled Stillman."
The Ninth Circuit noted that a taxpayer is compelled to give
information on his return under fear of criminal prosecution for
failure to do so-and so is given a "Hobson's choice."37 The court
held that while the government can compel the giving of informa-
tion, it may not later claim that such information was volun-
teered. By filing a return without objection, therefore, a taxpayer
has not waived his privilege against self-incrimination for pur-
poses of a non-tax crime.
After much comment on Garner8 the Ninth Circuit reversed
itself on rehearing en banc, and held that because the defendant
knew his answers might be incriminating, he had a choice either
of claiming his privilege or answering the questions. Once he
answered the questions, he could not "immunize himself" by
claiming the privilege retroactively. 9 The Tenth Circuit's ruling
in Pauldino is in line with this final holding of the Ninth Circuit.
1972), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1974) (No. 74-100); Grimes
v. United States, 379 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967); Stillman v.
United States, 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
11 United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
34 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 501 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Aug. 9,1974) (No. 74-100).
- 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949).
- 501 F.2d 228, 231.
31 Id. at 233.
3 See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law-Self-Incrimination-Use of Information
Provided without Objection on Income Tax Return Prohibited in Prosecution for Nontax
Offense-Garner v. United States, 86 HARv. L. REv. 914 (1973); Comment, The Use of the
Income Tax Return in Unrelated Criminal Prosecutions: Garner v. United States, 14 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 203 (1972).
39 501 F.2d 236, 240.
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In two cases decided the same day, Wall v. United States"
and Williams v. United States,41 the voluntariness of guilty pleas
was challenged on the grounds that the defendants were not ad-
vised that the sentences imposed would be served consecutively
with sentences they were presently serving for other convictions.
In both cases it was argued that the fact that the sentences would
be consecutive was a consequence of their pleas of which they
should have been informed under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11, which provides that the court must determine before
accepting a quilty plea that the accused understands the conse-
quences of the plea.4"
Defendants in both cases were imprisoned on state charges
at the time they plead guilty to the federal charges. Under 18
U.S.C. § 3568 (1970) a federal sentence commences on the date
the convicted individual is received at the federal penal institu-
tion. Because Wall and Williams would not arrive at the federal
institution until the completion of their existing state sentences,
their federal sentences were necessarily consecutive to the state
sentences.
In Wall the effect of section 3568 was not mentioned, and the
court simply concluded that the fact the federal sentences would
follow the previously imposed state sentence was "not a definite
'practical consequence of the plea' within the meaning of Rule
11."' In Williams, where defendant specifically argued that he
should have been warned of the effect of section 3568, the court
admitted that defendant's contention had support in a Ninth
Circuit case, United States v. Myers." But the court said that it
preferred the reasoning of Anderson v. United States,45 a case
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, and noted that "[s]ubsequent to
the Myers case, the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 11 did not re-
quire the sentencing court to advise a defendant that prison terms
on separate counts might run consecutively." The court was
500 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1974).
500 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1974).
42 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATING TO PLEAS OF
GuiLTY 25, § 1.4(c)(i) (approved draft 1968) provides that a judge accepting a guilty plea
must inform the accused "of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including that
possible from consecutive sentences" (emphasis added).
a 500 F. 2d at 39.
4 451 F. 2d 402 (9th Cir. 1972).
,1 302 F. Supp. 387 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 405 F.2d 492 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 965 (1969).
,1 500 F.2d at 44.
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referring to the Ninth Circuit case Johnson v. United States.47
An examination of the two Ninth Circuit cases cited by the
court, Myers and Johnson, reveals a distinction recognized by
that circuit which the Tenth Circuit apparently does not find
significant. In Myers the Ninth Circuit held that while a defen-
dant under an indictment with several counts need not be advised
of the possibility of consecutive sentences, a defendant presently
serving a sentence must be advised of the effect of section 3568,
which is that his federal sentence must be consecutive with his
present one. The distinction is based on the fact that while a
judge has discretion in the decision on concurrence of sentences
under a multiple count indictment, section 3568 gives the court
no discretion. The fact that section 3568 means that consecutive
sentences are a necessary result for a defendant serving another
sentence makes that statute a factor affecting the maximum
term. Section 3568 is, therefore, a consequence of a guilty plea of
which a defendant must be advised under Rule 11. In Johnson v.
United States'8 the defendant was given consecutive sentences for
multiple counts on a single indictment. The Ninth Circuit clearly
distinguished Myers on the grounds that Myers was in custody
for another crime at the time of his plea.
The district court case relied on by the Tenth Circuit,
Anderson v. United States,"0 involved a situation like that in
Myers: Anderson was in state custody when he plead guilty to a
federal charge. In that case the district court found no error in the
failure of the court to tell defendant that his federal sentence
would not begin until the completion of his state sentence. The
court erroneously said that concurrent sentences were discre-
tionary with the judge." In Myers the Ninth Circuit criticized this
statement:
In [Anderson], however, the question of the impact of § 3568 was
apparently not raised and the court mistakenly assumed that "de-
termining if a federal sentence is to run concurrent with or consecu-
tive to a state sentence is a part of the sentencing process left to the
judgment and discretion of the Judge.""
In the Tenth Circuit's affirmance of Anderson, the court cited
section 3568 but did not correct this apparent misconception."
460 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972).
'Id.
" 302 F. Supp. 387 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
Id. at 388.
451 F.2d at 404 n.2.
405 F.2d at 493 (1969).
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In Wall and Williams the Tenth Circuit did speak of the
consecutiveness of sentences as a fact, not as a possibility. The
court cited the Ninth Circuit cases which put great emphasis on
the nondiscretionary character of the imposition of consecutive
sentences where a defendant, like Wall and Williams, is serving
another sentence. But the court did not explicitly recognize the
distinction made in these cases between a defendant affected by
section 3568 and one for whom consecutive sentences for multiple
counts of a single indictment is a possibility. The court rejected
that distinction only by implication. Other circuits have faced the
issue more squarely. The Eighth Circuit recognized the distinc-
tion made in Myers and expressly declined to rule on the issue of
whether a defendant in state custody must be informed of the
effect of section 3568 by finding that the defendant knew his
sentence would be consecutive.53 The Fifth Circuit has ruled that
due process does not require that a defendant be informed of the
consequences of section 3568.11
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In United States v. Dolack,53 the Tenth Circuit applied a
unique approach to unique facts by merging the doctrines of right
to counsel and right to speedy trial. The court reversed a convic-
tion for abducting a female for sexual gratification because the
indigent defendant, incarcerated in a Canadian prison when the
charge was brought, in effect was denied the speedy appointment
of counsel.
Defendant requested the court where the charge was brought
to appoint counsel, to grant travel expenses so counsel could con-
fer with him in prison, and to employ private investigative assis-
tance. This motion was denied. When counsel was appointed 13
months after this request, a renewed motion for investigative as-
sistance was also denied without explanation. Defendant claimed
to have been unable to rebut the testimony of the complaining
witness because he could not locate witnesses necessary for his
defense.
" Harris v. United States, 493 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir. 1974). Cf. United States v. Nichols,
440 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the failure to advise a defendant that any sentence
imposed in the present case would run consecutively to any sentence he was already
serving was held not prejudicial because the state sentence for which he was in custody
at the time of the challenged plea had been reversed.
1, Opela v. United States, 415 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1969).
55 484 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1973).
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The court relied in part on Kirby v. Illinois,56 which held that
the right to counsel arises "at or after the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.
57
The court declared that adversary judicial criminal proceedings
had begun while defendant was incarcerated in the foreign juris-
diction and that his right to counsel arose at that time.
The court could have held that the delay in appointment of
counsel constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because ear-
lier appointment was necessary under the circumstances to pre-
pare an effective defense. Instead, the court relied on cases deal-
ing with the right to speedy trial. The court reviewed part of the
rationale of this right as spelled out in the landmark case on
speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo:51 the right protects defendant's
ability to prepare his case and prevents prejudice from the disap-
pearance or death of witnesses and from loss of memory. And the
court stressed the particular importance of a speedy trial to a
defendant who is incarcerated and unable to gather evidence.
In Smith v. Hooey" and Dickey v. Florida" the Supreme
Court held that the government is not excused from a denial of
speedy trial because the defendant is incarcerated in another
jurisdiction; the state must make a diligent, good faith effort to
bring defendant to trial. In a case in which a defendant incarcer-
ated (like Dolack) in a foreign jurisdiction asserted and was de-
nied his right to a speedy trial, it seems clear that a court, in
deciding whether a delay was excused, would apply a balancing
test, weighing among other factors, both the prejudice to defen-
dant caused by the delay and the reasons for the government's
failure to acquire the defendant's presence."1 In this case Dolack
did not demand a speedy trial; he requested appointment of
counsel and investigative assistance. The court found great preju-
dice to defendant's defense caused by the delay and no justifica-
tion for the delay-and decided that a 13-month delay in the
appointment of counsel was not excused.
Having analogized the harm to this defendant to the harm
resulting from a denial of a speedy trial, the court proceeded to
406 U.S. 682 (1972).
Id. at 689.
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
393 U.S. 374 (1969).
398 U.S. 30 (1970).
1, Cf. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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dismiss the charges against him, a remedy usually associated
with denial of speedy trial.6 2
Im. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES
In two cases this year the Tenth Circuit held photo identifi-
cations permissible. In United States v. Coppola 3 the fact that
defendant's photo carried the name of the state where the crime
was perpetrated against the witness was held not to create a
likelihood of misidentification. The court stressed the fact that
the witness had an excellent opportunity to observe the perpe-
trator of the crime and found evidence of no other suggestibility
in the identification.
The general rule under Simmons v. United States" is that
each photo identification is to be judged on its own facts-and
will be upheld if it is not so suggestive "as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 5 The
court's action, both in looking at the totality of the circumstan-
ces 6 and in finding the writing on the picture not impermissibly
suggestive 7 is in line with holdings in other circuits.
In United States v. Roby"6 an employee at the grocery store
from which defendant stole a check protector used in cashing
falsely-made money orders identified defendant's photograph at
a photo "showup" 5 months after the crime. At trial he testified
that his identification was based on observation of the theft, not
on the photo identification. In holding that the showup was not
suggestive, the court said that delay alone is not determinative. 9
Even a suggestive photo identification will not be held error if the
witness shows an independent identification which dispels the
62 The court cited the recent Supreme Court case, Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S.
434 (1973), which held that dismissal is the only fair remedy for denial of speedy trial.
" 486 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1973).
- 390 U.S. 377 (1967).
SId. at 384.
" United States v. Milano, 443 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943
(1971).
7 See United States v. Counts, 471 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1973) (number on picture
suggested date stolen articles were found, but witness not influenced by the number);
United States v. Faulkner, 447 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972)
(photo inscribed with "Denver Police Department" where Denver was connected with the
crime; permissible because no other suggestibility); United States v. Robinson, 432 F.2d
1348 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (date suggested date of crime; court said date could be overly
suggestive, but here witness testified she did not realize significance of numbers).
499 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1974).
6 Id. at 154. The court relied on Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); United States
v. Hurt, 476 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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likelihood of a mistaken identification.70 In Roby that the witness
had enough opportunity to observe defendant and could describe
his attire at the theft was held enough to establish independent
identification.
Another pretrial matter considered in two cases this year was
the motion to suppress evidence. In United States v. Romero7' the
Tenth Circuit approved a lower court's denial of a motion to
suppress. The circuit court ruled on the correctness of the action
of the lower court by examining testimony developed at trial as
well as evidence presented at the suppression hearing. The court
justified this by reference to the 1972 amendment to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41(f): "It would appear that the new subdi-
vision (f) under Rule 41 . . .has more clearly extended the in-
quiry [concerning a motion to suppress] to include new facts
developed at trial .... ," Former Rule 41(e) provided that:
The motion [to suppress] shall be made before trial or hearing
unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not
aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion
may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing.
In 1972 Rule 41(e) was replaced with a provision for motions for
the return of seized property to be made in the court of the dis-
trict where a challenged seizure occurred. Section (f), an appar-
ent complement to the new section (e), was added: "A motion to
suppress evidence may be made in the court of the district of trial
as provided in Rule 12."
Why the court feels that this amendment broadens the re-
view of action on a motion to suppress to permit consideration of
evidence developed at trial is unclear. Commentators suggest
that the new 41(f) reflects the position that it is better to hear a
motion to suppress in the district of trial than in the district
where the seizure occurred.73 On its face the change involves only
the proper court to hear particular motions and has no bearing
on the scope of an appellate court's review of a ruling on a motion.
The new rule says that motions to suppress are to be made "as
provided in Rule 12." Under Rule 12 a motion is to be "deter-
mined before trial unless the court orders that it be deferred for
10 United States v. Harrison, 460 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972);
United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. .1064
(1972); Davida v. United States, 422 F.2d 528 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
T' 484 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1327.
7 See 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 41.01[3] (2d ed. rev. 1974); 3 C. WaHT,
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE & PRocEDuRE § 673 (Supp. 1973).
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determination at the trial of the general issue." It is unclear how
this practice differs'from that under former Rule 41(e).
In the second case involving motions to suppress the Tenth
Circuit addressed the issue of standing to challenge a search. In
United States v. Smith" the court anticipated the demise of the
"automatic" standing rule of Jones v. United States.75
In Jones the Supreme Court resolved the dilemma faced by
a defendant when possession of the seized evidence is itself an
essential element of the offense with which he is charged; an
exercise of his fourth amendment right in challenging a search
requires the sacrifice of his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court held that where possession both
convicts and confers standing there is eliminated the "necessity
for a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched
or the property seized" ordinarily required to establish standing.7"
In Smith the defendant was convicted of possession of stolen
money orders. The money orders were seized by police officers
from an unoccupied car which did not belong to Smith, but in
which he had placed them. As the defendant did not own the car
that was searched, his standing to challenge the search depended
on his showing a possessory interest in the items seized. Because
evidence of a possessory interest in the stolen money order would
both confer standing and convict, Smith claimed that he had
"automatic" standing.
The Tenth Circuit, however, said that the rationale of auto-
matic standing was removed by Simmons v. United States." In
Simmons, a case where possession was not an element of the
crime charged and where the defendant was therefore required to
establish standing, the Supreme Court ruled that testimony given
by a defendant to show standing is inadmissible against him at
trial on the issue of guilt.78 In Brown v. United States," another
case where possession was not an element of the crime, the Court
held that defendants had failed to meet their burden of establish-
ing standing. The Court expressly reserved the question of the
"continued survival of Jones' 'automatic' standing now that...
Simmons has removed the danger of coerced self-incrimination"'80
7, 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1974).
' 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
Id. at 263.
390 U.S. 377 (1968).
' Id. at 390.




for a case in which possession at the time of the contested search
is an essential element of the offense.
8'
Smith is clearly the kind of case in which the Supreme Court
will decide whether or not to overrule the Jones rule of automatic
standing. The Tenth Circuit, however, ruled in Smith as though
the Supreme Court had already settled this question. The court
said:
The reservation in Brown of the "automatic" standing question
means to us that one who attacks a search must assert and establish
a personal right protected by the Fourth Amendment and that when
such an assertion is contested, "a full hearing on standing"
must be held. 2
The court remanded the case for a hearing on the issue of the
defendant's proprietary interest in the items seized. Having re-
jected the protections of Jones, the court noted that Simmons
would apply, that is evidence produced in the hearing is inadmis-
sible at trial on the issue of defendant's guilt.
In requiring defendants to establish standing even where pos-
session is an element of the crime charged, the Tenth Circuit
forces a defendant to produce more evidence that could poten-
tially be admitted against him for purposes of impeachment or
on issues other than guilt. The decision in Smith represents an
easing of the restrictions on the use of illegally obtained evidence
and thus a weakening of the exclusionary rule.
IV. PROCEDURE AT TRIAL
In United States v. Acosta 3 the Tenth Circuit held improper
a denial of defendant's request for a free transcript of his first trial
which he claimed was necessary to prepare his defense for his
second trial. The court construed the 1971 Supreme Court case
Britt v. North Carolina8' very narrowly. In Britt the Court said
that the defendant did not have to show a particularized need for
the transcript and did not have the burden of showing the inade-
quacy or unavailability of alternative devices, but held that it was
not improper to deny a transcript in that case. Although the
defendant did not have the burden of showing need or the inade-
quacy of alternatives, the Supreme Court found strong evidence
of the adequacy of the alternatives in the fact that the trial was
11 Id. at 228.
" 495 F.2d at 670.
" 495 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1974).
404 U.S. 226 (1971).
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in a small town before the same judge, and the court reporter
could have read back the trial record to counsel at any time before
the second trial. Furthermore, defense counsel conceded the
availability and adequacy of alternatives to a transcript.
The Tenth Circuit limited Britt to the situation where de-
fense counsel concedes the availability of a functional alternative.
In its view in the absence of such a concession and in the absence
of clear evidence of such an alternative, it is error to deny a
defendant a free transcript.
The holding that an indigent defendant has a basic right to
a free transcript under the equal protection clause, first articu-
lated in Griffin v. Illinois,85 and the later holding that a state may
provide an adequate alternative to a transcript" have been re-
fined and elaborated upon. Some courts, for example, considered
significant the fact that the same counsel represented defendant
in both hearings. 7 In 1969 the Second Circuit held that the use
of the same counsel did not justify denial of a transcript and that
access to a court reporter at the second trial to read back from
the record of the first trial was "too little and too late."' The
Supreme Court has since said that counsel's memory is no alter-
native to a transcript."9 In Britt the Supreme Court summarized
the factors relevant to a ruling on a request for a free transcript
and to an evaluation of the adequacy of alternative devices. The
Court said that neither counsel's notes from the previous hearing
nor counsel's memory nor limited access to a court reporter at the
second trial is an adequate alternative to a transcript.
In Acosta the Tenth Circuit focused on this dictum in Britt
and concluded that even though the Supreme Court held that a
transcript was not required in that case, Britt did not lower the
high standard of proof required to find that an adequate alterna-
tive to a transcript existed. The Sixth Circuit, too, has limited
Britt to its facts, putting emphasis on the fact that counsel for
Britt conceded the adequacy of alternatives to a transcript. 0 In
an Eighth Circuit case" defense counsel did not concede the ade-
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
'7 Compare Peterson v. United States, 351 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1965), with Forsberg v.
United States, 351 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966).
United States ex rel. Wilson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 896, 897 (2d Cir. 1969).
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (dictum).
" United States v. Young, 472 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1972).
" United States v. Talbott, 454 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 922
(1972).
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quacy of an alternative, but the court in effect inferred concession
from the fact that counsel was given access to the court reporter
at the second trial to read back from the record of the first trial,
but did not request the reporter to read back, and was allowed to
use the government's copy of the transcript. In Acosta, defense
counsel protested the lack of an adequate alternative and there
was no evidence like that in Britt of such an alternative.
In Leggroan v. Smith 2 the Tenth Circuit held a Utah jury
selection statute, which provided for use of real and personal
property tax rolls in jury selection, constitutional. However, the
court ruled unconstitutional the practice of choosing persons for
jury service from only the real property tax lists. The effect of the
practice was held to exclude non-property owners from juries,
prejudicially reducing the number of women, young people, poor
people, and members of minority races. This in the court's opin-
ion amounted to systematic exclusion of an identifiable class of
persons not based on a sufficiently reasonable classification.
Leggroan will apply retroactively for those defendants convicted
under this system who timely objected to the panel.
An early Supreme Court case, Gibson v. Mississippi,'" listed
"freeholders" as one of the valid classifications states could im-
pose on jury selection. This holding has never expressly been
overruled and has been cited with approval as recently as 1965
by a federal district court." The Tenth Circuit said that the valid-
ity of the "freeholder" classification was implicitly overruled
when the Supreme Court in Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene
County,'5 citing Gibson v. Mississippi" without quoting it, omit-
ted the "freeholder" item from its list of valid criteria.
Most cases on jury selection have been concerned with racial
discrimination, and most cases involving use of tax lists have
been viewed in terms of the manner of their use and their racially
discriminatory effect.' More recent cases, however, have exam-
2 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974).
" 162 U.S. 565 (1896). See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
" Williams v. State, 237 F. Supp. 360, 370 (E.D.S.C. 1965), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Morris v. State, 356 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1966).
396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970).
162 U.S. 565 (1896).
" See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953); Roach v. Mauldin, 391 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1095 (1969).
See also United States ex rel. Davis v. Henderson, 330 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. La. 1971),
modified, 474 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), where in rejecting defendant's claim that a system
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ined jury selection procedures in terms of their affirmative effect
on obtaining a fair cross section of the community rather than
merely for the absence of racially discriminatory application. 8
One federal district court has said in dictum that if a statute
"limits jurors to taxpayers assessed as owners of real property, the
statute must be deemed unconstitutional."" That court, like the
Tenth Circuit in this case, based its statement on an analogy with
Supreme Court cases declaring statutes unconstitutional which
restricted eligibility for voting on special issues or eligibility for
holding schoolboard office to owners of real property.'®
In another Tenth Circuit case this year, United States v.
Williams,101 the defendant claimed that he was denied his due
process right to the presumption of innocence when he appeared
at trial in jail attire. The Tenth Circuit rejected his claim on the
grounds that he had other clothes available and chose to wear the
jail clothes.
In looking at the particular facts of the case to determine
whether there was a voluntary waiver of his right, the court was
following its own 1972 precedent'02 and is in a clear majority.
However, the court cited the landmark Fifth Circuit case,
Hernandez v. Beto'03 as if it stated an automatic rule. In fact that
case held that a defendant could not wear jail clothes willingly
and claim error, and that each case is to be judged on its own
facts. The Tenth Circuit's holding in Williams is right in line with
the rule expressed in Hernandez.
The rationale given for this right not to appear at trial in jail
attire has been explained by saying that the presumption of inno-
cence requires that a defendant be entitled to the "garb of inno-
of selection resulted in juries of higher social, economic, and racial stature than the
community median, the court noted that the Supreme Court had yet to apply equal
protection to jury selection for any reason other than race or nationality.
" See, e.g., Moore v. Dutton, 294 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D. Ga. 1968), modified, 432
F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1970) (the court rejected the idea that use of tax digests in non-
discriminatory fashion is per se proper, holding that use of property tax digests could be
unacceptable in some circumstances even in the absence of racial bias).
"9 Clark v. Ellenbogen, 319 F. Supp. 623, 626 (W.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd mem., 402 U.S.
935 (1971).
10 Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
101 498 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1974).
'0 Watt v. Page, 452 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972), on
appeal from remand sub noam. Anderson v. Watt, 475 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1973).
'" 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971).
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cence"'' and that a defendant has the right to appear with dign-
ity and self respect instead of as one branded as convicted."5
Although the rule may first have been expressed as a per se rule,' °0
in practice courts look to see if the defendant was compelled to
wear clothes identifiable as prison clothes or if he did so voluntar-
ily. If there is clear compulsion, courts reverse and order a new
trial0 7 or remand to determine the question of waiver'0 8 unless the
wearing of jail attire on particular facts is found to be harmless.' °0
Compulsion will exist where an indigent defendant has no other
clothes, as well as from a denial of his request for civilian attire."0
Where courts find clear evidence that a defendant wore jail attire
willingly as a trial strategy, there is of course no denial of due
process."' The Tenth Circuit ruled that Williams involved no
denial of due process because the defendant was given the oppor-
tunity to change to civilian clothes and chose not to.
Another trial issue considered by the Tenth Circuit involved
the discovery of statements made by government witnesses under
the Jencks Act."' The Jencks Act provides that following a gov-
ernment witness' testimony at trial, a defendant may request the
production of certain previous statements made by the witness.
In United States v. Pennet" the defendant claimed that the trial
court erred in denying his request to examine the "daily logs" of
a government narcotics agent who had testified against him. The
Tenth Circuit held that the logs were not discoverable because
they did not fit the definition of "statements" in subsection (e)(2)
of the Jencks Act: "a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement made by . . . [a] witness and recorded contempora-
neously with the making of such oral statement." The circuit
1*1 Dennis v. Dees, 278 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. La. 1968); Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo.
488, 174 P.2d 717 (1946).
,o Commonwealth v. Keeler, 216 Pa. Super. 193, 264 A.2d 407 (1970).
'" See Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
,0 Gaito v. Brierley, 485 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Watt, 475 F.2d 881 (10th
Cir. 1973); Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971).
I" Lemons v. United States, 489 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1974); Bentley v. Crist, 469 F.2d
854 (9th Cir. 1972); Goodspeed v. Beto, 460 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1972).
'I Thomas v. Beto, 474 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 871 (1973); United
States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973);
Xanthull v. Beto, 307 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Tex. 1970); McFalls v. Peyton, 270 F. Supp.
577 (W.D. Va. 1967).
110 Bentley v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1972).
"I Garcia v. Beto, 452 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1972).
112 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
1" 496 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1974).
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court determined that the logs were internal recordkeeping proce-
dures, setting forth daily operations, expenses, and vehicle opera-
tions. The exclusion of such a document is clearly consistent with
the general definition of "statements" within the Act."'
However, in holding that the logs were not discoverable the
court erroneously stated that the defendant had the burden of
showing that an item qualifies as a "statement," citing its own
1973 case which so held."5 In fact, the annotation which the court
relied upon in Pennet" does not establish that the burden of this
question is on the defendant, but rather that the defendant has
the burden of showing the possible or probable existence of a
document that might be producible within the Act."7 The defen-
dant does not have the burden of showing that a document re-
quested is a "statement.""' 8 The Jencks Act itself does not pro-
vide a procedure for determining whether an item comes within
subsection (e)(2),111 but the Supreme Court has approved a proce-
dure whereby when there is doubt on the question the trial court
examines the evidence in an in camera hearing. 120 Because de-
fense counsel has not seen the documents, it seems unfair to place
on him the burden of showing whether an item comes within
subsection (e)(2),12 and the "burden" is properly placed on the
trial judge himself to call for such evidence as he needs to make
a fair determination. 2 The Supreme Court has approved a
nonadversary hearing on the issue, saying, "The statute says
nothing of burdens of producing evidence. Rather it implies the
duty of the trial judge affirmatively to administer the statute in
"' But see United States v. Phillips, 482 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1973), holding signed
receipts for payments made to informer to be statements within section 3500.
"I United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
915 (1974).
"' Annot., 1 A.L.R. Fed. 252 (1969).
"7 United States v. Hilbrich, 232 F. Supp. 111, 120 (D. ill. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 555
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965); Badon v. United States, 269 F.2d 75, 83 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959).
"I Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1960); Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d
178 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
"' Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
I Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 847 (1963); Palermo v. United States, 360
U.S. 343 (1959).
12 See Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 96 (1960); United States v. Lamma,
349 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947 (1965).
'2 Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Hilliard v. United States,
317 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
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such way as can best secure relevant and available evidence
''123
V. STANDARDS AND BURDENS OF PROOF; JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The court heard two cases this term involving the defense of
insanity, one in which the issue was the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to raise the issue of insanity, and one in which the issue
was the weight of the evidence necessary to require direction of a
verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity.
In United States v. Bettenhausen'21 the court ruled that in
determining whether or not a defendant has presented enough
evidence to rebut the presumption of sanity, a court may consider
only evidence presented at the present trial or in preliminary
hearings related to the present trial; the presumption may not be
rebutted by proof offered at a prior trial.
The general rule is that when "some evidence" of insanity is
introduced from any source, the presumption of sanity disappears
and sanity becomes an element of the crime which the govern-
ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 125 The trial judge
determines as a matter of law when the presumption has been
dissipated.'2  How much evidence defendant must produce to
raise the issue has been described various ways: as enough to raise
a reasonable doubt; 17 as something less than enough to raise a
reasonable doubt; 12 as "more than a scintilla;' 21 9 and as "slight"
and though disbelieved by the trial judge.
30
What kind of evidence is enough to raise the issue and shift
the burden of proving sanity to the government varies. The mere
claim of irresponsibility by the defendant 13 ' or notice of his intent
'1 Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 95 (1960).
124 499 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1974).
'2 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 473 F.2d 461, 464 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 920 (1973); Keys v. United States, 346 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 869 (1965); Fitts v. United States, 284 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960).
I" See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 364 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1966); Otney v. United
States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1965); Fitts v. United States, 284 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960).
'21 United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 383 U.S.
375 (1966); Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 852 (1948).
' Hall v. United States, 295 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1961); Tatum v. United States, 190
F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
"'2 McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hawkins v. United
States, 310 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"' Hurt v. United States, 327 F.2d 978, 981 (5th Cir. 1964).
M' Smith v. United States, 353 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 974
(1966).
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to use the insanity defense' is generally not enough to rebut the
presumption of sanity. A psychiatrist's opinion'13 and the fact of
a long history of mental illness 34 have been found to be enough
to raise the issue of insanity. In a previous case the Tenth Circuit
held that a defense motion for a psychiatric exam coupled with a
long history of mental illness was enough to make the government
aware of defendant's claim and so shift the burden.'35 But in the
present case, the court said that the language of that case was
merely descriptive, not prescriptive of a general rule.
In Bettenhausen's first trial the court ruled that he had re-
butted the presumption of sanity by information provided at the
omnibus hearing and at the arraignment, by a motion to deter-
mine competence to stand trial, and by records of prior psychiat-
ric consultation. At the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, a
psychiatrist and a psychologist testified for the defense. Prior to
the retrial, the government requested a psychiatric exam, but at
trial there was no expert testimony on the insanity issue-in fact
no defense testimony at all. The government discussed the insan-
ity issue in its opening statement and developed lay testimony to
show defendant's competence. Defense counsel attempted to de-
velop proof of insanity on cross-examination alone. The second
trial court ruled that notice of reliance on the insanity defense
and evidence elicited on cross-examination were not enough to
dissipate the presumption of sanity. The court did not consider
the matters raised before the first trial or the evidence produced
at that trial. The Tenth Circuit agreed that "the question
whether the presumption of sanity disappeared for purposes of
the second trial should be determined only in light of the proof,
from whatever source, actually introduced at that trial, or of a
showing furnished during pretrial procedures of an adjudication
of incompetence."' 3 The court ruled that the second trial judge
02 Kregger v. Barman, 273 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1960).
l" Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
,3 Phillips v. United States, 311 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1962).
- Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1965).
"" 499 F.2d at 1229 (emphasis added). In stating that the showing in pretrial proce-
dures must be of an adjudication of incompetence, the court relied on United States v.
Shultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970), and Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970). This rule is surely more strict than that
applied at least within the Tenth Circuit. The issue has been held to be properly raised
in pretrial proceedings by less than such an adjudication. See, e.g., Otney v. United
States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1965); Phillips v. United States, 311 F.2d 204 (10th Cir.
1962).
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is bound only by prior final judgments and that the judge's ruling
on this question was not a final judgment. On the basis of evi-
dence that counsel should have been aware that the trial judge
did not consider the issue properly raised, the court rejected de-
fendant's claim that he relied on the first ruling to his prejudice.
In the other case involving the insanity defense, United
States v. Coleman, 37 the defendant was convicted of aircraft pir-
acy and interfering with flight attendants. The issue was whether
the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal by
reason of insanity. The court held that there was no error in the
trial court's refusal to direct a verdict.
Other courts have said that to require a directed verdict for
the defendant, the evidence must be so as to compel a reasonable
juror to have a reasonable doubt, 38 or such that reasonable men
could not reasonably reach any conclusion except that the gov-
ernment has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was sane at the time of the crime. 39 The nature and
quantum of evidence which the government is required to pro-
duce so that a jury could conclude that the defendant is sane
depends on the circumstances of the case, and to some degree on
the weight and credibility of defendant's evidence.' 0 If the gov-
ernment produces no evidence of sanity, defendant is entitled to
a directed verdict,"' but if there is enough evidence so that a
reasonable man simply may (as opposed to must) have a reasona-
ble doubt, the issue is for the jury."'
In Coleman the defendant presented expert testimony of in-
sanity. The only other evidence was lay testimony concerning
defendant's rather bizarre behavior aboard the aircraft (ordering
creme de menthe with bourbon, pulling a toy gun, asking if his
fellow passengers were Secret Service agents, and crying) and
before boarding (playing mute and announcing he thought he was
going to die) and evidence of a parachute and newsclippings
about hijackings found in his apartment. The court looked to its
137 501 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1974).
' McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
W' right v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Bradley v. United States,
249 F.2d 922, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
10 Brown v. United States, 351 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1965); McDonald v. United States,
312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1962); United States v. Westerhausen, 283 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1960).
"I Fitts v. United States, 284 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960).
142 Bradley v. United States, 249 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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own precedents: McKenzie v. United States,"' where the court
found defendant's evidence "overwhelming" and the govern-
ment's evidence "meager" and ordered a directed verdict of ac-
quittal, and United States v. Stewart,"' where they found defen-
dant's evidence less than "overwhelming" and the government's
evidence relevant and probative. The court found that
Bettenhausen fell somewhere between the two. In applying the
Tenth Circuit's test of insanity announced in Wion v. United
States,"5 the court did not think it controlling that government
presented only lay testimony to rebut defendant's expert wit-
ness." 6 The court held that although reasonable men could con-
clude from this very ambiguous evidence that the defendant was
incompetent, they could also conclude that he was competent.
The Tenth Circuit has held that a forfeiture proceeding is a
civil proceeding for purposes of the government's burden of proof.
In Bramble v. Richardson"7 the constitutionality of a provision of
the forfeiture statute,"8 was challenged. Bramble was charged
with possession of marijuana, and his automobile was seized for
use in violation of the drug laws. Had he challenged the forfeiture
he would have had to post bond for his car"' and prove by a
preponderance of the evidence'50 that the car was not used in
violation of the law. Instead, Bramble claimed that because a
forfeiture proceeding is in reality a criminal action, the fifth
amendment due process clause requires that the government
prove his criminal violation beyond a reasonable doubt.
In rejecting this claim the Tenth Circuit entered the mire of
90 years of case law and emerged having imposed upon it a con-
vincingly logical structure. As the court noted, there is support
for the characterization of a forfeiture proceeding as "criminal."
In 1886's' the Supreme Court held that forfeiture actions "though
" 266 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1959).
" 443 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
143 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964): "at the time
the accused committed the unlawful act, he was mentally capable of knowing what he
was doing, was mentally capable of knowing that it was wrong, and was mentally capable
of controlling his conduct."
14 Accord, United States v. Robinson, 327 F.2d 959 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
1003 (1964).
147 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3148 (U.S. Sept.
24, 1974) (No. 74-280).
149 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1970).
", Id. § 1608.
"3 Id. § 1615.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal." It termed
"quasi-criminal" those forfeitures which were incurred by the
commission of offenses against the law. The Court said that such
proceedings are to be considered "criminal proceedings for all the
purposes of the fourth amendment" and of the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment.'52 Recent cases have reaffirmed
that holding.'53 Another line of cases has ruled on the effect of a
criminal prosecution on a subsequent forfeiture action related to
the same criminal act. This question involves both the issue of
double jeopardy and the issue of res judicata. In general it is held
that if the government's recovery is "civil" or "remedial," as
opposed to punitive, there is no problem of double jeopardy.
54
Where there has been an acquittal, the question of res judicata
is resolved in two ways: by finding that the elements required for
conviction differ from those required in a forfeiture proceeding 55
and by reference to the difference in degree of the burden of proof
in criminal and civil cases.' An acquittal is merely an adjudica-
tion that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all doubt of the
guilt of the accused, not an adjudication by a preponderance of
the evidence.
A landmark case in this area is Helvering v. Mitchell.'57 In
that case the Supreme Court held that an acquittal on the crimi-
nal charge of tax evasion did not bar a subsequent deficiency
assessment by the government. The Court explained this holding
by putting great emphasis on the fact that the action was "reme-
dial" in its nature. If the purpose of the action were punishment,
the Court held, the action would be barred by double jeopardy.
If the sanction imposed is "remedial" the action is not barred by
double jeopardy and has all the elements of a civil action: a
verdict may be directed against a defendant, the government may
appeal an adverse decision, the defendant has no right to confron-
tation and no right to refuse to testify, and the government need
152 Id. at 634.
153 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
IS, See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Murphy
v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926).
15, One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972);
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897).
" One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972);
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926).
151 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
This distinction between "punitive" and "remedial" forfei-
tures, even if vague, has significance in relation to the question
of double jeopardy. It has, however, been applied to other ques-
tions arising from the issue of forfeiture proceedings with very
confusing results. The cases upholding the applicability of fourth
and fifth amendment rights to forfeiture proceedings have been
couched in terms of "punitive" forfeitures,' and the most recent
case holding that an acquittal does not bar forfeiture by collateral
estoppel 5 ' emphasized the remedial nature of the sanction. To
rest these holdings on the punitive-remedial distinction leads to
the questions: if a sanction is "remedial," are the fourth and fifth
amendments not applicable, and if a sanction is "punitive," does
the reasonable doubt standard apply?
The Tenth Circuit avoided the confusing maze into which
such questions lead by rejecting the punitive-remedial characteri-
zation as "elusive." Had the court applied that distinction to the
present case, it might have been argued for Bramble that the only
cases holding that the reasonable doubt standard is not available
in a forfeiture action " are all cases in which the sanction is "rem-
edial." Helvering v. Mitchell"' never reached the question of the
standard of proof in a "punitive" forfeiture proceeding because it
held that such a proceeding would have been barred in that case
by double jeopardy. The forfeiture in this case was not barred by
double jeopardy because Bramble was given a one-year probation
and was never tried. Helvering merely said that if an action is
"remedial," the standard of proof is a preponderance. The forfei-
ture in Bramble's case is clearly punishment (unless one argues
that seizure of automobiles helps defray the cost of enforcement
of drug laws). Under such analysis of the punitive-remedial dis-
tinction, Bramble was asking the Tenth Circuit to rule on a ques-
" United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
"' One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37
(1914); McClendon v. Rosetti, 460 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1972) (dictum); Prince George's
County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971). See cases under the
Internal Revenue Code holding that the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence
in forfeiture for violation of tax laws, e.g., Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S.
237 (1887); Utley Wholesale Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1962); D'Agostino
v. United States, 261 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959); United
States v. One 1955 Mercury Sedan, 242 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1957); Grain Distillery No. 8 of
E. Distillery Co. v. United States, 204 F. 429 (4th Cir. 1913).
1"' 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
tion of first impression: when a forfeiture is punitive, what is the
standard of proof?
Instead of answering that question, the Tenth Circuit, noting
the futility of working with the remedial-punitive distinction in
this case, found a more logical way of phrasing the issue by refer-
ring to a footnote to the Helvering opinion:
The distinction here taken between sanctions that are remedial and
those that are punitive has not generally been specifically enunci-
ated. In determining whether particular rules of criminal procedures
are applicable, the cases have usually attempted to distinguish be-
tween the type of procedural rule involved rather than the sanction
being enforced."1
2
In the view of the Tenth Circuit whether a criminal procedural
right applies to a forfeiture proceeding should not depend on
whether the sanction is imposed for "punitive" or "remedial"
purposes. 13 Whether a right applies in a forfeiture proceeding
depends on the purpose for which the question is asked. Regard-
less of the characterization of the sanction, the action itself is
"criminal" for the purposes of some constitutionally guaranteed
criminal procedures. Bramble's claim, in these terms, is that a
forfeiture action is "criminal" for purposes of setting the standard
of proof. The Tenth Circuit's answer is that it is not. The Su-
preme Court has ruled that a forfeiture proceeding is "criminal"
for purposes of the fourth amendment and the privilege against
self-incrimination. For no other purpose to date has the proceed-
ing been characterized as "criminal." And the Tenth Circuit re-
fused to expand the list.
Two jury instructions explaining the reasonable doubt stan-
dard were criticized by the Tenth Circuit in recent cases.' In two
cases the trial courts instructed juries to the effect that a reasona-
ble doubt was established "if the evidence is such that you would
be willing to rely and act upon it in the more important of your
162 Id. at 400 n.3.
113 The penal-remedial distinction theoretically retains significance when the ques-
tion is double jeopardy. It is doubtful, however, that a forfeiture penalty would ever be
found to be so severe as to become "penal" for this purpose. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959).
" In no case was the use of the instructions held to be reversible error because the
instructions viewed as a whole were held to have made the standard of proof clear. See,
e.g., United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fletcher,
444 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1971); Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1970);
Bynum v. United States, 408 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 935 (1969).
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own personal affairs."'' 5 In responding to the challenge to this
instruction in one case, "' the court noted that the Supreme
Court, affirming a Tenth Circuit case, has said that the instruc-
tion is better if made in terms of "the kind of doubt that would
make a person hesitate to act ... rather than the kind on which
he would be willing to act."'' 7 In United States v. Pepe' the court
said that the Supreme Court's preference for the "hesitate to act"
formulation should be heeded.
The other instruction challenged is the "nothing peculiarly
different" instruction:
There is nothing peculiarly different in the way a jury is to consider
the proof in a criminal case from that in which all reasonable persons
treat any question depending upon evidence presented to them. You
are expected to use your good sense; consider the evidence for only
those purposes for which it has been admitted and give it a reasona-
ble and fair construction in the light of your common knowledge of
the natural tendencies and inclinations of human beings.
In United States v. Pepe"'5 the court noted the criticism of
this instruction in other circuits " " and said:
In view of its apparently frequent usage by some of the trial courts
of this Circuit we take this opportunity to express our disapproval
of future use of the instruction. Although it purports to deal only
with consideration and evaluation of the evidence, and does not
appear to offer any serious misdirection, we do not believe the in-
struction provides any particular assistance to the jury in the per-
formance of its tasks. And at least in the eyes of some analysts, it
offers possible confusion as to the standards required for conviction.
We therefore think the instruction is best omitted.'
VI. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURES
The court rejected defendant's claim in United States v.
Majors' that the sentencing judge should not have considered a
charge dismissed in plea bargaining in imposing sentence. The
" United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1347 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir. 1974).
" United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973).
"7 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, aff'g 209 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1954).
" 501 F.2d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id.
United States v. Cummings, 468 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding error in the use of
the instruction and ordering either its omission or the insertion after "question" of "arising
in the most important of their affairs"); Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970) (holding the instruction improper but not
prejudicial).
"1 501 F.2d at 1144.
112 490 F.2d 1321 (10th Cir. 1974).
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court stated that defendant's contention was plausibly supported
by United States v. Tucker,7 3 in which the Supreme Court held
that it was error for a trial judge to consider a defendant's uncon-
stitutional convictions in setting sentence. The court distin-
guished Tucker from the present facts on the grounds of the pre-
sumption of innocence:
The presumption of innocence shielded Tucker from enhancement
of his sentence by reason of the Constitutionally invalid convictions.
By his plea bargain and the subsequent dismissal of the indictment
against him . . . Majors was neither acquitted nor convicted
174
The presumption of innocence is a very unconvincing ground
upon which to base a distinction between use of an unconstitu-
tional conviction and use of a dismissed charge.'75 Because Majors
was "neither acquitted nor convicted" he still has the presump-
tion of innocence. What is really behind the distinction-and the
court would have done better to focus on this-is that while a
sentencing judge may consider any relevant and responsible in-
formation, including criminal behavior for which there has been
no conviction, untrue information should not be considered. Had
the court recognized this distinction, it would have found it un-
necessary to distinguish Tucker at all.
It has long been settled that a sentencing judge is not bound
by the rules of evidence'76 and may consider responsible unsworn
or out-of-court information relevant to the crime and to "the
convicted person's life and characteristics."' Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(c), regarding presentence investigation,
states:
The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior
criminal record of the defendant and such information about his
characteristics, his financial condition and the circumstances affect-
ing his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in grant-
ing probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and
such other information as may be required by the court....
173 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
'" 490 F.2d at 1324.
"7 See United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
919 (1973), where the court found defendant's argument based on presumption of inno-
cence "implausible." But see United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 843 (1965), where the court stated that a dismissal is not an adjudication on the
merits against the government.
,,' Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
177 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959).
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Cases prior to the Tucker decision consistently held that a judge
may consider criminal conduct not charged or tried.'78 It is
equally well settled that a judge may not rely upon false informa-
tion.'79
The Tenth Circuit questioned the impact of Tucker on this
settled distinction. Other circuits have had no problem.' 0 They
have read Tucker as in line with and affirming the cases under
Townsend v. Burke,'8 ' which held that a judge should not con-
sider false or misleading information. Under these cases the rule
remains undisturbed that a sentencing judge may consider be-
havior of which a defendant has not been convicted-as long as
the information is reliable.'82
,'T See, e.g., United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972), where a court ruled
admissible evidence from a trial resulting in acquittal because of its reliability. See also
United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973);
United States v. Donohoe, 458 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 865 (1972);
United States v. Cifarelli, 401 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1968); United
States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Jones v. United
States, 307 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 919 (1963); Young v. United
States, 259 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 917 (1959). However, there is
recent support for the exclusion of such information. See Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d
931, 934 (4th Cir. 1968), where the Fourth Circuit said, "No conviction or criminal charge
should be included in the [presentence] report, or considered by the court unless refera-
ble to an official record." And see ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATING TO
PROBATION, § 2.3 (ii)(B), comment at 37 (approved draft, 1970):
By [prior criminal record] the Advisory Committee means to include only
those charges which have resulted in a conviction. Arrests ... and the like,
can be extremely misleading and damaging if presented to the court as part
of a section of the report which deals with past convictions. If such items
should be included at all-and the Advisory Committee would not provide
for their inclusion-at the very least a detailed effort should be undertaken
to assure that the reader of the report cannot possibly mistake an arrest for
a conviction.
' Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809
(2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Jackson v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967); cf.
United States v. Sheppard, 462 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 985 (1972). In
United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1972), the court extended the rule and excluded information that was poorly substanti-
ated.
IN See Collins v. Buchkoe, 493 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Espinoza,
481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1972).
191 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
112 Of course, whether or not a presentence report contains information about charges
for which defendant has not been tried or information that is false, there is the further
problem of how a defendant knows what a judge considered-i.e., the problem of disclo-
sure of a presentence report to the defendant. See Lehrich, The Use & Disclosure of
Presentence Reports in the United States, 47 F.R.D. 225 (1969); ABA, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 4.3-4.5, 5.6
(approved draft, 1971). Challenges to the accuracy of information can be made only if the
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In Small v. Britton' defendant's federal parole was revoked
after he was convicted of a state crime. The United States Board
of Parole lodged a revocation warrant as a detainer against him
with state authorities. Defendant's parole revocation hearing was
not held until the completion of this intervening state sentence.
He challenged the delay in his revocation hearing as a denial of
due process. The issue faced by the court was whether within the
due process requirements of Morrissey v. Brewer'81 a delay of a
revocation hearing is excused by a parolee's being incarcerated.",
Morrissey held that a parolee must be afforded a hearing within
a reasonable time after being retaken into custody. In ruling that
the delay was not a violation of due process, the court said that
the promptness requirement of Morrissey is not triggered until
the execution of the revocation warrant after completion of the
intervening sentence.' 6 The court arrived at this conclusion by
imposing a strict reading on the language of Morrissey, which
requires a hearing "within a reasonable time after the parolee is
taken into custody,"'' 7 and the language of 18 U.S.C. § 4207: "A
prisoner retaken upon a warrant. . . shall. . . appear before the
Board ... "
The federal courts are split on the question of whether or not
a parole revocation hearing can be delayed when the parolee is
serving an intervening sentence. While the Fifth Circuit is in
accord with the Tenth, holding that the revocation hearing need
not be held until the execution of the warrant, M the District
Court for the District of Columbia has consistently held that the
judge explicitly relies on some item. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553
(5th Cir. 1973). There is the additional problem of establishing a procedure for a defendant
to challenge an item relied upon. See United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1972); Hoover v. United States, 268
F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1959).
1- 500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974).
"3 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
" It is well settled that a revocation warrant must be issued within the maximum
term of the intervening state conviction, but its execution may be delayed until the
completion of the intervening sentence. See, e.g., Cox v. Feldkamp, 438 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1971); Smith v. Blackwell, 367 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1966). Federal jurisdiction is resumed
when the state sentence is completed. Small v. United States Bd. of Parole, 421 F.2d 1388
(10th Cir. 1970); Taylor v. United States Marshal, 352 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1965). This, of
course, means that a parolee cannot serve the intervening sentence and his uncompleted
sentence concurrently.
" Cf. Simon v. Moseley, 452 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1971) (delay of hearing after
execution of a warrant is a violation of due process).
197 408 U.S. 471, 488 (emphasis added).
'" Cook v. United States Attorney General, 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1974); Moultrie v.
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promptness requirement of Morrissey is triggered by the issuance
of the revocation warrant. 8 '
Morrissey held that a prompt hearing is required to protect
a parolee from loss of evidence for his defense to the parole viola-
tion charge-loss from the death or disappearance of witnesses
and from loss of memory. There are two questions to be deter-
mined by the hearing: 1) whether parole has been violated and
2) if so, whether parole should be revoked.9 0 Once it is determined
there has been a violation, the parolee must have the opportunity
to present mitigating evidence to show why his violation does not
warrant revocation.1 1
When parole is revoked because of an intervening conviction,
the fact of the violation has already been litigated and is closed.
The District Court for the District of Columbia and the Eighth
Circuit have held that in such cases the promptness requirement
of Morrissey still applies to protect the parolee from the loss of
mitigating evidence.9 2 The District of Columbia court has said
that while the fact of a parolee's conviction alters the content of
the hearing, it does not affect the requirement that it be held
promptly."'
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, emphasize
the lack of harm from delay where the fact of a parole violation
has previously been established by a conviction."' While both
Georgia, 464 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1972); Galloway v. Attorney General, 451 F.2d 357 (5th
Cir. 1971).
"I Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F.
Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1974); Sutherland v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 366 F. Supp.
270 (D.D.C. 1973). The District Court for the District of Columbia held in Sutherland,
supra, that Morrissey v. Brewer overruled the previous D.C. Circuit case, Shelton v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 388 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1967), which held that where parole
was revoked for an intervening sentence there was no requirement of a revocation hearing.
11 The Supreme Court in Morrissey said: "Only if it is determined that the parolee
did violate the conditions does the second question arise: should the parolee be recommit-
ted or are other steps better ... 408 U.S. at 479-80.
"' 408 U.S. at 488.
Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973); Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp.
889 (D.D.C. 1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1974); Sutherland v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 366 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1973).
"I Sutherland v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 366 F. Supp. 270, 272 (D.D.C.
1973).
"' Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1974); Cook v. United States Attor-
ney General, 488 F.2d 667, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1974). See also the pre-Morrissey case, Shelton
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 388 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1967), in which the D.C. Circuit
held that no revocation hearing is required when parole violation is established by a
conviction, but where the violation warrant does not charge the intervening conviction as
the reason for revocation, a hearing should be held promptly.
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recognize that there are two issues in a revocation hearing, both
have found no prejudice to a parolee's presentation of mitigating
evidence where he has not shown what facts he would have pre-
sented in mitigation if given an earlier opportunity and how delay
has prejudiced his ability to present such evidence." 5 While the
District Court for the District of Columbia holds that a delay in
a revocation hearing is per se error,' apparently the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits will permit a delay in the absence of a showing of
actual prejudice.
Loss of favorable evidence is not the only form of prejudice
with which those courts requiring a prompt hearing despite a
parolee's incarceration have been concerned. The District Court
for the District of Columbia and the Eighth Circuit have recog-
nized the fact that delay in a revocation hearing results in the loss
of the chance to have the present sentence run concurrently with
the reinstated one. "7 Both have noted that when a parole revoca-
tion warrant is issued, a detainer is held against the parolee serv-
ing an intervening sentence. As a result an inmate loses eligibility
for vocational training and work release programs and other
prison privileges, and there is a detrimental effect on his rehabili-
tation. 118
In a case in which a detainer based on a revocation warrant
issued by one state was held against a parolee incarcerated in
another state, the Eighth Circuit held that delaying the revoca-
tion hearing affected "fundamental fairness."'99 Focusing on the
effects of the detainer, the court ordered that either the parolee
be made available to the seeking state for a prompt hearing or
that the conditions imposed by the custodial state as a result of
the detainer be discontinued. Although such a hearing might not
result in a removal of the detainer, the Eighth Circuit was ob-
viously concerned with the punitive effects of a detainer where
there had not been a final determination of its validity. The
Tenth Circuit in Small did not acknowledge these other forms of
"5 Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 302 (10th Cir. 1974); Cook v. United States Attor-
ney General, 488 F.2d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1974).
"I Where a revocation hearing has been delayed unreasonably after issuance of the
warrant, the District Court for the District of Columbia cancels the warrant. See cases
cited note 189 supra.
"I Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973); Sutherland v. District of Colum-
bia Bd. of Parole, 366 F. Supp 270 (D.D.C. 1973).
"' Id.
"' Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308, 313 (8th Cir. 1973).
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The Tenth Circuit held a federal gambling statute20 ' consti-
tutional in the face of three challenges. Defendant in United
States v. Smaldone20 2 charged that the statute was not a valid
exercise of congressional powers under the commerce clause be-
cause the statute requires no showing of involvement in interstate
commerce in each individual case. In rejecting this argument the
court joined five other circuits.203 The court relied, as have the
Second,204 Fifth, 20 5 and Seventh06 Circuits, on Perez v. United
States,2t 7 which upheld a statute prohibiting "loan sharking" and
stated that if a defendant's activity fits into a class of activity
within the reach of federal power under the commerce clause,
the government need not show in each individual case that defen-
dant's activity affected commerce.
20
1
The second challenge to the statute, which prohibits gam-
bling businesses illegal under state or local law, 209 was that the
statute violates the equal protection clause. This claim has been
rejected in two circuits.2 10 The Tenth Circuit relied on cases up-
holding other statutes that vary in effect because of a variation
in state law.21'
Moultrie v. Georgia, 464 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1972).
' 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
-2 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973).
m See United States v. Hunter, 478 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds,
94 S. Ct. 2597 (1974); United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Harris, 460 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972); Schneider v. United
States, 459 F.2d 540 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972); cf. United States v.
Palmer, 465 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
2 United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds,
94 S. Ct. 2597 (1974).
United States v. Harris, 460 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972).
United States v. Hunter, 478 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
-7 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
1 The other two circuits have rejected claims of unconstitutionality by upholding the
congressional conclusion that this particular activity has an effect on interstate commerce.
See United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972); Schneider v. United States, 459
F.2d 540 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972).
2" Under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) an illegal gambling business is one in "violation of
the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted .... "
210 United States v. Palmer, 465 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972);
Schneider v. United States, 459 F.2d 540 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972).
" Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); Turf Center, Inc. v.
United States, 325 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Finally, defendant argued that because the federal statute
incorporates the state gambling statute, he was being tried twice
under the same statute in violation of the double jeopardy prohi-
bition of the fifth amendment. The court ruled that this was a
case of prosecutions by "separate sovereigns" under Bartkus v.
Illinois22 and Abbate v. United States.
213
In United States v. MacClainm2 the court was asked to deter-
mine whether on the facts of the case defendant had used the
mails for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud. 215 Defen-
dant was charged with misrepresenting the financial condition of
a corporation in defrauding purchasers of its stock. Defendant
visited one defrauded purchaser in her home and there arranged
the sale of some of the stock. Later he mailed her a stock certifi-
cate and at a later time returned to her home to finalize the sale
by exchanging a note for a good check. Defendant contended that
the transaction was complete before the mail was used and that
the mailing was incidental to the scheme. Defendant relied on
United States v. Lynn, '2 a case involving purchases with a stolen
credit card, the sales drafts of which were mailed to BankAmeri-
card. In that case the Tenth Circuit held use of the mails to be
incidental to a scheme already completed. 27 The court distin-
guished Lynn by noting that in that case the mailing was done
by a third party and was not an integral part of the transaction
and that there the defendant had no stake in the mailing.
Indeed, for a conviction to lie under the statute use of the
mails need not be an essential element of the scheme."t " The
Supreme Court has said that where the mails are used after a
defendant has obtained money, each case will be considered on
its own facts to determine if the mailing was part of the scheme.
21'
2.2 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
2"3 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
214 501 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1974).
215 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) provides in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised . . . any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for ob-
taining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. . . for
the purpose of executing such scheme. . . places in any post office or author-
ized depository for mail matter ....
2"6 461 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1972).
2" See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), where the Court ruled that the
mailing of invoices from credit card sales did not come within the mail fraud statute
because the mails were not used to execute the scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
2I United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1
(1954).
" United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962). Compare United States v. Sampson
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The Tenth Circuit found that defendant's mailing his victim the
stock certificate enabled him to acquire and maintain dominion
over the proceeds and that it lulled his victim into a false sense
of security and prevented her from refusing to substitute a good
check for the note.
In United States v. Harpe1221 the Tenth Circuit interpreted
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1970) in a way new within the federal court
system.2 22 Defendant, convicted of disclosing the product of an
illegal electronic interception, claimed that the interception was
likely to have been made by means of an extension telephone and
so fit the exception to section 2510 in (5)(a):
electronic, mechanical or other device means any device or appara-
tus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication
other than-
(a) any telephone .... (i) furnished to the subscriber or user in the
ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or
user in the ordinary course of its business.
The court held that to fit the exception a telephone must be
used in the ordinary course of business and that the unauthorized
interception in this case did not fit that requirement.
United States v. Marx2n involved a unique fact pattern. De-
fendants forced a bank president to cash a check and deliver to
them the proceeds by threatening to detonate bombs placed with
his family and on his person. Defendants challenged their convic-
tion under the federal bank robbery statute 22 by claiming that
because they took the money from the victim, not from the bank,
there was no bank robbery but rather extortion, obtaining by false
pretenses, and kidnapping. The court was forced to meet this
argument and did so by holding that the victim was acting in his
with Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944), and Henderson v. United States, 425 F.2d
134 (5th Cir. 1970).
22 "Lulling" by use of the mails has frequently been found to fall within section 1341.
See United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962); United States v. Goldberg, 401 F.2d
644 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969); Bliss v. United States, 354 F.2d 456
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966); Beasley v. United States, 327 F.2d 566 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 944 (1964).
-2 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
22 A Michigan court has given the same reading to the statute. People v. Tebo, 37
Mich. App. 141, 194 N.W.2d 517 (1971).
m 485 F.2d 1179 (10th Cir. 1973).
22 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970) provides in relevant part:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any
other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, manage-
ment, or possession of, any bank . ...
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capacity of bank officer, an agent of the bank, and that the money
did not leave the bank's possession until the victim gave it to
defendants.2
In Wallis v. O'Kier2 1 the Tenth Circuit interpreted the provi-
sion in the Manual for Courts-Martial for the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained in illegal searches227 as permitting searches on
warrants not supported by oath or affirmation. Although the
fourth amendment to the constitution requires that probable
cause be supported by sworn affidavits, the manual has no such
provision. The court concluded that this omission was inten-
tional, noting that "[a]ny draftsman of a rule providing for prob-
able cause as an incident to the issuance of a search warrant
would be consciously aware of the Fourth Amendment provi-
sion.1"228
The court ruled that the omission of this requirement was
valid, saying, "There seems to be no doubt but that an express
provision of the military law that probable cause should be shown
by oral statements would be valid. '229 The court explained that
such a formal requirement might in some circumstances be im-
practicable or impossible in a military setting. Although the court
cited no support, its holding and its reasoning are in line with a
body of cases applying constitutional rights to military situations.
In 1867 the Supreme Court held that "the power of Congress,
in the government of the land and naval forces and of the militia
is not at all affected by the fifth or any other amendment. ' 230 This
holding has never been expressly overruled.2 3' However, since the
mid-1950's much attention has been given to the general question
of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to servicemen.2 3 The
22 See United States v. Jakalski, 237 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
939 (1957) (robbery from an armored car held to fall within section 2113). Cf. United
States v. Fox, 97 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1938), and White v. United States, 85 F.2d 268 (D.C.
Cir. 1936) (both involving robberies of bank employees).
-0 491 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1974)
(No. 73-1950).
227 THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 152, 27-64 (1969). The manual was authorized
by Exec. Order No. 11,476, 3 C.F.R. 802, (Comp. 1966-1970) under the power vested in
the President of the United States under 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970).
2 491 F.2d at 1325.
2n Id.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2138 (1867).
231 J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FiRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW 113 (1974).
n2 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Henderson,
Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293
(1957); Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice (pts. I, II),
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Uniform Code of Military Justice233 now provides many rights
similar to those in the first eight amendments to the constitu-
tion. 4 The rule generally followed now by both military and fed-
eral courts is one of qualified application of the Bill of Rights:
constitutional rights extend to servicemen except where "ex-
pressly or by necessary implication inapplicable ' 35 because of the
special needs of the military and the special conditions of military
life.236
This attention to the different needs of military life given by
courts in applying constitutional principles to the military was
approved again by the Supreme Court in its 1974 decision in
Parker v. Levy. 7 The Court held that the doctrine of constitu-
tional overbreadth will not necessarily invalidate a military stat-
ute which might be invalid in a civilian context. The Court said:
For the reasons which differentiate military society from civilian
society, we think Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater
breadth and with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by
which the former shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules
for the latter....
... The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the conse-
quent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible
within the military that which would be constitutionally impermis-
sible outside it.m
Applying this reasoning, military courts have not required
sworn affidavits for the issuance of search warrants in military
settings. This constitutionally-provided procedure has been said
to be impracticable because of the particular conditions and in-
terests of military life. 39 Although the Court of Military Appeals
has criticized the rule that a Commanding Officer may authorize
72 HARV. L. REv. 266 (1958); Willis, The Constitution, the United States Court of Military
Appeals and the Future, 57 MEL. L. Rev. 27, 38-70 (1972).
2 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970).
The Code includes the right against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, cruel and
unusual punishment, right to counsel, etc. See J. BIsHOP, supra note 231, at 137.
2 United States v. Manos, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 37 C.M.R. 274 (1967); United States
v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United States v. Jacoby, 11
U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
258 J. BISHOP, supra note 231, at 133, 144.
-1 94 S. Ct. 2547 (1974).
2 Id. at 2561-62, 2563.
"' See United States v. Doyle, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 4 C.M.R. 137 (1952); United States
v. Florence, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 620, 5 C.M.R. 48 (1952). See also J. BISHOP, supra note 231, at
145-46; McNeill, Recent Trends in Search and Seizure, 54 MiL. L. REv. 83, 86 (1971).
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a search for probable cause established by oral and unsworn infor-
mation,4 0 this practice continues to be the law in the military,
and the Tenth Circuit bowed to that practice.
M. Caroline Turner
I. CONFUSION AND CONFLICT IN SEARCH AND
SEIZURE
United States v. Nevarez-Alcantar, 495 F.2d 678 (1974)
By ROBERT L. McGAHEY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court headed by Warren Burger has demon-
strated a marked distaste for the exclusionary rules favored by
the Warren Court and a decided preference for the measuring rod
of "reasonableness."' This shift by the Burger Court has had a
very real impact on lower federal and state courts. Although some
courts have happily accepted the new trend, the decisions have
also bred confusion, conflict, and in some cases outright disap-
proval.2
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently handed down a
decision with the potential for creating the same type of judicial
unrest. In United States v. Nevarez-Alcantar a panel of the
2140 See, e.g., United States v. Penman, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 36 C.M.R. 223 (1966);
United States v. Davenport, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 33 C.M.R. 364 (1963).
* Attorney at Law, Denver, Colorado; A.B., 1971, Princeton University; J.D., 1974,
University of Denver College of Law.
I United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.
800 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See also Voorsanger,
United States v. Robinson, Gustafson v. Florida, and United States v. Calandra: Death
Knell of the Exclusionary Rule?, 1 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 179 (1974); Note, United States
v. Robinson: Toward a Neutered Principle of the Exclusionary Rule, 8 U. SAN FRAN. L.
REv. 777 (1974).
2 For example, Robinson and Gustafson were met with almost uniform disapproval
by commentators. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 416 (1974); Voorsanger, supra note 1; 7 AKRON L. REv. 499 (1974); 45 Miss. L.J. 800
(1974); 43 U. CINN. L. Rv. 428 (1974).
This disagreement has not been limited to commentators. Courts, too, have com-
plained-and strenuously. See Hammond v. Bostic, 368 F. Supp. 732, 736 (W.D.N.C.
1973); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51 (Hawaii 1974) (rejecting the applicability of Robinson
and Gustafson to search and seizure law in Hawaii); People v. Kelly, 77 Misc. 2d 264, 353
N.Y.S.2d 111 (Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1974); People v. Copeland, 77 Misc. 2d 649, 354
N.Y.S.2d 399 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1974) (both holding Robinson and Gustafson
inapplicable in New York).
3 495 F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Tenth Circuit upheld the warrantless search of the locked suit-
case of a suspected illegal alien; the search occurred while he was
being detained for questioning. The court, following the Supreme
Court's lead, found the search to be "reasonable." Although the
search may well have been justifiable, the court's opinion is con-
fusing in its use and choice of precedent. Not only does the deci-
sion seem to be directly at odds with decisions of both the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits, but it conflicts as well with decisions of state
courts within the Tenth Circuit, and with other decisions of the
Tenth Circuit itself.
Gilberto Nevarez-Alcantar had two problems when he
stepped off the bus in Lordsburg, New Mexico, on April 12, 1973.
One was that he was so intoxicated that he believed himself to
be in San Francisco.' The other was the 131 ounces of heroin
which he carried in his locked suitcase.
At about 12:20 a.m. Alcantar approached two Lordsburg po-
lice officers and asked them to drive him to an address which the
officers knew was not in Lordsburg. The officers began to question
Alcantar. In response to the questions, Alcantar produced as
identification an Alien Registration Receipt card and a driver's
license. The card gave his address as San Francisco, California;
the license listed his home as Zaragoza, Chihuahua, Mexico. The
officers arrested Alcantar for drunkenness and after discovering
that he was a Spanish-speaking alien,5 transported him to the
Lordsburg office of the United States Border Patrol.
At the Border Patrol office, Agent Ashton continued to inter-
rogate Alcantar. According to the Tenth Circuit's opinion "Al-
cantar was in possession of his suitcase during the interroga-
tion."' The agent was not satisfied with Alcantar's identification,
since to Ashton it was not clear whether Alcantar resided in Mex-
ico or the United States. Ashton and the two Lordsburg police-
men then forcibly opened Alcantar's suitcase "in search of further
I Alcantar had boarded the bus in El Paso, Texas, with San Francisco as his ultimate
destination.
I But see United States v. Guana-Sanchez, 484 F.2d 590, 592 n.3 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, 94 S. Ct. 3169 (1974), where the court said, "there is no crime in speaking Spanish
or being Mexican or Puerto Rican." See United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.
1973).
1 495 F.2d at 679. As will become clear, this simple sentence holds the key to the
subsequent search of the suitcase. Exactly what is meant by "possession"?-in his hands,
in his lap, at arm's length on the floor next to him, ten feet away, in the same room? Such
fine distinctions can often make the difference between a legal and an illegal search.
1975
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
identification."7 When the suitcase was opened, the heroin was
discovered and Alcantar was subsequently charged with illegal
possession of a controlled substance.'
Alcantar moved to suppress the heroin, contending that the
seizure which netted the evidence was made without a warrant,
without probable cause, without his consent, and was unreasona-
ble in light of the fourth amendment. At an evidentiary hearing
the district court denied the motion, holding: that Alcantar was
still intoxicated when interviewed by Agent Ashton; that he did
not consent to the search; that he had been arrested for intoxica-
tion and that the search therefore could not be justified as inci-
dent to arrest; that there was no danger that Alcantar could reach
into his locked suitcase to seize a weapon or to destroy evidence;
that the search of the suitcase was in no way an inventory of
Alcantar's personal property; that the search was solely an effort
to find more information by which to establish Alcantar's ident-
ity; and that the officers had probable cause to search the suit-
case for such information.'
Alcantar appealed, and the Tenth Circuit ruled against him.
The majority opinion was written by Judge Barrett, for himself
and Judge Durfee of the Court of Claims (sitting by designation);
Chief Judge Lewis filed a concurring opinion.
In finding the search of Alcantar's suitcase reasonable, the
court offered three major justifications for the search: (1) that the
search fell within the border search exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment; (2) that Alcantar had been
detained pursuant to a valid Terry v. Ohio9 "investigative stop";
(3) that the search was conducted pursuant to a valid arrest.
These rationales, especially the second and third, are somewhat
contradictory. The problems with the opinion are compounded by
the court's failure to adequately delineate the differences between
each of these justifications. The remainder of this article will
discuss each of the reasons given by the court for upholding the
search. Nevarez-Alcantar will be compared with decisions ren-
dered by other circuits in similar cases. There will also be a short
discussion of whether the court of appeals could have used United
States v. Edwards" to bolster its opinion.
7 Id. at 679.
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (1973).
495 F.2d at 680.
10 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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I. BORDER SEARCH
Border searches made without warrants constitute a long
recognized exception to the exacting requirements of the fourth
amendment.' 2 The United States Supreme Court recently consid-
ered some of the ramifications of border searches, and attempted
to confine the exception within acceptable limits. In Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States'3 the Supreme Court stated that war-
rantless searches of random vehicles conducted by roving squads
of Border Patrol officers are unconstitutional. Almeida-Sanchez
was designed to delimit and define the extremely broad authority
granted to border patrol and customs officials in their attempts
to ferret out illegal aliens and contraband. Justice Stewart, writ-
ing for himself and three others, confined legitimate border
searches to the border itself and the "functional equivalents"
thereof. Justice Powell concurred, agreeing that the roving patrols
conducted in the case before the Court were improper, but stating
that he might be inclined to uphold such patrols if their searches
were made pursuant to "area search warrants."' 4 Justice White
dissented vigorously, stating that Congress intended that border
searches be broad and all-encompassing, and that they should
therefore be permitted at any location, without the necessity of a
warrant or probable cause."
Almeida-Sanchez caused immediate waves within the three
circuits whose dockets contain the majority of border search
cases-the Fifth, the Ninth, and the Tenth. The Tenth Circuit
considered Almeida-Sanchez in several cases prior to Nevarez-
Alcantar. In United States v. Bowman 6 a panel including Chief
Judge Lewis and Judge Barrett distinguished Almeida-Sanchez
on the basis of the type of search involved. In United States v.
King7 the court remanded to the district court for a factual deter-
mination of whether a fixed checkpoint some distance from the
border constitutes the "functional equivalent" of a border. For
the same reason a remand was also ordered in United States v.
415 U.S. 800 (1974).
12 For good overviews of the border search issue see Note, From Bags to Body Cavities:
The Law of Border Search, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1974) and Note, In Search of the Border,
5 N.Y.U.J. oF INT. L. & PoLrrics 93 (1972).
13 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
" Id. at 283-85.
Id. at 293.
' 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973).
7 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973).
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Maddox. 8 In both King and Maddox the court emphasized that
border searches are an exception to the warrant requirement and
are not dependent upon probable cause for their validity.
Judge Barrett's dissent in Maddox was a forerunner of his
majority opinion in Nevarez-Alcantar. He indicated his prefer-
ence for Justice Powell's Atmeida-Sanchez concurrence with its
comments on "roving patrols" and "area warrants," and also
quoted approvingly from Justice White's dissent in Almeida-
Sanchez concerning the problems presented by illegal aliens and
the intent of Congress relative to those problems. He discounted
entirely the majority opinion of Justice Stewart.
The Nevarez-Alcantar opinion ignores the question of func-
tional equivalency, as well as the limiting tenor of the majority
opinion in Almeida-Sanchez. Instead, Justice Powell's concurr-
ence and Justice White's dissent are emphasized as if these opin-
ions are the holding of the case." The judges of the King and
Maddox panels stated that the question of functional equivalency
must be examined by the district court. It would thus appear that
a conflict now exists among the judges of the Tenth Circuit as to
the meaning, applicability, and proper procedures required by
Almeida-Sanchez .20 Furthermore, no other controlling opinion of
any circuit court uses Almeida-Sanchez in the manner Nevarez-
Alcanter uses it, with the opinions of Justices Powell and White
in the positions of prominence, with the opinion of the Court
relegated to a position of no importance.2'
" 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973).
It hardly bears commenting that concurrences and dissents are not the law, al-
though they may become law in time. Compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (Black,
J., dissenting) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" This conflict between the Tenth Circuit's judges is well illustrated in the recent
Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 40 (1974). Bowen, discussed more fully below, dealt with the retroactive effect, if
any, to be given to Almeida-Sanchez. See discussion in note 26 infra. The judges in the
majority cite the Tenth Circuit cases of King and Maddox to support their contention that
Almeida-Sanchez is to apply to both fixed and movable checkpoints, and to both full-scale
searches and investigative stops. Bowen, supra at 967. Judge Wallace, in dissent, cites
Bowman, King, and Maddox, stating that the Tenth Circuit has a two-step procedure:
the initial stop may be made without a warrant, but if the search goes beyond plain view,
there must be the added factor of either probable cause or the functional equivalent of a
border. Bowen, supra at 969 n.3.
21 Some recognition of a link between Justice Powell's concurrence and Justice
White's dissent can be found. See United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal.
1973), in which District Judge Turrentine, in a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion consid-
ers and rejects an analysis like that made in Nevarez-Alcantar: "the plurality's language
and reasoning [in Almeida-Sanchez] appears to require courts to address the question
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Both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have the same large-
scale problems with illegal aliens as the Tenth Circuit. Both have
considered Almeida-Sanchez and its implications in detail. The
Fifth Circuit, before allowing a search to be justified as a border
search, requires that the person or vehicle to be searched have a
"strong nexus with the border" coupled with a "reasonable suspi-
cion" of illegal activity." In addition, an initial inquiry must be
made as to whether the "search occurred either at the border or
at the functional equivalent thereof. If not, then it is not a border
search." 3 The Fifth Circuit has shown itself willing to void
searches which clearly violate the letter of Almeida-Sanchez,"4 as
well as searches which violate its spirit.25
The Ninth Circuit places a heavy emphasis on "founded sus-
picion" (which may be less than probable cause) as a pre-
requisite for not only border searches, but for any sort of lawful
detentive stop.26 The Ninth Circuit has also developed an effec-
of whether searches at the checkpoints are 'border searches' for immigration purposes as
that term is defined in Almeida-Sanchez." Id. at 408. See also United States v. Bowen,
500 F.2d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 1974):
[Tihe government's difficulty in detecting and repatriating illegal aliens
along our southern border needs no new documentation here. The short
answer to this argument [that necessity demands certain practices] how-
ever, is that necessity alone cannot override the Fourth Amendment's prohi-
bition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A similar argument was
made and rejected in Almeida-Sanchez itself. See 413 U.S. at 29 (dissenting
opinion of White, J.).
Compare the majority opinion in Nevarez-Alcantar with the dissenting opinion of Judge
Wallace in Bowen, supra at 968-75.
In fairness to Judge Barrett, it should be noted that several commentators have
reacted favorably to Justice Powell's concept of area search warrants, calling it a reasona-
ble or commonsense approach to the problems presented by searches for illegal aliens.
Sutis, The Extent of the Border, 1 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 235 (1974) (but note the strong
rejection of Justice White's dissent); The Supreme Court-1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv.
55, 196-204 (1973); Recent Developments, 27 VAND. L. REv. 523 (1974).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Bursey, 491 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Lonabaugh, 494 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Steinkoenig, 487 F.2d 225 (5th
Cir. 1973).
2 United States v. Speed, 489 F.2d 478, 479, (5th Cir. 1973), afj'd on rehearing, 497
F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3307 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1974)
(No. 74-599) (footnotes omitted).
2, Id. United States v. McKim, 487 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Byrd,
483 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 494 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1974).
n See United States v. Olivares, 496 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Lonabaugh, 494 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1973). In Lonabaugh the circuit court stated that
proximity to the border is not the only standard which is to be used in determining
functional equivalency; the searcher must have knowledge that the person or thing to be
searched has just crossed the border. Id. at 1261.
" United States v. Juarez-Rodriquez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United
States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 167, rev'g on rehearing 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973); United
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tive and easily applicable definition of "functional equivalency":
if the place at which the search is conducted is a location where
virtually everyone searched has just come from the other side of
the border, it is the functional equivalent of the border; if a signif-
icant number of those stopped are domestic travelers going from
one point to another within the United States, the search is not
a border search.Y
If the Nevarez-Alcantar court had made use of the Fifth
Circuit's concept of "nexus with the border" or the Ninth
Circuit's "founded suspicion," the Nevarez-Alcantar opinion
might not be so hard to fathom and the search which took place
would not seem to be grounded on such a weak foundation.2 8 Or
if the court had dealt with retroactivity and held Almeida-
Sanchez inapplicable, it could have avoided the quixotic use to
which that case is put in Nevarez-Alcantar .
2
States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974).
The founded suspicion must be of a customs or immigration violation. United States v.
Diemler, 498 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974).
But where should the Tenth Circuit find a strong nexus with the border? In the
fact that Nevarez-Alcantar spoke Spanish? That he boarded the bus in El Paso? That
Lordsburg is approximately 40 miles from the Mexican border? That Alcantar's identifica-
tion documents were contradictory? And where would they find founded suspicion? In his
drunkenness? In the conflict in his documents? The Nevarez-Alcantar panel appears to
assume that a search falls within the border search exception if conducted by a Border
Patrol agent at a location near a foreign border. This is one of the points which Almeida-
Sanchez rejected. See also cases cited note 22 supra.
" Both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have also come to grips with the question of
whether Almeida-Sanchez should be given retroactive effect. Their results differ. The
Fifth Circuit, attempting to simplify matters, will not apply the Almeida-Sanchez rules
to any case tried before Almeida-Sanchez was decided. United States v. Miller, 492 F.2d
37 (5th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit has developed a somewhat more complicated set of
rules. Cases in which the search was made by roving patrols are entitled to have A lmeida-
Sanchez applied if they were on appeal at the time Alrneida-Sanchez was handed down.
United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
Searches made at fixed checkpoints are entitled to have Almeida-Sanchez applied, but
only if the search was conducted after Almeida-Sanchez was decided. United States v.
Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974). The Tenth Circuit has yet to deal definitively with
the retroactivity issue. But see Peltier, supra at 990 where Judge Goodwin cites King and
Maddox in support of his holding that Almeida-Sanchez is applicable to pending cases.
It is not clear if the issue has yet been properly before the Tenth Circuit, although it
appears that it could have been considered in Nevarez-Alcantar. Almeida-Sanchez was
decided on June 21, 1973; the search of Nevarez-Alcantar's suitcase took place on April
12, 1973. Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974).
The Supreme Court is apparently ready to deal with the question of the retroactivity
of Almeida-Sanchez; the Court granted certiorari in Bowen, 95 S. Ct. 40 (1974), Peltier,
95 S. Ct. 302 (1974), United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 40, and United States v.
Ortiz, 15 CRIM. L. REP. 4133 (1974).
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II. INVESTIGATIVE STOP
A second ground on which the court justified the search of
Nevarez-Alcantar's suitcase was that the search was one con-
ducted pursuant to a valid investigative stop as authorized by
Terry v. Ohio.3 However, the minimum Terry criteria were not
met in the present case. Terry authorized brief detentive stops for
the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior," but the
underlying basis for such stops limited to a frisk of the outer
clothing of the person detained," was to protect police officers or
others from possibly armed individuals.13 Those boundaries were
exceeded in Agent Ashton's forcible opening of Nevarez-
Alcantar's suitcase. Recall that the district court found that
Nevarez-Alcantar could not seize weapons or evidence from his
suitcase. Therefore the search of the suitcase could not be legiti-
mated on the basis of protecting Ashton or the Lordsburg officers.
And a search of Nevarez-Alcantar's suitcase is far from the lim-
ited pat-down of outer clothing allowed by Terry.3 Perhaps the
Nevarez-Alcantar court invoked Terry in an attempt to extricate
itself from the problem of applying Almeida-Sanchez, since the
Tenth Circuit had already held that the limitations of Almeida-
Sanchez are not applicable to investigative stops.
3 5
The Tenth Circuit implies that the search in the present case
is justifiable under both Robinson3 and Terry,37 and in so doing
slurs the distinction between investigative stops and lawful cus-
todial arrests. Robinson went to great lengths to distinguish the
difference between the two types of searches .3 The frisk allowed
'0 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3, Id. at 22.
3, Terry has been elaborated upon and expanded by the Burger Court. Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
392 U.S. at 23, 25.
' The Tenth Circuit has shown a tendency to misapply Terry; it should not be used
to justify any detention. Compare United States v. Saldana, 453 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1972)
and United States v. Sanchez, 450 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1971) with Ramirez v. Rodriguez,
467 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973). Ramirez involved weapons
and was a proper application of Terry; the other cases lack the element of a need to protect
the police officer, and hence are not true Terry cases. Saldana and Sanchez are cited as
authority in Nevarez-Aicantar.
" United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit has
held Almeida-Sanchez applicable to investigative stops, specifically rejecting both the
holding and reasoning of Bowman. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 40 (1974).
n 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
37 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
-" 414 U.S. at 227-29.
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at an investigative stop is limited in scope; the search permitted
by a valid custodial arrest is much broader, encompassing a full
scale search of the person. Nevarez-Alcantar justifies the search
of the suitcase both as an investigative stop and a search incident
to a valid arrest, without recognizing that different factual con-
siderations are required to justify each type of search. Giving the
two types of searches identical treatment creates problems both
theoretical and practical .
3
The Tenth Circuit could have indicated where the investiga-
tive stop ends and the search incident to arrest begins. This was
done very well by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Peep.1°
In Peep federal agents were in the process of validly searching a
house suspected of being a manufacturing plant for illegal drugs.
Peep and a friend entered the house while the search was going
on. One of the agents noticed a suspicious bulge in Peep's front
pants pocket. Thinking it might be a weapon, the agent reached
out to pat it, per Terry. Peep slapped the agent's hand away. The
lump turned out to be a large wad of bills which coupled with the
attendant circumstances gave the officers probable cause to ar-
rest Peep. A thorough search of his person, as authorized by
Robinson, ensued and a matchbox containing illicit drugs was
discovered. Both the initial pat-down and subsequent search were
upheld but with judicial recognition that there were important
factual distinctions between the two. The initial frisk was proper
for the protection of the officers. After probable cause was estab-
lished and a valid arrest effected, the full search of Peep's person
which uncovered contraband was correct. The events in Peep
occurred in rapid succession, and a proper frisk became a proper
search incident to a valid arrest, each justified by different fac-
tual considerations and each supported by a distinct and separate
set of precedents. Peep illustrates the line of demarcation be-
tween Terry and Robinson which courts should draw.
III. SEARCH INCIDENT TO A VALID ARREST
The final reason given by the Tenth Circuit for upholding the
forcible search of Nevarez-Alcantar's suitcase was that the search
was conducted pursuant to a valid arrest for public drunkenness.
The court relied on its own opinion in United States v. Simpson,"
n See the Tenth Circuit cases supra note 31. See also People v. Stevens, 517 P.2d 1336
(Colo. 1973), especially Erickson, J., dissenting at 1342-46.
40 490 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1974).
41 453 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972). This case would appear
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and found further support in the recent decisions of United States
v. Robinson 2 and Gustafson v. Florida.'3 As will be shown, none
of these cases properly applied can justify the search of Nevarez-
Alcantar's locked suitcase." Indeed, the application of Robinson
and Gustafson to the search in the present case shows a clear
misunderstanding of the cases and represents an improper and
potentially harmful extension of their holdings.
There is a very real and important difference between open-
ing a cigarette package found in a suspect's inside pocket
(Robinson) and opening a locked suitcase over which a suspect
no longer has any control.'5 Robinson and Gustafson allowed for
a full search of the person of one placed under a lawful custodial
arrest. This is clear from the language of Robinson:
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a
full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment but is also a "reasonable"
search under that Amendment."
Robinson is thus not applicable to the search of Nevarez-
Alcantar's suitcase.
A United States Supreme Court case which would seem to
validate the search of the suitcase is Chimel v. California,7 where
it was held that pursuant to a valid arrest: "There is ample justi-
fication . . . for a search of the arrestee's person and the area
'within his immediate control'-construing the phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence."' 8 Chimel rejected any broader-based
search.4"
to be nonapplicable to Nevarez-Alcantar since it involves the search of a suspect's wallet
after he was incarcerated. Recall that the district court found that the search of Nevarez-
Alcantar's suitcase was not an inventory of his personal effects.
42 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
- 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
" Recall that the district court found that the search of the suitcase was not made
pursuant to a valid arrest. 495 F.2d at 680.
,1 Compare concurring opinion of Lewis, C.J., in Nevarez-Alcantar, id. at 682-83, with
dissenting opinion of Marshal, J., in Robinson, 414 U.S. at 238-59.
" 414 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added). That Robinson allowed searches of the person
only has been the understanding of every commentator on the case. See authorities cited
note 2 supra.
,7 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
41 Id. at 763. The Nevarez-A lcantar court credits this rule of law to Robinson. 495 F.2d
at 682. Recall that the district court in Nevarez-Alcantar specifically found that Alcantar
could not reach into his suitcase for weapons or destructible evidence. 495 F.2d 680.
,1 It is argued . . . that it is "reasonable" to search a man's house when
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Although Chimel would seem to be a more likely precedent
to apply in the present case, it is clear that Chimel cannot serve
to uphold the search either because of the issue of "control" over
the suitcase. In the first place, it was locked. Although the
Nevarez-Alcantar court stated that Nevarez-Alcantar had "pos-
session" of his bag, it fails to define "possession" in any way
which indicates the amount of "control" he exercised over it.
Once Agent Ashton and the Lordsburg police officers took the bag
away from Nevarez-Alcantar so that they could open it, the bag
was no longer in Nevarez-Alcantar's "control" at all. And since
Ashton had reasonable grounds to detain Nevarez-Alcantar, there
were no exigent circumstances requiring immediate opening of
the suitcase.
Other circuits have dealt with the question of when a suitcase
may be opened without a warrant pursuant to a valid arrest. The
Sixth Circuit upheld a search of a suitcase in United States v.
Kaye,50 even though Kaye was subdued and his suitcase was
under the control of the police. The court emphasized that the
bag was still within the area from which the suspect might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence; this was but-
tressed by the fact that the suitcase was unlocked, making access
to its contents easier for the suspect. Although the court cited
Robinson, it primarily relied upon Chimel to uphold the search.
The same court reached a similar result in United States v.
Crane,5 upholding the seizure of a paper bag found between the
feet of an armed robbery suspect; again, stress was placed on the
bag's being within the area of the suspect's immediate control.5
The Fifth Circuit has also been confronted with warrantless
searches of luggage. But that circuit, even in the light of
Robinson, has shown reluctance to allow such searches, absent
he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded on little more than a
subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct,
and not in considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under
such unconfined analyses, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would
approach the evaporation point.
395 U.S. at 764-65.
492 F.2d 744 (6th Cir. 1974).
499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1974).
52 Id. at 1388. Compare both Kaye and Crane with United States v. Cupps, 503 F.2d
277 (6th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Marshall, 499 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam); United States v. Artieri, 491 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1974), both citing Robinson and
Chimel together, but placing heavy emphasis on the immediate control which the defen-
dant exercised over the contraband seized.
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exigent circumstances. In the pre-Robinson case of United States
v. Garay,3 the Fifth Circuit stated that a warrant must be ob-
tained to search the luggage when a defendant is restrained, when
police officers have effective control over his luggage, and when
there is no significant probability that the luggage could escape
a search. Two recent cases, one decided after Robinson, have
reaffirmed this position. In United States v. Lonabaugh,5' federal
narcotics agents, acting on a tip from a reliable informant that
the defendant would drive his car to the airport and send his
accomplice to another city with illegal drugs, followed him to the
airport. The defendant and his companion checked two suitcases,
then proceeded to the coffee shop. The agents went to the baggage
area, separated the suitcases from the other luggage, and ac-
costed the defendant after his companion had boarded his flight.
The defendant identified the suitcase as his, but claimed he did
not have the key. The agents then forcibly opened the suitcase
and found narcotics. Citing Garay, the Fifth Circuit invalidated
the search. In United States v. Anderson,'5 a post-Robinson case,
the Fifth Circuit again invalidated a search of luggage over which
the defendant had no control, stating,
Lonabaugh and Garay make it quite clear that when officers,
through their possession of baggage checks or in some other manner,
have effective control over the movement of checked luggage ...
there is a lack of exigent circumstances upon which to justify a
warrantless search, probable cause notwithstanding.6
One other Fifth Circuit case deserves some scrutiny. United
States v. Soriano57 also involved the search of luggage. Federal
agents were pursuing persons whom they had probable cause to
believe were carrying narcotics. The agents stopped the cab in
which the suspects were riding, opened the trunk, and removed
luggage from it. They then immediately opened the luggage and
found drugs. The Fifth Circuit, en banc, upheld the search of the
suitcase as incident to a search of the car, citing Robinson in
477 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
', 494 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1973).
500 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1318 (emphasis supplied). Compare these cases and Nevarez-Alcantar with
United States v. Coll, 357 F. Supp. 333 (D.P.R. 1973), where immigration authorities took
the defendant into custody as an illegal alien and found on his person a large sum of
money, a suitcase key, and baggage claim checks. The defendant denied any knowledge
of the claim checks. The court upheld the subsequent warrantless search of the luggage
for identification, but stated that had the defendant acknowledged the suitcase as his, a
warrant would have been needed to search them. Id. at 336.
" 497 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 482 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1973).
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dictum. But in a footnote the court indicated that had the bags
been removed from the area to be searched later a warrant might
well have been required. 8 The important part of Soriano for pur-
pose of this discussion is the concurring opinion of Judge God-
bold, for himself and Judges Thornberry and Goldberg. They
upheld the search of the suitcases, but as a Chimel search, not a
Robinson search. They recognized that the search of moveable
personal property disassociated from the person falls within the
confines of Chimel, not Robinson.5 They speculated as to
whether the Supreme Court intended Robinson and Gustafson to
encompass Chimel situations, or whether the two cases are to
stand as equals, each covering different types of searches.
The Soriano concurrence points up the most severe problem
with the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Nevarez-Alcantar. The court
acts as if Robinson has indeed absorbed Chimel, without recog-
nizing that Chimel and Robinson are founded on very different
premises. Chimel requires that the search of an area be for weap-
ons or easily destructible evidence; Robinson specifically disa-
vows those criteria when a search of the person pursuant to a
lawful arrest is involved. 0 To apply Robinson and Chimel to-
gether in justifying a search of the person and of items in his
immediate control, while recognizing the distinction between the
decisions, as the Sixth Circuit has done, would seem to be accept-
able. But to justify searches of the person and of items, whether
in control of the defendant or not, as the Tenth Circuit does in
Nevarez-Alcantar is to expand Robinson and to effectively negate
Chimel. Justice Stewart's opinion in Chimel was a lengthy one,
with a solid foundation in the theory behind the fourth amend-
ment. If Chimel is to be regarded as enveloped by Robinson, or
indeed as no longer viable in light of Robinson, such a pronounce-
ment can only come from the U.S. Supreme Court. Failure to
recognize the distinctions and to adequately analyze the implica-
tions of each case can only lead to the type of judicial confusion
and unrest that followed in Robinson's wake.6 '
V. United States v. Edwards
Although the court made no reference to it, does the case of
Id. at 150 n.6.
" Id. at 151.
414 U.S. at 234-35.
ol A perfect example of such conflict can be found in two recent decisions by state
appellate courts within the Tenth Circuit. In People v. Grana, 527 P.2d 543 (Colo. 1974)
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United States v. Edwards"2 serve to support the conclusion
reached in Nevarez-Alcantar?13 Edwards involved the search of a
suspect's clothing some 10 hours after his arrest; the clothing was
taken from the already jailed suspect because police had probable
cause to believe that the clothing itself would be material evi-
dence. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the search as one made
pursuant to a valid arrest, holding that the delay in conducting
the search was not improper. Justice Stewart, for himself and
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissented, stating that
this was neither a proper search of the person under Robinson, nor
was it a valid Chimel search."4
It should be noted that Edwards involved evidence which
was under the defendant's control, and since paint chips were
involved, the evidence was easily destructible. Furthermore, the
Court placed some small emphasis on protection of the police and
prevention of escape." Finally, the high Court pointed out that
the clothing was searchable as part of normal jail check-in proce-
dures-an inventory search."6 However, the time factor relative to
the search seems to be the most important aspect of the deci-
sion."
and State v. Vigil, 524 P.2d 1004 (N. Mex. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d
988 (1974), the courts of Colorado and New Mexico were faced with cases which were
almost identical to each other on their facts. The Colorado Supreme Court invalidated
the search in Grana; the New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the search in Vigil.
S2 94 S. Ct. 1234 (1974).
1 In United States v. Roe, 495 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1974), decided 3 days after
Nevarez-Alcantar, the court used Edwards to validate entry into a lawfully impounded
car. The court was not sure if the entry was a search at all, but stated that if it was, it
was justified under Edwards and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
Edwards appears to be aimed at the time the search is made, rather than its scope.
Erickson, U.S. Supreme Court Criminal Decisions: 1973 - 1974 Term, 3 COLO. LAWYER 465,
468 (Sept. 1974). Although this aspect of Edwards is mentioned in Roe, it is only in
passing. Note also that Roe appears to contain the same blurring and intermingling of
Chimel and Robinson as does Nevarez-Alcantar.
" 94 S. Ct. at 1240-42 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "[Tlhe mere fact of an arrest does
not allow the police to engage in warrantless searches of unlimited geographic or temporal
scope." Id. at 1240.
" Id. at 1237. If these factors are important in Edwards, how can the Supreme Court
consistently cite Robinson as justification for the search? As discussed above, Robinson
seems to require only a valid arrest for a full search of the person; subjective factors such
as those relied upon in Edwards are of lesser or no importance. Query: Is Edwards the
Supreme Court case which begins the dismantling and eventual abandonment of Chimel?
Note that Justice White's majority opinion links Robinson and Chimel together without
distinguishing between the two. Id. at 1236.
" Compare United States v. Gardner, 480 F.2d 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
977 (1973) (wallet searched as inventory of effects of already incarcerated person). See
United States v. Grill, 484 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974).
11 Edwards has been analyzed in the following manner:
1975
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Nevarez-Alcantar does not fit the Edwards mold. As the dis-
trict court recognized, Nevarez-Alcantar did not have access to
the interior of his suitcase; hence there was no weapon or evidence
which he could easily reach. And, as discussed above, it is debata-
ble if the suitcase could have been opened contemporaneously
with Nevarez-Alcantar's arrest.
6 8
Edwards might arguably have offered a viable justification
for the search in Nevarez-Alcantar. But enough significant fac-
tual differences exist between the two cases to render Edwards
inapposite.
CONCLUSION
United States v. Nevarez-Alcantar offered the Tenth Circuit
an opportunity for a detailed analysis of fourth amendment prob-
lems, both at the border and incident to arrest. Given the fluid
nature of the legal questions involved, such an analysis was in
order, so that the Tenth Circuit could lend the force of its reason-
ing and the perceptive comments of its judges to the resolution
of those questions. Yet the Tenth Circuit, perhaps due to the
pressures of a crowded docket, has written a brief opinion lacking
in-depth consideration of the legal issues presented, as many
courts too often do. The precedents chosen by the Nevarez-
Alcantar court and the use to which they were put may well
compound the problem and result in confusion as to the law of
search and seizure within the Tenth Circuit. Conflict has also
been created with other circuits.
Nevarez-Alcantar does not consider the question of func-
tional equivalency, tacitly ignores the majority opinion in
Almeida-Sanchez, blurs the distinction between investigative
stops and searches incident to valid arrests, and eschews exclu-
sionary rules in favor of testing the reasonableness of the search.
It is hoped that the near future will bring a clarification of the
perplexing opinion in Nevarez-Alcantar.
That case held only that a search otherwise proper under the "incident to a
lawful arrest" exception would not be invalidated simply because it was
postponed until after arrest or processing, or until the next morning.
Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690, 701 (D. Va. 1974).
U See text accompanying notes 39-58 supra. For cases discussing the circumstances
in which luggage may be opened without a warrant see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959); United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 185
(1974); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971);
United States v. Issod, 370 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Wis. 1974).
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II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: PROBABLE CAUSE
The fourth amendment to the Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court held in
Carroll v. United States' that searches and seizures which are
based on probable cause are not unreasonable and hence not
violative of the fourth amendment.2 The term "probable cause"
is not defined in the Constitution, but has been variously defined
as "reasonable ground for belief in guilt"3 or as something more
than bare suspicion but less than that quantum of evidence nec-
essary to justify conviction.'
No matter how probable cause is defined, the determination
of its existence necessarily entails a close examination by the
court of the facts in each case. The Tenth Circuit made such an
examination in four cases involving a warrantless search of a
vehicle5 with a subsequent seizure of contraband: United States
v. Bowman,' United States v. Newman,7 United States v. Cage,8
and United States v. Sigal? In each case the lower court had
found probable cause and convicted; only in Newman did the
Tenth Circuit disagree with the finding of probable cause and
reverse.
I. ODOR AND PROBABLE CAUSE
The Tenth Circuit has joined the Ninth Circuit in holding
that the detection of the distinctive odor of marijuana by trained
officers can by itself satisfy the probable cause requirement for
searches and seizures.'" In United States v. Bowman," the defen-
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 161, citing McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). For a recent general discussion
by the Tenth Circuit of what probable cause is, see United States v. Neal, 500 F.2d 305
(10th Cir. 1974).
1 Warrantless searches of vehicles are considered reasonable if based upon probable
cause and exigent circumstances. This exception to the warrant requirement exists be-
cause of the impracticality of obtaining a warrant; see, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In order to justify the search
as reasonable, there must be an actual danger that the vehicle might be moved and
evidence lost. Where such exigent circumstances do not exist and obtaining a warrant is
practicable, a warrantless search is unreasonable and hence illegal. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
1 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973) (marijuana).
7 490 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1974) (marijuana).
494 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1974) (unregistered sawed-off shotgun).
- 500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 216 (1974) (marijuana).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Barron, 472 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 413
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dant's car was stopped for a routine nationality check by the
United States Border Patrol at a checkpoint near Truth or Conse-
quences, New Mexico. While a Border Patrol agent was talking
with Bowman, the agent detected the odor of marijuana." A
search revealed 48 pounds of marijuana inside the car. Bowman
was then arrested for possession with intent to distribute mari-
juana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) and subse-
quently convicted.
3
The Tenth Circuit had previously held that the odor of mari-
juana was one valid factor in determining probable cause.'4 In
these earlier cases other factors in addition to odor were present,
so the court had not been faced squarely with the issue of whether
U.S. 920 (1973); United States v. Campos, 471 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1972); Fernandez v.
United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963). It is interesting to note that the Hon. Talbot
Smith, District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, was sitting by designation in
both the Barron and Bowman cases.
A Third Circuit case recently held that a trained agent's independent detection of the
odor of marijuana after being alerted by an air freight employee who detected the odor
first was sufficient basis for probable cause to search for marijuana. Valen v. United
States, 479 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 185 (1974).
487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973).
32 There is nothing in Bowman or the other marijuana cases to indicate that mari-
juana was being smoked. Rather, the indications are that the marijuana was packaged in
some unspecified manner and in transport. The writer contacted local police agencies to
ascertain how odorous packaged marijuana is. One agency allowed the writer to enter a
vault in which packaged marijuana seized in recent drug arrests was stored. There was a
definite, distinctive odor to the writer's untrained nose. However, it should be noted that
the quality of packaging, quantity and quality of marijuana, and other physical factors
make the possibilities of human detection of the odor highly variable.
In most cases the existence of the odor will be proved entirely by the testimony of
the officer conducting the search. With the Bowman holding that smell alone can sustain
a finding of probable cause, the possibility of police abuse arises. That policemen have
resorted on occasion to using unsavory testimony was well documented in the "dropsy"
cases so common after the federal exclusionary rule was applied to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Following Mapp's holding that evidence obtained as a result
of an illegal search was not admissible, there appeared to be an increased reliance upon
the plain view doctrine to justify searches and to circumvent the strictures of Mapp. The
increase in these "dropsy" cases was noted by Younger in his article The Perjury Routine,
THE NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596. More formal studies followed: Barlow, Patterns of
Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4
Cram. L. BuLL. 549 (1968); Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New
Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971). See also People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63,
314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1970).
Police abuse of the "furtive gesture" basis for probable cause has also been assailed
judicially; see People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970).
' The facts are more fully set out in 487 F.2d at 1230.
'4 United States v. Anderson, 468 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
927 (1973); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Miller, 460 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1972).
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odor alone was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. 5
The only basis for probable cause in Bowman was the odor of
marijuana, and the court held that that was sufficient. The court
noted that the Border Patrol agent had smelled marijuana many
times in the past and was familiar with its distinctive odor."6
The odor of marijuana also played a role in United States v.
Newman. 7 The court distinguished Bowman on the pivotal fact
that in Bowman the detection of the odor preceded and in fact
precipitated the search, but in Newman a search for illegal aliens
had already begun when the odor of marijuana was detected.
Newman and Coldwell were driving a pickup truck with
camper through a Border Patrol checkpoint in northeast Okla-
homa, some 700 miles from the Mexican border. Because the
camper was large enough to conceal illegal aliens, an agent
wanted to inspect it and ordered the truck stopped. When the
camper door was opened by Coldwell, the agent smelled mari-
juana. Coldwell returned to the front of the truck on a pretext and
11 There are also some earlier Supreme Court cases indicating that detection of the
odor of a contraband substance may be a valid factor in determining probable cause; see,
e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (burning opium); Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (fermenting mash). An older Fifth Circuit case, McBride v.
United States, 284 F. 416 (5th Cir. 1922), explained that odor alone was, in appropriate
circumstances, enough to meet the probable cause requirement, since a crime (possession
of contraband) was being committed in the officer's presence.
Arguably, detection of an odor could be viewed as the olfactory equivalent of the
"plain view" doctrine. The Fourth Circuit rejected this thesis recently in United States
v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1101 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974), where an
agent smelled moonshine whiskey and then searched for and found it in a truck:
The liquor was certainly not in "plain view," within the ordinary meaning
of that phrase, when [the agent] first detected the odor emanating from the
truck. Nor did he, at that point, have any basis upon which to conclude, with
certainty, that liquor was actually present in the truck. An alternative ex-
planation of the smell was equally probable-that liquor had once been
present in the truck but had since been removed leaving the truck permeated
with its vapors. [The agent] thus had no more than a reasonable ground to
infer the presence of liquor at this point. A further visual observation was
necessary to confirm the hypothesis.
Although detection of the odor did not justify the search under the plain view doctrine,
the majority did say however that that was sufficient basis for probable cause. Id. How-
ever, the search was invalidated on the ground that exigent circumstances were not pres-
ent to justify a warrantless search. Judge Widener dissented "on the ground that the
evidence was lawfully seized under the plain view exception." Id. at 1104.
The Supreme Court apparently has no objection to basing probable cause to search
on the detection of the odor of contraband, as it denied certiorari on the same day in
Bradshaw, Sigal, and Valen v. United States, 479 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 185 (1974). See discussion of Valen, supra note 10.
" 487 F.2d at 1231.
,T 490 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1974).
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rode off quickly with Newman. The truck was found abandoned
a short while later. A search of its contents disclosed 741 pounds
of marijuana. Newman and Coldwell were later arrested and con-
victed of possession with intent to distribute marijuana.'8
The Tenth Circuit found no probable cause to justify the
search at its inception and reversed the conviction. The court
concluded that the search began when the door to the camper was
opened and that at that time there was no probable cause to
search for illegal aliens.' 9 Thus the subsequent detection of the
odor of marijuana was irrelevant, because "a search in violation
of the constitution [i.e., not based on probable cause] is not
made lawful by what it brings to light . "2... 0 Further, the sei-
zure of the marijuana was tainted by the initial illegal intrusion
into the camper and thus the marijuana was inadmissible as
evidence against Newman and Coldwell under the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.2'
The odor of marijuana was also a significant factor in the
determination of probable cause in United States v. Sigal.u It is
surprising, however, that the Tenth Circuit made no reference to
its clear statement on the matter of odor in Bowman, which had
appeared almost 8 months earlier.
2 3
As Sigal crossed the Mexican border into the United States
at El Paso, Texas, a customs inspector noticed that Sigal tried
to conceal an aircraft key. An aircraft with a registration number
matching that on Sigal's key was located and followed on a 13-
day series of flights through the Southwest. A customs agent
finally had the opportunity in New Mexico to inspect the aircraft
, The facts are more fully set out id. at 994.
" Id. at 995.
Harris v. United States, 151 F.2d 837, 841 (10th Cir. 1945), afl'd, 331 U.S. 145
(1947), citing Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927). See also Carr v. United
States, 59 F.2d 991, 993 (2d Cir. 1932): "[One cannot] lawfully be subjected to a search,
illegal because not based on probable cause at its inception, on any theory that the finding
of contraband justifies the means employed to find it."
The Tenth Circuit recently considered a case where a search ultimately disclosed an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun. United States v. Omalza, 484 F.2d 1191 (10th Cir. 1973).
Although the court concluded the search was valid, arguably its validity rested upon what
was found after the search had begun.
21 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 216 (1974).
2 As support for the thesis that the odor of marijuana is a valid factor in determining
probable cause, the court cited two cases which Bowman had cited: United States v.
McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973); United States
v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1972).
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from the outside. He detected the odor of marijuana while in-
specting around the air vents and then searched one of several
boxes being transported in the aircraft and found marijuana.
Sigal returned several hours later and flew on to Kansas, where
agents following him from New Mexico arrested him on a charge
of possession with intent to distribute marijuana .2
In examining the search in New Mexico, the court found that
the detection of the odor of marijuana was the deciding factor in
finding probable cause to search. 25 Furthermore, the court
stressed that in determining the existence of exigent circumstan-
ces justifying a warrantless search, the mobility of the vehicle
searched was more significant than the type of vehicle searched,
and hence the search of a highly mobile aircraft fell within the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."
Sigal claimed that there were no exigent circumstances since
his aircraft was on the ground for some 15 hours in New Mexico
and the agents thus had time to obtain a warrant. The court
rebutted this contention by stating that the proper test to be
applied is how the facts appeared to the agents at the time the
search was initiated. The court noted that the agents had no way
of knowing when Sigal or another might return and take off; only
in hindsight did it appear that there was sufficient time to obtain
a warrant from the United States magistrate located 90 miles
from the airport."
The defendants in Bowman, Newman, and Sigal were all
charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana in
violation of section 841(a)(1). The distribution charge was based
in each case on the quantity of marijuana possessed: in Bowman,
48 pounds; in Newman, 741 pounds; and in Sigal, 445 pounds.
Without specifying a minimum amount, the court obviously has
, The facts are more fully set out in 500 F.2d at 1120-21.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1121. Sigal mentioned, inter alia, as support for a search of a vehicle with
probable cause but without a warrant, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Both involved searches of an automobile.
71 500 F.2d at 1122-23. The court cited Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), for the
proposition that although the agents might have obtained a warrant before conducting the
search, the fact that they did not obtain a warrant at the earliest possible time was not
necessarily fatal to the legality of the search. Id. at 2472. United States v. Miller, 460 F.2d
582 (10th Cir. 1972), involved a similar situation where there was no activity on the part
of the defendants for 3 hours; in hindsight, there would have been time to obtain a search
warrant, but the waiting officers at the time had no way of knowing when the defendants




concluded that quantities in excess of purely personal needs sup-
port the inference that distribution is intended. 8
II. BORDER SEARCHES
The searches in Bowman and Newman were conducted by
the Border Patrol at distances of about 98 and 700 miles from the
border respectively. The Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States" severely limited roving warrantless "border"
searches by the Border Patrol, where such searches were actually
made some distance from the border."0 In Almeida-Sanchez the
Border Patrol stopped a car about 25 miles from the border in
order to look for illegal aliens. The defendant's car was stopped
on a purely random and indiscriminate basis without regard for
probable cause.' The search resulted in the discovery of 161
pounds of marijuana under the back seat. The Supreme Court
reversed the subsequent conviction in a 5-4 decision, holding that
a search of a particular car had to be justified by probable cause.2
Almeida-Sanchez figured prominently in both Bowman and
Newman.3 3 Bowman was distinguished from A lmeida-Sanchez on
the sole basis that the detection of the odor of marijuana provided
probable cause to search Bowman's car. Absent probable cause,
the Bowman search would have been illegal .
3
On the other hand, the reversal in Newman followed
The court made the same point in United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.
1973), where 602 pounds of marijuana supported the inference that defendant intended
to distribute.
413 U.S. 266 (1973).
Searches at the border are of a special type not requiring a warrant or even probable
cause, because of an overriding national security interest inherent in any sovereign nation.
See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); United States v. King, 485
F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973).
413 U.S. at 268.
Id. at 269.
31 Two cases were heard in the Tenth Circuit between Almeida-Sanchez and
Bowman, with facts much as in Almeida-Sanchez (i.e., an inland search of a car con-
ducted by the Border Patrol without warrant or probable cause): United States v. King,
485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973).
Upon remand to the U.S. District Court in New Mexico, that court found that the Truth
or Consequences, N.M. checkpoint 98 miles from the border was not the "functional
equivalent" of a border search and overturned King's and Maddox's convictions. The
government appealed and was then granted a postponement (King, No. 74-1744, and
Maddox, No. 74-1839, 10th Cir.) until the U.S. Supreme Court decides similar cases
coming from the Ninth Circuit on which certiorari was recently granted, 95 S.Ct. 40
(1974): United States v. Ortiz, - F.2d - (9th Cir. June 19, 1974), 15 CRIM. L. Rpm.
4132; United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974).
1, 487 F.2d at 1231.
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Almeida-Sanchez in two respects: there was no true border search
because the search took place over 700 miles from the border, and
because there was no probable cause prior to the search. The
government attempted to claim that probable cause existed
based on these facts: the camper had Texas license plates; con-
tainers large enough to conceal illegal aliens were in the camper;
the agent was experienced; and, many illegal aliens had been
captured at this particular checkpoint. These facts, according to
the court, were not sufficient to point specifically to Newman and
his companion Coldwell as transporters of illegal aliens.3
The court set out the policy rationale for requiring a firm
basis for probable cause in such so-called "border searches" as
follows:
To uphold a finding of probable cause on the facts presented would
effectively authorize the search of each and every vehicle passing
through this checkpoint with a border state license plate and suffi-
cient capacity to conceal a human body; the inherent potential for
abuse under such a rationale is virtually unlimited. It is significant
to note in this respect that [the agent] admitted that he was "just
indiscriminately stopping vehicles." This type of activity is not pro-
hibited per se but cannot be escalated to frustrate the fourth amend-
ment."
It should be noted, however, that the Tenth Circuit considers
A Imeida-Sanchez to have no effect on the authority of the Border
Patrol to stop vehicles for the restricted purpose of ascertaining
nationality. 7
III. TRANSFERABILITY OF INFORMATION
The extent to which information furnished by another may
be used in determinations of probable cause is an issue frequently
confronted by the courts." The Tenth Circuit was confronted
" The court distinguished Newman from United States v. Saldana, 453 F.2d 352
(10th Cir. 1972). In Saldana the riders were of Mexican descent, had no nationality papers
when asked in the routine citizenship inquiry, and when asked where they came from
replied that they had "swum the river." Those facts were sufficient to sustain a finding
of probable cause.
The validity of using Mexican descent in determinations of probable cause has been
questioned in two other circuits. United States v. Guana-Sanchez, 484 F.2d 590, 592 (7th
Cir. 1973), citing United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1973).
u 490 F.2d at 995.
" Id.; 487 F.2d at 1231. Thus Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th
Cir. 1969), decided before Almeida-Sanchez, appears to remain valid for this point. Contra
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.Ct. 40
(1974).
31 See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) (information from a police radio
bulletin may be used, provided it has a valid basis in probable cause); United States v.
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with this issue in United States v. Cage,"9 where police acted on
the basis of a radio bulletin.
Two police officers received a radioed pickup order on a car
driven by the alleged perpetrators of an assault. The message
described the car, and also described the occupants by sex and
ethnic background, adding that they might be armed with a
sawed-off shotgun. The officers found the car with occupants
matching the radioed descriptions. The occupants were given
their Miranda rights but were not arrested. Then the officers saw
a bloody towel in the car. Cage was asked to open the trunk; when
he complied, the officers saw a sawed-off shotgun. Cage was ar-
rested on state charges and later a federal charge of possession of
an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. 0 The Tenth Circuit upheld
the subsequent conviction and justified the search on the two
separate grounds of probable cause and consent.
In discussing the probable cause issue, the court first held
that police may act on the basis of a radio bulletin." Then the
court said that seeing the bloody towel "gave sufficient support
to the radio bulletin to sustain probable cause for the search.'
2
On the facts of this case, it was necessary to have both the bulle-
tin and the bloody towel in order to sustain probable cause.
The court apparently analyzed the radio bulletin both as a
message and as a medium for transmitting the message. The
court relied on Whiteley v. Warden43 for the proposition that
radio, as a medium, is a permissible means of transmitting infor-
mation. 4 In analyzing the message contained in the bulletin, the
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (information received from fellow officers may be used by
officer-affiant to justify issuance of warrant); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971)
and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (under the proper circumstances, hearsay
may be used to justify issuance of warrant). If the information comes from an informant,
there is a requirement that the underlying circumstances be furnished to the neutral
magistrate so that he can decide whether a warrant should issue by judging the credibility
of the informant and the reliability of the information. E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). But see United States v. McCoy,
478 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973) and United States v. Bell,
457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972), where the credibility of eyewitness victims needs not be
shown the magistrate to justify issuance of a warrant.
- 494 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1974).
40 The facts are more fully set out id. at 741.
1 Id. at 742, relying on Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971).
," 494 F.2d at 742.
401 U.S. 560 (1971).
" In Whiteley, radio was used to transmit an arrest warrant. Subsequently it was
determined that the warrant was not based on probable cause and hence the arrest was
invalid. However, the Court clearly left the inference that if the warrant had been valid,
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court noted that it contained a report of a street crime. 5 Whether
the report was made by the victim, an eyewitness, or an inform-
ant was not stated. In holding that the police could reasonably
respond to such a report of a street crime, the court relied on
language in Adams v. Williams:"
But in some situations-for example, when the victim of a street
crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his
assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific impend-
ing crime-the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an
appropriate police response.'7
In Cage the court seemed to say that the particular report ini-
tially received by the police and subsequently transmitted by
them could be used as a factor in determining probable cause, but
it was not sufficient by itself to support probable cause. The court
analogized the report to an informant's tip, which the Supreme
Court discussed in Whiteley. The Court stated that information
gathered by the arresting officers can be used to sustain a proba-
ble cause finding not adequately supportable by the tip alone."8
Thus the sight of the bloody towel was "information gathered"
by the officers, and this, when added to the report of the street
crime, was sufficient to sustain probable cause.
The second basis for justifying the Cage search was consent,
which the trial court and the Tenth Circuit found to be voluntary.
Cage argued that the consent was not voluntary since he had not
been told that he could withhold his consent. In Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte4" the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the general
rule that consent is a valid exception to the fourth amendment
warrant and probable cause requirements. 0 On the issue of volun-
tariness, the Supreme Court stated that "[violuntariness is a
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances
.... "" Thus lack of knowledge on the defendant's part of the
right to withhold consent, or failure on the government's part to
its transmission by radio would have been entirely neutral and permissible, as radio is
merely one modem, valid means of transferring information between police units.
,5 494 F.2d at 742.
' 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
, Id. at 147.
, 401 U.S. at 567.
' 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
In Bustamonte the Court relied upon two cases in support of the consent exception:
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624,
630 (1946). 412 U.S. at 219.
11 412 U.S. at 248-49.
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inform the defendant of such a right, is only one of many factors
to be considered. The trial court, acting as trier of fact, found that
Cage had given his consent; this finding and the language in
Bustamonte convinced the Tenth Circuit that the consent had
been validly given.2
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's approach to issues involving probable
cause to search and seize without a warrant in exigent circum-
stances is traditional and correct. It should be noted that the
judges apparently agree upon what probable cause is, as there
were no concurring or dissenting opinions in the four cases dis-
cussed above. There are no surprises or radical departures from
accepted views of the probable cause requirement for searches
and seizures. In examining a search and seizure case, the court
carefully scrutinizes the facts to ascertain: if there were reasona-
ble grounds to believe a crime had been committed; if these rea-
sonable grounds existed prior to the commencement of the
search; and if exigent circumstances existed. If all three criteria
are met, then the warrantless search is valid.
Richard F. Currey
I. GOVERNMENT INFORMERS
I. DEFINITION OF "INFORMER"
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Miller' considered the
definition of the term "informer." Miller was charged with as-
sault with intent to commit murder,2 and subsequent to the of-
fense a witness voluntarily contacted the FBI to give information.
The defendant, claiming the witness was an "informer," de-
manded reversal because the government had failed to identify
the witness as an informer. The defendant moved to strike the
witness' testimony, requesting that the court define an "in-
former" as:
52 The result in Cage appears to bear out the prediction voiced in Tribe, The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 221 (1973): "[T]he net result of Bustamonte may
be that in practice a lack of knowledge of the right to refuse will rarely if ever be a
significant factor in a decision about the voluntariness of consent." Bustamonte was
affirmed in the 1973 term in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
499 F.2d 736 (10th Cir. 1974).
18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1970).
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[A] person who voluntarily furnishes information to authorities as
contrasted to persons who merely supply information after being
interviewed and after a request for the information has been made.,
The court, denying Miller's appeal, held:
The voluntary submission of information. . . does not, without
more, make an individual an informer, in the absence of some
connection between the individual and the government agency. To
be an informer the individual supplying the information generally
is either paid for his services or, having been a participant in the
unlawful transaction, is granted immunity for his testimony.'
A requirement that the relationship between the informer
and the government precede the criminal activity can be inferred
from the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Harris.5 Harris'
partners in a bank robbery testified against him at trial in ex-
change for leniency. The issue on appeal was whether informer or
accomplice jury instructions should have been given.' The court
held that the witnesses testified as accomplices and not as in-
formers.' Seemingly, the missing element in Harris was a connec-
tion or relationship between the witnesses and the government
prior to the criminal activity.
Construing these cases, an "informer" can probably be de-
fined as one who, pursuant to a relationship existing with the
government prior to the crime charged, discovers and gives the
government information concerning criminal activity. That the
informant is paid or granted immunity for his services is a good
indication of the existence of the requisite relationship.8
II. PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT INFORMERS
The government enjoys a privilege to withhold the identity
of its informers from the defendant.9 The purpose of the privilege
is to encourage the free flow of information concerning criminal
activity from the public to authorities, thus protecting the public
interest in effective law enforcement."0 However, this privilege
499 F.2d at 741; accord, Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 875 (5th Cir. 1971).
499 F.2d at 742 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
494 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit, distinguishing between an "in-
former" and an ordinary witness, has limited "informers" to those who were "purposely
used by the government to obtain evidence." United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283, 288
(9th Cir. 1969).
See text accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
494 F.2d at 1274.
499 F.2d at 742.
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
" Id. Courts in creating and perpetuating this privilege have taken notice of the high
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must give way when disclosure of the informer's identity is neces-
sary to insure the defendant a fair trial and an adequate oppor-
tunity to prepare his defense."
In United States v. Martinez2 the defendant appealed his
conviction on the grounds of the trial court's denial of his request
for disclosure of the identity of an informer. The informer was a
government-sanctioned participant in the transaction which re-
sulted in the charge. He did not testify at trial. The evidence
implicating Martinez in the transaction was conflicting, and the
informer, an eyewitness, potentially could have been helpful to
the defendant. Before and during the trial, defense counsel re-
quested the informer's identity, but each time the request was
denied by the trial court. The Tenth Circuit, basing its holding
on Roviaro v. United States, 3 reversed the convictions."
Factually, Roviaro was almost identical to Martinez. In
Roviaro, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that despite the strong
underlying policy to protect the public interest in effective law
enforcement, the "informer privilege" is not without limitation:
Where the disclosure of an informer's identity . . .is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determi-
nation of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations
the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government with-
holds the information, dismiss the action."
The Court set forth what has been characterized as a "balancing
test" to determine the applicability of the "informer privilege."
The basic opposing interests are, on the one side, the public inter-
est in effective law enforcement and, on the other, the individ-
ual's right to prepare his defense. Whether or not the government
must disclose the identity of its informer is determined by the
particular facts in each case. In making the proper balance,
courts should consider all relevant factors, specifically including
"the crime charged, the possible defenses, [and] the possible
mortality rate of identified informers. "Dead men tell no tales." Id. at 67 (Clark, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184 (10th Cir. 1974).
" 353 U.S. at 60-61.
.2 487 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1973).
13 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
" 487 F.2d at 977. The case was remanded to the district court with the instruction
that the government identify the informer or the case should be dismissed. In the event
the informer was disclosed, the possible relevance of his testimony was to be determined
at an evidentiary hearing. Should the court find his testimony favorable to the defendant,
a new trial was to be conducted; otherwise, the conviction was to be reinstated. Id.
"1 353 U.S. at 60-61 (footnotes omitted).
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significance of the informer's testimony."'" Committing the facts
of Roviaro to the balance, the Court noted that the informer was
the sole participant with the accused in the criminal transaction
and was the only witness in a position to dispute or amplify the
testimony of the government agents. Furthermore, the evidence
showed that the informer denied having known the defendant
before the incident in question. The Court concluded that under
these circumstances denying the defendant the disclosure of the
identity of the informer was prejudicial error.'7
The primary issue in Roviaro was disclosure of identity at
trial. One of two counts on which Roviaro was convicted was sale
of illegal narcotics. Because the informer "was a participant in
and a material witness to that sale,' 8 the Court held that the
government should have been required to make pretrial disclo-
sure of the informer's identity in its bill of particulars, at pain of
dismissal of that count. Roviaro has therefore become the leading
case for the defendant's right to pretrial disclosure of the identity
of an informer.
III. LIMrrs OF THE Roviaro EXCEPTION"
Subsequent cases have in effect limited Roviaro to its facts,
making them weighty determinants in the "balancing test." The
Roviaro exception was intended to protect an individual's right
to prepare his defense,1° and, therefore, the identity of the in-
former must be essential to that defense before it will be dis-
closed.2' The burden of proof is on the defendant to demonstrate
a valid need for disclosure, beyond mere speculation.
2
I Id. at 62.
1 Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65 n.15.
" Note that this discussion is not intended to deal with disclosure of an informer's
identity for purposes of challenging probable cause. The law of disclosure at a suppression
hearing is different from that herein discussed. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967);
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Gutterman, The Informer Privilege, 58
J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 32 (1967); Quinn, McCray v. Illinois: Probable Cause and the
Informer Privilege, 45 DENVER L.J. 399 (1968).
'* 353 U.S. at 60-61.
21 E.g., United States v. Guzman, 482 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
911 (1973); United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973); United States v. Roberts, 388 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Han-
nah, 341 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 1965); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States
v. Kelly, 449 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Pitt, 382 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1967).
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To meet this burden, the defendant must show that the in-
former's testimony could be relevant and material." The informer
must have been present at the criminal activity, although he need
not have been an actual participant.24
Another factor in determining the need for disclosure is
whether the defendant actually knew the identity of the informer
before the trial or otherwise had sufficient information to sub-
poena him. 5 Some cases have extended this reasoning to affirm
nondisclosure when the informer was actually identified at trial
through the testimony of another witness or by the appearance
of the informer himself.
2 6
IV. THE TESTIFYING INFORMER-WITNESS
In two cases this year, the Tenth Circuit considered the testi-
fying informer-witness.Y In United States v. Baca21 the defendant
prior to trial requested that the government disclose the name of
its informer. This request was denied. The informer had wit-
nessed and participated in the transactions for which the defen-
dant was indicted. Given these facts alone, Roviaro would have
required disclosure of the informer's identity, but here, unlike
Roviaro, the informer testified at trial. The court never consid-
ered the applicability of Roviaro. Instead, it reasoned:
It is settled law in this circuit that, in the absence of a statutory or
constitutional requirement, the government is not required to...
disclose its witnesses in any manner, except in a case where trial is
for treason or other capital offense.2'
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957); United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d
1292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); Garcia v. United States, 373 F.2d 806
(10th Cir. 1967); United States v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, 265 F.2d 21
(10th Cir. 1957).
21 E.g., United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Zito,
451 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Turchick, 451 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Gibbs, 435 F.2d
621 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d
279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960).
2s E.g., United States v. Casiano, 440 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836
(1971); United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
951 (1971); Glass v. United States, 371 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
968 (1967); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
846 (1960).
The theory is that no prejudice is done the defendant. See Smith v. United States,
273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Weinberg, 345 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.
1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 1351 (3d Cir. 1973). But see
United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184, 188 (10th Cir. 1974) (dissent).
" United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Baca, 494
F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1974).
- 494 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 427. Accord, United States v. Seasholtz, 435 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1970); United
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Since this was not a capital case, the court held that the defen-
dant was not entitled to a list of government witnesses before trial
and that refusing to disclose the informer's identity was not
error.30
Baca was followed by United States v. Pennick. 1 In Pennick
a government informer who had bought illicit drugs from the
defendant testified against him at trial. The defendant sought
and was denied pretrial disclosure of the informer's identity. In
reviewing the denial, the Tenth Circuit initially considered 18
U.S.C. § 3432 (1970), which "has been construed as meaning that
in a noncapital case a defendant is not entitled as a matter of
right to a list of the government's witnesses in advance of trial.
3 2
Baca would seemingly have disposed of the case at this point, but
instead the court considered the applicability of Roviaro and ap-
proved the trial court's denial of disclosure on the basis of the
balancing test. The court reasoned that because the informer had
testified for the government there was no possibility that his testi-
mony could have been helpful to the defendant.? Furthermore,
the court found that the defendant had ample opportunity to
cross-examine the informer34 and the record showed neither sur-
prise nor prejudice to the defendant. 3 In this situation the Tenth
Circuit ruled there was no reason to require disclosure of the
witness' identity.
The dissent, stressing the need for fairness, disagreed with
the application of the balancing test, but not with its applicabil-
ity."0 Noting that the defense was limited to an unprepared cross-
examination of the informer and that the government's case was
wholly dependent upon the credibility of the informer, Chief
States v. Hughes, 429 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1970); Nipp v. United States, 422 F.2d 509 (10th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008 (1970); Edmondson v. United States, 402 F.2d 809
(10th Cir. 1968); Thompson v. United States, 381 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1967). The court's
language stems from 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1970), which provides that in a capital case a
defendant shall be furnished with a list of the witnesses to be produced by the prosecution.
Conversely, the defendant in a noncapital case is not entitled to such a list. 494 F.2d at
427.
494 F.2d at 427; see United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184 (10th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Gleeson, 411 F.2d 1091
(10th Cir. 1969); Edmondson v. United States, 402 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1968).
31 500 F.2d 184 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 186.
" Id. at 187.
Id. Cf. United States v. Miller, 499 F.2d 736 (10th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Smith v.
United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960).
500 F.2d at 187.
Id. at 188 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
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Judge Lewis pointed out that Roviaro is not limited to witnesses
potentially favorable to the defense and that, under the circum-
stances here, the demands of a fair trial required disclosure of the
informer-witness' identity. 7
V. PRODUCTION OF INFORMERS AT TRIAL
In United States v. Williams38 an informer was present
though not a participant in the illegal transactions for which the
defendant was convicted. The informer did not testify at trial.
The defendant alleged entrapment and demanded that the gov-
ernment produce its informer at trial. On appeal the defendant
contended that the information should have been dismissed for
failure to produce the informer.
The Tenth Circuit described the modern trend to require the
prosecution to produce an informer at trial upon the defendant's
demands39 but then, quoting from United States v. Hayes,'0 held:
The government is not the guarantor of the appearance of its inform-
ant at trial, but is required to accord reasonable cooperation in
securing his appearance where a timely request is made and his
testimony might substantiate a claim of the defense.' 1
The court noted that even upon the showing of due diligence by
the government to locate the informer the demands of due process
may require dismissal of charges if by this absence of the in-
former, the defendant could not obtain a fair trial.'" Here, where
the informer's activity was limited to introducing the government
agents to the defendant, and where he took no further part in the
transactions, the facts were not such as would deprive the defen-
dant of a fair trial without the presence of the informer.'3
Analogous to Williams is United States v. Johnson." The
defendant alleged entrapment and demanded that the govern-
ment produce its informer." Prior to trial the defendant and the
government agreed not to call the informer since the defense was
unable to interview him. At trial the defendant demanded pro-
3 Id.
- 488 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 790.
477 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1973).
488 F.2d at 790; United States v. Hayes, 477 F.2d 868, 871 (10th Cir. 1973).
488 F.2d at 790.
43 Id.
" 495 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1974).
41 Johnson's entrapment defense was stronger than Williams'; the court itself la-
mented the informer's absence. Id. at 245.
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duction, and the court granted a continuance while the govern-
ment issued a subpoena for the missing informer. In the light of
this tardy and inconsistent request, the Tenth Circuit held that
the government had made a reasonable effort to locate the in-
former and therefore their duty was fulfilled. In so doing, the
court held that by failing to exercise due diligence to obtain the
informer's presence, the defendant could not appeal his absence.'"
VI. THE INFORMER AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS
United States v. Harris'7 presented the question of jury in-
structions available to a defendant against whom an informer has
testified. When an informer testifies for the government the de-
fendant is entitled to a special, cautionary jury instruction. 8 Har-
ris appealed because the trial court gave accomplice instructions
instead of informer instructions." The appeal was denied on the
grounds that the accomplice instructions were more appropriate
50
and that the instructions as a whole were adequate .1
In United States v. Anderson" the informer was not present
at trial. The defendant requested the following "missing witness"
instruction be given:
If a witness whose testimony would have been material on an
issue in this case was peculiarly available to the government and was
not introduced by the government and the absence of that witness
, Id. The defendant is obligated to make a timely request either for disclosure or
production, and failure to do so will reduce or eliminate the government's duty to make a
reasonable effort to find its informer. United States v. Hayes, 477 F.2d 868 (10th Cir.
1973); United States v. Smart, 448 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Lopez-Hernandez v.
United States, 394 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968) (at trial request for disclosure not in bad faith
or for dilatory purposes).
47 494 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1974).
" Todd v. United States, 345 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1965); cf. On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1952). For an example of an informer instruction, see United States v.
Miller, 499 F.2d 736, 742 n.3 (10th Cir. 1973). Where the informer's testimony is "very
substantially" corroborated, the cautionary instructions can be omitted without error.
Todd v. United States, supra at 300-01.
11 Accomplice and informer instructions differ only in title, not in substance. See C.
WRIGHT, 2 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 490 (2d ed. 1969). Wright treats the in-
former and accomplice instructions in the same paragraph. The jury is told that the
testimony of the informer or accomplice should be considered "with close and searching
scrutiny and caution." United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 959 (1963).
" See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
51 494 F.2d at 1274; see United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1972); Devine v. United States, 403
F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1003 (1969); Beck v. United States, 305
F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1962).
12 484 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1973).
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has not been sufficiently accounted for or explained, then you may,
if you deem it appropriate, infer that the testimony by that witness
would have been unfavorable to the government and favorable to the
accused. 53
As indicated by the requested instruction, the "missing wit-
ness" instruction permits the jury to make a presumption in favor
of the defendant when the government is either capable of finding
the witness or incapable of demonstrating a reasonable effort to
do so.5 The court here found that since the officer had not seen
the informer for "some time" and had given defense counsel the
informer's last known address, the "missing witness" instructions
were not required.5
Alex Halpern
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DENVER'S
HOLD AND TREAT ORDINANCE
Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973)
INTRODUCTION
In Reynolds v. McNichols' the Tenth Circuit upheld the con-
stitutionality of a Denver ordinance aimed at controlling venereal
disease. The plaintiff, Roxanne Reynolds, an admitted prosti-
tute,2 sued the City and County of Denver, its mayor, and several
other city officials under sections 1983 and 1985 of the Civil
Rights Act. 3 Miss Reynolds alleged that her civil rights had been
violated by Denver's hold and treat health ordinance, section 735
of the Revised Municipal Code of Denver.'
The Denver ordinance attempts to protect the public from
the spread of venereal disease by two separate methods-jail
quarantine 5 and mandatory health examination.' The ordinance
Id. at 747.
, See United States v. Fancutt, 491 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1974); accord, United States
v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pugh, 436 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (and cases cited therein); United States v. Peterson, 424 F.2d 1357 (7th Cir. 1970)
(no presumption where witness equally available to both sides).
484 F.2d at 747.
488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1382.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1964).




CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
empowers police to detain in jail any individual "reasonably sus-
pected" of having venereal disease. Section 735.1-1(1) defines
those "reasonably suspected" as any persons arrested and
charged with prostitution, vagrancy (a non-sex offense), rape, or
"another offense related to sex." 7 Such persons may be detained
in jail without bond, examined, and treated for venereal disease;
the detention continues for "such time as is reasonably necessary
to examine and render treatment."8
The ordinance also gives the police authority to issue "walk-
in" orders, which require individuals to report to the department
of health and hospitals for examinations and treatment. Section
735.1-1(2) outlines those persons who may be required to undergo
such an examination-those "reasonably suspected to have had
a contact with another individual reasonably believed to have
had a communicable venereal disease at the time of such contact
''9
Reynolds was subjected to the ordinance's walk-in and quar-
antine provisions a number of times. In 1970 upon her initial
arrest for prostitution she was taken to the city jail for quarantine
and, as provided in the Denver ordinance, was given a blood test,
treated with an injection of penicillin, and then released on bond.
Twice in 1971 the plaintiff was issued walk-in orders to report to
the Department of Health and Hospitals for tests and possible
treatment. In the first of these examinations she was found in-
fected with venereal disease and treated. However, in May of
1972, when she was served with another walk-in order, she re-
ported to the Department of Health and Hospitals with her attor-
ney and refused to submit to any examination. Finally, in June
of 1972 she was arrested again for prostitution. Once in the city
jail, she was given the choice between quarantine for 48 hours
during which time she would be examined and treated for vener-
eal disease, or a penicillin injection without a prior examination,
followed by immediate release. The plaintiff chose the latter al-
ternative.
Upon her release, Reynolds filed suit, alleging that Denver's
hold and treat ordinance was unconstitutional on its face, and,
in the alternative, that it had been unconstitutionally applied to
her. The plaintiff based her constitutional attack on several
Id. § 735.1-1(1).
' Id. § 735.1-2.
' Id. § 735.1-1(2).
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grounds: (1) that the ordinance authorizes involuntary detention
without bail, and involuntary examination and treatment in vio-
lation of the fourth amendment right to be secure in one's person;
(2) the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague as to the class of
persons who can be forced to submit to examination and treat-
ment; (3) the ordinance authorizes an unconstitutional coercion
of persons in forcing them to choose between detention without
bail for examination or immediate treatment and release without
an examination;' 0 and (4) the ordinance is applied only to fe-
males."
The Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Denver
legislation, noting that the purpose of the ordinance was to con-
trol the spread of communicable venereal disease and that prosti-
tutes were the logical source.'" It concluded that quarantine to
examine and treat those suspected of having venereal disease is
a valid exercise of the police power. The court dismissed two of
the plaintiff's constitutional allegations, finding the selective en-
forcement ground "unavailing' '1 3 and holding that no evidence of
unconstitutional coercion existed.' The court never addressed
itself to the plaintiff's bail and vagueness arguments.
The Reynolds decision failed to deal with many issues which
clearly expose the ordinance's unconstitutionality. However, the
court had little choice but to uphold the legislation, for the plain-
tiff never raised the proper constitutional issues and never ex-
plored in the proper depth those arguments which were made.
Courts have held that a strong presumption of legislative validity
exists, and a statute will not be struck down unless those chal-
lenging the legislation adequately rebut this presumption. 5 Here
the plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption and the court
was forced to confirm the ordinance's validity.
"* 488 F.2d at 1380. This comment does not discuss the unconstitutional conditions
issue, since the court did not deal with it broadly, but limited the holding to the facts of
the case. The court implied that given a different factual situation and a different record,
it might have reached another conclusion. "According to the record, there was no particu-
lar risk involved in the taking of a penicillin shot . . . . On this state of the record, we
find no unconstitutional coercion of the plaintiff." See generally Note, Another Look at
Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. oF PA. L. REv. 144 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HAev. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
488 F.2d at 1382.
" Id. at 1382-83.
'3 Id. at 1383.
14 Id.
'1 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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There are a number of attacks the plaintiff should have made
which, arguably, would have convinced the court to strike down
the ordinance. When more substantive challenges to a similar
San Francisco hold and treat ordinance were presented to a Cali-
fornia Superior Court, the court invalidated the legislation."6 This
plaintiff should have explored the police power and search issues
more thoroughly. In addition, equal protection, due process, and
bail analyses clearly expose the ordinance's constitutional flaws.
This comment begins where the plaintiff left off and assesses the
validity of the ordinance in light of these arguments.
I. POLICE POWER
Denver's hold and treat ordinance was ostensibly passed
under the city's police power, the inherent power of all sovereign
governments to legislate, to maintain order, and to promote the
public good-to govern in the broadest sense of that term."7 It is
considered a power reserved to each state8 by virtue of the state's
sovereignty, rather than an enumerated power which the states
surrendered to the Federal Government when creating the
Constitution. 9 States traditionally utilize the police power to cre-
ate legislation which promotes and protects the health, safety,
welfare, and morals of its citizens.20
Under the auspices of the police power, then, Colorado has
the authority to pass legislation whose end is to control venereal
disease.2" Moreover, the City and County of Denver shares con-
current powers with the state to legislate for the public health.2
Both the Colorado constitution2 and the Denver municipal
charter24 recognize this police power of the city. The Denver hold
Griggs v. Scott, No. 669-690 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1974), slip op. at 2.
'7 People v. Brazee, 183 Mich. 259, 149 N.W. 1053 (1914), aff'd, 241 U.S. 340 (1916);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
1 Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935).
" Id.
California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
" Colorado has exercised its power by enacting CoLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 66-9-1 to -7
(1963).
" Denver is a "home-rule" city and, therefore, has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
purely local matters. When a state statute conflicts with a municipal ordinance, if the
matter is of "local" concern, the state statute is without effect. What is of a "local" nature
has been determined by the courts. See Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 484 P.2d 1204 (1971);
Vick v. People, 166 Colo. 565, 445 P.2d 220 (1968) (dictum); Woolverton v. City & County
of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 254, 361 P.2d 982, 985 (1961); Spears Free Clinic & Hospital v.
State Bd. of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 149, 220 P.2d 872, 874 (1950).
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
' Denver City Charter ch. B, art. I, para. B1.1 (1968).
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and treat ordinance is an exercise of these municipal police pow-
ers.
Courts have had difficulty defining and limiting the police
power 2 and generally allow states wide discretion in their exercise
of this power.20 Although the police power has been described as
"one of the least limitable of government powers,"2 courts have
fashioned some general guidelines for its exercise.28 Legislation
must be "reasonably related" to the protection of the public
health, safety, welfare, or morals29 or else will be invalidated.30
The test of what is reasonable is to determine whether the means
of legislation further its end.3" When considering whether the
means used are reasonable, courts look to whether they are "un-
duly oppressive 3 2 or go beyond what is reasonably required for
the protection of the public. 3 However, there is no consensus as
to what constitutes reasonableness, since courts determine the
issue on an ad hoc basis, evaluating and weighing the facts and
circumstances of each case."
Because the public health is viewed as essential to the well
being of any society, 5 the legislature has been given great discre-
tion in the area of health regulation. The state has great latitude
both in determining what constitutes a danger to public health
and what means are appropriate to cope with the problem. For
example, states can regulate anything from contagious disease to
the method of garbage disposal. 3
Courts have often upheld legislation similar to the Denver
hold and treat ordinance.n These decisions have stressed the ob-
2 See, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
" All of the tests which apply to a state's police powers apply to municipalities also.
" Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946).
" West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207
(1903).
" West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id.; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
32 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
3 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
1, State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938). See generally cases cited note
29 supra.
11 California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
3 Ex parte Fowler, 85 Okla. Crim. 64, 184 P.2d 814 (1947).
3, California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
" Welch v. Shepard, 165 Kan. 394, 196 P.2d 235 (1948); Ex. parte Fowler, 85 Okla.
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ject of the legislation, that is, the need to protect the public
health. On the other hand, some courts have invalidated this
same type of legislation and usually have emphasized the unrea-
sonableness of the means employed. 39 For example, in Ex parte
Dillon0 a California court invalidated a health department order
which authorized the police to quarantine individuals arrested for
''any . . .offense involving sexual immoralities" and to examine
and treat them for venereal disease. The court decided that the
ordinance was an inappropriate use of the police power because
it went beyond what was needed to protect the public health since
not all of the individuals arrested under it had venereal disease.
This result was reached even though "90% of the women so ar-
rested and charged . . .[were] found to be afflicted with conta-
gious . . .venereal disease.""
Although a state has broad powers in the field of health, the
Denver ordinance goes far beyond what is a reasonable means of
controlling venereal disease. The ordinance requires that individ-
uals who refuse treatment are to be detained in jail without bond
"for such time as is reasonably necessary to examine such person
and render treatment."'" Since these individuals are being
"detained for health,' 3 the proper place for them is a hospital,
not a penal institution." These means, then, are extreme and an
inappropriate use of the police power.
The means are also unreasonable since the quarantine fails
to promote the control of venereal disease. The ordinance allows
individuals detained under its provisions to receive a penicillin
injection in lieu of quarantine; 5 once they have received this shot,
they are immediately eligible for release. However, the penicillin
does not take effect and destroy an infection until 24 to 48 hours
Crim. 64, 184 P.2d 814 (1947); People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N.E.2d 441
(1944); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943); City of Little Rock v. Smith,
204 Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705 (1942).
Ex parte Dillon, 44 Cal. App. 239, 186 P. 170 (1919); State v. Kirby, 120 Iowa 26,
94 N.W. 254 (1903).
"* 44 Cal. App. 239, 186 P. 170 (1919).
41 Id. at 171. However, this statistic was compiled in a 1908 study and no longer
reflects the current incidence of venereal disease in prostitutes.
11 REv. MUNIcAn'L CODE OF DENVER § 735.1-2 (1950).
43 Id.
" Dowling v. Harden, 18 Ala. App. 63, 88 So. 217 (1921). See generally Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972): "At the least, due process requires that the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed."
488 F.2d at 1383.
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after the time of the injection." During this period an individual
remains fully capable of spreading the disease. A quarantine,
then, for less than 48 hours is a completely ineffective method of
controlling venereal disease.
A primary limitation on the police power are the rights guar-
anteed to individuals by the U.S. Constitution.' 7 A federal district
court has remarked that "the police power. . . is not a sanctuary
from which constitutionally protected rights of citizens may be
violated with impunity."" A state may clearly have the power to
legislate in a given area, but even if the legislation utilizes reason-
able means, it must not invade other constitutionally protected
rights. As the following analyses will demonstrate, the exercise of
the police power contained in the Denver ordinance is subject to
challenge on fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amendment grounds.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
Although the plaintiff did not utilize the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection provisions to evaluate the constitution-
ality of the Denver ordinance," such analyses clearly reveal its
constitutional defects. The fourteenth amendment prohibits a
state from denying any person equal protection of the laws.s°
While a state can statutorily classify individuals into different
groupings for various purposes, those classifications must be rea-
sonable."' Courts have adopted two tests to determine whether
" Brief for Plaintiff at 41, Griggs v. Scott, No. 669-690 (Cal. Super., Feb. 7, 1974).
47 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Is Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, 222 F. Supp. 349, 383 (W.D. Mich. 1963), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 356 F.2d 276 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966).
4' The plaintiff alluded to the equal protection issue of discriminatory enforcement,
but failed to explore or argue it in depth. Brief for Appellant at 6, Reynolds v. McNichols,
488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973). Reynolds offered as proof of such selectivity only two
instances both of which occurred when she was arrested and quarantined while her "pa-
tron" was not. To successfully argue and prove selective enforcement, one must show
systematic, deliberate, or intentional discrimination. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456
(1962); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 359 (1959); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d
1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972); Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1963). Since the
government is allowed some discretion in enforcement, mere laxity or failure to prosecute
all offenders is not sufficient to prove a denial of equal protection. McKay Tel. & Cable
Co. v. City of Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th
Cir. 1972); Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforce-
ment of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 88 (1973); Rosenbleet & Pariente,
The Prostitution of the Criminal Law, AM. CriM. L. REv., 373, 403-11 (1973). The Reynolds
court quite correctly found plaintiff's claim "unavailing," for the plaintiff failed to offer
enough instances which would indicate any pattern of deliberateness on the part of the
Denver Police Department. 488 F.2d at 1383.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
W, eber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 75-76 (1971); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
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legislation violates equal protection-a rational relationship test
and a compelling interest test.52
Under the traditional rational relationship scheme, a pre-
sumption exists in favor of a statute's constitutionality.5 3 A court
will uphold any classifications which reasonably promote a legiti-
mate government end, provided no fundamental rights or suspect
classes are involved. However, when legislation adversely affects
fundamental rights, such as the right to vote,5 the right to pro-
create,5" or criminal procedure guarantees, 57 or is based upon the
suspect classifications" of race,59 or lineage, 0 a court will utilize
a strict scrutiny standard. The state has the burden of
demonstrating that the challenged legislation is not only ration-
ally related to the legislative end, but is necessary to promote a
"compelling" state interest and that no alternative means of ef-
fecting that purpose exist.'
A. Rational Relationship
A rational relationship analysis reveals that the classifica-
tions which the ordinance creates by its quarantine section do
little to promote the legislative end of controlling venereal dis-
ease. As the Tenth Circuit repeatedly emphasized, the purpose
of the ordinance is "to bring under control, and lessen, the incid-
ence of venereal disease . ..by determining and treating the
source of [the] infection."" The ordinance distinguishes three
U.S. 535, 540 (1942); Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir. 1972); Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALF. L. REv. 341, 342 (1949);
Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Developments].
52 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Developments, supra
note 51, at 1076-87.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
1, Independent Dairyman's Ass'n v. Denver, 142 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir. 1944);
Developments, supra note 51, at 1082, 1087-1132.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
51 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
0 The Supreme Court has not designated sex as a suspect classification, though at
least one court has. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529 (1971);
Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 49, at 392-393.
11 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942); Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 49, at 381; Tussman & tenBroek, supra
note 51, at 353-65.
0 488 F.2d at 1381 (emphasis added).
1975
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
classes of those who may have venereal disease: 1) those falling
within section 735.1-1(1), who may be quarantined; 2) those fall-
ing within section 735.1-1(2), who may be given "walk-in" orders
to appear at the department of health; and impliedly, 3) those of
the general public not included within the ordinance. 3
The special burden of quarantine is imposed on only those
persons arrested and charged with vagrancy, prostitution, rape,
or another "offense related to sex." 4 Section 822 of the Denver
Municipal Code delineates the "offenses relating to sex" referred
to in the health ordinance. These offenses include: prostitution;
public indecency; exposing the breasts or lower torso; unlawfully
registering under a fictitious name; use of transient accomoda-
tions for immoral purposes; bestiality; patronizing a prostitute;
solicitation of drinks. 5 Quarantining this class of individuals only
a REV. MUNICIPAL CODE OF DENVER § 735.1-1(1), (2) (1950).
" Id. § 735.1-1(1).
REV. MUNICIPAL CODE OF DENVER § 822 (1950), "Offenses Relating to Sex":
822-OFFENSES RELATING TO SEX
.1. Prostitution; Public Indecency; Deviate Sexual Intercourse.
.1-1. It shall be unlawful for any person:
.1-1(1). To solicit another for the purpose of prostitution;
.1-1(2). To arrange or offer to arrange a meeting of persons for the purpose
of prostitution;
.1-1(3). To direct another person to a place knowing such direction is for
the purpose of prostitution;
.1-1(4). Knowingly to arrange or offer to arrange a situation in which a
person may practice prostitution;
.1-1(5). To have or exercise or control the use of any facility, and:
.1-1(5) (a). Knowingly to grant or permit the use of such facility for the
purpose of prostitution; or
.1-1(5) (b). Knowingly to permit the continued use of such facility for the
purpose of prostitution, after becoming aware of facts or circumstances from
which such person should reasonably know that such facility is being used
for purposes of prostitution;
.1-1(6). By word, gesture, or action, to endeavor to further the practice of
prostitution in any place which is public in nature or within public view;
.1-1(7). To perform, offer, or agree to perform any act of prostitution; or
.1-1(8). To perform an act of public indecency. (Ord. 836, Series 1973)
.2. Prostitute, Pimp, Panderer, or Procurer Loitering.
.2-1. It shall be unlawful for:
.2-1(1). Any person to loiter or stroll in, about, or upon any way, place, or
building, either public or private, accosting or soliciting any other person or
persons for the purpose of prostitution; or
.2-1(2). Any pimp, panderer, or procurer to loiter or stroll in, about, or upon
any way, place, or building, either public or private, accosting or soliciting
any other person or persons for the purpose of prostitution. (Ord. 836, Series
1973)
.3. Exposing the Breasts or Lower Torso.
.3-1. It shall be unlawful:
.3-1(1). For any female person who has reached her twelfth birthday to
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marginally furthers the legislative purpose. Venereal disease can
be spread only by sexual contact;"6 yet the ordinance sirkgles out
people arrested and charged with offenses that do not include
such contact. Of all the offenses enumerated in the ordinance,
only bestiality, rape, and some acts within the prostitution sec-
tion specifically include sexual intercourse as a necessary
element. 7 The statutory net, then, sweeps too wide and if it
catches those infected with venereal disease does so more by acci-
dent than design.
appear in any place which is public in nature clothed or costumed in such a
manner that the portion of her breast or breasts consisting of the nipple and
the pigmented area adjacent thereto, otherwise defined as the aureola, is not
fully covered with a completely opaque covering; or
.3-1(2). For any person to appear in any place which is public in nature
with any part of his or her lower torso uncovered so as to expose the cleft of
the buttocks or genital organs. (Ord. 836, Series 1973)
.4. Unlawful to Register Fictitious Name.
.4-1. It will be unlawful for any person to write or cause to be written, or
knowingly to permit to be written, in any register in any hotel, motor hotel,
lodging house, rooming house, or other place whatsoever where transients are
accommodated, any other or different name or designation than the true
name of the person so registered therein, or the name by which such person
is generally known, for the purpose of committing an offense relating to sex,
as provided in this article 822. (Ord. 836, Series 1973)
.5. Use of Transient Accommodations for Immoral Purposes.
.5-1. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to permit the use of or
to use any hotel, motor hotel, lodging house, rooming house, or other place
whatsoever, where transients are accommodated, for the purpose of commit-
ting an offense relating to sex, as provided in this article 822. (Ord. 836,
Series 1973)
.6. Bestiality.
.6-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to have sexual intercourse with an
animal other than a human being. (Ord. 836, Series 1973)
.7. Patronizing a Prostitute.
.7-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in or offer or agree to
engage in an act of sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with a
prostitute or to enter or remain in a place of prostitution with the intent to
engage in an act of prostitution or deviate sexual conduct. (Ord. 836, Series
1973)
.8. Solicitation of Drinks.
.8-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to frequent or loiter in any tavern,
cabaret, nightclub, or other establishment where intoxicants are sold for the
purpose of engaging in the practice of or with the purpose of soliciting an-
other person to purchase drinks.
.8-2. It shall be unlawful for the proprietor or operator of any such estab-
lishment to allow the presence in such establishment of any person who
violates the provisions of this Section 822.8 (Ord. 836, Series 1973)
Brief for Plaintiff at 41, Griggs v. Scott, No. 669-690 (Cal. Super., Feb. 7, 1974).
In the Denver Code, even the offense of prostitution does not contain "contact" as
a necessary element; one need only "solicit" to be arrested for the offense. Similarly, one
arrested as a panderer need only loiter and solicit for prostitution.
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While a legislature may deal with a problem in a piecemeal
manner, regulating only that harm which it thinks is most
acute, 8 even piecemeal legislation must have a factual, logical
basis.69 Here, the drafters of the Denver ordinance apparently
presumed that those arrested for the enumerated offenses would
be more likely to maintain contacts with carriers of venereal dis-
ease. However, there is no rationale for assuming that one picked
up on charges of vagrancy or allowing others to register under a
ficticious name is more likely to have venereal disease or have had
contact with a carrier than anyone else in the general public. The
ordinance, then, irrationally regulates a very small group of indi-
viduals more because they are highly visible than because they
pose a major health threat.
Even the assumption repeatedly made by the Reynolds
court, that prostitutes are a major source of venereal disease, is
erroneous. The court implies that although the ordinance requires
quarantine of persons charged with varied offenses, the primary
health hazard is the prostitute.' Recent studies, though, indicate
that prostitutes are not a major source of venereal disease. In a
3-year study of venereal disease in Seattle, Washington, all
women arrested as prostitutes were examined and fewer than 6
percent were found to be infected with gonorrea.7' A 1972 Califor-
nia study yielded similar results. Only 8 percent of those prosti-
tutes subjected to a quarantine similar to that provided for in the
Colorado ordinance were found to be infected with venereal dis-
ease.72 The Seattle study also indicated that while the highest
rate of venereal disease is found among people aged 15-30, the age
group which most frequently visits prostitutes ranges from 30-
60. 71 These findings support the general conclusion that prosti-
11 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955); Developments, supra note 51, at 1084.
" See authorities cited note 68 supra.
7o 488 F.2d at 1382-83.
7' The court in United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super., Nov.
3, 1972), slip op. at 14, took judicial notice of this study and of others which reached the
same conclusion:
Over a decade ago, it was remarked in a United Nations publication that
"(T)he prostitute ceases to be the major factor in the spread of venereal
disease in the United States today." This general conclusion has been firmly
ratified by knowledgeable physicians and investigators in the field of public
health.
See also Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 49, at 417.
' Brief for Plaintiff at 40, Griggs v. Scott, No. 669-690 (Cal. Super., Feb. 7, 1974).
T United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super., Nov. 3, 1972), slip.
op. at 16; Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 49, at 417.
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tutes no longer account for a significant spread of venereal dis-
ease.74 Thus, the State of Colorado is at best marginally control-
ling venereal disease by singling out prostitutes for quarantine.
Courts also assess whether legislation is overbroad or under-
inclusive to determine if it meets the rational relationship test.,
The Denver ordinance suffers from both overbreadth and under-
inclusiveness. Equal protection prevents a state from enacting
"overbroad" legislation which regulates and burdens those who
do not possess the characteristics forbidden by the legislature.76
A classic example of overbreadth is the ordinance struck down by
the Supreme Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville." That
ordinance deemed vagrants those who are
[riogues and vagabonds . . .common gamblers, persons who use
juggling or unlawful games ... common drunkards ... lewd, wan-
ton and lascivious persons . . . persons wandering or strolling
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object...
habitual loafers .... 78
While this ordinance purported to regulate only vagrants, it
clearly affected perfectly innocent behavior. Similarly, the Den-
ver ordinance regulates both those who may have venereal disease
and those who clearly do not. It lumps together individuals ar-
rested for both noncontact and contact offenses and imposes the
burden of quarantine on all of them. It therefore sweeps too
broadly and fails to promote logically the legislative intent. It
aims at too large a group, in hopes of hitting its target.
At the same time, the ordinance is underinclusive, because
it imposes quarantine and mandatory treatment on only a small
portion of those possibly infected with venereal disease: "'Proba-
bly ninety per cent (90%) of venereal disease is unrelated to pros-
titution.' ,,71 While there is a recognized epidemic of venereal dis-
ease among high school students80 no quarantine or examination
" See generally Note, The Principle of Harm and Its Application to Laws Criminaliz-
ing Prostitution, 51 DENVER L.J. 235 (1974).
" For a discussion of legislative underinclusiveness and overbreadth, see Tussman &
tenBroeck, supra note 51, at 344-53.
76 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 451, 454-55 (1972); see Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 654-57 (1972); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
T' Id. at 156-57.
' United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972)
slip op. at 15, citing Dr. R. Palmer Beasley of the University of Washington School of
Public Health and Community Medicine.
U Brief for Plaintiff at 43, Griggs v. Scott, No. 669-690 (Calif. Super. Ct., Feb. 7,
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procedure has been created for them. The ordinance deals with
the problem in an ineffectual, discriminatory manner." The ordi-
nance's classifications, then, as to prostitutes and the other
groups subjected to quarantine is unreasonable, and therefore,
fails the equal protection rational relationship test.
B. Fundamental Interests
Because the ordinance also affects two fundamental inter-
ests-liberty and privacy-it must be evaluated by a compelling
state interest standard. Courts have stated that liberty is a funda-
mental right protected by the Constitution." Pretrial imprison-
ment is viewed as an infringement of liberty because it imposes
a punishment prior to conviction and therefore erodes the pre-
sumption of innocence.13 The Denver ordinance curtails an indi-
vidual's liberty by detention in jail before it is determined that a
quarantine is even necessary. Although the ordinance states that
such detention has no punitive overtones, 4 its effect is in fact
punitive in that individuals are detained in a jail and prevented
from leaving or posting bail. 5 In addition, the conditions of this
pretrial imprisonment are traditionally poor-overcrowding, in-
adequate recreational facilities, and low-quality food. 8
The quarantine ordinance also deprives individuals of their
right to privacy. Privacy has long been recognized as a fundamen-
tal constitutionally protected interest .8 The Supreme Court has
recently enunciated the right as a separate guarantee, which has
its roots in the "penumbras" (literally "shadows") of various con-
stitutional rights, such as those of the first, fourth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments. The right is not confined to marital
1974). A recent World Health Organization study indicated that in "the world as a whole
the rate of venereal disease among teenagers aged 15 to 19 is twice the rate for the entire
population." Rocky Mountain News, Nov. 16, 1974, at 116, col. 1.
See generally Tussman & tenBroeck, supra note 51.
" Gardner v. Illinois, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
93 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F.
Supp. 8, 16 (D. Conn. 1968); United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), slip op. at 38.
14 Section 735.1-2 of the ordinance states that "The provisions hereof shall not be
utilized as, nor construed to be, a penalty or punishment."
" For a discussion of the bail issue, see text accompanying notes 137-46 infra.
0 Conditions in city jails are so poor that "when an accused is convicted and sent-
enced to imprisonment, his standard of living is almost certain to rise." Foote, The
Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1144 (1965).
87 Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). See generally Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Rhoades & Patula, The Ninth Amendment: A Survey of Theory
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relationships, but extends to all individuals.89 The Supreme
Court has protected this right from unwarranted governmental
intrusions in activities relating to procreation, 0 contraception,9
family relationships," and the decision to have an abortion. 3 The
Court has not yet established the boundaries of this right. The
privacy right infringed upon by the Denver ordinance is, argua-
bly, a logical extension of the privacy rights enunciated by the
Court. Individuals quarantined are deprived of their right to body
integrity through extractions of blood, pelvic and rectal examina-
tions, and unwarranted penicillin injections under threat of incar-
ceration." In the area of fourth amendment rights, the Court has
noted that intrusions such as these beyond the body's surface are
related to interests of privacy and human dignity and can be
invaded by the State only in the most unusual of circumstances. 5
The intrusions under the Denver ordinance are particulary severe
since individuals can be given shots of penicillin prior to any
determination that they are, in fact, infected.
Equal protection requires that a state justify legislation
which affects fundamental rights by demonstrating a "compel-
ling interest."" Here, the state has no compelling interest which
can justify the Denver ordinance's invasions, particularly since
control of venereal disease can be accomplished through less in-
trusive and more effective means. Quarantine is not essential to
controlling venereal disease. Examinations and treatment for
those infected could easily and successfully be performed at a
health clinic, on a voluntary basis, during regular hours. 7 The
state could widely advertise these out patient services, offer them
free, and provide some form of transportation to clinics. Cash
bonuses could also be offered. The state could even legalize pros-
and Practice in the Federal Courts Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 DENVER L.J. 153
(1973).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
' Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
' Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
" See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Reynolds was given an injection of penicillin prior to a determination as to whether
or not she actually was infected with venereal disease. See Brief for Plaintiff at 35, Griggs
v. Scott, No. 669-690 (Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 7, 1974); Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d
705 (1962) (right to refuse treatment); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's
Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN. L. REv. 293, 296 (1966).
" Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
" See cases cited note 61 supra.




titution and regulate venereal disease in that sector through li-
censing of prostitutes. High schools and colleges could require
annual examinations for students and businesses might require
the same for employees. Such alternatives are feasible, and would
neither curtail an individual's liberty nor infringe on one's pri-
vacy by coerced examinations or unwarranted injections of peni-
cillin prior to determination of infection. The Denver ordinance,
then, violates equal protection on a number of grounds.
Im. DUE PROCESS
The ordinance also violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The quarantine section creates a conclu-
sive presumption, while the milder walk-in section suffers from
unconstitutional vagueness.
The conclusive presumption doctrine is often applied to leg-
islation similar to the Denver ordinance which is considered over-
broad under an equal protection analysis.98 The doctrine falls
within the purview of the due process clause and can be utilized
only in situations which create deprivations of "life, liberty, or
property.""
A statute creates a conclusive presumption when it imposes
a burden on a class of individuals and gives them no opportunity
to refute or overcome the legislative presumption on which the
burden is based.' ® Such presumptions are particularly suspect
when the class of those burdened includes individuals who should
not be affected by the legislation. Legislative schemes based on
irrebuttable presumptions are viewed as arbitrary and unreason-
able, and violative of due process because due process requires
that an individual have an opportunity to be heard and refute
such presumptions.'0 '
The Supreme Court has revitalized and applied this doctrine
in its 1972 term to invalidate legislation which creates presump-
tions "not necessarily or universally true."'' 0 For example, in
"1 Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72
MICH. L. Rv. 800, 829-30 (1974).
gg Id. at 824; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1w Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Corn'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
"' See cases cited note 100 supra.
'0 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973); accord United States Dep't of Agricul-
ture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Note, Irrebuttable Statutory Presumptions as an
Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEO. L.J. 1173 (1974).
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Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur,03 the Supreme Court
struck down a rule which provided for mandatory maternity leave
of pregnant teachers. The court noted that the rule conclusively
presumed that every teacher in the fifth month of pregnancy was
physically incapable of teaching. This presumption applied even
if medical evidence to the contrary existed. The Court found the
school's goal of preventing unfit teachers from working legiti-
mate, but held that the state must find less arbitrary means of
effecting the end."4
The Denver ordinance, like the Cleveland school regulation,
creates an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption. The detention
section conclusively presumes that anyone arrested for the enu-
merated offenses has venereal disease and should be quarantined.
There is no examination prior to detention, nor any opportunity
to rebut this presumption. While quarantine of individuals prior
to examination or to a determination of whether probable cause
exists to believe that one should be examined may be an efficient
state procedure, courts will not uphold conclusive statutory
schemes based on a state's need for efficiency, particularly where
other methods exist.
0 5
As noted above, Colorado has other reasonable means of de-
termining whether or not one has venereal disease and should be
treated. Even a quarantine or walk-in procedure could be utilized
if preceded by a hearing. A hearing procedure is particularly use-
ful to cure the ordinance's due process defects, since it provides
an individual with a fair opportunity to rebut the legislative as-
sumption and to prevent unwarranted detention, examination,
and treatment.' Prior to quarantine (or even to a walk-in order),
an individual could request a hearing which would only occur if
asked for. At the hearing, the state would have to demonstrate
that probable cause exists to believe that the person is infected
and in need of examination or treatment. The probable cause
standard could be based on "trace-back" evidence; that is, the
state would have to prove that the individual had been in physi-
cal contact with a known venereal disease carrier.
Although the walk-in section of the ordinance is much milder
and less restrictive than the quarantine section, it too, violates
10 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
"o Id. at 647.
" Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656
(1971).
I See cases cited note 100 supra.
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due process. Due process requires that legislation be drawn with
definite, ascertainable standards which give the public fair notice
of what is forbidden by the statute.'"7 Courts consistently strike
down legislation which lacks such fixed standards and which in-
stead gives a judge or a police officer the discretion to determine
what is prohibited.18 Vague laws are particularly objectionable
because they give rise to arbitrary enforcement and can be used
as tools for harassment.09
Section 735.1-1(2) of the Denver ordinance outlines catego-
ries of persons "reasonably suspected" of having venereal dis-
ease. 10 Police are empowered to authorize walk-in orders to such
people, which require them to report to the department of health
for an examination. Failure to obey such an order is a violation
of the law."' This section clearly lacks general guidelines and
fixed standards as to what behavior gives rise to a policeman's
"reason to believe" that one should be issued a walk-in order. Is
''reason to believe" based on a probable cause standard or merely
a vague unsubstantiated suspicion?" 2 The purpose of this section
may have been to "trace-back" partners of those found to be
infected with venereal disease; however, its wording is so vague
and unclear as to standards for "reason to believe" that it gives
a police officer the complete discretion to determine who shall be
issued a walk-in order.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT
The plaintiff argued that the Denver ordinance violates the
fourth amendment because it authorizes an invasion of the body
without a warrant and absent any emergency situation."3 The
plaintiff never fully developed the search analysis and the court
dealt with it rather cursorily. A more thorough analysis of the
fourth amendment issue indicates that the plaintiff's rights were
indeed violated.
107 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Giaccio v. Pennsyl-
vania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1938); United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875); Hines v. Baker, 422 F.2d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir.
1970); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 903 (D. Colo. 1969); Note, The Void-For-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
1* Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Martin v. United
States, 100 F.2d 490, 493-94 (10th Cir. 1939).
' Note, Arbitrary Enforcement and Overbreadth of Vagrancy Ordinance Violative
of Due Process Clause, 19 N.Y.L.F. 191, 196 (1974).
1 REV. MUNICIPAL CODE OF DENVER § 735.1-1 (1950).
Id. § 735.1-6.
11 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
" Brief for Appellant at 11, Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973).
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The Supreme Court has specifically extended fourth amend-
ment protections to the field of health regulation."' The fourth
amendment, which requires that searches of individuals, their
homes, papers, and effects be reasonable,"' is enforceable against
the states through the fourteenth amendment."' Ordinarily,
searches must be authorized by a warrant which is based upon
probable cause to believe a specific item will be found in a partic-
ular place." 7 These protections apply regardless of whether the
person is suspected of criminal behavior or whether the purpose
of the search is to obtain evidence for criminal proceedings."' The
Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
ment in searches following a lawful custodial arrest" 9 or in an
emergency situation.2 0
Emergencies have been found to exist in a variety of instan-
ces. Warrantless searches have been upheld when the police are
in "hot pursuit"'' of an offender as well as when an immediate
search is required to prohibit destruction of evidence.'22 In these
cases the court has sanctioned warrantless searches because the
lives of policemen or others would be endangered by any delay.
In addition, warrantless searches of autos have been upheld on
the grounds that, were there a delay, the evidence could be easily
moved out of the jurisdiction.' In assessing the need for search
warrants in the area of public health, courts have looked to
whether or not the public will be exposed to the dangerous person
or object if there is a delay for the warrant."'
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's fourth amend-
ment argument by holding that an emergency situation did exist,
and, therefore, there was no need to obtain a search warrant. 5
However, there is little in the facts to support the argument that
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"0 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648
(1961).
"7 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
"' Id. at 530-31.
"' United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762-63 (1969).
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967), citing Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
23 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925).
,14 North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).
11 488 F-2d at 1383.
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an emergency existed. Since the defendant was already in jail
when examined, there was no danger that she might communi-
cate the disease, if, in fact, she had it. Also, it is difficult to justify
the examination on the grounds that an immediate cure of the
disease was necessary to protect the defendant's health. Gonor-
rhea is neither extremely harmful to an individual's health nor
extremely hard to cure. 2' Syphilis, while a more dangerous dis-
ease, develops slowly and usually a substantial time passes before
any harm to the individual occurs.
2 7
Reynolds was apparently placed under a lawful custodial
arrest before she was searched; her arrest, then, can serve as a
justification for a warrantless search. However, the question re-
mains as to the proper limits of that search.
The Supreme Court has never determined whether searches
made incident to a lawful arrest may extend to the body cavity.
However, in United States v. Robinson 28 the Court held that any
custodial search, regardless of its purpose, is reasonable by fourth
amendment standards:
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a
full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable"
search under that Amendment.'
Robinson though, still leaves open the question of whether the
body cavity is included within the term "full search of the per-
son" and, therefore, a valid object of a warrantless search.
In Robinson the respondent was arrested for driving while his
license was revoked. Immediately following the arrest, the police
officer fully searched him. While patting him down, the officer
discovered a crumpled up cigarette package in the respondent's
shirt pocket. The officer opened the pack and found what was
later analyzed as heroin. The Court upheld this search as valid,
noting that it
partook of none of the extreme or patently abusive characteristics
which were held to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Rochin v. California .... 3
"' See Brief for Plaintiff at 39, Griggs v. Scott, No. 669-690 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 7,
1974).
See id. at 45.
' 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
29 Id. at 235.
" Id. at 236.
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By this reference to the Rochin case, the Court may have carved
out an exception to Robinson, preserving the greater protections
it had previously afforded individuals from body cavity searches.
In Rochin the police extracted the contents of a man's stom-
ach by forcing a tube down his throat.3 ' The Reynolds examina-
tion-an extraction of blood for venereal disease analysis-clearly
does not approach the "brutal conduct" of Rochin. However,
courts have held that a more stringent probable cause standard
exists for any search of the body cavity:
[a] strip or skin search of appellant was justified by "a real suspi-
cion directed specifically to appellant" . . . . [Tihe search of a
body cavity, however, must satisfy a more stringent test ... 132
In Schmerber v. California'33 the Supreme Court distin-
guished searches of "the person of the accused"' 3' for evidence or
concealed weapons from searches involving "intrusions beyond
the body's surface."''3 The Court held that considerations which
go to a warrantless search following a lawful arrest
have little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions
beyond the body's surface. The interests in human dignity and pri-
vacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intru-
sions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.
In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will
be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to
suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an
immediate search.lu
Searches going beyond the body's surface, then, are held to
a higher probable cause requirement. They are arguably, like
Rochin, not within the scope of the Robinson exception to the
warrant requirement. Since Reynolds involved instrusions be-
yond the body's surface, the higher probable cause standard is
applicable. Unless the police had some "clear indication" that
Reynolds actually was infected with venereal disease, they should
not have searched her without first securing a warrant.
V. BAiL
In choosing to challenge the Denver hold and treat ordinance
in federal court, the plaintiff denied herself the argument that the
" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
"' United States v. Shields, 453 F.2d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir. 1972).
"' 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
4 Id. at 769, citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
in Id.
I Id. at 769-70.
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ordinance deprives one of the right to bail'37 under state law.
While the majority of federal courts have not acknowledged an
absolute right to bail in non-capital offenses, 3' in Colorado the
issue is settled. Thus, if the ordinance were challenged on this
basis in a state court, it would likely be declared unconstitu-
tional. The State constitution provides that "all persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when
the proof is evident or the presumption great.' 3 This has been
interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court to mean that "per-
sons charged with offenses are bailable with the one exception
mentioned."4 0
The Denver hold and treat ordinance attempts to skirt this
constitutional infirmity with language to the effect that this is a
detention "for health" and not a denial of bail subsequent to an
arrest."' This distinction seems to run directly opposite to pre-
vailing Colorado law. In Palmer v. District Court' the Colorado
Supreme Court held that an individual may not be denied bail
because of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court
referred to the Colorado constitution's bail provision as a basis for
its decision and said, "the mention of one exception excludes
other exceptions.' 41 3 To emphasize this, the court then quoted
extensively from a California case"' which it said was "applicable
"' REV. MUNICIPA CODE or DENVER § 735.1-2 (1950):
No person detained for health under the provisions hereof shall be released
from such detention even if he or she is otherwise eligible for release on
bond ...
' Cases which acknowledge a constitutional right to bail: United States v. Motlow,
10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926); Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); Dye v. Cox,
125 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va. 1954); United States v. Fiala, 102 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Wash.
1951). Cases which deny a constitutional right to bail: Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964); People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City
Prison, 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498, 39 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1943); Vanderford v. Brand, 126
Ga. 67, 54 S.E. 822 (1906). The U.S. Supreme Court has never reached the issue of whether
or not there is a constitutional right to bail in criminal proceedings. In Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524 (1952), the Court upheld the denial of bail in deportation proceedings and
stated that the eighth amendment does not apply to such civil proceedings. In Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), the Court decided that there is a right to bail in criminal cases
but based the holding on statutory grounds. See also Note, Preventive Detention Before
Trial, 79 HASv. L. REv. 1489 (1966).
... COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19.
"0 Palmer v. District Court, 156 Colo. 284, 398 P.2d 435 (1965). See also Shanks v.
District Court, 153 Colo. 332, 385 P.2d 990 (1963); In re Losasso, 15 Colo. 163, 24 P. 1080
(1890).
M REV. MUNICIPAL CODE OF DENVER § 735.1-2 (1950).
1,2 156 Colo. 248, 398 P.2d 435 (1965).
"3 Id. at 287, 398 P.2d at 437.
1" Ex parte Keddy, 233 P.2d 159 (Cal. 1951).
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to the case herein": 45
The people of the State of California through their Constitution
have provided . . . that "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great ..
"This mandate of the people cannot be legally set aside by the
civil, legislative, or judicial branch of the government."'
Denver Municipal Ordinance Section 735 seeks to do exactly
what is prohibited by the court in Palmer, that is to legislate
another exception to the right to bail. Thus, a strong case can be
made that the ordinance violates the State constitution because
of its denial of bail.
CONCLUSION
The Denver ordinance is clearly unconstitutional on a num-
ber of grounds. Had the plaintiffs thoroughly researched and
raised the police power, equal protection and fourth amendment
issues, the Tenth Circuit arguably would have been compelled to
void the law. On the other hand if the plaintiff had challenged
the ordinance in a state court rather than a federal one, she could
have made a persuasive bail argument. However, any decision to
attack the ordinance in a state tribunal would have precluded her
from bringing her claims under sections 1983 and 1985 of the Civil
Rights Act.
As the above analyses illustrate, until this ordinance is either
invalidated by a court or revised by the city government, individ-
uals subjected to it will be deprived of their constitutional rights.
Ronna L Wineberg
John V. Works





REv. MUNICIPAL CODE OF DENVER § 735
.1. Protection of Public Health. In order to protect persons in the City and County
of Denver from the spread of communicable venereal disease the department of health and
hospitals is empowered and authorized and the manager of health and hospitals is directed
to use every available means to ascertain the existence of and to investigate immediately
all suspected cases of communicable venereal disease and to determine the sources of such
infections. Certain persons reasonably suspected to be infected with a communicable
venereal disease may be detained in jail, examined, and if determined to be so infected,
treated, in accordance with the provisions of this section. The manager of health and
hospitals or his authorized representative shall order other persons reasonably suspected
to be infected with a communicable venereal disease to be examined at the department
of health and hospitals on an in-patient or out-patient basis, or, with the consent of the
manager or his representative, by a person licensed to practice medicine, and to be treated
medically for such disease, if necessary. (Sec. 1, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.1-1. Categories of Suspected Persons. A person in any of the following categories
may be reasonably suspected to have venereal disease: (Sec. 1, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.1-1(1). Any person who is arrested and charged in the municipal court of the city
and county or any other court in the city and county with an offense in the nature of or
involving vagrancy, prostitution, rape, a violation of this article, or another offense related
to sex and any person convicted of any such offense in the city and county. (Sec. 1, Ord.
423, Series 1955)
.1-1(2). Any person reasonably suspected to have had a contact with another indi-
vidual reasonably believed to have had a communicable venereal disease at the time of
such contact and any person who is reasonably believed to have transmitted any such
disease to another individual. Any person who has had any such disease or who has been
convicted of any offense of the kinds herein specified within twelve months next past, and
who is reasonably believed to be engaged in any activity which might have occasioned
exposure to a communicable venereal disease. (Sec. 1, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.1-2. Detention in Jail. Suspected persons in the categories enumerated in Section
735.1-1(1) may be detained in jail. When any person so detained is determined not to have
venereal disease in communicable form the manager shall release the individual from
detention for health purposes. The detention of any person in jail under the provisions
hereof shall continue only for such time as is reasonably necessary to examine such person
and render treatment if such person is found to have a venereal disease in a communicable
form. The provisions hereof shall not be utilized as, nor construed to be, a penalty or
punishment. No person detained for health under the provisions hereof shall be released
from such detention even if he or she is otherwise eligible for release on bond or by reason
of payment of fine, or termination of sentence imposed. (Sec. 1, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.1-3. Examination in Jail. Every suspected person detained in jail under the provi-
sions of Section 735.1-2 shall be examined by the department of health and hospitals for
the purpose of determining whether or not such person is, in fact, infected with a commun-
icable venereal disease. Every such person shall submit to such examinations as are
necessary and permit specimens to be taken for laboratory analyses. The detention of each
suspected person shall continue until the results of such examinations are known and the
person found to be free from any such disease, or, if infected, until the disease is no longer
communicable. (Sec. 1, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.1-4. Treatment in Jail. The department of health and hospitals shall treat every
person suspected to have venereal disease who has been detained and examined in jail
and found to have any such disease. The treatment shall continue until the disease is no
longer communicable. (Sec. 1, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.1-5. Examination and Treatment at Department or by Private Physician. Every
suspected person in the categories enumerated in Section 735.1-1(2), and in the categories
enumerated in Section 735.1-1(1), who is not detained in jail shall be examined at the
department of health and hospitals on an in-patient or out-patient basis as determined
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in individual instances by the manager of health and hospitals or his authorized represent-
ative. Each such person shall submit to examinations as necessary and permit specimens
to be taken for laboratory analyses and shall comply with the directions of the manager
or his authorized representative with relation to hospitalization on an in-patient basis or
attendance at clinic on an out-patient basis, as the case may be. Each such person shall
continue to follow these directions until the results of his or her examination are known
and the person determined to be free from any such disease, or, if infected, until the
disease is no longer communicable. With the consent of the manager or his authorized
representative a suspected person may be at his or her expense examined by a doctor
licensed to practice medicine and treated medically for such disease, if necessary. In these
latter instances, the manager or his authorized representative shall receive reports of
examinations and treatment and other information relative to the problems involved from
the medical doctor selected. (Sec. 1, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.1-6. Violations. It shall be unlawful to refuse to submit to examination or treatment
provisions hereof or to violate any order of detention. It shall be unlawful to refuse to obey
any order of the manager of health and hospitals or his authorized representative requiring
examinations and treatment, if necessary, for such disease, or any other order issued
hereunder. (Sec. 1, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.2. Duties of Manager of Safety and Excise and Police Officers. The manager of
safety and excise and the officers of the police department of the city and county are
hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to implement the purposes of Section 735.1
in accordance with the provisions of this section. (Sec. 2, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.2-1. Manager of Safety and Excise. The manager of safety and excise shall cause
to be furnished to the department of health and hospitals information pertinent to the
enforcement of Section 735.1 with relation to persons who are arrested and charged or
otherwise imprisoned in any jail administered by the department of safety and excise. The
manager of safety and excise is directed to make available in such jails an area, room, or
place which may be used as a detention for health facility and for examinations. The
manager of safety and excise, officers of the police department, and employees of the
department of safety and excise shall co-operate in the execution of such detention proce-
dures as may be necessary, and shall assume custodial supervision of persons detained
under the provisions of Section 735.1-2 and shall supply such personal restraints as may
be necessary to effectuate the purposes thereof. (Sec. 2, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.2-2. Police Department. Officers of the police department of the city and county
shall furnish to the department of health and hospitals information pertinent to the
enforcement of the provisions of Section 735.1. Police officers shall have the authority to
detain suspected persons in the categories enumerated in Section 735.1-1(1) for health
purposes in jail in accordance with the procedure set forth in Section 735.1-2 for examina-
tion and treatment by the department of health and hospitals under the provisions of
Sections 735.1-3 and .1-4. Police officers shall have authority to order suspected persons
in the categories enumerated in Section 735.1-1(2) and in the categories enumerated in
Section 735.1-1(1) who are not detained in jail to report to the department of health and
hospitals for examination and treatment at the direction of the manager of health and
hospitals or his authorized representative in accordance with the provisions of Section
735.1-5. They shall also have authority to order persons to report to the department of
health and hospitals for examination and treatment, as aforesaid, who have been held for
investigation of offenses of the types enumerated in Section 735.1-1(1) and who have been
released without charges having been filed and similarly persons who have been acquitted
of any such charges and other suspected persons who have been released on bond. (Sec.
2, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
.2-3. Violations. It shall be unlawful to refuse to submit to examination or treatment
under an order as hereinabove provided or to violate any order of detention or to refuse to
obey any order requiring submittal to examination and treatment at the department of
health and hospitals. (Sec. 2, Ord. 423, Series 1955)
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This provides a practical overview of the Tenth Circuit's
decisions involving federal practice and procedure issues which
arose during the past year. Consequently, the following discussion
presents brief summaries of cases considering issues involving the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' and related areas.2 One case,
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co.,' dealing with a judge's power
to tax costs against a prevailing party, is discussed in greater
depth because it reveals the Tenth Circuit's willingness to exer-
cise its inherent equitable powers.
I. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Applying rule 8(a) to a counterclaim,4 the court reaffirmed
its ability to construe pleadings liberally5 by allowing the counter-
claim to stand even though the party failed to specify the theory
of law under which he was proceeding.6 In two cases involving rule
19(b), 7 the court of appeals affirmed the dismissals of the actions
by the trial court for failure to join an indispensable party.8 In
doing so, the court carefully considered each of the factors identi-
fied in rule 19(b) without giving greater weight to one factor over
another
I All citations to rules in this section are to the FEDERAL RuLES OF CIVL PROCEDURE
unless otherwise indicated.
I A number of cases involving jurisdiction based on diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970), while involving procedural issues, are omitted from discussion because they pri-
marily involve applications of local law.
496 F.2d 76 (10th Cir. 1974).
Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller, 490 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1974).
See, e.g., Dearman v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 273 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1959); Knox v. First Security Bank, 196
F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1946); Clyde v. Broderick, 144 F.2d 348 (loth Cir. 1944).
In so holding, the Tenth Circuit followed the general purpose of the rule to permit
claims to be stated in general terms. See 2A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.13
(2d rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE].
I Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974); Glenny v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 494 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1974).
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) says, in part:
If a person . . . cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus re-
garded as indispensable ...
* The factors identified include prejudice to the absent party if a judgment is given
in his absence, the possibility of shaping relief to protect the absent party, the adequacy
of judgment given if the party is absent, and whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. Id. In Glenny, the court states that
"[rlule 19(b) does not state what weight is to be given to each factor [citation omitted],
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In In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation v. Bank of
America,'° the Tenth Circuit considered what a member of a class
involved in a class action suit must do in order to opt out of the
action. The Bank of America, as trustee for a member of the class,
received notice of a settlement of the class action that stated the
recipient of the notice would be bound by the judgment unless it
elected to opt out. The Bank replied to this notice in a letter
stating its "concern as to whether it could participate in the class
recovery as a member of the class and also retain" a separate
cause of action in a state court." To do this, the Bank sent a
"purported proof of claim" which was modified to allow it to
pursue its state action by the addition of a proviso stating that if
the proof of claim were not "accepted, the Bank would regard
itself as having opted out of the class."'" The trial court held that
in this letter the "Bank effectively elected to remove itself from
the class and . . . was not entitled to share in the settlement. '"'3
The court of appeals affirmed, 4 holding that
a reasonable indication of a desire to opt out ought to be
sufficient .... [F]lexibility is desirable in determining what con-
stitutes an expression of a class member's desire to exclude himself
and any written evidence of it ought to be sufficient."5
Therefore, despite the good faith of the Bank in its desire to
protect both its class action and state claims, it effectively opted
out and could not participate in the settlement.'"
and thus we must determine the importance of each factor on the facts of each particular
case and in light of equitable considerations." 494 F.2d at 653, citing 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1608 (1972) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGH'].




, Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1291, citing Bonner v. Texas City Indep. School Dist., 305 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.
Tex. 1969); 7A C. WRIGHT § 1287.
," 493 F.2d at 1290. The court also considered whether FED. R. Cir. P. 6(b), which
allows the court to "order the period enlarged," permitted the enlargement of the time in
which the Bank could effectively opt out of the class action. The court held that the "facts
support a finding of good faith on the part of the Bank. There is no indication that the
tardiness [in opting out] was part of a strategy to gain a tactical advantage....
Moreover, there was no prejudice suffered from the enlargement of time." 493 F.2d at
1290-91, citing Coady v. Aquadilla Terminal, Inc., 456 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1972); 4 C.
WRIGHT § 1165.
The court also considered the question of enlargement of time that arose in Gooch v.
Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 311 (1974). In Gooch,
cocounsel failed to communicate with each other as to when an appeal should be filed and
they attempted, under FED. R. App. P. 4(a), to have the district court extend the time for
appeal on the basis of excusable neglect. Relying on dictum in Cohen v. Plateau Natural
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In United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land,7 the Tenth Circuit
considered the quashing of that portion of a subpoena duces
tecum'5 which demanded production of appraisals by the Govern-
ment's expert witness made for private owners of property in the
vicinity of the property involved in a condemnation action. In
holding that the denial of this discovery was not an abuse of
discretion, the court rejected the appellants' arguments based on
rules 26 and 45(b) 9 and stated that the "rule of reason" favors
the broad power of the trial court to regulate discovery. 0
The Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the dis-
missal of an action on the basis of failure to prosecute in SEC v.
Power Resources Corp." The court stated that the procedural
history of each case must be examined in order to determine
whether dismissal is proper, and this statement is compatible
with the main line of decisions in other jurisdictions." In Brennan
v. Sine, 3 where dismissal under rule 41(b) was caused by the
Secretary of Labor's inaction over an 18-month period, the court
held that the dismissal was justified and within the discretion of
the trial court.24
Citing its own precedents,25 the Tenth Circuit continued in
line with the settled application of rule 50 in Symons v. Mueller
Gas Co., 303 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1962) as the basis for its holding, the Tenth Circuit held
that this lack of communication did not create the unique or extraordinary circumstances
required to provide excusable neglect necessary for an extension of time under FED. R. App.
P. 4(a).
" 495 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir. 1974).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1), (5).
" 495 F.2d at 1400.
2 See, e.g., Benning v. Phelps, 249 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1957); Doglow v. Anderson, 53
F.R.D. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308
(E.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Kohler, 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
2 495 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1974).
22 See 5 J. MooRE 41.11[2].
- 495 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1974).
U Judge Holloway dissented from this conclusion, saying that "the dismissal of these
actions with prejudice was an abuse of discretion when all circumstances are considered,
including the possible effect on rights of employees allegedly under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act." Id. at 877-78 (Holloway, J., dissenting). The circumstances Judge Holloway
considered were the difficulties in obtaining discovery and a pretrial hearing considering
whether the defendants in Brennan were entitled to assert their privilege against self-
incrimination with respect to disclosure of information. In Judge Holloway's opinion,
"dismissals with prejudice [are] .... [a] harsh sanction, reserved for extreme cases."
Id. at 879, citing Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963).
2 Taylor v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 433 F.2d 569, 571 (10th Cir. 1970); Wilkins
v. Hogan, 425 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1970); Sweargin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376
F.2d 637, 639 (10th Cir. 1969).
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Co.26 by holding that a grant of directed verdict is proper only
when there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion drawn by the
jury. In United States v. Fisher-Otis Co.,27 the court found that
there were no grounds for a claim of deprivation of due process
when the trial court granted summary judgment without an oral
hearing.28 Although rule 58 requires that every judgment be set
forth on a separate document, 9 the Tenth Circuit held in United
States v. Clearfield State Bank3 that an order granting summary
judgment is in itself a separate document when there is no opin-
ion or memorandum which provides any other basis for the entry
of judgment.
II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A. Finnerman v. McCormick, 499 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Finnerman v. McCormick,3' the plaintiffs, Gerald Finner-
man and the widow and son of Robert Sparr, sought damages for
the wrongful death and injury resulting from the crash of a plane
operated by deceased defendant McCormick and owned by his
permanent employer, Sunset Drive-In Theatre, the owner of the
airplane. The present action was held in abeyance until the claim
filed by McCormick's widow before the Colorado Division of
Labor was settled. That claim asserted that McCormick was
employed at the time of his death by Finnerman's and Sparr's
employer, Aubrey Schenck Enterprises, Inc. ("Schenck"), and
that Ms. McCormick was entitled to workmen's compensation
benefits from Schenck. 32 The referee found in favor of Ms. McCor-
mick and the award of workmen's compensation was upheld by
the Colorado Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion. Based
upon the Industrial Commission's determination that McCor-
mick was an employee of Schenck and that plaintiffs and McCor-
mick were coemployees, the federal district court granted a mo-
tion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.
3
1
" 493 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1974).
- 496 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1974). For other Tenth Circuit cases interpreting FED. R.
Civ. P. 56, see O'Bryan v. Chandler, 496 F.2d 403 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
245 (1974); Brantner v. Poole 487 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1973).
496 F.2d at 1149.
FED. R. Civ. P. 58 states that "[elvery judgment shall be set forth on a separate
document."
- 497 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1974).
3, 499 F.2d 212 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1974) (No.
74-355).
32 The claim was brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 81-1-1 to -17-7 (1963).
33 499 F.2d at 212.
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On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that the finding of employment by the Industrial Commision
did not bar the plaintiffs' claim.3 ' The court emphasized two
points. First, unlike the common law interpretation of "em-
ployee," the broad interpretation given to the term "employee"
under the Workmen's Compensation Act creates a presumption
favoring the finding of an employee relationship.3s The court
argued that this definitional distinction was such as to place the
issue of McCormick's employment status in different contexts in
the two actions. Thus, the plaintiffs were not collaterally es-
topped from litigating the employment issue in the federal
courts .
3
Second, the court held that a finding of temporary, special
employment of McCormick by Schenck did not preclude a find-
ing of vicarious liability on the part of the primary employer
under the agency principle that one is able to serve two masters
when the temporary service of one does not involve an abandon-
ment of service to the other. 31 Collateral estoppel is not applicable
when a plaintiff is seeking to establish "a positive and not incon-
sistent thesis," such as the one involved in McCormick.
3
1
B. Brown v. DeLayo, 498 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Brown v. DeLayo,31 plaintiff brought an action under sec-
tions 1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act"0 asserting a denial of
due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment as a result
of an improper termination of her employment as a school
teacher. Holding that the due process issue had been litigated to
11 Id. at 213. The district court based its action on CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-1-4
(Supp. 1967) which prevents coemployees from suing one another for injuries sustained
while jointly employed if they have elected to receive benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
'7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-2-7(2) (1963) defines the term "employee" to include
[elvery person in the service of any person, association of persons, firm,
private corporation, including any public service corporation, personal repre-
sentative, assignee, trustee, or receiver, under any contract of hire, express
or implied . . . but not including any persons who are expressly excluded
from this chapter [81] or whose employment is but casual and not in the
usual course of trade, business, profession or occupation of his em-
ployer . ..
u 499 F.2d at 214, citing Embry v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 451 F.2d 472 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972); Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d 185 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); 1B J. MooRE 0.443[2].
" 3 AM. Juii. 2d Agency §§ 234-35 (1962); 2A C.J.S. Agency H9 278-79 (1972).
m 499 F.2d at 214.
498 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1974).
,0 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Civil Rights Act].
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an adverse conclusion in the state courts, the federal district
court dismissed the complaint as res judicata. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the dismissal on the basis of collateral estoppel.
Although proceeding under the Civil Rights Act appeared to
give a new context to the action, the court held that the Civil
Rights Act was "not a vehicle for collateral attack on a final state
court judgment."'" The adjudication of a federal constitutional
right in a state court precludes relitigation of the identical right
in a federal court. The only recourse from an adverse state deci-
sion involving a federal right is certiorari review by the Supreme
Court of the United States.4"
Plaintiff's additional argument that a change in defendants
from the state to the federal action barred application of estoppel
was found to be without merit. Collateral estoppel in federal
courts is "not grounded upon the 'mechanical requirements of
mutuality,' " but on "whether a litigant has had a 'full and fair
opportunity for judicial resolution' of the issue.""
III. THREE-JUDGE COURTS
Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1974)
Doe v. Rampton45 involved a challenge to the State of Utah's
regulations requiring welfare recipients to aid in the location of
absent parents as a requisite to receiving Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. The plaintiffs alleged that the State regu-
lations were in conflict with those of the Federal Government and
were therefore void under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. The district court, on cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, held that the State regulations were contrary to the federal
statutes and, as a result, void.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and
considered whether the district court followed the proper proce-
dure in deciding the statutory question over which it had pendent
jurisdiction.47 To resolve this procedural issue, the Tenth Circuit
4 498 F.2d at 1175.
"' Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
See also S. CT. R.P. 23(1)(f).
11 498 F.2d at 1175-76, quoting P I Enterprises v. Cataldo, 457 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st
Cir. 1972).
" 498 F.2d at 1176, quoting Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illi-
nois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
45 497 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1974).
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-43 (1970).
11 497 F.2d at 1036.
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relied on the recent Supreme Court decision of Hagans v.
Lavine." Hagans involved a challenge to New York welfare regu-
lations by recipients of public assistance. The district court en-
joined the implementation of the regulations on the grounds that
the regulations violated the equal protection clause and con-
flicted with federal regulations. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court, in affirming the
decision of the district court and reversing that of the court of
appeals, held that the claim was sufficiently substantial to give
the district court jurisdiction. 9 The district court, therefore,
could decide the statutory question of the validity of the New
York statute without convening a three-judge court.50
In applying Hagans, the Tenth Circuit noted that the "alle-
gations of the constitutional issues in [Doe v. Rampton] are
much more substantial than" those in Hagans and the district
court properly exercised its pendent jurisdiction." The correct
statutory interpretation by the district court "obviated the need
to determine the constitutional challenges as well as the need to
convene a three-judge court" under Hagans.52
IV. TAXATION OF COSTS, ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND ATTORNEY'S Ex-
PENSES AGAINST SUCCESSFUL PARTY AS A PENALTY
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1974)
The general rule in American courts has been to deny the
recovery of attorney's fees, either as costs' or as damages,' in the
absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing for them.
The rationale most frequently expressed in support of this rule
has been that
one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
415 U.S. 528 (1974).
" The Court said that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which provides redress for the deprivation
of civil rights under the color of state law, confers jurisdiction upon the federal district
courts only "if [the claim is] of sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction." 415
U.S. at 536. For criticism of the substantiality doctrine, see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1969); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
-w For a discussion of when a three-judge court must be convened in state complaints
under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), see 7 J. MOORE 65.16 n.16.
11 497 F.2d at 1036.
52 Id. In the only other court of appeals' case interpreting this aspect of Hagans, a
similar result was reached. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 493 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 498 (1974), the Fifth Circuit did not require a three-judge court and
allowed the district court to exercise its pendent jurisdiction.
I Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).




lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from insti-
tuting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing in-
cluded fees of their opponent's counsel.
3
This rule has been traditionally subject to the qualification that
the federal courts have discretion to allow attorney's fees in suits
in equity because of the ability of the equity courts to fashion the
remedy to meet the wrong.4
In recent years, the Supreme Court has recognized two addi-
tional exceptions to the general rule without reference to a re-
quirement that the suit be one "in equity." The Supreme Court's
most recent synthesis of cases permitting an award of counsel fees
was decided in F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex parte Industrial
Lumber Co.5 In F.D. Rich, the Court stated that it has "long been
recognized that attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful
party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons ... ."I The second exception
is that when the plaintiff creates a fund for the benefit of others
or confers a substantial benefit on a class of persons, an award of
attorney's fees to that party distributes the expense to those bene-
fited.'
The federal courts have also long recognized their power to
allow, deny, or tax costs to the prevailing party in civil litigation.
This discretionary power over costs has been incorporated into
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,8 which provides that costs
are to be awarded to the prevailing party "unless the court other-
wise directs,"' or "unless otherwise . . . ordered by the court."'
In the absence of a statute directing the awarding of costs, "Rule
39(a) follows the principle of Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure that the prevailing party is entitled to costs as a matter
of course unless the court orders otherwise." The Supreme Court
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
The basis and scope of that discretion was described in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939):
The suits "in equity" of which these courts were given "cognizance" ever
since the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, constituted that body of remedies,
procedures and practices which theretofore had been evolved in the English
Court of Chancery ....
Id. at 164.
94 S. Ct. 2157 (1974).
Id. at 2165.
See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
FED. R. CIv. P. 54(d).
'Id.
10 FED. R. App. P. 39(a).
" 9 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 239.02[1] at 4304 (2d ed. 1973).
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has recognized that the allowance of costs to the prevailing party
"is not, moreover, a rigid rule."' 2 Utilizing this discretionary
power, the Tenth Circuit, in Basso v. Utah Power and Light Co. ,
taxed as a penalty costs, attorney's fees, and attorney's expenses
against the successful appellant because of "gross negligence" on
part of appellant's counsel."
In Basso, the plaintiff won a wrongful death award of
$255,447.12 in a trial to the court. On appeal, the defendant for
the first time contended that its principal place of business was
in Utah, thus removing the requisite diversity of citizenship. 5
After remand to the district court for a determination of the fed-
eral jurisdiction issue, the court of appeals ruled that diversity
did not exist and that defendant could not waive the issue nor was
he estopped from making the jurisdictional attack after entry of
judgment. Defendant claimed that its failure to raise an earlier
objection was the result of a mistake of law in that defendant's
counsel thought that participation in the proceedings had waived
that issue. However, the court determined that this failure
amounted to gross negligence and penalized the defendant as a
consequence of this failure.
The mandate issued by the court follows precedent estab-
lished in previous federal court decisions and is a proper exten-
sion of "the oppressive conduct" exception to the general rule,"
even though the party taxed with such costs and expenses was
here the prevailing party. An early circuit court of appeals deci-
sion" recognized the discretion in the federal courts in awarding
1 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284 (1946).
13 495 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 911. In Mobile Power Enterprises, Inc. v. Power Vac., Inc., 496 F.2d 1311
(10th Cir. 1974), the Tenth Circuit held that a dismissal with prejudice filed by plaintiff
because of a settlement with one co-defendant does not convert the other co-defendant
into a prevailing party entitling him to recover costs.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970).
IS Successful litigants have been allowed recovery of attorney's fees under this excep-
tion when, for example, in Vaughan v. Atkinson, 396 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962), a seaman
was forced to sue the shipowner for maintenance and cure, the shipowner's attitude being
described as "callous" and "recalcitrant;" when a student sought injunctive relief against
the school's segregation policy in Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1974) because
the school board (1) had a long, continued pattern of evasion. and obstruction, (2) had
refused to take the initiative to desegrate the schools, and (3) had interposed administra-
tive obstacles in order to block desegregation; and, in First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471
F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973), when a debtor, in an action by a judgment creditor to set aside
certain conveyances as fraudulent had attempted to conceal assets, to make fraudulent
conveyances, to suborn perjury, to bribe a witness, and to falsify records for trial.
7 Harland v. Bankers' & Merchants' Tel. Co., 32 F. 305 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
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costs and used this discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party
when his failure to raise objections by demurrer fatal to the oppo-
nent's complaint resulted in greater expense and delay to both
parties.
The Seventh Circuit, in taxing the prevailing party with all
costs and expenses, described the latitude of the power as being
one of "wide discretion."'" The Seventh Circuit has also recog-
nized the power to assess partial costs against the prevailing
party as a penalty for some defection on his part, such as delay
"in raising objection[s] fatal to the plaintiff's case."' 9 Where a
judgment was reversed for want of jurisdiction and remanded
with instructions to dismiss, the costs of the appeal were assessed
against the appellant when the issues which disposed of the ap-
peal were not presented to the court until after the appeals were
perfected and the briefs filed. 0 Similarly, a district court held
that where substantial costs were incurred because the defendant
did not challenge the existence of diversity jurisdiction until after
the case had been tried and submitted, the imposition of costs
even though the defendant prevailed was justified.2'
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit refused to award attorney's
fees in Signorile v. Quaker Oats Co."2 under a fact situation simi-
lar to that of Basso. In Signorile, the plaintiff, an Illinois resident,
asserted the defendant was incorporated and had its principal
place of business in New Jersey. Ten months after filing its an-
swer, defendant obtained new counsel who became aware that
defendant's principal place of business was in Illinois. In moving
to dismiss the suit in the district court because of a lack of diver-
sity jurisdiction, defendant's counsel stipulated that all discovery
in the federal court could be used in the state court proceeding.
The district court dismissed for lack of diversity and awarded
attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiff. The court of appeals
reversed the award of attorney's fees because "there was no show-
ing of any financial burden or hardship to plaintiff. His access to
the state courts to refile his lawsuit was unimpaired." 3
In Signorile, the plaintiff's expenses were attributable to
work which could later be used in any state court proceeding.
" Jones v. Schellengberger, 225 F.2d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1955).
" Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1949)
(dictum), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950).
The Castillo Bellver, 143 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1944).
21 Davey v. Faucher, 84 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Fla. 1949).
499 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 145.
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Additionally, the district court and court of appeals were both
located in Illinois, the State of plaintiff's residence. In Basso,
however, the court of appeals particularly noted that defendant's
failure to attack jurisdiction in the district court in Utah forced
the plaintiff to defend this issue in the court of appeals in Colo-
rado. Arguably, this is the "financial burden or hardship" that
was absent in Signorile.24
The federal courts have long exercised their discretion over
the awarding of costs to litigants according to the conduct of the
parties. The taxing of costs against the appellants in Basso fol-
lows existing case law and was a proper exercise of the court's
discretion since all costs incurred before the Tenth Circuit were
the result of defendant's failure to make his attack on jurisdiction
in the district court.
The order with respect to attorney's fees and expenses was a
proper application of the judicially created exceptions to the gen-
eral rule denying recovery of these expenses. The award of these
expenses can be justified either upon the theory of the court's
equitable power or the existing decisions wherein a party has




In the 1973-1974 term the Tenth Circuit handed down opin-
ions on federal taxation issues as diverse as the definition of
"farmer"' and the requirement that Miranda warnings be given
in the course of Internal Revenue Service criminal investigations.
2
Two opinions, one dealing with the corporate accumulated earn-
ings tax and working capital requirements 3 and the other con-
cerned with collateral estoppel in federal income tax cases,4 have
been selected for extended comment in this section. Issues from
five other opinions are discussed briefly in the following over-
view.5 The only basis for the selection of these issues is that the
author subjectively found them to be interesting.
I. OVERVIEW
A. United States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974)
When a taxpayer's undivided interest in real property is sub-
jected to a tax lien, most circuits hold that under section 7403 of
the Internal Revenue Code' the court may order foreclosure
against the entire property.7 Only the Fifth Circuit has ruled that
Hi-Plains Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 496 F. 2d 520 (10th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1974).
The Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1974).
Weiszmann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973).
Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Eaves, 499
F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974); Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974); Kirtley v. Bickerstaff, 488 F.2d 768
(10th Cir. 1973).
The eight remaining decisions handed down on taxation issues this term are not
discussed at all: United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1974); Hi-Plains
Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1974); Reardon v. United
States, 491 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1974) (taxpayer entitled to section 105(d) sick pay exclusion
until he reached mandatory retirement age; Treas. Reg. § 1.105-4(a)(3)(i)(a)(1956), inso-
far as it necessitates a contrary result, is invalid); Maytag v. United States, 493 F.2d 995
(10th Cir. 1974) (trust assets properly includible in gross estate where decedent had a
section 2024 general power of appointment over the trust assets at his death); Alpine
Country Club v. United States, 490 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1974) (concerning repealed section
4241 of the Code); Glasgow v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1973) (Tax Court's
determination that undergraduate educational expenses of Baptist minister were deducti-
ble is affirmed); King Radio Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1973)
(movable partition system qualifies as "section 38 property" for purposes of the invest-
ment credit); Wallace v. Commissioner, 485 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer's pay-
ments to former spouse were lump sum and not periodic payments); Hicks v. United
States, 486 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974) (valuation of close
corporation properly included market rather than book value of certain corporate assets).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7403.
United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
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the government's foreclosure rights are limited to the sale of the
property interest on which the lien has attached.8 The statutory
section clearly states that the court may order a foreclosure sale
on a tax lien, indicating that a district court would be within its
authority in not ordering any foreclosure at all.' In United States
v. Eaves, 0 the Tenth Circuit decided that it was also within the
trial court's discretion to order a sale of only the taxpayer's inter-
est in jointly held property.
The Eaves court first rejected the Folsom v. United States"
rule and, "[t]o the extent necessary in this case,"1 adopted the
majority interpretation of section 7403. It then concluded that the
majority rule states "the limit of authority conferred by section
7403,' ' 13 within which the district court could fashion a remedy
"gear[ed] . . . to the factual situation and legal relationships
• . . to best accomplish the statutory aims and the rights and
equities of the owners."'" In this case the lower court chose an
appropriate remedy in confining the foreclosure sale to the tax-
payer's half-interest in the property.
The Tenth Circuit's result is consistent with both the statu-
tory section involved and precedential inferences. 5 As such it
merits close attention by other courts concerned with the same
issue.
B. Kirtley v. Bickerstaff, 488 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1973)
Section 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
that, with certain exceptions, "no suit for the purpose of restrain-
ing the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained
(1973); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Trilling,
328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964); see Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 978 (1971).
Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
The word "may" replaced the word "shall" in the statute in 1936, Revenue Act of
1936, ch. 690, § 802, 49 Stat. 1743-44, indicating a congressional desire that the power to
order a foreclosure sale was to be discretionary rather than mandatory. United States v.
Boyd, 246 F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889 (1957).
10 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
" 499 F.2d at 871.
13 Id.
Id.
United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (the court affirmed a sale
of the entire property rather than just the taxpayer's interest, but stated that the district
court should use its discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy under the statute);
United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1964) ("IThere is no evidence which
suggests any impropriety in the sale of the entire property.").
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in any court by any person . . . ." Section 6013(e) of the Code
relieves an "innocent spouse" from liability for taxes assessed
against the income of both spouses in certain situations where a
joint return is filed." In Kirtley v. Bickerstaf" the Tenth Circuit
rendered the first circuit court decision on the issue of whether
section 6013(e) operates as an exception to the general rule of
section 7421.18 The court held that no exception was created.
The decision seems both legally correct'" and fundamentally
fair. The "innocent spouse" has the options available to every
taxpayer of either filing a petition with the Tax Court to prevent
assessment or collection of any alleged deficiency until a judg-
ment is rendered 0 (unless of course the Commissioner has
grounds for and makes a jeopardy assessment") or paying the
alleged deficiency and suing for a refund.2 No equitable consider-
ation appears which would so separate the innocent spouse from
the average taxpayer against whom a tax is wrongfully assessed
or collected as to entitle the former to greater procedural remedies
than the latter.
C. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974)
In United States v. Hodgson 3 the Tenth Circuit quietly
joined the Second" and the Fifth25 Circuits in ruling that the
nature and scope of the attorney-client privilege in federal income
tax matters26 is governed by federal and not state law. Only the
" See the discussion of Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974), text
accompanying notes 40-47, infra.
17 488 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1973).
11 The Sixth Circuit had an opportunity to discuss the issue when the district court
granted a temporary injunction against collection of any tax pending a hearing on the
applicability of section 6013(e). The court remanded the case for a consideration of the
potential conflict between sections 6013(e) and 7421 rather than deciding the issue itself.
Clarke v. District Director of the IRS, 457 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1972).
11 The stringent nature of the injunction-bar rule of section 7421 is underlined by
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), cited as authority in
Kirtley v. Bickerstaff, 488 F.2d 768, 769 (10th Cir. 1973). Enochs limited injunctions
against the collection of taxes to situations where both (1) the taxpayer would be irrepara-
bly injured by the collection and (2) the government could not possibly prevail on the
merits. See generally Recent Development, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1502 (1973); Note, 30 WASH..
& LEE L. REv. 573 (1973).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a).
22 Id. § 6861(a).
n Id. § 7422.
U 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974).
N Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963).
" United States v. Finley, 434 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1970).
" Specifically involved was a summons issued under section 7602 of the 1954 Code.
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Ninth Circuit stands for the opposing rule that state law gov-
erns. 7 The Seventh Circuit has expressly refused to take a stand
on the issue where there was no state statute to turn to even if
state law did govern.m It has been predicted that the Eighth
Circuit will follow the plurality rule if and when an occasion for
its decision on the issue arises.2
The announced policy consideration in favor of the plurality
rule is "the desirability of avoiding inconsistent treatment to fed-
eral taxpayers."0 However, the real issue is not so much whether
uniformity of treatment is preferable to distinctions among tax-
payers of different states, but rather whether the policy favoring
uniform treatment outweighs the policy in favor of a precisely-
delineated privilege. When an attorney represents a client with
respect to both tax and non-tax matters, concepts of what is or
is not privileged should not change with each shift in the nature
of the advice given. Thus the Ninth Circuit rule may be the better
one insofar as it grants clarity of the privilege a higher priority
than national uniformity.
D. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974)
In United States v. Davis,' the Supreme Court held that a
husband who transferred appreciated property to his wife under
a voluntary pre-divorce property settlement agreement had to
recognize his gain on the exchange. Under the Delaware law appl-
icable in Davis, the wife had only inchoate rights in her husband's
property, 32 and hence the transfer of property under the settle-
ment more closely resembled a taxable transfer of property in
exchange for release of an independent obligation than it did a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners.
3
In Wiles v. Commissioner,U the Tenth Circuit applied the
United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d
623 (9th Cir. 1960).
n Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).
" United States v. Kansas City Lutheran Home & Hosp. Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 239
(W.D. Mo. 1969).
Id. at 243.
" 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
32 The wife has no interest-passive or active-over the management or
disposition of her husband's personal property. Her rights are not descenda-
ble, and she must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage she shares in the property only to such extent as the
court deems "reasonable."
Id. at 70.
n Id. at 69-71.
- 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974).
VOL. 52
FEDERAL TAXATION
Davis rule to a property settlement agreement where the marital
rights of the parties were governed by Kansas law. In a well-
reasoned, well-researched opinion the court held that under Kan-
sas law, like Delaware law, the settlement agreement more closely
resembled a transfer of property for release of an independent
obligation than a division of property between co-owners. How-
ever, the court expressly noted the possibility of a different deci-
sion where the rights of the parties were governed by Oklahoma
lawn or by Colorado law.36
The Supreme Court noted in Davis the distinct possibility
that taxpayers in different states would be treated differently
under its ruling, 7 and this observation was echoed in Wiles.3"
Under existing statutory law the decisions seem unassailable. Yet
it is strange that a Congress which has often reached out to elimi-
nate tax discrepancies between community property and com-
mon law jurisdictions39 rests complacent with a rule in which
discrimination is so blatant. A statutory change would seem to
be in order.
E. Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974)
Spouses filing joint returns are normally jointly and severally
liable for the tax due on their joint income."0 In 1971 a Congress
dismayed by the sometimes inequitable results brought about by
this rule" added subsection 6013(e) to the Internal Revenue Code.
The new subsection provided that a spouse could be relieved of
liability for tax due on income omitted from the joint return if
three conditions were met: (1) the omitted income must have
u "The Oklahoma law would seem to be in a state of flux." Id. at 258.
u Especially significant to the court was the Colorado Supreme Court's response to
an inquiry about the nature of marital rights under Colorado law. The Colorado Supreme
Court had stated that vesting of property rights occurs when a dissolution action is filed
and any transfer of property occurring thereafter pursuant to a court-approved, stipulated
property settlement agreement more closely resembles a division of property between co-
owners than a transfer for release of an independent obligation. In re Questions Submitted
by the United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974). In the corresponding federal
action, the taxpayer was held not to be required to recognize his gain on the transfer of
appreciated property pursuant to a post-dissolution property settlement. Imel v. United
States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
370 U.S. at 70-71.
499 F.2d at 259.
E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2056(c)(2)(B) (marital estate tax deduction),
2523(f) (marital gift tax deduction).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(d)(3).
,1 See S. REP. No. 91-1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. [U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6089,
6090-91 (1970)].
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been attributable to the other spouse and must have exceeded 25
percent of the reported gross income; (2) the spouse seeking relief
from liability must establish that he or she did not know or have
reason to know of the omission; and (3) the spouse seeking relief
from liability must establish that he or she did not significantly
benefit from the omission, or that it would be inequitable to hold
him or her liable for the deficiency.42
In Dakil v. United States" the Tenth Circuit was faced with
the issue of a spouse's liability or nonliability under section
6013(e). The court stated that "[slection 6013(e)(1) of the Code
relieves a spouse of liability under certain conditions, only one of
which is pertinent here."" The court then went on to find that
either Mrs. Dakil had not significantly benefited from her hus-
band's omissions, or it would be inequitable to hold her liable for
the tax due on them, and hence she was relieved of liability under
section 6013(e)(1). Nowhere does the opinion deal with the 25
percent requirement or the innocent spouse's burden of proof with
respect to knowledge of the omitted income. The court's state-
ment that "only one" of the conditions of subsection 6013(e)(1)
was "pertinent" indicates its belief that these other requirements
were irrelevant.
To the extent the opinion indicates that the three conditions
of subsection 6013(e)(1) are disjunctive rather than conjunctive,
it is clearly incorrect. The statutory language indicates by the use
of "and" between the second and third conditions that the re-
quirements are conjunctive. Both the House and Senate commit-
tee reports on the amendment stated, "[T]he bill provides that
when three conditions exist [not "one of three"], the 'innocent
spouse' is to be relieved of the tax liability . . . ."' In Wissing
v. Commissioner4" the Sixth Circuit found that where only two of
the three conditions were met, the spouse was not entitled to
relief. The Tax Court has expressly held that "[in order to be
relieved from liability . . . petitioner must shoulder the burden
of proving that the three conditions of section 6013(e) are met and
not just one of them."47
I NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(e).
a 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 433.
S. REP. No. 91-1537, supra note 41 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 91-1734, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (empahsis added).
441 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1971).
R. Adams, 60 T.C. 300 (1973).
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Possibly the Tenth Circuit realizes that the conditions are
conjunctive, but it failed to deal with the first two conditions in
Dakil because, perhaps, they were stipulated or clearly proven at
trial. If so, the court's failure to acknowledge the existence and
fulfillment of the other requirements makes the opinion highly
misleading. The court should correct or clarify its view of section
6013(e) at the first opportunity.
James D. Butler
II. ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX-WORKING CAPI-
TAL REQUIREMENTS: A FORMULA APPROACH
The Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner
494 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1974)
Corporations which are "formed or availed of for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax with respect to [their] shareholders
• . .by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate"' rather
than distributing them are subject to a special tax under sections
531 through 537 of the Internal Revenue Code.' The tax imposed
is a percentage of the corporation's "accumulated taxable in-
come," 3 which can be offset in part by any accumulations which
are demonstrably intended for the "reasonable needs of the busi-
ness."' Working capital requirements are expressly stated in the
Treasury Regulations to be reasonable needs of the business.'
In The Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner,' the
petitioner contested the Commissioner's imposition of the section
531 tax on its accumulations. As part of its justification for accu-
mulating earnings, Cheyenne claimed a need for operating work-
ing capital equal to 6-months' worth of operating expenses, or
$620,000. In support of this claim, Cheyenne cited other court
decisions which held operating expense requirements based upon
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 532.
2 Section 531 imposes the tax and sets its rate. Section 532 states which corporations
are subject to the tax. Section 533 provides that allowing income to accumulate "beyond
the reasonable needs of the business" is "determinative" of a purpose to avoid income tax
with respect to shareholders unless the corporation proves to the contrary by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The burden of proof in section 531 cases is set by section 534; and
the definition of "accumulated taxable income" is contained in section 535. Section 537
defines "reasonable needs of the business."
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
I d. § 535(c)(1).
Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b)(4) (1959).
494 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1974).
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even greater lengths of time to be reasonable. The Tenth Circuit
rejected this contention and held that each business must be
considered in light of its particular needs in order to ascertain
what accumulations for working capital are reasonable for it.'
The working capital of a business, which can be defined as
the amount by which current assets (cash, inventory, receivables,
and securities') exceed current liabilities9 (liabilities which will
become due and payable within one year'0 ), is used to meet the
day-to-day needs of a business. Working capital funds are used
to purchase supplies and inventory and to pay for labor costs and
other operating expenses of a business. While there is agreement
that working capital is a reasonable business need, a prevalent
issue in most section 531 cases is how much working capital the
business should be able to accumulate before it finds itself sub-
ject to the section 531 penalty tax.
Cheyenne offered testimony by an independent newspaper
executive and its own comptroller to substantiate its working
capital claim. Both witnesses testified that an accumulation of 6-
months' working capital was reasonable in light of contingencies
such as mechanical failures, labor strikes, natural disasters,
paper shortages, and Cheyenne's conceivable loss of its second
class mailing permit. The Tenth Circuit in analyzing these con-
tingencies found them to be neither realistic nor reasonable. The
last time Cheyenne had suffered a natural disaster, which then
only curtailed but did not stop operations, was in 1949. The news-
paper operation had not suffered a mechanical breakdown. suffi-
cient to prevent publication in 33 years and had not experienced
a labor strike in 20 years. Finally, the newspaper's asserted fear
of losing its second class mailing permit was held to be un-
founded."
The court held that mere possibilities do not amount to
reasonably-anticipated business needs, and thus it refused to per-
mit justification of 6-months' working capital on the posited hy-
pothetical disasters. The court went on to find that Cheyenne's
true working capital requirements were indicated by two facts:
(1) Cheyenne had to make only insubstantial inventory expendi-
' Id. at 432.
Federal Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co., 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 391 (1969).
W. MEIGS, C. JOHNSON & A. MOSICH, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (1970).
10 Id.
11 494 F.2d at 433.
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tures; and (2) Cheyenne's accounts receivable turned over rap-
idly.
Cheyenne's only inventory was newsprint, and the cost of a
year's supply represented 15 percent of Cheyenne's yearly operat-
ing cost. However, this fact, standing alone or even in conjunction
with the other findings of the court, reveals little in determining
the amount of working capital required. When properly dis-
counted to its true significance, it is worth very little.
Secondly, Cheyenne's income was primarily derived from
advertising and subscriptions, and most of these accounts were
collected within 30 days. This accounts receivable collection rate
has been a valid factor used by many courts (particularly those
applying the Bardahl test 2 ), and the Tenth Circuit properly
noted its significance. However, other courts that have used this
factor in determining reasonable working capital requirements
have gone further in their analyses than did the Tenth Circuit.
They certainly have not decided cases relying on a simple state-
ment of the existence of this bare fact.
Thus Cheyenne's arguments for accumulations sufficient to
cover anticipated operating expenses for 6 months articulated
only the most speculative reasons for using this time period. Yet
with little more articulation of rationale, the Tax Court and the
Tenth Circuit, "on the basis of all the evidence," concluded that
accumulations for only 3-months operating expenses were allowa-
ble. Baldly stating that an accumulation of 3 months', as opposed
to 6 months', operating expenses is reasonable is as unacceptable
as stating that one year is per se not unreasonable.'" Yet in
Cheyenne the Tenth Circuit rejected that latter formulation and
contemporaneously utilized the former.' 4
When the question of what constitutes a reasonable amount
of working capital has arisen in other circuits in recent years, the
analyses used in resolving the issue have been quite different than
that used by the Tenth Circuit in Cheyenne.
The First Circuiit in Apollo Industries, Inc. v.
" See text accompanying notes 18-28 infra.
" The 1-year rule has been rejected by many courts as no more than a rule of thumb.
See, e.g., Hardin v. United States, 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972); The Shaw-Walker Co. v.
Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968); Coastal Casting Service, Inc. v. Phinney, 70-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9716 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Walton Mill, Inc., 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 75
(1972).
" 494 F.2d at 432-33.
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Commissioner,'5 the Fifth Circuit in Hardin v. United States,'"
and the Sixth Circuit in Shaw- Walker Co. v. Commissioner'7 all
have recognized the importance of making an indepth analysis of
a company's working capital needs before imposing a section 531
tax. The court in Shaw- Walker held it to be reversible error when
the Tax Court failed to make the necessary detailed analysis and
findings of fact relative to the anticipated needs of the taxpayer
for working capital in its normal business operations.
In Apollo, the First Circuit emphasized the need for a partic-
ular analysis of the corporation's working capital requirements:
We do not think that a summary view of the balance sheet, or
of working capital, or even of the amount of net liquid assets can give
a court enough of an appreciation of the real needs of a business for
operating funds. Business decisions are not made on the basis of
information collected at arbitrary dates. They take into account the
timing of needs and availability of resources. And so should judicial
attempts to deal justly with these decisions. But to ascertain such
needs and the resources available, we are required to go behind the
simple balance sheet presentation of assets and liabilities."
In determining what amount of working capital is reasonable
for a business, the above courts have all employed an operating
cycle concept as first enunciated by the Tax Court in Bardahl
Manufacturing Corp. '" The starting point under this approach is
a determination of the amount of net liquid assets available to
meet the reasonable needs of the business, which are considered
for this purpose to be the cost of operating the business during
one complete operating cycle plus appropriate amounts as may
be needed to meet any anticipated nonoperating expenses of the
business.20
An operating cycle of a business may be described as the time
period needed to convert cash into raw materials, raw materials
into finished goods, inventory into sales and accounts receivable,
and accounts receivable back into cash.21 Determination of the
length of an operating cycle for a business is based on the so-
called Bardahl formula. The formula consists of (a) an inventory
turnover period, computed by dividing the annual cost of goods
sold into the peak period (or average) inventory, and (b) an ac-
" 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966).
" 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972).
7 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968).
" 358 F.2d at 871.
1 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 1030 (1965).
Bardahl Int'l Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935 (1966).
21 Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1030 (1965).
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counts receivable turnover period, computed by dividing the an-
nual sales into the peak period (or average) accounts receivable.
These calculations produce two decimal figures, each represent-
ing part of a year, which when added together yield the average
length of an operating cycle expressed as a decimal part of a
year." This figure is then multiplied by the sum of the corpora-
tion's cost of goods sold and its operating expenses (excluding
noncash expenses such as depreciation) for the year in issue. The
result is the amount of cash needed to cover the reasonably-
anticipated costs of operating the business for a single operating
cycle.23
A comparison of this amount, plus any amounts needed for
other business purposes, with the net liquid assets of the corpora-
tion (i.e., current assets less current liabilities) will indicate
whether or not earnings are being accumulated unreasonably. For
example, if the figure produced by the operating cycle formula,
when added to provisions for other reasonably-anticipated busi-
ness needs, exceeds the net liquid assets of the corporation, then
the section 531 penalty tax may be imposed. If the figure for the
operating cycle plus amounts required for other business needs is
less than net liquid assets, then the corporation can reasonably
accumulate a portion of its annual earnings as working capital.
The formula's use is probably best suited to manufacturing
industries, but its application has been extended to service indus-
tries. When used in service industries a distorted picture of work-
ing capital requirements appears because of the calculation in the
formula for the inventory turnover rate.24 A service industry's
"inventory" and only real asset is its brainpower and the skills it
offers for hire. The lack of any substantial finished goods or raw
materials inventory yields a lower inventory turnover period and
consequently a lower figure for working capital as computed by
the formula than would result from an application of the formula
to a manufacturing concern with comparable working capital
needs.
Although this disparity precludes a rigid application of the
" Id. Some courts have suggested the use of a third element in the formula. This is
the accounts payable turnover period, computed by dividing annual purchases into aver-
age accounts payable. This figure should then be subtracted from the sum of the inventory
and accounts receivable turnover periods in arriving at the operating cycle expressed as a
decimal part of the year. See Bardahl Int'l Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935 (1966).
2 Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1030 (1965).
24 Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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formula to service industries, its use is not entirely inappropriate.
In Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States5 the district court com-
puted a working capital figure for a professional engineering serv-
ice company by first utilizing the Bardahl formula and then add-
ing to this figure 2-months' salary expense. The court found this
to be necessary and appropriate because of the high fixed costs
of the corporation. In other words, when business was slow, the
operating expenses remained constant as the salaries had to be
paid *2
Although the figures for application of the formula to Chey-
enne are not all available from the facts as reported by the court,
enough information exists to attempt an analysis using the
Bardahl method.
Average Inventory 7
(a) Average Inventory Turnover = Cost of Goods Sold
1965 1966 1967
91,735 .092 .093 30 .093
1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
(b) Average Accounts Receivable Turnover = Average Accounts ReceiSales
25 Id.
SId.
Assuming a decline in business for a quarter or more . . . it would be
foolhardy to have an abrupt reduction in force by discharging those highly
paid specialists already recruited and trained at considerable expense. In-
deed, its ability to recoup is dependent upon their continued availability.
Id. at 1007.
In computing the inventory turnover figure, "cost of operations" was used rather
than the "cost of goods sold." "Cost of goods sold" is a term more appropriate for a
manufacturing or retail business than for a service-related business such as a newspaper.
In any event, the cost of operations for a newspaper is an analogous figure to the cost of
goods sold for a manufacturing or retail concern, and its use here seems appropriate.
The average inventory (or average accounts receivable) is computed by dividing the
annual cost of inventory purchases by two. In Cheyenne the average inventory was ob-
tained by dividing the annual cost of newsprint purchases (which was said to be 15 percent
of the annual operating cost) by two.
The calculations use the average inventory figure rather than the peak period inven-
tory figure because the former is the only one available. In some businesses, however, the
peak period inventory figure is preferable, because
reasonably prudent businessmen, in considering the cash needs of a business
. . . . would take into consideration the fact that the business had peak
periods during the year when cash was tied up in inventory and receivables
for longer periods than usual, and would be justified in accumulating suffi-
cient net liquid assets to meet the needs of the business during this peak
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The facts necessary to calculate the accounts receivable
turnover period were not given in the opinion, but the court did
state that they were collected for the most part every 30 days,
implying an annual turnover rate of 12. This figure expressed as
a decimal is .083.
(c) Operating Cycle expressed in terms of a decimal part





(d) Working Capital = (Annual Operating Expenses +





The figures obtained vary somewhat from those arrived at by
the Tax Court ($310,000 for each tax year). However, a newspaper
is not totally a manufacturing business. It is both a service and a
product industry (that is, it has high fixed costs due to salary
payments). Using the reasoning of the court in Simons-Eastern,
to these figures should be added a certain amount for salary ex-
pense, plus any amount reasonably anticipated by Cheyenne to
be necessary for extraordinary expenses. How much should be
added would come from a more detailed analysis of Cheyenne's
expenses and needs.
The underlying purpose of the Bardahl formula is to provide
a yardstick against which to measure the judgment of the officers
and directors of the corporation in an effort to determine whether
their decision to retain earnings and profits . . . was influenced by
the desire to avoid a second tax on the corporate earnings at the
stockholder level.n
period, rather than just an average operating cycle. [This method] will
distort the picture of the cash needs of this business during most of the time,
but we cannot say that making provision for such a peak period would be
unreasonable or unlikely on the part of the officers and directors of this
corporation in determining the reasonable needs of its business.
Bardahl Int'l Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935, 945-46 (1966).
2Id. at 944.
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A major attractive feature of the formula method of determining
working capital is its objectivity, and yet "[lt has the advantage
of leaving room for consideration of many variables which may
be applicable to the particular corporate situation which many
so-called rules of thumb do not.""9 Businesses cannot operate in
an uncertain environment. Use of this formula would do much to
inject a little certainty into business decisions with respect to
accumulations of earnings. Determination of working capital
needs based upon the Bardahl formula "would not only go a long
way to dispose of the issues in the instant case but could be useful
to the legal and accounting professions as a future guide."
Utilization of the Bardahl approach in Cheyenne would
probably not have changed the result. The Tax Court noted that
a penalty tax would have been imposed on Cheyenne even if the
court had accepted Cheyenne's $620,000 figure for working capi-
tal. The imposition of the tax would have resulted from the rejec-
tion of Cheyenne's claims for credit for an offset press and for the
development of a Sunday edition. This comment contends that
the Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit erred not in their final
conclusions, but rather in their failure to make a more analytical
scrutiny of the relevant data to determine what would have been
a reasonable accumulation for working capital. The problem in
Cheyenne is the court's failure to articulate its standards for deci-
sion. One is left in the dark as to how the court related and
weighed the various facts before it to arrive at its conclusion. It
is in this situation where the Bardahl approach is superior.
Though the Bardahl formula has been criticized,3' it contin-
ues to be used by some courts. 2 While it may not provide a final
answer in every case, the formula should nonetheless be used as
2Id.
" Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197, 207 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957).
3, Livsey, A Proposed Operating Cycle Test for Sec. 531 Working Capital
Accumulations, 46 TAXES 648 (1968); Monyek, The Growing Problem of Accumulated
Earnings: Section 531 Today, 47 TAxEs 761 (1969).
2 Hardin v. United States, 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972). In Hardin the taxpayer
suggested a formula for working capital similar to that used by the taxpayer and the court
in Cheyenne. The Fifth Circuit said of this formula as compared to the operating cycle
formula:
We need not decide generally whether the operating cycle calculation
successfully urged by the Government is always necessarily preferable to any
other method for determining a corporation's reasonable business needs.
Whatever its merits in the abstract, the Government's approach to the prob-




a starting point in analyzing a company's working capital needs.
In summation, the Tenth Circuit should follow the other circuits
on this question and adopt the Bardahl formula not to sanctify
it, but as the beginning of a detailed analysis of a business' need
for working capital.
Phil McCarty
HI. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL
Weiszmann v. Commissioner
483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973)
Collateral estoppel is a procedural device which prevents a
litigant from receiving a new decision on the merits of issues
previously decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in a dif-
ferent action between the same parties.' The doctrine, a child of
res judicata,' promotes both the public interest in putting an end
to controversies between the same parties, 3 and the parties' inter-
est that "redundant litigation of . . . identical question[s]" be
avoided.' In Weiszmann v. Commissioner the taxpayer tried for
the second consecutive tax year to deduct as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses' costs which he incurred attending law
school while working for an oil company in a patent training
program. The Tenth Circuit held that the petitioner was collater-
ally estopped from relitigating the deductability of his legal edu-
cation expenses, regardless of the fact that the taxpayer's job
I RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942) (questions of fact); Scott, Collateral Estop-
pel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942) (questions of fact and questions of law);
Heckman, Collateral Estoppel as the Answer to Multiple Litigation Problems in Federal
Tax Law: Another View of Sunnen and The Evergreens, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 230
(1963) (questions of fact and of mixed law and fact).
2 Scott, supra note 1, at 1-3.
The segregation .of collateral estoppel as a separate concept (from res
judicatal is not a purely academic exercise. Collateral estoppel does not
prevent the second suit's being tried, nor does it bar relitigation of matters
which might have been decided in the first action [as does res judicata],
but only operates to prevent relitigation of those issues of fact or law which
were contested and decided in the first action and which were essential to
the judgment.
Note, Collateral Estoppel as to Questions of Law in Federal Tax Cases, 35 IOWA L. REV.
700, 701 n.1 (1950).
' Scott, supra note 1, at 1, 29.
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598-99 (1948).
5 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973), aff'g 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1201 (1972).
, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
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status had undergone a factual change since the previously-
litigated tax year. The contention is made herein that the court's
application of collateral estoppel to the part of the tax year which
occurred after the change in job status was incorrect, even though
the result reached (nondeductibility) was proper. In order to un-
derstand the criticisms made below, the reader must first under-
stand the nature of the educational expense deduction.
The deductibility of educational expenses requires the reso-
lution of a conflict between provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 which allow deduction, on the one hand, of ordinary
and necessary business expenses,7 and require inclusion, on the
other hand, of personals and capital' expenditures. 10 Because the
statutory sections in question provide so little guidance in the
matter, the applicable treasury regulations "take on added signif-
icance.""
For several tax years prior to 1968, either of two sets of regu-
lations was applicable to determine the deductibility of educa-
tional expenses under section 162(a). Under the old 1958 regula-
tions, a taxpayer could deduct his educational expenses only if
they were undertaken for the primary purpose of either (1) main-
taining or improving skills required in his employment or (2)
,Id.
Id. § 262.
1 Id. § 263(a). Several authors have suggested that professional educational expenses
should be treated as capital expenditures, amortizable against income tax liability over
some useful life. E.g., Heckerling, The Federal Taxation of Legal Education: Past, Pres-
ent, and Proposed, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 117 (1966); McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit
Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61
CALF. L. Rv. 1 (1973). It seems clear that such a privilege would have to be created by
legislative change rather than judicial flat. In D. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971), the taxpayer
argued that if his legal education expenses were not currently deductible, he should at
least have been allowed to capitalize and amortize them. The court responded to this
contention simply and succinctly: "There is no legal or factual support for this conten-
tion." Id. at 1362.
1* Heckerling, supra note 9, attributes the origins of this conflict to a statement by
Justice Cardozo in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1933):
[A] man conceives the notion that he will be able to practice his vocation
with greater ease and profit if he has an opportunity to enrich his culture
... . Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the goodwill
of an old partnership .... The money spent in acquiring them is well and
wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of the business.
Heckerling, supra note 9, at 120 (emphasis added by Heckerling) (footnote omitted). See
also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (1967).
D. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357, 1359 (1971).




meeting the express requirements of an employer or of an applica-
ble law or regulation for continuing in his position.'3 The expenses
were not deductible if the education was undertaken for the pri-
mary purpose of either (1) obtaining a new or a substantial ad-
vancement in position or (2) fulfilling general educational aspira-
tions."
In 1967,'1 new regulations were promulgated which replaced
the "subjective" test of the 1958 regulations with an "objective"
test of deductibility.'6 Under these now current regulations, edu-
cational expenses are deductible if the education (1) maintains
or improves skills required in the taxpayer's trade or business or
(2) meets the express requirements of the taxpayer's employer, or
an applicable law or regulation." However, educational expenses,
even those meeting the above criteria, are never deductible if the
education either (1) enables the taxpayer "to meet the minimum
educational requirements for qualification in his employment or
other trade or business," or (2) will lead to qualifying the tax-
payer in a new trade or business.'8
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 63.
" Id. § 1.162-5(b).
's T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CUM. BuLL. 36.
Is Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), (b) (1967). On the subjective-objective distinction,
compare R. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964) (claims adjuster for insurance
company entitled to deduct law school expenses under 1958 regulations, because his
primary purpose in attending law school was to maintain and improve skills required in
his job) with R. Connelly, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 376, afi'd, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9188 (lst Cir. 1971) (claims adjuster for insurance company not entitled to deduct law
school expenses, regardless of subjective intent, because the education qualified him for
a new trade of business. Baum was stated to have no precedential value because it was
decided under the old regulations.).
I7 Tress. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1967).
Id. § 1.162-5(b)(2), (3). The validity of the 1967 regulations has been challenged
and upheld. Melnik v. United States, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9521 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (the
regulations are said to be consistent with the statute and further validity is achieved
through legislative acquiescence); M. Taubman, 60 T.C. 814 (1973); D. Bodley, 56 T.C.
1357 (1971). Some taxpayers have advanced an equal protection argument against the
regulations on the grounds that teachers are treated far more favorably than other groups
(particularly law students). Compare, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i)(d) (1967) with
id. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), example (2). So far these arguments have been rejected. Weisz-
mann v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); M. Taubman, supra at
819; J. Lunsford, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 64 (1973); R. Connelly, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
376, aff'd, 1972-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 1 9188 (1st Cir. 1971); however, the taxpayer who is willing
to make a sufficient evidentiary showing of discrimination may yet prevail. Compare
Weiszmann, supra; Lunsford, supra; Connelly, supra (1st Cir.'s affirmance), where the
courts rejected the equal protection arguments on the merits, with Taubman, supra; Con-
nelly, supra (T.C. opinion), where the courts withheld judgment on the equal protection
argument pending a case in which a sufficient evidentiary showing was made. In
1975
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In 1968 the Commissioner announced that taxpayers could
rely on either the 1958 or the new regulations in computing their
income tax liability for tax years beginning prior to January 1,
1968.'1 Weiszmann was litigating deductibility of his law school
expenses in tax years 1965 and 1966, and consequently he was
entitled to make this election. 0
Under the 1967 regulations, expenses for legal education are
never deductible, because such education invariably leads to
qualifying the taxpayer in a new trade or business." Under the
1958 regulations the result is not automatic-some taxpayers
have been successful in showing a primary purpose for their law
school education other than obtaining substantial advancement
or meeting general aspirations." However, the majority of the
Taubman, the Tax Court referred to potential future disagreement with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Weiszmann opinion in stating that it considered the issue unresolved. Supra at 820
n.8.
1 Rev. Rul. 68-191, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 67.
Furthermore, he was not required to choose one regulation or the other in prosecut-
ing his case before the Tax Court. He was entitled to plead and argue deductibility under
both regulations, and he was entitled to the deduction if he could prove his case under
either. R. Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106, 1108 (1969), aff'd, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam).
21 Melnik v. United States, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9521 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (IRS agent);
D. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971)(electronics teacher/court constable); J. Weiler, 54 T.C. 398
(1970) (IRS agent); L. Bakken, 51 T.C. 603, 607 n.2 (1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.
1971) (weapons research engineer); J. Lunsford, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 64 (1973) (patent
examiner); C. Berry, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 465 (1971) (CPA) (taxpayer was held to be
entitled to the deduction under the 1958 regulations); R. Connelly, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 376, aff'd, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9188 (1st Cir. 1971) (insurance claims adjuster).
Possibly an exception to this general rule would arise where the taxpayer enrolled only in
those courses which would be particularly helpful to him in his trade or business, and not
in a full educational program leading to the award of the LL. B. or J.D. degree. Cf. D.
Morrison, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 745 (1970) (taxpayer not entitled to deduct his law school
expenses under 1958 regulations when he could have enrolled only in specific courses
helpful to him in his trade, but instead enrolled in full law school curriculum).
" Welsh v. United States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964) (IRS agent); Campbell v.
United States, 250 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Penn. 1966) (forensic pathologist); Williams v.
United States, 238 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (IBM patent trainee required to attend
law school as a condition to the retention of his employment). An opposite result was
reached in another case involving taxpayers in the same program, 0. Lamb, 46 T.C. 539
(1966), and the Williams decision was severely criticised in both Lamb and Rombach v.
United States, 440 F.2d 1356, 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1971)); C. Berry, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 465
(1971) (CPA); F. Kilgannon, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 619 (1965) (accountant); M. Schultz,
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1372 (1964) (IRS agent); W. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420
(1964) (CPA); R. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964) (insurance claims adjuster);
W. Brennan, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1222 (1963) (IRS examiner/reviewer); D. Frazee, 22
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963) (Air Force "Maintenance Program Control Officer" whose




contests between the government and taxpayers on the deducti-
bility of law school expenses have been decided in favor of the
Commissioner-the taxpayer's primaryl purpose is usually held
to be qualifying for a new trade or business 4 rather than meeting
express requirements of an employer or maintaining or improving
skills.25
2 The requirement of a primary purpose gives rise to the "dual purpose" doctrine.
Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958), rev'g 27 T.C. 624 (1956) (the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Raum in the Tax Court decision is adopted in full by the Second
Circuit). In Marlor the petitioner, a college tutor, was said to have two purposes in getting
his advanced degree: (1) it was a requirement for maintaining his position as a teacher;
(2) it was a minimum requirement for appointment to permanent teaching staff. Judge
Raum, dissenting from the Tax Court decision (and subsequently affirmed on appeal),
found that the taxpayer's "much more immediate objective," 27 T.C. at 626, was to retain
his position as a tutor.
The same reasoning was applied in Williams v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 351
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), where the petitioner was an IBM "patent trainee" who was required to
attend law school as a condition to the retention of his employment. The court found that
his primary purpose was to retain his position as a trainee.
The reasoning of Williams was rejected in Rombach v. United States, 440 F.2d 1356
(Ct. Cl. 1971), a case involving a similar patent training program. Rombach distinguished
the patent trainee situation from the Marlor situation on the grounds that a patent trainee
is trying to obtain a new status as a patent attorney, while in Marlor the taxpayer was
simply trying to retain his status as a teacher.
24 Rombach v. United States, 440 F.2d 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (patent chemist required
to attend law school); N. Baker, 51 T.C. 243 (1968) (administrative assistant in construc-
tion business-legal education undertaken "primarily for personal reasons"); 0. Lamb,
46 T.C. 539 (1966) (IBM patent trainee required to attend law school); D. Roeberg, 29
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1007 (1970) (CPA); J. Williams, jr., 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 853 (1970)
(IRS officer); D. Morrison, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 745 (1970) (engineer engaged in some
contract supervisory work); M. Helms, Jr., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1020 (1968) (aeronauti-
cal engineer engaged in some administrative work involving legal matters); J. Martin, Jr.,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 982 (1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (peti-
tioner was in law school for 11/2 years before joining Patent Office as a patent examiner;
R. Montgomery, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 599 (1964) (patent searcher required to attend
law school); J. Lezdey, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 485 (1964) (patent "agent"); G. Gulbran-
son, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1022 (1963) (real estate assistant); D. Pfeffer, 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mei. 785 (1963) (patent liaison); J. Condit, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1306 (1962), aff'd,
329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964) (administrative assistant in construction business); J. Engel,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962) (IRS field agent); R. Hines, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1028 (1961), aff'd sub norm. Sandt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962) (patent
chemist required to attend law school); B. Sandt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 913 (1961), affd,
Sandt v. Commissioner, supra (patent chemist required to attend law school); L. Aronin,
20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 909 (1961) (NLRB field examiner).
' Some cases turned not on the finding of a bad primary purpose, but rather on the
lack of any qualifying purpose on the part of the taxpayer in undertaking the education.
Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (practicing accountant did not
show sufficient proximate relationship between skills acquired in law school and skills
required in accounting practice); N. Baker, 51 T.C. 243 (1968) (law school education would
be "helpful" to virtually anyone in business-in case of administrative assistant in con-
struction business, legal education was not sufficiently related to required job skills to
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In the initial litigation between Weiszmann and the IRS, R.
Weiszmann,8 the taxpayer contended that he was entitled to
deduct his law school expenses for the tax year 1965. Weiszmann
had taken a job with Marathon Oil Company as a patent trainee
after his 1964 graduation from the Colorado School of Mines.
"His duties were to conduct literature searches in the field of
chemistry, draft patent applications, and prepare amendments
for patent applications for the attorneys of Marathon's patent
department." He was further required to attend law school on a
fulltime basis. It was understood that the position of patent
trainee was a temporary one only. Upon graduation from law
school Weiszmann would become a patent attorney, either stay-
ing with Marathon in such capacity or, more likely, seeking such
employment elsewhere. Marathon's patent attorneys, as opposed
to its patent trainees, worked under little supervision, drafted
contracts, negotiated licenses, and made substantially more
money than did patent trainees. After his graduation from law
school in 1967, Weiszmann took a position with Chevron Research
Company as a patent attorney.
On the issue of deduction under the 1958 regulations, the
court found 0. Lamb28 to be controlling. In that case a patent
trainee for IBM was held not to be entitled to a deduction for legal
education expenses, because he undertook the training program
for the primary purpose of going to law school and becoming a
patent attorney. Similarly, in this case, the court stated:
[Ilt is impossible to conclude that the petitioner expended a great
deal of time and money to obtain a law degree simply for the purpose
of either maintaining his job skills or his position as a patent trainee.
It seems evident to us that his primary purpose was to improve his
position by becoming a patent attorney .... [Tihe petitioner's
primary purpose for undertaking a legal education did not lie in his
desire to continue working for Marathon as a patent trainee.
2'
Thus the court decided that Weiszmann's law school expenses
were not deductible under the 1958 regulations because a patent
trainee would not go to such lengths to maintain or improve his
make the expenses of acquiring the education deductible) (Drennen, J., concurring); A.
Spitaleri, 32 T.C. 988 (1959) (accountant); R. Paulson, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 246 (1970)
(engineer and cost analyst); W. Rylaarsdam, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 707 (1966) ("contract
coordinator").
- 52 T.C. 1106 (1969), aff'd 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971).
52 T.C. at 1107.
46 T.C. 539 (1966).
2 52 T.C. at 1109 (emphasis added).
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job skills or to meet the requirements of retaining his job.
Under the 1967 regulations, the taxpayer contended that he
had met the minimum educational requirements for his job as a
"patent professional" when he became a patent trainee. The
court quite properly rejected this argument since law school led
to qualifying the petitioner in a new trade or business-that of a
lawyer °.3 Education which leads one to qualify in a new trade or
business is never deductible under the objective test of the 1967
regulations.
3 '
In the second Weiszmann 31 decision ( Weiszmann I/), the tax-
payer contended that he was entitled to deduct his legal educa-
tion expenses for 1966. The only difference between the previous
tax year and the one in issue was that the petitioner had become
a registered patent agent in May 1966.
A patent agent is a person who has been admitted to practice before
the United States Patent Office. Such admission to practice . . .
requires proof of technical training and experience, and passage of
a requisite examination. A patent agent can represent clients in all
matters before the United States Patent Office.Y
A patent attorney, on the other hand, can represent clients not
only before the Patent Office, but also in legal matters outside the
province of the Patent Office.
34
Citing Commissioner v. Sunnen,5 the Tax Court held that
Weiszmann was collaterally estopped from relitigating the de-
ductibility of his law school expenses for the part of the year prior
to May. However, the petitioner's change of job status in May
changed a "controlling fact" and made collateral estoppel inappl-
icable to the second part of 1966.
On the merits, the court held that, under the reasoning of
Weiszmann I, petitioner was not entitled to a deduction under the
1958 regulations:
Both petitioner and Marathon recognized that petitioner's employ-
ment in either the capacity of patent trainee or patent agent was
only temporary. Once petitioner obtained his law degree he would
See authorities cited note 21 supra.
" The Ninth Circuit's affirmance adds nothing to the opinion of the Tax Court except
for an express rejection of Weiszmann's equal protection argument.
12 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1201 (1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973).
31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1203; see generally 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.341-48 (1974).
"Id.
" 333 U.S. 591 (1948). See generally text accompanying notes 39-57 infra.
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either become a patent attorney with Marathon or he would seek
such a position elsewhere3
The court clearly felt that a new decision on the merits was re-
quired because of petitioner's change in status from patent
trainee to patent agent. As to deductibility under the 1967 regula-
tions, the court simply noted again that the legal education quali-
fied Weiszmann for a new trade or business.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the result reached by the Tax
Court, but did so in part on different grounds.37 The affirmance
agreed that Weiszmann was collaterally estopped as to the first
part of the tax year, but also felt that he was collaterally estopped
as to the second part:
[Tihe fact that Weiszmann's status changed from patent trainee
to patent agent was not a change which materially altered his status
as a taxpayer insofar as relates [sic] to the deductibility of his legal
education expenses. Whether or not he was a patent trainee or a
patent agent, he nevertheless had as his primary purpose in attend-
ing law school the object of becoming a patent attorney ....
[Tihe relevant facts . . . essential to judgment were "actually liti-
gated and determined in the first tax proceeding," and "the parties
are bound by that determination in a subsequent proceeding..."
Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 . . . (1948). In sum, the relevant
facts in the two proceedings are indistinguishable, the legal issues
therein were identical, and the situation was not altered between the
time of the first judgment and the second. Mr. Weiszmann is there-
fore collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue3
Thus the court indicated its belief that petitioner's change in
status from patent trainee to patent agent was not a significant
change for purposes of collateral estoppel.
The court's application of collateral estoppel to the post-
patent-agent part of tax year 1966 is incorrect for two reasons: (1)
the change in taxpayer's status was a change in a controlling fact
which renders collateral estoppel inapplicable; (2) to apply collat-
eral estoppel in this case is contrary to some well-established
principles governing the application of the doctrine where the
intent of the taxpayer is at issue.
The landmark case in the application of collateral estoppel
to federal income tax issues is Commissioner v. Sunnen,"9 in
31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1205 (emphasis added).
a 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 819-20.
333 U.S. 591 (1948). The pre-Sunnen history of collateral estoppel in the Supreme
Court can be briefly summarized as follows: In Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351
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which the substantive issue was petitioner's tax liability under
assignment-of-income principles." Sunnen had assigned several
royalty contracts to his wife, who had received substantial
amounts of income therefrom. The Commissioner contended that
Sunnen was taxable on all the income which his wife had received
pursuant to these contracts. In a decision involving an earlier tax
year,4' the Board of Tax Appeals had had one of the assignments
before it (the "1928 agreement") and had held against the Com-
missioner's contention that Sunnen should have been taxed on
the income his wife had earned from the contract. In Sunnen, the
Supreme Court held that the previous decision did not collater-
ally estop the Commissioner from relitigating petitioner's tax lia-
bility on either the 1928 agreement or the non-1928 agreements.
The Court began its opinion by reciting the traditional dis-
tinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel.42 The Court
then focused specifically on federal income tax matters.
(1877), the Court recognized the distinction between res judicata, which operates as a bar
or a merger preventing relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties
regardless of either party's failure to raise a particular claim or defense in the previous
litigation, and collateral estoppel. The latter bars relitigation only of those issues actually
raised, controverted, and decided between the same parties in a previous litigation. See
Note, supra note 2. In New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.S. 371 (1897), the Court, in
a state taxation case, held that each tax year presented a new cause of action to which
collateral estoppel, rather than res judicata, was applicable. In the same year the Court
announced that the purpose of the rule was to further "the very object for which civil
courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the
settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the
maintenance of social order." Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897).
Tait v. Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933), reaffirmed the principle that each tax year
presents a different cause of action, making collateral estoppel rather than res judicata
applicable, and first applied the doctrine to a federal tax case. In Blair v. Commissioner,
300 U.S. 5 (1937), the Court decided that an intervening change in state law (as settled
by a state court decision) was a sufficient change in the "situation" to prevent the opera-
tion of collateral estoppel. Id. at 9.
A more detailed history of the pre-Sunnen case law can be found in Note, supra note
2. See also Heckman, supra note 1.
,0 It has for a long time been well established that a taxpayer can
not avoid the tax on income by assigning the right to receive it without the
transfer of the property from which such right arises.
2 J. MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 18.02 (J. Malone ed. rev. 1967)
(footnote omitted). On assignment-of-income doctrine generally, see id. §§ 18.01-.15.
J. Sunnen, 1935 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 35,211.
" The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving
the same cause of action. . . .[W]hen a court of competent jurisdiction has
entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to
the suit and their privies are thereafter bound "not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but




These same concepts [of res judicata and collateral estoppel]
are applicable in the federal income tax field. Income taxes are
levied on an annual basis. Each year is the origin of a new liability
and of a separate cause of action. Thus if a claim of liability or non-
liability relating to a particular tax year is litigated, a judgment on
the merits is res judicata as to any subsequent proceeding involving
the same claim and the same tax year. But if the later proceeding
is concerned with a similar or unlike claim relating to a different tax
year, the prior judgment acts as a collateral estoppel only as to those
matters in the second proceeding which were actually presented and
determined in the first suit ...
* * * A taxpayer may secure a judicial determination of a partic-
ular tax matter, a matter which may recur without substantial vari-
ation for some years thereafter. But a subsequent modification of the
significant facts or a change or development in the controlling legal
principles may make that determination obsolete or erroneous, at
least for future purposes. . . .[Collateral estoppel] is designed to
prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been de-
cided and which have remained substantially static, factually and
legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have
become obsolete or erroneous with time, thereby causing inequities
among taxpayers."3
The Court reiterated that collateral estoppel is applicable only
"where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain
unchanged,"" and only where "the second proceeding . . .
involve[s] the same set of events or documents and the same
bundle of legal principles that contributed to the rendering of the
first judgment."45 "[If the relevant facts in the two cases are
separable, even though they be similar or identical, collateral
estoppel does not govern the legal issues which recur in the second
case."" The Court then turned to the agreements at issue.
As to the 1928 agreement, the Court found that there had
been a significant change in the "legal climate"47 governing
assignment-of-income issues since the BTA had rendered its ear-
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a differ-
ent cause or demand, the principle of res judicata is applied much more
narrowly. In this situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined,
but "only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered."








Her decision. If the BTA had had the current rules before it when
it rendered its decision, it "might well have produced a different
result."4 This change in legal climate was sufficient to prevent
application of collateral estoppel.' 9
As for the agreements which had not been previously liti-
gated, the Court found that "even though those contracts [were]
identical in all important respects with the 1928 contract . . .
and even though the issue as to those contracts [was] the same
as that raised by the 1928 contract,"50 collateral estoppel was not
applicable. "For income tax purposes, what is decided as to one
contract is not conclusive as to any other contract which is not
then in issue, however similar or identical it may be." 5'
Sunnen holds that where the relevant facts are separable,
collateral estoppel does not apply.5" "Separable" does not mean
distinguishable as to legal relevance, for the Court stated clearly
that even if the non-1928 contracts had been identical to the 1928
agreement, collateral estoppel would still not have been applied.
"Separable" must then mean distinguishable in form, regardless
of substance.
Furthermore, if the Court is to be consistent, "relevant" facts
must be the same as "controlling" facts, for it is changes in such
facts which the Court states to be preclusive of collateral estop-
pel.53 A controlling fact is obviously not a fact which, if changed,
would cause the present court to reach a different verdict on the
merits than did the previous court. If a court must determine the
merits before knowing whether or not to apply the procedural bar
of collateral estoppel, the doctrine serves no useful purpose.' Nei-
ther is a controlling fact properly defined as one which, if altered,
" Id. at 607.
" The concept that collateral estoppel should not apply in tax cases where the law
governing a previous decision undergoes significant change seems to have been first intro-
duced by Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320, 1357-58 (1937),
cited with approval in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 602 (1948).
" 333 U.S. at 602.
" Id.
52 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
' Compare text accompanying note 46 supra with text accompanying note 44 supra.
Compare Comment, Res Judicata-Federal Tax Litigation-Collateral Estoppel
Inapplicable After an Intervening Change of Law, 1 STAN. L. Rav. 162 (1948). The author
of the comment contends that the effect of Sunnen is to confine the operation of collateral
estoppel to "cases in which the court would reach the same result without it." Id. at 168.
As a result, "collateral estoppel becomes worse than empty form." Id. The author recom-
mends abolishing the doctrine from application in federal tax cases.
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would definitely have led the previous court to a different result.5
The second court cannot usually be positive of which facts led the
court to reach its result. A controlling fact is correctly defined as
a fact which the second court can say might have altered the
result in the previous case had the fact been changed:
The possibility of a different verdict because of the introduction of
evidentiary facts different from those before a court and jury in a
prior case is sufficient to surmount the danger of collateral estoppel
in an income tax situation. The new evidence need not positively
change the character of the case. It need only change the complexion
of the significant facts presented to the jury.1"
To sum up the rule for purposes of examining the Weiszmann
II opinion, Sunnen held that where a court was presented with an
issue which had previously been litigated between the same par-
ties,57 it could apply the procedural bar of collateral estoppel to
avoid having to make a redetermination of the same issue. How-
ever, if any of the facts which were before the previous court and
which, if changed, might have produced a different result, have
changed so as to be distinguishable in form, then collateral estop-
pel is inapplicable.
In Weiszmann I the issue was the taxpayer's primary purpose
for attending law school-a question of intent. It was inconceiva-
ble to the Tax Court that a person would expend "a great deal of
time and money to obtain a law degree simply for the purpose of
either maintaining his job skills or his position as a patent
trainee.'5 8 In Weiszmann II the taxpayer's status had changed
from patent trainee to patent agent, the latter being entitled to
represent persons in all matters before the United States Patent
Office.5 9 Because the issue and the parties were the same, the
" One must be careful to distinguish between "ultimate" facts and "controlling"
facts. The former are facts upon the occurrence of which the right or duty in question
arises. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944). "Controlling" facts are the
"mediate data," id., "from whose existence may be rationally inferred the existence" of
an ultimate fact. Id. at 928. It is upon ultimate facts that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
operates. Id. It is the similar occurrence of mediate data which gives rise to the doctrine.
See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 F.2d 591, 601 (1948).
m Parker v. Westover, 221 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1955); compare text accompanying
note 48 supra.
"7 No issue with respect to the necessity for a final judgment arises here. Compare
United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953), where the Court held that
collateral estoppel was inapplicable where the previous judgment rested on a "pro forma
acceptance" of the Commissioner's stipulation.
- 52 T.C. 1106, 1109 (1969); text accompanying note 29 supra.
51 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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collateral estoppel issue was properly raised under Sunnen. As to
the part of the tax year before Weiszmann's job status had
changed, collateral estoppel was properly applied. As to the latter
part of the tax year, Weiszmann's change in job status was a
change in fact properly said to be severable-distinguishable in
form.60 Hence the Sunnen exception was applicable if job status
was a "controlling" fact before the first court.
As noted in the quotation above, the first Tax Court decision
was premised on Weiszmann's status as a patent trainee. A
change in that status would not have altered the court's decision
as to the taxpayer's lack of a primary purpose to meet the require-
ments of his employer for retention of his job-whether Weisz-
mann was a patent trainee or a patent agent the job was strictly
temporary. However, it is certainly less "impossible to
conclude" 6' that a person would go to law school to improve his
skills as a patent agent than it is to conclude that he would do so
to improve his skills as a patent trainee. Thus, the change in
status might have affected the court's determination as to Weisz-
mann's primary purpose with respect to maintaining or improv-
ing job skills. Consequently collateral estoppel should not have
been applicable to bar Weiszmann from litigating the deductibil-
ity of his law school expenses.
The only explanation the Tenth Circuit gave for rejecting the
change in facts as a grounds for making collateral estoppel in-
applicable is as follows:
[Tihe fact that Weiszmann's status changed from patent trainee
to patent agent was not a change which materially altered his status
as a taxpayer insofar as relates to the deductibility of his legal edu-
cation expenses. Whether or not he was a patent trainee or a patent
agent, he nevertheless had as his primary purpose in attending law
school the object of becoming a patent attorney .... 2
The first sentence promises a discussion of the "controlling fact"
issue, yet the second sentence resolves the issue by way of conclu-
sion rather than rationale. Worse still the conclusion goes not to
the larger issue of deductibility, but rather applies simply to the
sought-to-be-litigated issue of primary purpose. Thus in reality
the court has not applied collateral estoppel to come to a decision
Cf. R. Weiszmann, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1201, 1203 (1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 817
(10th Cir. 1973), where the Tax Court carefully distinguished between a patent trainee
and a patent atorney, and a patent agent and a patent attorney.
S, 52 T.C. 1106, 1109 (1969).
62 483 F.2d at 819-20.
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on the petitioner's overall case; to the contrary, it has reached a
decision on the merits with respect to the issue which the tax-
payer sought to litigate. Having reached this decision on the mer-
its, the court then applied the collateral estoppel rule to avoid
having to render a decision on the merits. This non sequitur fol-
lows unavoidably from the court's failure to clearly discern that
a controlling fact is one which might have been determinative
before the prior court, not one which is determinative before the
second court.
Perhaps the Tenth Circuit was taking a different approach.
Perhaps the court meant to say that, for purposes of applying the
1958 regulations, the taxpayer's primary purpose was to be ascer-
tained as of the time he entered law school. The deductibility of
all his law school expenses was to be governed by his intent at
that crucial date. The first Tax Court decision determined that
intent, and subsequent events are irrelevant since they cannot
vary such a determination. Such an interpretation would make
the opinion facially more logical, but would probably also make
the opinion inconsistent with precedent.
Case authorities speaking directly to the issue of when intent
is to be measured for purposes of the educational expense deduc-
tion are conflicting. 3 However, the Tenth Circuit has ruled by
way of inference that even a prior determination of intent to make
a gift could be relitigated if new facts appeared. 4 This is espe-
cially significant since the actual intent involved would never
change-only the evidence tending to establish it would vary.
Proceeding from this opinion, the Tenth Circuit has also ruled
that a finding of lack of intent to create a valid family partner-
ship65 barred relitigation of the same issue unless new facts were
alleged. The conjunction of these cases gives rise to a rule that
63 Compare 0. Lamb, 46 T.C. 539 (1966) (implying intent could change during law
school attendance) and J. Martin, Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 982 (1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d
35 (4th Cir. 1966) (implying intent could change), with R. Jones, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
866 (1970) (stating that the proper time to measure intent is when taxpayer first embarks
upon the course of legal education).
11 Gillespie v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 839
(1946).
a Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), held that the controlling issue
in whether family partnerships would be regarded as valid for federal income tax purposes
was whether or not each member of the purported partnership had a bona fide intent to
be a partner in the business. The opinion did not say specifically when that intent was to
be measured (i.e., upon formation or during each separate tax year).
" Jones v. Trapp, 186 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1950), quoting with approval from Gillespie
v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1945).
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whether a previously-determined intent is static (as in the gift
case) or varies from year to year (as in the family partnership
case), the previous decision will collaterally estop the parties from
relitigating the issue of intent only if no new facts are alleged."7
No circuit has taken the position that would be necessary to
explain the decision reached in Weiszmann //-that once intent
is determined it cannot thereafter be relitigated even if new evi-
dence is produced."8
Thus Weiszmann was entitled to a redetermination of his
intent (his "primary purpose") if he could allege any new facts
having a bearing on that intent." As discussed above, 0 a change
1, Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973), cited by the court in Weiszmann II as authority, is not to the contrary. Jones
simply held that where the meaning of a contract had been previously determined, the
taxpayer was collaterally estopped from relitigating the meaning of the contract. The only
"new" evidence which the petitioner wanted to produce was (1) evidence which had been
ruled inadmissible at the first trial because improperly presented, and (2) evidence on
which the petitioner had testified at the first trial but which was now more important
because backed up by certain facts. As to the first type of evidence, the court stated that
the taxpayer had had her day in court. As to the second type, the court said that there is
a distinction between new evidence and evidence previously offered which is later entitled
to more weight. The former may bar collateral estoppel, the latter does not. A change of
stress to be placed on facts is not a modification of those facts.
u E.g., Koch v. United States, 457 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1972) (jury verdict that taxpayer
was in the business of selling real estate during certain tax years was relevant to, but not
conclusive of, the same issue in later tax years); Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d
266 (7th Cir. 1965) (each tax year gives rise to a new issue of intent to carry on a business
as partners to which collateral estoppel is inapplicable); Thomas v. Commissioner, 324
F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1963) (finding that taxpayer intended to operate his farm as a business
in 1955 was not conclusive of the same issue in later tax years); Jackson v. King, 223 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1955) (determination that taxpayer was in the business of selling houses in
1945 was not conclusive of the same intent in 1946 and 1947, because different houses were
involved); Parker v. Westover, 221 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1955) (collateral estoppel inapplica-
ble to previously-determined issue of intent to create a family partnership where, inter
alia, new evidence had become available since the previous trial). Compare Murray v.
United States, 426 F.2d 376 (Ct. Cl. 1970), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973) (taxpayer
contended that he was no longer in the business of selling real estate, although a previous
court decision had established that he was so engaged in business at the time he entered
into the section 453 installment sale in issue. Taxpayer argued that later payments re-
ceived under the installment contract should be treated as capital gains rather than
ordinary income, since he was no longer in the business of selling real estate. The couit
held that his change of business was irrelevant, since section 453 altered only the timing
and not the characterization of the gain. Thus the only important intent was that which
had existed at the time taxpayer entered into the contract). See also Griswold, supra note
49, at 1357.
0 Even if precedent were totally lacking, it would be specious to argue that a tax-
payer's primary purpose with respect to education could not change. The nature of the
deduction is for ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred "during the
taxable year." INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). The Commissioner chose to define an
educational expense as a business expense if the taxpayer had the requisite intent. Treas.
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in status from patent trainee to patent agent could have had a
substantial bearing on the taxpayer's intent to maintain or im-
prove skills required in his job. Weiszmann was entitled to a
determination of this intent on the merits. Collateral estoppel
was improperly applied to prevent him from receiving such a
decision.
In Weiszmann II an overburdened" court was faced with a
taxpayer who for the second sucessive tax year was trying to
deduct the expenses of his legal education. He raised an issue
which had been dealt with repeatedly by other courts, and which
had been decided adversely to taxpayers in all but one severely-
criticized instance." Understandably but incorrectly the court
collaterally estopped the petitioner from getting a new decision
on the merits with respect to the issue he raised. An appropriate
question is why.
If the court was interested in saving judicial time, it had a
number of other alternatives available to it. A simple adoption
of the well-written Tax Court memorandum opinion would have
sufficed.13 If the court felt that the difference in facts between
Weiszmann I and Weiszmann II was insignificant and the desira-
bility of consistency of decision was great, it could have applied
the doctrine of stare decisis.1' Finally, since it came to a conclu-
Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 63. To be consistent with the statute, the
regulation must refer to a primary purpose existing "during the taxable year." Surely if
the intent changes from year to year, so does the deduction.
Imagine how chafed the Commissioner would be in the following hypothetical situa-
tion: An IRS agent started law school with the clearly-established single purpose of im-
proving his skills as an IRS agent. This hypothetical agent had stated on innumerable
occasions how despicable he thought lawyers were, and how he would never even think of
becoming one himself. After 6 weeks in law school the agent changed his mind and clearly
demonstrated his intent to become a lawyer. Nevertheless, the Tax Court allows him to
deduct all his educational expenses because he started law school with a proper primary
purpose.
7 Text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
"' See introduction to this issue at 6-8.
7 See authorities cited notes 22 & 24 supra, especially those noted therein as concern-
ing various kinds of patent trainees.
71 Such a procedure was in fact utilized by the court in Glasgow v. Commissioner,
486 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1973) (see Taxation Overview infra at 239 n.5).
71 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948) (If controlling facts are severa-
ble, the court may reexamine the issue and either arrive at "a different result, or if
consistency in decision is considered just and desirable, reliance may be placed upon the
ordinary rule of stare decisis."); Journal-Tribune Publ. Co. v. Commissioner, 348 F.2d 266
(8th Cir. 1965) (previous determination of deductibility of business expenses inapplicable
where different purchases were involved-stare decisis invoked in lieu of collateral estop-
pel); Bryan v. United-States, 319 F.2d 880 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (previous decision on the defini-
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sion on the merits anyway,75 the court could easily have written
a brief rationale on the merits as well, drawing from the previous
Weiszmann opinions.
The court's choice to forego these alternatives is disturbing
insofar as it may represent a step away from the well-established
principle that collateral estoppel is to be narrowly applied in tax
cases 76--"collateral estoppel must be used with its limitation
carefully in mind so as to avoid injustice. 7 7 It is contended here
that the court failed to properly so observe the limitations of the
doctrine. Although injustice was avoided in this case-the tax-
payer rightly lost his case-the court may not be so fortunate the
next time it denies a taxpayer the benefit of a fully-reasoned
decision on the merits.
James D. Butler
tion of "property" as applied to taxpayer's lands for purposes of depletion allowance
inapplicable where different lands were involved-stare decisis invoked in lieu of collateral
estoppel).
7' Text accompanying note 62 supra.
o Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
7 Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 913




Among the labor law cases decided last term by the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was that of Satterwhite v. United
Parcel Service, Inc. I In that case the plaintiff employees, after
losing in arbitration, brought an action under section 16(b) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act' for overtime compensation. The Tenth
Circuit decided against the employees, holding that when a wage
dispute is submitted to arbitration in accordance with the provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement, the employees may not
thereafter maintain a Fair Labor Standards Act suit for recovery
on the basis of the same factual occurrence as that presented to
the arbitrator. In other words, resolution of this kind of wage
claim by an arbitrator is dispositive of a statutory claim under
section 16(b) of the Act. The Satterwhite case is commented on
more extensively below.
In the second comment of this section the Tenth Circuit's
decision in NLRB v. Serv-AUI Co.3 is analyzed. In that case the
affected union had filed an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain charge4
against the employer for its alleged refusal to execute a contract
with that union. The National Labor Relations Board found an
8(a)(5) violation in terms of repeated occurrences of the em-
ployer's refusal to execute a contract with the union. The Tenth
Circuit reversed the Board, holding that the unfair labor practice
complaint was barred by the Labor-Management Relations Act
section 10(b) statute of limitations.'
Two additional labor law cases are noted here briefly. In
Bill's Coal Co. v. NLRB,6 the employer had made extreme anti-
union statements in an attempt to oppose the unionization of his
plant, and, at about the same time, had laid off nine employees
who had signed union cards. The Tenth Circuit upheld the
Board's finding of an 8(a)(1) interference violation by the em-
ployer, but reversed the finding of an 8(a)(3) discrimination to
discourage membership violation.' The Tenth Circuit's reversal
1 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
3 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
Id. § 160(b).
493 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1974).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
Id. § 158(a)(3).
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of the finding of an 8(a) (3) violation was based on the ground that
the Board's finding of a discriminatory layoff did not find sub-
stantial support in the record.
Gordon v. Laborers' International Union of North America'
presented the Tenth Circuit with a consolidated appeal from sev-
eral lower court suits. In the facts of the case the International
Union had imposed a trusteeship upon one of its locals because
of the local's independent action in bargaining on its own and
signing an agreement with the employer group in violation of the
constitution of the International. The local's independent action
was due to its discontent with the representation scheme for the
District Counsel which had been set up as the unitary bargaining
committee to negotiate with the designated employer association.
The Tenth Circuit here upheld the imposition of a trusteeship by
the International on the grounds that it was proper under the
provisions of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act.' 0 In addition, the court held that section 101 of
that Act," which gives every member of a labor organization
equal rights and privileges of participation was inapplicable to
international or intermediate bodies such as the District Counsel.
Therefore, the court concluded that the imposition of a propor-
tional representation system upon the District Counsel, as re-
quested by the local, was not mandated by the Act.
I. ARBITRATION AND THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO SUE:
ALTERNATIVE OR PARALLEL REMEDIES
Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974)
Following the arbitrator's decision that the employee's dis-
charge was for cause, the employee sued under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.' In a per
curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding that an employee who volun-
tarily submitted a grievance based on racial discrimination to
final and binding arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment was precluded from maintaining a court action on the same
1 490 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1974)
(No. 73-1821).
"0 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66 (1970).
Id. § 411.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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issue.2 In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Gardner-
Denver, finding the employee's statutory right to a trial de novo
under Title VII not foreclosed by prior submission to arbitration. 3
At the time of the Supreme Court's reversal of Gardner-
Denver, Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc., was pending
before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The contro-
versy in Satterwhite concerned elimination by the employer of
two 15-minute coffee breaks a day. The collective bargaining
agreement between the employer, United Parcel Service, Inc.,
and the union5 did not specifically cover coffee breaks but did
provide for a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitra-
tion.' The employees grieved the elimination of coffee breaks,
seeking compensation at one and one-half times the hourly wage
for the extra half-hour a day worked in lieu of coffee breaks. On
submission to arbitration, the arbitrator held that the company
could not unilaterally eliminate the paid coffee breaks, awarded
the extra half-hour a day compensation to the employees, and, in
a supplemental decision, directed that the payment be at straight
time rather than at time and one-half.
7
Fifty-nine employees then brought suit under section 16(b)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for payment at time and
one-half, in accordance with section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA which
provides pay for work in excess of 40 hours a week at one and one-
half times the straight rate.8 Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act provides employees with the statutory right to recover
for violations by employers of the wages and hours provisions of
the FLSA by bringing an action in any court of competent juris-
diction.' The district court dismissed the employee's action on
the basis of the court of appeals' decision in Gardner-Denver. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the judgment against the em-
ployees, stating that prior submission of the wage claim to bind-
ing arbitration precluded a suit under section 16(b) of the FLSA.10
2 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
3 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
£ 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974).
Delivery Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 435.
The agreement provided that the arbitrator's award would be binding and conclu-
sive unless it was beyond the jurisdiction given the arbitrator by the agreement. No claim
was made in this case that the award exceeded jurisdictional limits.
496 F.2d at 449.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1970).
Id. § 216(b).
496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974).
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I. FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
The appellants in Satterwhite argued that the Supreme
Court's decision in Gardner-Denver secured their statutory right
to bring suit in federal court irrespective of prior submission to
arbitration." This assertion raised the most controversial issue
posed by the Supreme Court opinion: Did Gardner-Denver open
the doors of the courts to independent adjudication of already
arbitrated issues on the basis of statutory rights? 2
The Tenth Circuit refused to attach a broad, inclusive read-
ing to the Court's preservation of the statutory right to sue in
Title VII actions. Instead, the court relied on Gardner-Denver's
reaffirmation of the federal policy favoring arbitration as deter-
minative in Satterwhite.3 The federal policy favoring arbitration
had been previously expressed in a number of decisions, most
notably the Steelworkers Trilogy cases." These cases emphasized
arbitration as the vehicle to promote industrial stability and
peace; 5 defined the role of the arbitrator as the dispenser of in-
dustrial justice; and, of major significance, restricted the role to
be played by the court in labor disputes previously submitted to
arbitration:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is
the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitra-
tion would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits
of the award."6
The court of appeals viewed the exclusion of Title VII rights
from the general principle precluding a statutorily-based action
after submission to arbitration as an exception. Thus the issue in
Satterwhite was defined by the court to be whether rate of pay
for overtime, statutorily protected in the FLSA, was subject to
the general rule of election of remedies or was in the nature of an
exception, such as afforded Title VII rights in Gardner-Denver.
Id. at 450.
' See Getman, Can Collyer and Gardner-Denver Co-Exist? A Postscript, 49 IND. L.J.
285 (1974).
" Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974).
" United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
11 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
,1 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596 (1960).
11 Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d 448, 450 (10th Cir. 1974).
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The court of appeals culled from Gardner-Denver two factors
essential to the creation of an exception: the nature of the right
must be of a personal rather than collective character; and a
relatively clear legislative intent to override a policy favoring el-
ection of remedies should exist. In analyzing the Satterwhite
complaint, the court juxtaposed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
against the Fair Labor Standards Act, contract rights against
statutory rights, and racial discrimination against rate of pay for
overtime.
II. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT
Status as an exception rests in part on the nature of the right
being protected by the statutory privilege to sue. The Supreme
Court recognized this aspect, stating "that a union may waive
certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the
right to strike."" The court of appeals focused on two interrelated
factors in determining into which category the overtime wage
provision of the FLSA fell. Was the right personal or collective
in nature? Was the right primarily related to "shop" law or public
law? The two appear to merge when addressing the degree to
which the protected right has been traditionally a subject of
collective bargaining as contrasted to a right basically peripheral
to union activity.
In assessing the right involved in Gardner-Denver, the Su-
preme Court found that harmony between the union and the
individual cannot be presumed where racial discrimination is in-
volved. 9 However, in Satterwhite, the court of appeals found
"[olne of the highest objectives of any union is to get all the
money possible for all of its members."2 In considering which
rights could be waived, the Supreme Court noted that "rights
. ..conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of
bargaining . . . properly may be exercised or relinquished by the
union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits
for unit members."'" Applying the Supreme Court's economic
benefit test in Satterwhite, the court of appeals found "[wlages
and hours .. .at the heart of the collective-bargaining process
. . . more akin to collective rights than to individual rights
" Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
i' Id. at 58 n.19.
496 F.2d at 451.
21 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
1975
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.... ,22 And, the court saw as evidentiary support for this con-
clusion the fact that 58 employees joined the initial complaint in
Satterwhite, testifying to the "collective-shop" nature of the
FLSA provision concerning rate of overtime pay.
23
I. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
While recognizing the federal policy favoring arbitration, the
Supreme Court distinguished the statutory right involved under
Title VII from an employee's contractual rights under a collective
bargaining agreement, and decided that deferral to arbitration
would not comport with the congressional objective that federal
courts should be responsible for enforcing the rights granted the
individual under Title VII. 24 In line with this portion of the Su-
preme Court's analysis in Gardner-Denver, the Satterwhite court
differentiated the congressional intent with regard to statutory
rights involving racial discrimination (Title VII) and those in-
volving wages and hours (FLSA).
In the early years of the administration of the Fair Labor
Standards Act,25 numerous section 16(b) actions were litigated. 21
In these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to analyze
the policy behind the FLSA; of particular importance was the
case of Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil.27 In analyzing the con-
gressional intent behind FLSA, the Court discovered a public
policy of protecting certain groups of workers from substandard
wages and excessive hours. This legislative protection was ac-
corded in recognition of the unequal bargaining power between
employees and employers. In particular the Act sought to aid the
unprotected and unorganized workers-those who lacked suffi-
cient bargaining power to secure sufficient wages. The growth of
labor unions and the emphasis since afforded the collective bar-
gaining process abrogated to a substantial extent the importance
of the FLSA, in that employees now have the ability to organize
and assert their interests through contract negotiations and to
n 496 F.2d at 451.
n Id.
1, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974).
2 FLSA was enacted in 1938.
n See City Serv. Cleaning Contractors v. Vanzo, 179 Misc. 2d 368, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 24
(Sup. Ct. 1942), afJ'd, 266 App. Div. 660, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1943), which held that the right
of suit under FLSA section 16(b) is a "substantive" right; such a suit could not be
restrained because of a collective bargaining agreement compelling arbitration, which is
a remedial right. A similar conclusion was reached in Bailey v. Karolyna Co., 50 F. Supp.
142 (D.C.N.Y. 1943).
- 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
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acquire new and expanded rights and privileges in labor agree-
ments.
In a footnote, the Court in Brooklyn Savings Bank cited the
legislative intent to give employees the means to assert a statu-
tory right by maintaining a court action to recover wages due.28
The legislative intent expressed in Brooklyn Savings Bank to
allow individual suits by workers to recover wages, was aimed
primarily at unprotected, unorganized workers. In Satterwhite,
the workers were organized into a union, occupied a relatively
strong position in relation to their employer, and could assert
their right through the collective bargaining process and griev-
ance procedure, with a final step of binding arbitration.
In reviewing the legislative history of Title VII, the Supreme
Court found that Congress had attached "highest priority" to the
Civil Rights Act;29 discovered a congressional intent that the sta-
tutory right to sue supplemented existing laws and institutions
relating to discrimination; 3 and that "Congress gave private indi-
viduals a significant role in the enforcement process of Title
VII."' In contrast, the Tenth Circuit concluded that private en-
forcement was not a major objective of FLSA; 32 and that FLSA
did not, as Title VII, present an intent to accord parallel, overlap-
ping relief apart from contractual remedies.Y
In making this determination, the court of appeals examined
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,'3 which it discovered expressed
a congressional policy favoring the collective bargaining process
over judicial review. 5 In order to effectuate this intent, the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 established a good faith defense to
FLSA actions.3" The court of appeals noted that Congress pro-
vided neither a good faith defense in Title VII actions nor directly
" Id. at 705 n.16.
5 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
Id. at 48-49.
" Id. at 45.
' 496 F.2d at 450.
"Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1970).
" In its declaration of policy behind the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Congress ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation of FLSA in disregard of long-
established customs and contracts between employers and employees, and with the liabil-
ity imposed on employers as a result of strict interpretation. Congress thus declared a
policy to protect the right of collective bargaining and limit the jurisdiction of the courts,
by limiting the liability of employers in certain cases, and permitting a good faith defense
to FLSA claims by employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251, 259 (1970).
=Id.
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addressed the relationship between collective bargaining and ju-
dicial review.37 The court concluded that the difference in ap-
proach as illustrated by the inclusion of a good faith defense and
the emphasis on collective bargaining in the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act "indicates that Congress intended that wage disputes
and racial disputes should not receive the same treatment."3
Thus, to the extent that contract provisions paralleling
FLSA statutory rights are included within the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the statutory rights are placed within the province
of the arbitrator, who, applying the law of the shop, decides the
relative rights of the parties. Under these circumstances, prior
submission to arbitration precludes the right to bring suit in fed-
eral court.
IV. THE BALANCING TEST IN Satterwhite
The Tenth Circuit inferred the necessity of a balancing test,
wherein both the nature of the protected right and congressional
intent were combined in weighing the federal policy favoring arbi-
tration of industrial disputes against the statutory right to a court
suit. In applying this balancing test to a wage claim under FLSA,
the court found the scale tipped toward arbitration, concluding
that wages and hours were better suited to the arbitral forum
than a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII. While the
law of the shop applied by arbitrators lends itself to pay issues,
Title VII cases require consideration of public law concepts. The
court stated that in Gardner-Denver
[tihe conclusion that the anti-discrimination policy rated higher
than that favoring arbitration of labor disputes was determinative.
We find nothing in any pertinent legislative history or court decision
to indicate that Congress, by the grant of a right to private suit
under FLSA § 16(b), intended to establish a policy preference for
the determination of a wage dispute in judicial rather than arbitral
proceedings."
V. CONCLUSION
Favoritism towards arbitration as a general principle is noth-
ing more than the judicial policy of election of remedies. In effect,
11 496 F.2d at 451. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the absence of an intent to discriminate, or even a good intention,
does not redeem discriminatory employment practices. According to that case, the in-
tended thrust of Title VII was to the consequences of employment practices rather than
simply the motivation behind them.




a union may elect for its members the remedy of compulsory,
binding arbitration on issues relating to the shop, which have a
collective impact, and on which harmony between the union and
individual members can be presumed.
The finality accorded the arbitrator's decision on the merits
is dependent upon whether the right is one whose adjudication
can be properly waived by the union in a collective bargaining
agreement in favor of arbitration. If the right is waivable, the
courts will defer to the arbitrator's special competence in the law
of the shop and deny judicial review on the merits. By refusing
to entertain a suit under FLSA, the court of appeals in
Satterwhite effectively defers to the arbitrator's decision, recog-
nizing the Supreme Court's reaffirmation in Gardner-Denver of
the deferral doctrine and placing Title VII in proper perspective
as an exception to this doctrine.
Although Satterwhite leaves unresolved whether a statutory
right to sue will be precluded by prior resort to arbitration under
statutes similar to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the method of
analysis utilized in Satterwhite, in terms of balancing the policy
favoring arbitration against the statutory right involved, could
readily be applied. Gardner-Denver will undoubtedly control
when individual civil rights are involved, but Satterwhite cor-
rectly construes the scope and impact of Gardner-Denver: in the
usual areas of industrial disputes and interpretation of collective
bargaining provisions arbitration will remain the favored forum.
Loretta B. Paris
II. LABOR LAW-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-THE
LMRA 10(b) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE DE-
MANDS UPON THE DEFENSE
NLRB v. Serv-AU Co., 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974)
In the early part of last year the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit decided the case of NLRB v. Serv-AUl Co.' in which
the court addressed the issue of the proper application of the
statute of limitations under section 10(b) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act.2 This 10(b) statute of limitations
provides that a complaint will not issue upon any unfair labor
practice occurring more than 6 months before the filing of the
1 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974).
2 29 U.S.C. 160(b) (1970).
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DENVER LAW JOURNAL
charge with the National Labor Relations Board and service of a
copy upon the party charged.' Because this 10(b) limitations pe-
riod is relatively short, interesting situations have arisen when an
unfair labor practice is repeatedly committed. If the aggrieved
party neglects to file an unfair labor practice charge within 6
months of the initial instance of the unfair labor practice but does
file a charge within 6 months of a later recurrence of the same
unfair labor practice, is the charge barred by section 10(b)? That
is, does the limitation period begin to run from the first incident
of an unfair labor practice, so that the charge is barred by the
running of the initial 6-month limitation period; or does the stat-
ute begin to run anew upon each recurrence of the unfair labor
practice, so that the charge is not barred by 10(b) since it fell
within 6 months of a repeated occurrence?
The wording of the 10(b) statute of limitations suggests that
this kind of recurrence of the same unfair labor practice within
the 6-month period immediately preceeding the charge would not
result in the barring of the charge, because the charge could be
based entirely upon the unfair labor practice within the period.
The language of the statute merely proscribes a complaint issued
on the basis of an unfair labor practice occurring more than 6
months prior to the charge,4 and in true recurrence situations the
basis of the charge would be the later unfair labor practice that
took place within the period. When confronted with this issue,
however, courts have gone both ways depending upon the type of
unfair labor practice and the circumstances of the particular case.
In many instances the courts have found that the charge is not
barred, frequently applying the continuing violation and continu-
ing obligation doctrines.' But in other cases, like that of Serv-AUl,
courts have gone the other way and have found that the charge
is barred by the running of the 10(b) statute of limitations.
In this comment the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in the Serv-AUI case will be carefully examined,
together with a comparison of that case with decisions on similar
facts in other jurisdictions. In this treatment special emphasis
I Id. The statute makes an exception for persons who are prevented from filing their
charge because of service in the armed forces-for them the 6-month period begins to run
from the date of their discharge.
Id.
See Melville Confections, Inc. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
White Constr. & Eng'r Co., 204 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1953).
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will be placed on an analysis of the rationale offered by the court
for barring the complaint.
I. THE Serv-AlU CASE
In Serv-A U, an employer association composed of plumbing
and piping contractors had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the designated union.' That agreement allowed
non-association members to become parties by separately signing
the association agreement, and Serv-All Co., Inc. chose to do so.
The association agreement further provided that employers
would be bound by succeeding collective bargaining agreements,
including amendments, extensions, and renewals, unless the
employer gave 60-days written notice. At no time did Serv-All
give this kind of written notice. Through later negotiations the
termination date of the collective bargaining agreement was ex-
tended, and toward the end of that extended period the employer
association and the union began negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement. When the negotiations failed to produce
an agreement, the union struck the employer association and in
July 1970 those parties signed a formal contract.7
In June 1970, at a point in' time prior to the 10(b) 6-month
statute of limitations period, Serv-All filed a representation peti-
tion with the Board claiming that the union no longer represented
a majority of its employees. In September, Serv-All ceased paying
fringe benefits to the union and did not give its employees the
wage increases provided for in the new collective bargaining
agreement.' At a later time within the 10(b) limitations period a
hearing was held on the representation petition. At that hearing
the president of Serv-All, in replying to a question put by union
counsel, stated that he would not sign the agreement reached
between the union and the employer association.' Also, on several
occasions within 6 months of the filing of the charge the union's
1 491 F.2d at 1273. The employer association was named the Mechanical Contractors
Association, and the union was the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices
of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States & Canada.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
The pertinent part of the transcript contained the following:
Q. If I handed it [the agreement] to you now, would you sign it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why not?




business manager tried to reach the employer concerning this
matter, but was unable to do so. 10
The union filed a refusal to bargain charge" on March 18,
1971. In considering the charge, the Board held that although the
employer's initial refusal to sign or abide by the contract occurred
outside the 10(b) 6-month limitations period, other instances
within the 6-month period were sufficient to indicate that the
initial refusal to bargain recurred, specifically the colloquy be-
tween the union counsel and the company president at the repre-
sentation hearing. Therefore, the Board concluded that the
charge was not barred. 2
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
Board, however, holding first that whether the conduct of the
employer several months preceeding the limitations period con-
stituted an unfair labor practice was a stale issue, because that
conduct came within the scope of the 10(b) bar. Secondly, the
court held that there was not sufficient conduct by the employer
within the limitations period to amount to recurrence of the possi-
ble initial refusal to bargain. What would have been needed in
this regard would have been a specific request by the union to sign
or negotiate, followed by a specific refusal by the employer. The
Tenth Circuit could not accept that the president's statement at
the representation hearing constituted a refusal to bargain. Fi-
nally, the court also held that the Board's decision was faulty as
a matter of law "and not dependent on the fact issue of whether
[Serv-All] refused to sign [the agreement] during the six month
period preceding the complaint."' 3 That is, under these particular
circumstances, even if the employer had committed an unfair
labor practice outside the 6-month period by refusing to sign or
abide by the contract and that refusal had been repeated within
the 6-month period, the charge still would have been barred by
section 10(b).
II. CASES DECIDED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ON SIMILAR FACTS
The Tenth Circuit decision in Serv-Al follows decisions on
similar facts in two other circuits. In the important case of NLRB
v. McCready & Sons, Inc.,' decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1973,
tO 199 NLRB No. 159 (1973).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
" 491 F.2d at 1274-75.
" Id. at 1275.
482 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1973).
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the employers had negotiated with the designated union on a
multi-employer basis, with the agreement reached in those nego-
tiations calling for execution of individual agreements by each
employer at a later time. The union initially presented contracts
to the employers for their signature at a point in time outside the
limitations period, at which time the employers unequivocally
refused to sign. Subsequently these same employers again refused
to sign when given another opportunity within the 6-month limi-
tations period. The union filed a refusal to bargain charge more
than 6 months after the initial refusal to sign the contract, but
within 6 months of subsequent refusals. 5 In spite of the definite
repetition of the unfair labor practice within the limitations pe-
riod, the Sixth Circuit held that the charge was barred by section
10(b).
In finding the charge barred, the McCready court carefully
examined the purpose behind the section 10(b) statute of limita-
tions and concluded that its purpose was to protect against stale
claims and to give alleged violators an opportunity to prepare
defenses." In the court's analysis the employer would defend the
refusal to bargain charge by denying that a contract binding upon
him had in fact been formed. Such a defense would involve refer-
ences to facts surrounding the contract negotiations. With the
passage of time, however, these facts would become harder and
harder to prove, and therefore the defense would bear an ever-
increasing burden.'7 In this way the McCready court looked to the
needs of the defense and found the unfair labor practice charge
barred by section 10(b) because of burdens upon the defense in
going outside the 6-month period to make out its case.
This reasoning in NLRB v. McCready & Sons, Inc. in looking
to the demands upon the defense was explicitly adopted by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Serv-AU 1.'8 Therefore,
two circuits on similar facts have found a refusal to bargain
charge barred because of the burden upon the defense to go out-
side the period to make its case. The First Circuit, in NLRB v.
Field & Sons, Inc.,'" also held that the charge was barred on
" Id. at 873.
" Id. at 875. For a similar statement of the purposes behind section 10(b), see NLRB
v. Waterfront Employers, 211 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1954).
' NLRB v. McCready & Sons, Inc., 482 F.2d 872, 875 (6th Cir. 1973).
" 491 F.2d at 1275.
, 462 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1972).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
similar facts, but did so on a quite different rationale2" which was
not embraced by either the McCready" or Serv-A112 courts. The
circuits are split on this issue of a section 10(b) bar, however, in
that in the case of NLRB v. Strong13 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held on similar facts that the charge would not be
barred by section 10(b). The Ninth Circuit there found that refus-
als by the employer to sign the collective bargaining agreement
within the 6-month limitation period in and of themselves consti-
tuted unfair labor practices,24 and so concluded that the charge
would not be barred. This older case did not even consider the
McCready/Serv-AUl rationale of looking to the demands upon the
defense to go outside the 6-month period.
III. THE REFUSAL TO APPLY THE CONTINUING OBLIGATION DOCTRINE
In earlier failure to bargain cases, the Board and the courts
have sometimes applied the continuing obligation doctrine,
thereby finding the charge not barred by section 10(b). In the case
of NLRB v. White Construction Co.,5 for example, the petition-
ing union had been selected as the employees' collective bargain-
ing representative in a representation election, and later the
Board certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive. The employer originally declined to recognize the union
immediately after the election, more than 6 months prior to the
filing of the charge, and then persisted in that refusal down to
within 11 days of the filing of the complaint. In this regard the
court found that the employer expressly refused to bargain with
the designated union on two definite dates well within the section
10(b) period. Then the court held:
Respondent's duty to deal with the certified union was a continuing
20 Id. at 751. In giving a rationale for its decision to find the charge barred, the First
Circuit here distinguishes between breach of a general duty, as to which each refusal may
be a new unfair labor practice, and failure to perform a particular act, such as to execute
an agreement. In the former situation a charge based upon repetition of the same unfair
labor practice within the period would not be barred, whereas it would be barred with the
latter.
21 See 482 F.2d at 874, where the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit states that it
does not embrace the distinction made in this regard by the First Circuit in the Field &
Sons case.
See 491 F.2d at 1275, where the Tenth Circuit agreed with the result reached in
Field & Sons, but remained silent as to the merits of the rationale offered there.
386 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1967).
24 Id. at 931.
204 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1953). See also International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 363 F.2d
702 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11 204 F.2d at 952.
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one. Since its refusal continued well into the six month period im-
mediately preceding the filing of the charge, the Board correctly
held that the complaint was timely filed. 7
Thus, the continuing obligation doctrine was applied and no
10(b) statute of limitations bar was found in that context. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit refused to apply the con-
tinuing obligation doctrine in McCready however, reasoning that
application of that doctrine to a charge of refusal to execute a
contract would be inconsistent with the purposes of section
10(b).28 The Tenth Circuit in Serv-AUI also implicitly refused to
apply the continuing obligation doctrine through its adoption of
both the result and rationale of the McCready case."9
This McCready/Serv-AUI approach of not applying the con-
tinuing obligation doctrine, and instead finding the charge barred
by looking to the demands upon the defense, marks a significant
change from that of previous section 10(b) cases. In earlier 10(b)
statute of limitations cases, the courts did not even consider the
issue of the possible demands upon the defense, and certainly did
not answer that issue along the McCready/Serv-All lines. In the
case of NLRB v. White Construction Co. ,0 for instance, the Fifth
Circuit did not consider possible demands upon the defense in
going outside the period to make its case. If it had done so the
result might have been quite different. In that case the employer
might well have wished to defend against the charge of failure to
bargain by claiming that he did not have a continuing obligation
to bargain with the complaining union. In making that defense,
however, the employer might have looked back to the representa-
tion election that took place outside of the limitations period.
Thus, if courts in earlier continuing obligation cases had looked
to the demands upon the defense, the results might have been
different, and in this respect the McCready/Serv-All approach
amounts to a significant departure. In any case, explicitly looking
to the demands upon the defense is a novel approach in the sec-
tion 10(b) statute of limitations area.
3'
Id. at 952-53.
482 F.2d at 875. See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
See 491 F.2d at 1275.
204 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1953). See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
3' An alternative analysis suggests that although the McCready/Serv-All approach
appears, on its face, to be a radical departure from that used in previous recurrence cases,
the "burden on the defense" doctrine may only be a new label for an old theory. In Local
1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 711 (1960), the Supreme Court stated what has become the




In NLRB v. Serv-All Co., the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has held, in line with decisions in two other circuits, that
an unfair labor practice charge based upon alleged refusals of an
employer signatory member of a multi-employer association to
execute a contract with the designated union both within and
without the 6-month limitations period would be barred by the
section 10(b) statute of limitations. In finding the charge barred,
the court looked to the burden upon the defense and the staleness
of the operative facts which the defense would need to look to in
making their case.
In support of this approach of looking to the demands upon
the defense, it can be effectively argued that this approach is in
accord with the policies underlying the 10(b) statute of limita-
tions. In this regard the policies underlying section 10(b) have
been discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Local
1424, IAM v. NLRB, 32 in which the Court stated that those poli-
cies were:
to bar litigation over past events "after records have been destroyed,
witnesses have gone elsewhere, and recollections of events in ques-
tion have become dim and confused," H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 40, and of course to stabilize existing bargaining
relationships.3
In pointing here to the effects of the passage of time upon records,
witnesses and their recollections, the Supreme Court did not dis-
tinguish these factors in terms of the charging and charged par-
ties respectively in an unfair labor practice action. In line with
the analysis in the Serv-AUI and McCready cases, the passage of
time has these same undesirable effects with regard to both par-
ties, namely the charging party in presenting his charge, and the
party charged in presenting defenses. In light of this analysis,
looking to the burden upon the defense seems to be a reasonable
rence situation, the latter unfair labor practice must be one in and of itself without
reference to any earlier acts. In other words, if a latter act is an unfair labor practice only
because an earlier one is an unfair labor practice, there is no recurrence and the statute
of limitations begins to run at the time of the first act. Id. at 423. Under this rationale, it
can be seen that in both McCready and Serv-AU, the legality of the alleged recurrence
could be assessed only upon a determination of the legality of the initial refusal to bargain.
Such a determination would require going back to the facts surrounding the initial refusal
to sign the agreement, and this leads to what the Sixth and Tenth Circuits call an
unreasonable burden on the defense. When viewed in this light, the new label is unneces-
sary and may be overly broad.
32 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
1 Id. at 419.
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requirement. In addition, the Court in the quotation given above
also pointed to the purpose of stabilizing existing bargaining rela-
tionships. This looking to stability in the bargaining process em-
phasizes the fact that the parties involved in that process, the
union and the employer, have an on-going relationship. Given
this two-sided, on-going relationship, it seems reasonable to look
to the demands and burdens upon both sides and to pay special
attention to the possible burdens upon the defense.
Looking to the burdens upon the defense, on the other hand,
can have strikingly undesirable results, in that when the charge
is thereby found to be barred, the offending party is given the
option of engaging in continuing, permanent unfair labor prac-
tices of that same type with impunity. To give the Serv-AUI case
as an example, the court's finding that the unfair labor practice
charge is barred allows the employer the possibility of continually
persisting with that particular unfair labor practice with impun-
ity. In other words, the employer could continue in his refusal to
sign the agreement involved with that case; and given that oppor-
tunity to so flagrantly thumb his nose at the union, the employer




LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
This section of the annual Tenth Circuit survey encompasses
the interrelated areas of property, public lands, natural resources,
and the environment. The continuing tension between develop-
ment of western energy sources and environmental concerns, cou-
pled with the high incidence of public ownership of land in the
states which make up the Tenth Circuit, suggests that this topic
will be the subject of increasing judicial activity in the coming
years.
In Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,' the
Tenth Circuit considered one of the numerous problems created
by severance of the mineral from the surface estate of federal
lands. This decision, which affirmed the district court's holding
that a mineral estate leased from the United States is dominant
and uncondemnable by the owner of a servient surface estate
subsequently created by the Federal Government, is analyzed
more extensively below. In the second comment of this section
three decisions of the Tenth Circuit involving the procedures of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) are examined as
a basis for consistent interpretation of that statute's require-
ments.' Finally, three less significant issues relating to lands and
natural resources which were decided by the Tenth Circuit last
term are noted here briefly.
A. Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th
Cir. 1973)
The Citizens Environmental Council brought this action to
enjoin a federally-assisted highway construction project. The pri-
mary issue concerned the adequacy of the environmental impact
statement (EIS) prepared pursuant to the requirements of
NEPA.3 Plaintiffs claimed that the impact statement was inade-
quate because: (1) it was prepared by the Kansas State Highway
Commission instead of the United States Department of Trans-
portation; and (2) it did not detail alternative routes.
In denying plaintiffs' appeal from a summary judgment, the
492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. July
2, 1974) (No. 73-1943).
' Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974); National
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974);
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
3 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
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Tenth Circuit cited Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v.
Volpe4 for the proposition that NEPA's requirements are met
when a state agency prepares an EIS in consultation with other
state, federal, and private agencies and the responsible federal
official does not merely rubberstamp the EIS, but reviews it and
adopts it as his own.' Had the court desired to use it, authority
existed for a broader statement of the same rule.'
As to the contention that alternative routes were not ana-
lyzed, the court found that the consideration given was sufficient
to meet NEPA's requirements.7 Although not stated in the opin-
ion, it seems obvious that the court saw little difference between
the various possible routes. Consequently, "an exhaustive, pain-
staking and extensive report of the environmental effects of alter-
natives" was not necessary for a "reasoned choice."' This ap-
proach foreshadows the "rule of reason" enunciated in National
Helium Corp. v. Morton9 where the Tenth Circuit indicated that
it would search for a reasonable, good faith effort to prepare an
EIS adequate as a basis for an agency's substantive decision.' 0
B. Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974)
Trespass to airspace was the cause of action considered by
the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of Sandia." The modern trend, which
was established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1946 decision,
United States v. Causby,2 distinguishes between trespass to air-
space and common trespass to realty. 3 Essentially, trespass to
airspace requires more than interference with bare possessory
rights; there must also be a showing of direct and immediate
interference with the actual use and enjoyment of land.
' 355 F. Supp. 933, 938 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd sub nom., Finish Allatoona's Interstate
Right, Inc. v. Brinegar, 484 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1973).
355 F. Supp. at 938.
It has been held that NEPA does not require that the EIS be prepared by a federal
official and that development of an EIS by a state agency is not violative of either the
spirit or mandate of NEPA, National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp.
123, 127 (D. Mont. 1972).
484 F.2d at 873.
'Id.
486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974).
Id. at 1002.
497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974).
12 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
13 Id.
" See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Speir v. United States, 485
F.2d 643 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937); City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750
(D.N.J. 1958).
VOL. 52
LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Even though most of the flights operating out of Smith's
airport crossed Pueblo of Sandia's boundary line at heights of 150
feet or less, the court refused to reverse the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Smith because the nearest improvement on
the Pueblo of Sandia's land was 5.4 miles from the boundary line
adjoining Smith's runway. Moreover, the intervening land was
uninhabited and, in fact, was used for no purpose whatsoever.
Consequently, "[t]he complaint did not allege, and the accom-
panying affidavits did not show, a substantial interference with
the actual use of appellant's land."'"
Further, Pueblo of Sandia's allegation of a decreased market
value for potential commercial development as an element of
damages was rejected. The court held "that low level flights must
be a direct, immediate and present cause of injury, and not spec-
ulative or a mere possibility."'"
C. Upper Pecos Association v. Stans, 500 F.2d 17 (10th Cir.
1974)
The Economic Development Agency (EDA), an agency
within the Department of Commerce, offered a grant of nearly $4
million to a New Mexico county commission for construction and
surfacing of 33.3 miles of roadway. The offer was made prior to
the preparation of an EIS. Plaintiff conservationists sought to
enjoin construction of the road.
After a labyrinthine trip through the federal judicial sys-
tem, 7 only one issue was finally presented to the Tenth Circuit
for review-whether or not the EDA was so deeply committed to
the project after making the initial offer that subsequent prepara-
tion of an objective EIS was precluded.
497 F.2d at 1045.
' Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
" The action was originally brought in January 1971, before any EIS had been writ-
ten. NEPA requires preparation of an EIS when "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment" are contemplated. Before trial, the U.S.
Forest Service prepared an EIS. The district court held that the Forest Service was the
"head agency" and consequently had primary responsibility for development of the EIS.
Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332, 335 (D.N.M. 1971), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1233
(10th Cir. 1972). EDA was, therefore, not required to prepare an EIS. The Supreme Court,
however, granted certiorari on the question, Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Peterson, 406 U.S. 944
(1972), after which EDA, for reasons unstated, prepared an additional EIS. The Supreme
Court then remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to determine whether the issue of
EDA's preparation of an EIS had become moot. 409 U.S. 1021 (1972). The Tenth Circuit
in turn remanded the case to the trial court where it was determined that the issue was
moot. An appeal was taken.
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The point at which an EIS "tends to serve as a post facto
justification of decisions based on traditional and narrow
grounds"'" is primarily a factual determination. In the instant
case, the Tenth Circuit held that the critical stage had not been
reached and that the EIS was timely prepared.'9 The mere offer
by EDA did not constitute a commitment by the agency that
would prevent objective reconsideration of the project during
preparation of the EIS.
By finding the EIS to have been properly, although some-
what belatedly, prepared, the court effectively mooted plaintiffs'
environmental challenge.
I. MINERAL ESTATE LEASED FROM THE UNITED STATES HELD
DOMINANT AND UNCONDEMNABLE BY THE OWNER OF THE SERVIENT
SURFACE ESTATE SUBSEQUENTLY CREATED BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974)
By DON H. SHERWOOD*
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.' illustrates
one of the many problems generated by the severance of federal
title to the public domain into mineral and surface2 estates.' In
, 3 CEQ ANN. REP. 246 (1972).
g In so deciding, the court relied partly on Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information,
Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where it was stated that:
Statements must be written late enough in the development process to con-
tain meaningful information, but they must be written early enough so that
whatever information is contained can practically serve as an input into the
decision making process.
Id. at 1094. The initial and primary responsibility for striking the balance between com-
peting factors rests with the agency.
*Member of the Firm, Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; Ad-
junct Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.S., 1960; J.D., 1961,
University of Nebraska.
' 492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974), aff'g an unpublished decision of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Mexico, petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3001, (U.S. June
27, 1974) (No. 73-1943).
2 It is convenient to call the fee-less-mineral estate a "surface estate," but this is a
misnomer. See, e.g., United States v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Calif. 1973)
(distinguishing fee title, subject to a reservation of minerals, from surface estate); State
ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
1 The problems were recognized in PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEw COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF
THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESs 136-38 (1970), which
said:
There are over 62 million acres of land, the surface of which is in non-Federal
ownership, in which the Federal Government holds reserved mineral inter-
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this instance, the United States, in 1954, leased the right to mine
potash on certain lands in New Mexico to one company, reserving
surface rights-insofar as not interfering with the use of the land
by the lessee in mining potash 4-and then in 1959, the United
States granted a right-of-way across the same lands to another
company for a pipeline and compressor station site, "subject to
all valid existing rights."'
The pipeline company, Transwestern, was fully aware of the
prior rights of Kerr-McGee, the mining company, and knew that
mining could damage or destroy its compressor station, but it
nonetheless built the pipeline and station, putting its facilities
into operation in 1960 under a certificate of public convenience
and necessity issued by the Federal Power Commission! To but-
tress its rights in its compressor station site,' Transwestern ob-
tained a patent to that land in 1962. The United States, however,
reserved the minerals in the land patented, together with the
right to prospect for, mine, and remove the minerals.' Further-
more, the patent was issued subject to the rights of prior permit-
tees or lessees to use so much of the surface of the lands as is
required for mining operations, without compensation to the pa-
tentee for damages resulting from proper mining operations.9
ests. . . .Present law is totally inadequate to provide proper consideration
of the legitimate interests of surface owners.
Conflicting views exist as to the means appropriate to resolution of the problems. Compare
Sherwood, Mining Law at the Crossroads, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 161, 167-69 (1970);
with Carpenter, Severed Minerals as a Deterrent to Land Development, 51 DENVER L.J. 1
(1974); Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy
the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. 411 (1974); Hawley,
Problems of Surface Damage, 33 DICTA 115 (1956); Note, Surface Damages from Strip
Mining Under the Stock Raising Homestead Act, 50 DENVER L.J. 369 (1973); Note,
Protection for Surface Owners of Federally Reserved Mineral Lands, 2 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L.
REv. 171 (1973).
See 30 U.S.C. §§ 186, 285 (1970).
492 F.2d at 880.
Id. The mining lease and the right-of-way were issued by the Bureau of Land
Management, an agency of the Department of the Interior, under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920. Compare 30 U.S.C. §§ 281-85 (1970) (leasing of potash mining rights) with 30
U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (granting of rights-of-way for pipeline purposes). The latter statute
has recently been amended as a result of the Alaska pipeline controversy. Act of Nov. 16,
1973, Pub. L. 93-153, § 101, 87 Stat. 576. Cf. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1974). The Federal Power Commission acted under the Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. § 717(a)-(w) (1970).
1 These rights might well have exceeded the rights which the government is author-
ized to grant under 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d
842 (D.C. Cir. 1973), afj'g Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
The patent was probably issued pursuant to an exchange under 43 U.S.C. § 315g
(1970) by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior.
1 492 F.2d at 881-82. It must be emphasized that the situation here described strongly
1975
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Unable to negotiate protection for its facilities with Kerr-
McGee, Transwestern brought this action to prevent Kerr-McGee
from commencing mining operations within the land patented to
it by the United States, arguing that: (1) its pipeline facilities
were entitled to lateral and subjacent support; (2) Kerr-McGee's
mining plan was unlawfully approved by the Government;'" and
(3) it could utilize the power of eminent domain to insure physical
support for its compressor station.
The United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico dismissed all three counts of Transwestern's complaint.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the same
grounds adopted by the trial court, one judge dissenting."
The argument that the Government could not lawfully ap-
prove Kerr-McGee's mining plan because it failed to provide pro-
tection for Transwestern's compressor station was unanimously
rejected by the appellate court, which agreed with the trial court
that the Government was under no obligation to Transwestern
with respect to its consideration of the mining plan.'" As to the
adequacy of the plan itself, which the lower court found to be
proper, the Tenth Circuit treated this as a finding of fact not
clearly erroneous. 3 These conclusions require no discussion if the
Transwestern estate is to be considered servient to the mineral
estate leased by the government to Kerr-McGee.
On this issue, the court of appeals-again, unani-
mously-concluded that Kerr-McGee's leasehold interest ac-
quired under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 constitutes the
dominant estate. The court relied on Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v.
Kieffer 4 for its conclusion that:
Where, as here, the United States reserves the mineral estate, to-
gether with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same in
a grant of the surface estate, there is a servitude laid on the surface
estate for the benefit of the mineral estate .... Kerr-McGee was
favors the mineral lessee. See note 40 infra. In the more usual situation 30 U.S.C. § 186
(1970) is not available to buttress the position of the holder of the mineral title.
See 43 C.F.R. § 23.8 (1973).
The majority opinion is by Barrett, J., with whom Hill, J., joined. Doyle, J.,
dissented, with opinion.
11 492 F.2d at 882. The mining plan required by 43 C.F.R. § 23.8 (1973) is for the
benefit of the government, not the owner of a surface estate which might be affected by
mining thereunder. See 43 C.F.R. § 23.2(b) (1973); but compare The Montana Power Co.,
72 Interior Dec. 518 (1965).
" 492 F.2d at 881-83.
277 U.S. 488 (1928).
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empowered to remove potash, and if necessary, to subside the sur-
face in so doing."
In the circumstances of this case, where Transwestern took its
interest with full knowledge of Kerr-McGee's rights, subject to
express patent provisions in favor of Kerr-McGee, and went
ahead with construction notwithstanding the obvious infirmity in
its position," any other result would negate the terms of the lease
issued to Kerr-McGee, which, after all, was first in time and
therefore first in right.
The court's reliance upon Kinney-Coastal Oil is well placed.
The severed mineral estate must be considered dominant or it
will fail altogether. 7 But this does not mean that the servient
surface estate must fail altogether; the two estates can be harmo-
nized as has occurred in numerous cases. Thus, for example, not
all valuable minerals may be deemed part of the dominant es-
tate;i8 some minerals may be deemed part of the surface itself and
therefore not subject to a servitude in favor of a severed mineral
estate, 9 and some severances may be treated as not having con-
templated surface mining methods.20 But the Government insists
on dominance for its severed mineral estates 2' equal to its sover-
eign powers.2 2 To some extent this attitude is justified because
Congress has generally provided for compensation to the patentee
disturbed in his possession by operations under the mineral inter-
est.2 3 As -in the instant case, the surface owner takes subject to a
known servitude which must affect the consideration paid for
such a title.
24
" 492 F.2d at 882-83.
Id.
Id. at 881-82.
See, e.g., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971), discussed in Patton, Recent
Changes in the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18 RociKY MTN. MIN-
ERAL L. INST. 19 (1973).
" See, e.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d
122 (1971); Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954).
' See, e.g., Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970).
" See, e.g., United States v. Isbell Constr. Co., 4 I.B.L.A. 205, 78 Interior Dec. 385
(1971). In this case, the Department of the Interior concluded that a mineral reservation
by the government applies to the surface material itself even after the surface estate has
been patented by the United States. The decision in Isbell is persuasively criticized in
Carpenter, supra note 3, at 15-16.
2 Of course, the government insists on dominance for its surface estate when the shoe
is on the other foot. See United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D.W. Va. 1955)
(Polino reserved minerals from a grant to the United States).
21 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 299, 315g(d) (1970), the former concerning stockraising
homestead patents and the latter exchange patents.
' While this seems obvious in some cases, such as those involving stockraising home-
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Ultimately, then, harmonization or correlation of rights must
come down to compensation for loss of enjoyment of one estate
or the other. But which one? Plainly, the owner of the dominant
estate cannot be required to compensate the owner of the servient
estate. 5 Nothing, however, should prevent compensation of the
owner of the dominant estate by the owner of the servient estate
or by the government through condemnation. In either case, the
counter to dominance should be the power of eminent domain;
the servitude should be defined through just compensation. 6 Un-
fortunately, the Government habitually resists just compensa-
tion 27 and the power of eminent domain is grudgingly given to
individuals.
21
Because Transwestern operates under a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and has express statutory authority to
condemn property for right-of-way and compressor station pur-
poses, 21 one would expect Transwestern to prevail on the third
count of its complaint. Clearly, Transwestern would have pre-
vailed if Kerr-McGee had been the lessee of minerals in privately-
owned land.30 This does not mean, however, that the power of
steads, id., it is not always clear that this is so. See, e.g., Withrow, Broad-Form
Deed-Obstacle to Peaceful Coexistence Between Mineral and Surface Owners, 60 Ky.
L.J. 742 (1972).
Such a solution has been suggested. Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Es-
tates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN.
MINERAL L. INST. 411, 435 (1974).
" The point is best illustrated in Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 353
F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), where the court resorted to zoning analogies in an effort to
destroy dominant severed mineral estates but, id. at 710, mentioned, without deciding,
that compensation for the consequences of its decision might be had under the Tucker
Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970). But see Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 497
F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974), reversing the district court on rather narrow procedural grounds.
A few examples should suffice. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488
(1973); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
1 The excuse is that private property should not be condemned for private use. See,
e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14.
2 The statute, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1970), refers to condemnation "of property" for
the purpose of acquiring "the necessary right-of-way ... and the necessary land or other
property, in addition to right-of-way, for the location of compressor stations . The
character of property which can be condemned is neither defined nor limited.
" 492 F.2d at 883: "[A] number of decisions in which holders of certificates of public
convenience and necessity have exercised condemnation powers under Section 717f(h)
[section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act] . . . do not control because each involved the
condemnation of privately owned land" (emphasis by the court). Of course, no one is
suggesting that Transwestern sought the right to mine the mineral estate. Cf. 26 AM. JUR.
2d Eminent Domain § 134 (1966): "[T]he owner [generally] . . . retains general title
to the minerals underlying the land condemned . . . [and] the right to remove them
when he can do so without interfering with the rights of user passing to the condemnor."
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eminent domain operates in such a case to convert a servient to
a dominant estate; the dominant estate can, as we have seen, be
enjoyed without obligation to the owner of the servient estate, at
least in the absence of a contractual commitment." The power of
eminent domain is available in the public interest precisely for
that reason. It enables the owner of a servient estate to overcome
the bar of the dominant estate through just compensation.2
Both courts here concluded, however, that the dominant es-
tate was shielded from condemnation by the government's owner-
ship of the minerals leased to Kerr-McGee. They held the United
States an indispensable party and concluded that Transwestern's
complaint in condemnation was an unconsented suit against the
United States.3 To reach this result, the Tenth Circuit reasoned
that Kerr-McGee had given valuable consideration to the United
States for its lease and that the United States, as owner in fee of
the minerals, would be denied its royalties if Transwestern were
allowed-through condemnation-to prohibit exploitation of
those minerals. 4 Holding, then, that the leasehold created by the
United States is a completely dominant estate, 5 the court re-
jected condemnation by the owner of an estate servient thereto
on the ground that the power of eminent domain extends only to
private property and not to lands owned by the United States. 6
The dissent applies to this point alone, arguing that the interest
of the United States is not in controversy-the only real issue
being whether the power to condemn allows the taking, upon just
compensation, of Kerr-McGee's private leasehold interest:37
Unquestionably Kerr-McGee is entitled to just compensation for the
reasonable market value of its leasehold estate-the reasonable
market value, no doubt, of the minerals involved. The government
has no interest in this except to require Kerr-McGee to account to
it for its interest in whatever it receives. 8
" Note, for example, that the use of servient land by the owner of a dominant mineral
estate therein to facilitate mineral production from other lands is wrongful. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, 471 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1973); Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp.,
48 Cal. App. 2d 429, 119 P.2d 973 (1941). But see Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo.
321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955). Cf. Carpenter, supra note 3, at 9, and 30 U.S.C. 124 (1970).
"2 See J. Gerand & R.L. Moran, Development of Federally Reserved Minerals in Fee
Lands in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.51 at 579 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Founda-
tion ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN LAW OF MINING].
492 F.2d at 883-84.
34 Id.
u Id. at 884.
31 Id. at 883-84.
11 Id. at 884, 885.
31 Id. at 885 (emphasis added).
1975
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The effect of the rule adopted by the majority in this regard39
is to give the leasehold grant to Kerr-McGee a much greater
quality than the fee surface title granted to Transwestern.4 0 The
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 does give the United States a direct
monetary interest in mineral development, but that fact is not
alone sufficient cause to treat the interest of the mineral lessee
differently than any other private interest in land." The various
Acts of Congress implicitly recognize the rights of both surface-
and mineral-interest owners "to the use of the same tract of land
and afford compensation to the prior possessor whose rights have
been supplanted to an unreasonable extent by the subsequent
use." 42
The condemnation provisions of the Natural Gas Act on
which Transwestern relied43 are not limited, but apply to property
of all kinds. The result reached in Transwestern Pipeline limits
those provisions to private fee-simple absolute titles. If those
provisions do not apply to private leasehold titles to publicly-
owned minerals, then it must follow either that a mineral lease
from the United States is not property or that section 7(h) of the
Natural Gas Act does not mean what it says. As the dissent
correctly points out, the royalty interest of the United States,
which is the only portion of its fee title not held by the private
" The dissent suggests that the majority rule "could seriously curtail the exercise of
the power of eminent domain by pipeline companies" and might place Transwestern in a
position which "may also subject it to hardship greatly disproportionate to the injury
which its pumping station created." Id. at 885-86. Under some conditions, however, the
reverse might be true, as where the necessity to preserve a portion of a surface estate
dictates-perhaps for economic reasons-that there be no mining at all there or in adja-
cent areas as well. Cf., e.g., Bureau of Mines of Maryland v. George's Creek Coal &
Land Co., 321 A.2d 748 (Md. Ct. App. 1974).
0 In this particular case, there is a distinction and the difference is not entirely
without support. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.47 (1960), discussing the specific
statutory and regulatory provisions, 30 U.S.C. § 186 (1970); and 43 C.F.R. §§ 2093.0-3
through 2093.0-6 (Oct. 1, 1973), which applied in this case because the Kerr-McGee lease
was in effect when Transwestern's patent issued.
" Acts of Congress predating the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437
(which provided for leasing rather than sale of severed titles to certain minerals in federal
land), such as the Stockraising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 864 (especially
section 9 thereof, now 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970)), did not contemplate
that the United States, as owner of reserved minerals, would reap any direct
monetary benefit from the mineral development. We have a situation in
which the sovereign landlord has created two estates in particular tracts of
land, each estate possessed by different persons, and all seeking to exploit
the land under governmental grants of equal quality.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.42 at 562 (1960).
," Id. § 3.50 at 577.
13 See note 29 supra.
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mineral lessee,44 would be completely protected and fully realized
in condemnation proceedings. There is, therefore, no reason to
treat the mineral lessee whose lessor happens to be the Federal
Government any differently than the mineral lessee whose lessor
is the owner of private property. In each case the lessee's interest
is property, and whether or not it should be considered a domi-
nant estate, it should be subject to condemnation exactly as it is
subject to taxation by a state notwithstanding the fact that the
source of the title is the Federal Government.45
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT OF 1969 STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973)
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244
(10th Cir. 1973)
Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker
500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974)
Since the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA), I the federal courts have struggled to define their
role in implementing the Act. Although recognizing that federal
agencies often find their plans frustrated by NEPA's environmen-
tal goals, the courts have nevertheless actively intervened when
procedural compliance with NEPA had been in issue.' In line
with several other jurisdictions, the Tenth Circuit has developed
a broad standard of review applicable to the procedural require-
ments outlined in NEPA,3 while noting that substantive decisions
If anything, condemnation would protect the government's reversionary interest
and prevent waste.
0 There is no question that the federal mineral lessee's interest is property subject
to state taxation. See, e.g., Rummel v. Musgrave, 142 Colo. 249, 350 P.2d 825 (1960),
appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 293 (1960), where the lessee's interest under a United States
uranium mining lease covering Government lands was held property taxable by a state.
Compare Hagood v. Heckers, 513 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1973), and Mesa Verde Co. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 178 Colo. 49, 495 P.2d 229 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972),
with Georgia Pac. Corp. v. County of Mendocino, 357 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Calif. 1973).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
The court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837
(D.C. Cir. 1972), recognized that "administrative difficulty does not interpose such flexi-
bility into the requirements of NEPA as to undercut the duty of compliance 'to the fullest
extent possible.'"
' 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970), which in part provides that all agencies of the Federal
Government shall:
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are still to be reviewed under the much narrower arbitrary and
capricious standard promulgated in section 706(2)(A) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1
This comment examines two recent cases where the standard
of review to be accorded NEPA-mandated agency action was in
issue. The Tenth Circuit's approach is then compared to that of
other courts. Finally, a third Tenth Circuit case provides a
springboard for considering the application of this standard to
situations involving agency inaction where NEPA's requirements
are involved.
I. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
Two closely related issues have recently been presented to
the Tenth Circuit: what standard is the court to apply in review-
ing an environmental impact statement (EIS) mandated by
NEPA; and, similarly, what standard is to be applied when an
agency decides that an EIS is not required because the contem-
plated measures are not "major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment." 5 The latter deci-
[Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
For a review of landmark decisions involving close scrutiny of agency procedures man-
dated by this provision see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 16-26 (1973).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). This section states that the reviewing court shall
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law ....
The narrow arbitrary and capricious standard of review enunciated in this section is a less
searching test than the broad standard developed for review of issues involving procedural
compliance. The narrower standard allows the agency much discretion. It has been said
that "[aidministrative action may be regarded as arbitrary and capricious only where it
is not supportable on any rational basis." Carlisle Paper Box Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 1, 5
(3d Cir. 1968).
5 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). This is probably the most important phrase in
NEPA because proposals for federal action which come within this phrase must be accom-
panied by an EIS. See France, Judicial Review of Threshold Determination of the Applic-
ability of NEPA, 12 LAND & NATURAL REs. Div. J. 37 (1974). The broad statutory language
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sion is referred to as a negative EIS determination.' One standard
has evolved for determining both issues.
In National Helium Corp. v. Morton,7 the Secretary of the
Interior had been enjoined by the district court from terminating
helium purchase contracts entered into pursuant to the Helium
Act.' It had earlier been decided that an EIS was a prerequisite
for terminating the contracts,' and one issue in this action was
whether the resulting EIS fulfilled NEPA's requirements. The
lower court, relying on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,' decided that the proper standard of review was the arbi-
trary and capricious test enunciated in section 706(2)(A) of the
APA."
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Overton Park as
a case involving "true" agency action, while preparation of an
EIS is "a prerequisite for agency action but is not agency action
itself."'" The Tenth Circuit seemed to be saying that true agency
action relates to substantive decisions while the issue here con-
cerned procedural compliance. Having freed itself from the ap-
parent confines of the APA, the court fashioned a standard which
allows close scrutiny of an EIS to insure strict and objective good
faith compliance with NEPA's procedural requirements. Finding
support in the District of Columbia Circuit for the proposition
that environmental considerations should bear equal weight with
economic and technical factors,' 3 the Tenth Circuit summarized
the standard as a determination of whether the EIS:
(1) discussed all of the five procedural requirements of NEPA,
of this action-forcing provision has received the most attention in the courts. See F.
ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 56.
1 Exactly what is required to support a negative EIS determination (sometimes called
a negative threshold determination) is not certain, but more is needed than a statement
by the agency that it need not file an EIS. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334
F. Supp. 877, 880 (D. Ore. 1971). On the other hand, when the record shows a "wide-
ranging and continuing assessment . . . of the potential environmental impact" a court
will find good faith compliance with NEPA and uphold the negative EIS determination.
Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D. Me. 1972).
486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974).
50 U.S.C. § 167 (1970).
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1971).
0 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
,I 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
12 486 F.2d at 1001. Since the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), provides judicial review
only for agency action, the Tenth Circuit in calling action under NEPA by another name
has attempted to remove review from the ambit of the APA.
" Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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(2) constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the de-
mands of NEPA, and
(3) contains a reasonable discussion of the subject matter involved
in the five required areas."
Applying this "rule of reason,"' 5 the court determined that the
EIS was sufficient.
Less than a month before National Helium, the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz."
There an action was brought for declaratory, injunctive, and
mandamus relief against performance of two contracts entered
into by the Forest Service for the sale of timber. The timber was
located in the Teton National Forest of Wyoming and harvesting
it in accordance with the contracts would have resulted in 46
clearcuts involving about 770 acres. Plaintiff conservationists
thought preparation of an EIS should precede contract perform-
ance, but the Forest Service determined that NEPA did not re-
quire an EIS in this instance. The agency concluded that these
timber sales did not constitute major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.
The court thought this determination was essentially a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation, and decided that, under NEPA's
high standards, 7 an EIS was required. In so doing, it did not
define the key terms "major federal action" and "significantly
affecting," but relied on several earlier cases evidently for the
proposition that determining the outer limits of these broad sta-
tutory terms is to be accomplished on a case-by-case basis.' s Sev-
eral courts have attempted to define these terms, 9 but the defini-
tions themselves are so broad that they offer little guidance.
486 F.2d at 1002-03.
Id. at 1002.
I, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). This section states that compliance with the procedural
requirements shall be "to the fullest extent possible."
" Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); National Helium Corp. v. Morton,
455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970),
afl'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
"1 A "major Federal action" is federal action that requires substantial planning, time,
resources, or expenditure. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp.
356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972). Whether an action will significantly affect the environment
will depend on at least two relevant factors:
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects
in excess of those created by existing uses in the area affected by it, and
(2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action
itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to
existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area.
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While deciding that an EIS was a prerequisite for perform-
ance of the contracts, the Tenth Circuit stated a standard of
review of negative EIS determinations similar to that developed
for an EIS in National Helium. Here also the court indicated that
the decision whether or not to prepare an EIS was not true agency
action and not within the agency's discretion. Consequently, the
APA did not control review of a negative EIS determination.,,
Relying in part on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v.
AEC,2 the Tenth Circuit held that a negative EIS determination
would be reviewed under a standard of reasonableness in light of
NEPA's mandatory requirements and high standards in order to
be "in accordance with the law. '2 2 In using this quote from the
APA, the court may have been attempting to bring its standard
within the penumbra of that Act. At least it apparently wished
to refrain from announcing too radical a departure from stan-
dards enunciated therein.
In both National Helium and Wyoming Outdoor, the court
noted that its broad standard of review applied only in determin-
ing if there was compliance with NEPA's procedural require-
ments. Substantive decisions based on strict, good faith compli-
ance remained within the agency's discretion, and would be re-
viewed under the narrower arbitrary and capricious standard of
the APA.
It is suggested that construing agency action relating to
NEPA's procedural requirements as something other than true
agency action constitutes a weak and unnecessary distinction. In
Wyoming Outdoor, the court, in stating its standard, quoted the
APA for the proposition that compliance had to be "in accord-
ance with law."" It is therefore arguable that the legislative in-
tent manifested in this phrase would encompass broad review of
issues raised under NEPA where that Act mandates strict proce-
dural compliance as a prerequisite to substantive decision. It fol-
lows that both the procedural compliance and substantive deci-
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
For a perceptive discussion of Hanly, see Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative
Statement, 53 B.U.L. REv. 879 (1973).
m See text accompanying note 13 supra.
21 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114. See also Save Our
Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v.
Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
n Id.
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sions would constitute true agency action and would be reviewa-
ble under the APA although the respective standards of review
would differ in scope.24
This approach would compare favorably with other jurisdic-
tions where such distinctions were avoided. The Fifth Circuit,
searching for a standard in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger
("SOTA "), 5 treated Overton Park more charitably than did the
Tenth Circuit in National Helium. In SOTA, the court con-
cluded:
Overton Park teaches that a more penetrating inquiry is appropriate
for court-testing the entryway determination of whether all relevant
factors should ever be considered by the agency.2
This rather awkward sentence has been interpreted as providing
authority for a more expansive review under the APA wherever
the pertinent organic statute so dictates. 27 The different stan-
dards applied to review of procedural compliance and substantive
decisionmaking 2s are analogous to the different standards applied
to questions of law and those of fact. The complex issues arising
under NEPA are similar to questions of mixed law and fact. 2 The
21 Authority for different standards can be found in Overton Park where the Court
said inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, but the ultimate standard of
review is a narrow one. 401 U.S. at 413-16. Similarly, under NEPA the test for procedural
compliance is searching and careful, but review of the substantive decisions is narrow.
That the broader review finds its basis in the phrase "in accordance with law" is supported
by the district court's definition of that phrase in Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States,
268 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Ky. 1967), rev'd sub nom., American Commercial Lines, Inc.
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968):
It is not in accordance with the law . . . if it is based upon an erroneous
interpretation or misapplication of relevant statutory provisions.
In reversing, the Supreme Court did not quarrel with this definition.
472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 466.
48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 522, 538 (1973). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
2 The substantive goals of NEPA are stated in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-32 (1970). Other
jurisdictions have concluded that substantive issues raised under NEPA can be tested
against an arbitrary and capricious standard. The proper approach is to determine
whether the agency balanced all relevant factors. Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473
F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d
289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115. One commentator believes the stage is set for a close
scrutiny of substantive as well as procedural issues under NEPA. F. ANDERSON, supra note
3, at 265.
Classifying complex issues as law, fact, or mixed law and fact is difficult, and the
obvious pitfall is that a court will subdivide to its liking and then attach the appropriate
labels. Thus, definitive criteria which would lead to consistency often remain elusive. K.
DAvis, ArwismTRATxiv LAW TEXT § 30.01, at 545 (3d ed. 1972). The same pitfall may await
a court attempting to draw lines between procedural and substantive issues.
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Supreme Court developed a standard for reviewing mixed law
and fact issues in NLRB v. Hearst.3 0 It has been both relied upon
and distinguished in other jurisdictions concerned with NEPA-
related issues,3 ' but it seems that the Tenth Circuit's approach
(minus the distinction between true and other kinds of agency
action) can be reconciled with it.
Both the Hearst Court and the Tenth Circuit dealt with the
specific application of broad statutory terms. Both thought their
standard of review had a basis in reason. The Supreme Court held
that an agency's determination was to be accepted if it had
" 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law. ' 32 Simi-
larly, in both National Helium and Wyoming Outdoor, the Tenth
Circuit, while noting that an agency's substantive decisions
would be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard
of section 706(2)(A) of the APA,13 in essence stated it would ac-
cept the decision if it had a reasonable basis in law predicated on
warrant in the record. But to have warrant in the record under
NEPA, sufficient facts must be developed pursuant to the man-
datory procedures of NEPA: procedural compliance shall be "to
the fullest extent possible. 3 Thus the court will search for strict
procedural compliance to determine if there is warrant in the
record for any substantive decision. Once it finds a record ade-
quate under NEPA, its standard narrows to the arbitrary and
capricious test.
There is, then, ample room within the framework of the APA
for the court to closely scrutinize an EIS or negative EIS determi-
nation for procedural compliance. Such an approach could avoid
potential inconsistency in judicial review and agency administra-
tion which might result from splintering closely related actions
into different categories.
II. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD TO AGENCY INACTION
Considering the Tenth Circuit's broad standard of review of
agency action taken in compliance with the procedural mandates
of NEPA, is it likely that the same standard will be applied in
determining when agency inaction constitutes a negative EIS de-
322 U.S. 111 (1944).
31 Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972); Citizens for Reid State Park
v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D. Me. 1972).
11 322 U.S. at 131.
33 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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termination? In Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 5 this
issue was raised but not decided. One contention of the plaintiffs
was that the ongoing operation of the Glen Canyon Dam requires
the preparation of an EIS. Plaintiffs were particularly concerned
with the fluctuations in the discharge of the water below the dam
which endangered their river float trips. The court thought the
issue was substantial, but lacked ripeness because there had been
neither agency action nor a request for such. The opinion indi-
cated that some formalized administrative action would be a
prerequisite for review.
There is good authority, however, for the proposition that
formalized action should not necessarily be a prerequisite; that
agency inaction can, in some instances, be tantamount to nega-
tive agency action. This view was taken by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin,31 where
the court concluded:
Clearly relief delayed is not always equivalent to relief denied ....
But when administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on
the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude
judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather
than in the form of an order denying relief. 7
The District of Columbia Circuit further stated that meaningful
review would be impossible without some agency action based on
an adequate record. Consequently, the court's role would be to
insure that the agency exercise its discretion within a reasonable
time, and also to insure that the decision finds support in the
record.
That this approach is especially applicable to issues related
to NEPA was noted in Scientists' Institute for Public Informa-
tion, Inc. v. AEC.3 Although recognizing that in the final analysis
agency expertise is necessary to weigh the competing concerns, 31
the court thought that
3 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974).
- 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31 Id. at 1099. In addition, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), was
cited for the general proposition that review of agency action is authorized absent clear
and convincing evidence of legislative intent to preclude review.
38 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
3 It has been pointed out that although technical expertise is justification for defer-
ence to an agency, environmental issues should not be reviewed solely in technical terms.
Judges may be in a better position to balance the competing interests than the responsible
agency. 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 522, 539 (1973). But see Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert.
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some degree of judicial scrutiny of an agency's decision that the time
is not yet ripe for a NEPA statement is necessary in order to ensure
that the policies of the Act are not being frustrated or ignored.
Agency decisions in the environmental area touch on fundamental
personal interests in life and health, and these interests have always
had a special claim to judicial protection.' 0
Had administrative action been requested in Grand
Canyon," would the issue have been properly ripe? The court
could have found ample authority to conclude that formalized
agency action is not a prerequisite for judicial review;42 that
agency inaction can be construed as constituting a negative EIS
determination. Given the Tenth Circuit's strict scrutiny of
agency action under NEPA, it is foreseeable that strict scrutiny
of agency inaction which frustrates NEPA's mandates will follow.
Im. CONCLUSION
Certain policies relating to the standard of review of agency
action under NEPA have been established in the Tenth Circuit.
A substantive agency decision finding a base in an adequately
developed EIS (or negative EIS determination) will be reviewed
under the arbitrary and capricious standard enunciated in the
APA. Yet the court will closely examine the EIS (or negative EIS
determination) to test whether it complies with NEPA's manda-
tory procedural requirements. Such compliance is a prerequisite
for substantive decisions. Should this approach be extended to
the issue of when administrative inaction becomes tantamount to
a negative EIS determination, the issue should necessarily in-
volve questions pertaining to NEPA's procedural requirements
and, therefore, merit strict scrutiny.
Although the Tenth Circuit has termed procedures man-
dated by NEPA something other than true agency action, and,
thus, not within the ambit of the APA, it is suggested that they
constitute true agency action and the Tenth Circuit's standard of
denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973), for the proposition that the judiciary can only delay action
through NEPA. Undoubtedly, a plaintiff's best chance for success is to convince the
agency of the wisdom and correctness of his views.
481 F.2d at 1094.
" No matter how sharply the issues are drawn or how imminent the harm alleged,
there must be legislative authority for the court to review. Comment, Judicial Control of
Administrative Inaction: Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 57 VA. L.
REv. 676, 688 (1971). The opinion in Grand Canyon indicated that such authority does
not exist until some formal administrative action has occurred.
" E.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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review need not rest on this distinction. The APA provides a basis





By DONALD M. DuFr* AND ROBERT C. DoRR**
The Tenth Circuit considered five cases on appeal involving
patents, copyrights, and unfair competition this past term. There
were no cases involving trademarks. The most important case,
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc.I
which involved record and tape piracy, has contributed to a wid-
ening split among the circuits with the Tenth Circuit joining the
Ninth Circuit in ruling against the tape pirate. Although the
Supreme Court has not ruled on a petition for certiorari by the
"tape pirate," the Court has invited the Solicitor General to file
a brief expressing the views of the United States.2 The Marks case
will be analyzed in the ensuing case comment.
In Moore v. Shultz, 3 Judge Seth writing for the majority
stated that the presumption of validity for a patent can be over-
come only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence by the
alleged infringer. The Moore case provides a good vehicle for a
partial summary of the Tenth Circuit's position on patent valid-
ity and infringement. The patent at issue involved a pants top-
ping machine which was composed of elements old in the art, but
combined so as to produce new and improved results. Judge Seth
stated that McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc.,' set forth
the Tenth Circuit rule for patentability:
The test of whether a particular patent is a mere aggregation and
invalid or a combination and valid has been variously stated. Gener-
ally, where elements old in the art are united in such a way that a
new and useful result is secured or an old result is attained in a more
facile, economical and efficient manner, there is a patentable com-
bination.'
* Patent Attorney, Boulder, Colorado; B.S., 1949, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.B., 1953, New York University; LL.M., 1971, New York University.
** B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engineering; M.S., 1970, Northwestern Univer-
sity; J.D., 1974, University of Denver.
497 F.2d 285, rehearing en banc, 497 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1974).
BNA PAT., T.M., & COPYRIGHT J., No. 199, A-17 (Oct. 17, 1974) [hereinafter cited
as BNA].
3 491 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1974).
343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 393 (citations omitted).
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Here, Shultz had failed to prove the Moore patent invalid and he
was, therefore, found guilty of infringement.
The Tenth Circuit in Moore adhered to its previous view that
all three elements of patentability-novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness-present issues of fact. The court held to this
view even though it recognized that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have held nonobviousness to be an issue of law.
The court after upholding the jury finding of nonobviousness
and, thus, the validity of the patent, then pursued Moore's claim
of Shultz's infringement by equivalency. It reiterated the Tenth
Circuit test and found that Moore proved his infringement claim:
The question of equivalency is one of fact and it must be determined
against the context of the patent, the prior art and the particular
circumstances of the case and consideration must be given to the
purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it
has when combined with the other ingredients and the function it
is intended to perform.'
Shultz, the alleged infringer, petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari asserting that the question of obviousness was not
within the province of a jury and that the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits supported the correct view. The Court denied certiorari,7
but Mr. Justice Douglas filed a dissent agreeing with the peti-
tioner:
The decision [by the Tenth Circuit] . . .represents an abdication
which is likely to produce haphazard application of the statutory
and constitutional standard. Happily, two other circuits have not
adopted this approach!'
Douglas reasoned that the constitutionally granted and protected
17-year patent monopoly "is one that demands reasoned elabora-
tion and, therefore, treatment as a question of law" and that such
responsibility is vested in the courts, not for the "unarticulated
resolution by the jury.
' 'g
Without explanation or discussion of Moore, the Tenth Cir-
cuit recently in Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc.'0 appar-
ently reversed its stance on nonobviousness:
1 491 F.2d at 300, quoting McCullough Tool Co. v. Wells Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381,
401 (10th Cir. 1965).
BNA, No. 200, A-13 (Oct. 24, 1974).
1 Id. at A-14, citing Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 395 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1968); Hensley
Equipment Co. v. Esco Corp., 375 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1967).
BNA, No. 200, A-14 (Oct. 24, 1974).
183 U.S.P.Q. 519 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Ascertainment of the scope of the prior art and determination of the
difference between the prior art and the claims in suit together with
the level of skill in the art are all questions of fact. Whether in light
of these factual matters the patent is obvious then becomes a ques-
tion of law."
The proper resolution of Price in view of Moore has not been
undertaken in this issue due to the timeliness of Price. Hopefully,
next year's survey will consider this interesting contradiction.
In Iron Ore Co. of Canada v. Dow Chemical Co., 2 the plain-
tiff sued the defendant for infringement of the plaintiff's patent
for "detonable explosive in slurry form." The defendant raised
the defense that the plaintiff's patent was invalid since the inven-
tion was disclosed in defendant's prior patent. The trial court
found the patent invalid and the plaintiff appealed to the Tenth
Circuit arguing that the claims should be interpreted in light of
the terms found in the specification. The specification used the
terminology "completely water soaked" whereas the claims made
no mention of such limitation. The plaintiff maintained that its
patent would be valid if the claims were read to include this
limitation. The Tenth Circuit in affirming the ruling of the trial
court reasoned that since the term "completely water soaked" did
not appear in the claims, then the trial court's finding was not
clearly erroneous.
In Maloney-Crawford Tank Corp. v. Rocky Mountain Natu-
ral Gas Co.," Judge Hill considered whether a 7-year interval
between the first knowledge of infringement and the commence-
ment of the suit supported a defense based on laches. In resolving
the issue, he set forth (1) the Third Circuit's view "that mere
delay or passage of time alone does not suffice to constitute laches
in a patent infringement action,"' 4 and (2) the elements required
in the Tenth Circuit to sustain a defense of laches:
[T]wo elements must be established: inexcusable delay in institut-
ing suit, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from such
delay. . . .And whether or not a delay is inexcusable must be de-
termined by the particular facts of each case."
Hill found no "clearly erroneous" error in the trial court's finding
" Id. at 521.
12 500 F.2d 189 (10th Cir. 1974).
.3 494 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 403, citing Jenn-Air Corp. v. Penn Ventilator Co., 464 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1972).
" 494 F.2d at 403 (citations omitted).
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of infringement after having found the delay to be excusable and
of no prejudice to the defendant.
In Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. Mechanex Corp.," the Tenth
Circuit considered an alleged theft by Mechanex of a trade secret
concerning electronic speedometers manufactured by Kodekey.
Mechanex acquired the exclusive rights to market Kodekey's
speedometers. In exchange, Mechanex agreed to "keep confiden-
tial all proprietary information regarding Electronic Speedome-
ters . . . and not to use this information in any way detrimental
to the interests of [Kodekey]." 7
Mechanex subsequently began to manufacture a speedome-
ter similar to Kodekey's. Kodekey thereupon brought suit, the
district court found a clear breach of contract, and enjoined the
production of the Mechanex speedometer.
Mechanex appealed arguing that for a trade secret to be
protected there must be a showing of uniqueness and value. The
Tenth Circuit following the Restatement of Torts held that
"[niovelty and invention are not requisite for a trade secret."' 8
Judge Barnes writing for the unanimous three-judge panel
defined a trade secret to be
[a]ny formula, patent, device, plan, or compilation of information
which may be used in one's business and which gives a person an
opportunity over his competitor."
He then relied on Callman:20
An employee's express agreement "not to disclose any of the pro-
cesses and methods" of his employer is a positive acknowledgment
of the fact that some of such processes and methods are secret; the
stipulation would otherwise be meaningless. .. .
to conclude:
Such an interpretation applies with stronger reason to an agreement
between a secret-holder and a non-employee than between owner
and employee.2
The Tenth Circuit, therefore, upheld the district court's finding
of a trade secret theft.
1" 486 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1973).
'1 Id. at 451.
11 RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs § 757 (1939).
1 486 F.2d at 455, citing International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 907, 914 (D. Del. 1951).
20 CALLMAN, UNFAIR CoMPErrmION TRADE & MONOPOLIES (1968).
"1 486 F.2d at 455, quoting CALLMAN, supra note 20, § 53.3 at 390 (footnote omitted).
2 486 F.2d at 455.
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COPYRIGHT LAW-TAPE PIRACY- COMPULSORY
LICENSING PROVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc.
497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974)
INTRODUCTION
In Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics,
Inc.,13 the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit 4 in construing
the compulsory licensing provision, section 1(e), 5 of the Copy-
right Act in favor of the copyright holder and against the "tape
pirate." The Marks decision furthers a split among the circuits
since a decision by the New Jersey District Court 6 reached the
opposite opinion.
Marks, a musical composition copyright owner, brought a
copyright infringement action against Colorado Magnetics, the
alleged "tape pirate," in the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Oklahoma, seeking damages and injunctive relief for elec-
tronic tape duplication by Magnetics of hit records authorized by
Marks and containing its musical compositions. The district
court concluded that such duplication was not barred by section
1(e) and in its decision adopted verbatim the findings and conclu-
sions submitted by Magnetics." Marks appealed and a three-
judge panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court deci-
sion by a 2-1 vote.25 On rehearing en banc, the majority opinion
of Judge McWilliams was sustained by a vote of 5-2 with Chief
Judge Lewis and Judge Holloway dissenting.29 Judge Murrah, a
member of the original three-judge panel, recused.
Magnetics then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme
Court."0 The Supreme Court, not yet acting on the petition, has
invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views
of the United States.
3'
' 497 F.2d 285, aff'd on rehearing, 497 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1974).
2 Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847
(1972).
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) [hereinafter cited as section 1(e)].
N Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J.
1972).
" Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Okla. 1973).
- 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 292.
" Petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1974)(No. 73-2006).
11 BNA, No. 199, A-17 (Oct. 17, 1974).
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A brief discussion of the history and evolution of section 1(e)
is set forth in the following section in order to provide a founda-
tion for subsequent detailed analysis and critique of Marks. The
line of precedence supporting the Marks holding will then be
discussed followed by a consideration of the precedence opposing
the Marks view. Finally, other remedies for obtaining relief
against tape piracy will be briefly presented.
I. HISTORY OF SECTION 1(e)
Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909,2 the Supreme Court held
in White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 3 that mechanical re-
productions of copyrighted musical compositions, such as perfor-
ated piano rolls and records, were not infringing copies and,
therefore, that the copyright owner did not have a copyright in-
fringement remedy against these "piano roll pirates."
Pressure from the music industry for greater protection after
Apollo prompted Congress to include section 1(e)" in their new
Copyright Act. Section 1(e) extended the scope of the composer's
copyright protection by giving him the right to control (i.e., to
permit or to not permit) the first mechanical reproduction of his
work. This right was one of "control" only and did not give the
composer a copyrightable interest in the recording.3 At the same
time, Congress had no desire to create a recording monopoly for
the composer copyright owner and it, therefore, expressly worded
section 1(e) to require that after the first authorized mechanical
reproduction is produced, subsequent recordings can be made by
anyone upon tender of a 2-cent royalty per recording with proper
notice to the copyright holder.
32 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Copyright Act of 1909].
209 U.S. 1 (1908).
It was this situation that your committee had in view when they
sought to formulate a law which would give to the composer the exclusive
right to prohibit the reproduction of his music by mechanical means on the
part of anybody if he desired, to secure to him adequate compensation from
all reproducers if he did not desire to exercise this exclusive right to prohibit
and to prevent the establishment of a great trade monopoly. We fully believe
that all this will be secured under the provisions of subsection (e).
HOUSE COMM. ON PATENTS, COMM. REP. ON BILL (H.R. 28192) ENACTING COPYRiHT ACT OF
1909, No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909), reproduced in, HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW
230 (4th ed. 1962). (emphasis added)[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
It is not the intention of the committee to extend the right of copyright
to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer
or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of the
bill, of the manufacture and use of such devices.
HOUSE REPORT, at 9.
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Section 1(e) was a significant departure from all prior statu-
tory copyright protection concepts." Most other countries at that
time allowed anyone to reproduce freely compositions mechani-
cally with no compensation to the composer." The intent of Con-
gress in breaking with tradition was that "justice and fair dealing
. . . [requires that the] composer should have some compensa-
tion . . . . s Congress, however, was also concerned that a
[d]anger lies in the possibility that some one company might se-
cure, by purchase or otherwise, a large number of copyrights of the
most popular music, and by controlling these copyrights monopolize
the business of manufacturing and selling music-producing ma-
chines, otherwise free to the world."A
Congress believed that the compulsory licensing provision was
the solution to (1) providing adequate compensation to the com-
poser while (2) keeping music available to all:
The only way to effect both purposes . . . was, after giving the
composer the exclusive right to prohibit the use of his music by the
mechanical reproducers, to provide that if he used or permitted the
use of his music for such purpose then, upon the payment of a
reasonable royalty, all who desire might reproduce the music.4'
Section 1(e) of the Copyright Act reads in pertinent part:
Provided . . . as a condition of extending the copyright control to
such mechanical reproductions, that whenever the owner of a musi-
cal copyright has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the
use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving
to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may
make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to the
copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part manu-
factured, to be paid by the manufacturer thereof . . .
Before proceeding further, the reader is invited to conjecture
as to the meaning of the word "similar" with regard to defining
the rights, if any, of the "pirate" under section 1(e). Does the
term (1) prohibit piracy, (2) permit piracy or (3) neither? Does
No legislative body in the world has as yet taken such advanced
ground in . . . securing the rights of composers in the matter of the
reproduction by mechanical means of their music as is contemplated by this
bill.
Id. at 5.
In 1895, Austria clearly favored the mechanical reproduction of copyrighted compo-
sitions: "The manufacture and public use of instruments for mechanical reproduction of
music records shall be no infringement of the copyrighted music." Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
" Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909).
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"similar" refer to the act of recording? Or does it characterize the
style or the content of the "similar" recording?
A few years after the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909, a
federal district court in Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 2
held that section 1(e) does not permit a pirate to duplicate the
piano rolls of the first authorized mechanical reproducer. After
Aeolian and until the era of Jondora Music Publishing Co. v.
Melody Recordings, Inc. ,'3 (in favor of the pirate), Duchess Music
Corp. v. Stern" and Fame Publishing Co. v. S & S Distributors,
Inc. 5 and Marks (the latter three against the pirate), the issue of
record piracy and its relationship to section 1(e) has not been
extensively litigated.
In 1971, Congress became increasingly aware of the growth
and extent of tape piracy" and enacted the federal record piracy
act 7 which became effective on February 15, 1972, for a trial
period of 5 years. The act is prospective only and is not retroac-
tive. For the first time, it permits a statutory copyrightable inter-
est in a recording. Before passage of this act, no statutory copy-
right could be obtained on a recording based on the Supreme
Court decision in Apollo. The federal record piracy act permits a
record manufacturer to obtain copyright protection by placing a
symbol on each recording. The act, however, pertains only to
protection for the record manufacturer and does not give the com-
position copyright owner a copyright interest in the recording.
II. CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASES DEALING WITH RECORD OR
TAPE PIRACY
This section briefly analyzes and comments upon the more
significant cases in which the issue of record or tape piracy and
section 1(e) has been considered. The cases that have held in
favor of a copyright owner and against the "pirate" are first dis-
cussed. The authors use the term "pirate" throughout this com-
ment not to connote possible wrongdoing, but rather as a term of
convenience indicating one who duplicates a recording of another.
41 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
43 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972).
44 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir: 1972).
41 363 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
"1 The volume of business conducted each year by "pirates" exceeds $100 million.
International Tape Mfgr's Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38, 48 n.36 (1972).
41 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2,
5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the federal record piracy act].
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A. Aeolian, Duchess, Fame, and Marks Sequence
In Aeolian the pirate duplicated perforated music rolls em-
bodying copyrighted music that the plaintiff had recorded with
permission of the copyright owner."8 The district court's decision
in favor of both the plaintiff and, in dicta, the copyright holder
is unenlightening since it merely sets forth a conclusion that is
devoid of detailed legal reasoning and citation of authority:
The provision of the statute [section l(e)] that "any other person
may make similar use of the copyrighted work" becomes automati-
cally operative by the grant of the license; but the subsequent user
does not thereby secure the right to copy the perforated rolls or
records. He cannot avail himself of the skill and labor of the original
manufacturer of the perforated roll or record by copying or duplicat-
ing the same, but must resort to the copyrighted composition or
sheet music, and not pirate the work of a competitor who has made
an original perforated roll."
The court is literally correct in stating above that a subse-
quent user under section 1(e) "does not thereby secure the right
to copy." The court, however, neglected to add that section 1(e)
does not mention copying, either implicitly or explicitly, and, it
therefore obviously neither gives nor denies anybody the right to
copy anything. Section 1(e) merely permits a subsequent user to
make "a similar use" of the copyrighted work. Thus, the conclu-
sion of Aeolian that he must "not pirate the work of a competitor"
would appear to be judicial pronouncement rather than a well-
reasoned decision.
In Duchess, the pirate duplicated recordings issued by the
plaintiff who was also the copyright owner of the recorded compo-
sitions. The Ninth Circuit held against the pirate:
The statute provides that anyone who properly invokes the li-
cense provision "may make similar use of the copyrighted work."
Rosner admits that she duplicates appellants' copyrighted composi-
tions. She does not make "similar use" of them, she makes exact
and identical copies of them. This is clearly outside the scope of the
compulsory license scheme.
Given our view that exact duplication is not "similar use," we
need not decide when a prospective licensee must invoke the com-
pulsory license scheme and file his notice of intention to use."
Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
, Id. at 927.
458 F.2d at 1310.
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The essence of the above reasoning in Duchess is:
(1) that section 1(e) permits only a similar use;
(2) that copying or duplicating is an identical and not
a similar use; and
(3) that copying is, therefore, outside the scope of sec-
tion 1(e).
The validity of this syllogistic reasoning rests entirely on the
court's premise that the term "identical" is not encompassed by
the scope of the term "similar." It is submitted that the court's
definition of terms may be seriously questioned on a number of
grounds.
First, from a common sense reading of section 1(e), it could
be argued that "similar" merely refers to the act of recording.
Consequently, after a copyright owner permits a first recording to
be made, subsequent recordings can be made by anyone who
gives the required notice and pays the required 2-cent royalty.
The legislative history of the act and the intent of Congress would
appear to support this interpretation.5 1 Congress was primarily
concerned about preventing record manufacturers/composition
copyright owners from becoming giant "music trusts."5 The term
"similar" presumably had no special meaning attached to it by
Congress, other than that the subsequent recordings need not be
identical to the first, but may deviate to some extent to take
advantage of the compulsory licensing provision and to prevent
the formation of "music trusts."
Secondly, an argument can be made that the Duchess defini-
tion of "similar" conflicts with historical precedence. Shafter53
analyzed the term "similar" and found it to permit some latitude
or deviation beyond being identical for subsequent reproducers.
He implied that "similar" not only includes "identical" reprod-
uctions, but also those reproductions deviating from an "identi-
cal" reproduction. Shafter's reasoning rested upon an analysis of
English and Canadian copyright law wherein the record that is
first recorded must be identically reproduced by subsequent re-
cordings without any variations unless permitted by the copy-
right owner. 4 The American copyright law by using the word
" See text accompanying note 34 supra.
52 HOUSE REPORT at 8.
A. SHAFrER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 330-35 (2d ed. 1939).
' Id. at 333.
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''similar" was a liberalization of the English and Canadian views.
According to Shafter, in the 1910's and 1920's, American musical
copyright owners attempted to narrow the deviation given to sub-
sequent recorders by arguing for a definition of "similar" that in
essence was indistinguishable from "identical." Now, with avail-
ability of sophisticated electronic duplicating equipment, copy-
right owners apparently have changed their position to the oppos-
ite view by arguing, as was held in Duchess, that "similar" does
not mean "identical." 5
A third argument that can be made against the Duchess
definition of "similar" is based on a dictionary definition of the
term. In one authority a number of cases are cited supporting the
proposition that "similar" means "exactly like; identical; exactly
corresponding."" Another authority supports the proposition that
the general class of "similar" objects includes the subclass of
"identical" objects.57
If any or all of the above arguments are correct, then the
Duchess view of "similar" is in error and the making of subse-
quent "identical" recordings is one of the similar uses included
within the scope of the term "similar" as used in section 1(e).
This, of course, does not mean that section 1(e) authorizes piracy.
It only means that a pirate must pay 2-cents per record.
If these arguments concerning the use of the term "similar"
are wrong and the definition in Duchess is correct, then a plethora
of definitional issues could be raised in the future regarding the
meaning of the term:
(1) Similarity of the rendition vehicle.
58
If the first recording was instrumental, must the second re-
cording be instrumental or can it be both instrumental and vocal?
Can it be vocal alone?
(2) Similarity of rendition style."
If the first recording was rock and roll, must the second re-
35 Id.
" BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1554 (4th ed. 1957) defines it as "[a]lso, sometimes,
exactly alike; identical; exactly corresponding (at least in all essential particulars)."
The word similar is often used to denote a partial resemblance only. But
it is also often used to denote sameness in all essential particulars.
Commonwealth v. Fontain, 127 Mass. 452, 454 (1879).
WF sTERs SEvmrr NEW COLLEGIATE DIcrIoNaRY 810 (1970).
See, e.g., Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A. Mills, Inc., 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
See, e.g., Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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cording be rock and roll, or can it be a waltz?
(3) Similarity of the recording medium."
If the first recording was a record, can the second recording
be a tape?
(4) Similarity of the record speed."
If the first recording was at 33 RPM, must all subsequent
recordings be at the same speed?
(5) Similarity of the recording material.
If the first record was made of shellac, can the second record-
ing be of acetate composition?
In summary, the validity of the Duchess court's reasoning
rests entirely upon the logic of its definition of the term "similar."
If "similar" does encompass "identical," as urged by the authors,
the court is wrong. The preceeding discussion has argued that the
Duchess definition of "similar" is contrary to its plain meaning,
to historical precedence, and to present-day legal and grammati-
cal definitions of the term.
In Fame Publishing Co. v. S & S Distributors, Inc.,2 the
pirate duplicated authorized recordings and attempted to comply
with the notice and royalties provisions of section 1(e) by tender-
ing a check for the statutory amount to the plaintiff/composition
copyright owner. The plaintiff returned the proffered royalty and
sued for infringement, and requested a preliminary injunction.
The court held for the plaintiff by following the Duchess view that
"similar" does not include "identical."
Especially interesting is the court's statement that:
A compulsory licensee acquires no right to duplicate or reproduce
the recordings of another. Anyone who seeks to rely on the compul-
sory license premium must hire some musicians, take them into a
studio and make his own recording. 3
Unfortunately, Fame did not cite any authority for this startling
pronouncement which, in itself, would appear to raise a number
of interesting questions. For example, why must only "musi-
cians" be hired-what about a recording of a solo vocalist without
0 See, e.g., Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A. Mills, Inc., 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
" See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 108.4611 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
NIMMER].
82 363 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
63 Id. at 988 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
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musicians? Why must the musicians be "hired"-what about
amateur musicians donating their services free of charge? Why
must the hired musicians be brought "into a studio"-what
about recording a marching band in a street parade?
Although these comments might appear to be unduly criti-
cal, they do illustrate the potential danger of loose language in
court decisions. Such loose language can have its genesis in a first
decision, be quoted and followed by successive decisions, and
ultimately become the "law of the land" even though the original
language is devoid of legal support or reasoning. Such a legal
evolution occurred with Aeolian, which was a judicial proclama-
tion regarding the meaning of the word "similar." This decision
was based upon no cited legal authority, was adopted in full by
Duchess, and later adopted from Duchess by Fame. In addition,
Aeolian pertained only to a cause of action brought by a licen-
see/record manufacturer. Duchess and Fame concerned the rights
of the copyright holder upon whose rights Aeolian expounded in
obiter dicta.
In justifying its decision Fame concluded:
It is not lightly to be inferred that Congress, in carving out the
compulsory licensing exception to the otherwise exclusive rights of
the copyright proprietor, intended thereby to sanction the type of
activity in which defendants engage. The compulsory licensing sys-
tem was designed to encourage various recordings of musical compo-
sition. To permit duplication of existing recordings under compul-
sory licensing would have the opposite effect. Rather than encourage
a multiplicity of recordings it would obviously discourage the pro-
duction of new recordings.6 '
The court might be correct regarding what Congress in-
tended had it given any consideration to the piracy problem.
Unfortunately, if this was the intent of Congress, it was never
expressed either in proscriptive legislation or guiding legislative
history. Consequently, the wording of section 1(e) in no way sup-
ports this statement by the Fame court.
Marks is the most recent case following Aeolian, Duchess,
and Fame. Marks as copyright owner had authorized several re-
cording companies to make recordings. Colorado Magnetics, with
no authorization from Marks, but fulfilling the notice and 2-cent
royalty tender requirements of section 1(e), purchased the au-
", Id. (emphasis added).
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thorized hit records on the open market, duplicated them with
recording equipment, and then sold the duplicated recordings at
a substantially lower price. Marks then brought a copyright in-
fringement action against Colorado Magnetics seeking damages
and injunctive relief.
The majority in Marks embraced the Duchess reasoning:
In Duchess, the majority held that the phrase "similar use" within
the meaning of the Act of 1909 does not include the "right to copy"
the recordings of others. We agree and are generally persuaded that
the majority opinion in Duchess sets forth the proper interpretation
of the statute. 5
The validity of the argument that a "similar use" is not an
"identical use" has already been discussed in connection with
Duchess.
Marks contains a number of additional observations and con-
clusions of questionable validity. Consider the assertion that a
subsequent recorder may not use a third party's record but must
begin with the raw material (i.e., the copyrighted composition)
in a manner "similar" to that employed by the first recording:
This means, to us, that one who complies with royalty payment
called for by the statute, though not having any authorization from
the copyright owner, may nonetheless then "use," not a third party's
record, but the copyrighted composition, which has been character-
ized as the "raw material," in a manner "similar" to that employed
by the recording company which did have authorization from the
copyright owner. .... 11
While this may be what section 1(e) means to the court, it is not
expressly so stated in section 1(e) and the court did not cite any
authority indicating how it arrived at this conclusion.
In another portion of the opinion, the court noted that sec-
tion 1(e) does not affirmatively authorize duplication:
There is, of course, nothing in the statute which affirmatively au-
thorizes Magnetics to duplicate and copy the recording of one li-
censed by the copyright owner to reproduce his composition .... 1,
While this is literally correct, it is equally correct to state that the
statute does not affirmatively prohibit duplication. A more accur-
ate statement would be that the statute is totally silent on the
subject and neither authorizes nor prohibits duplication.





The Marks court apparently modified the holding of Fame
which advanced the incredible proposition that in order to be a
"similar use," a subsequent user must "hire musicians." The
Tenth Circuit changed the mandatory "must" to the permissive
"may" and stated:
However, under the statute Magnetics may "use" the copyright
composition in a manner "similar" to that made by the licensed
recording company. All of which means, to us, that Magnetics may
make its own arrangements, hire its own musicians and artists, and
then record. It does not mean that Magnetics may use the com-
poser's copyrighted work by duplicating and copying the record of a
licensed recording company. Such, in our view, is not a similar use."
The court's comment is somewhat irrelevant since the issue
before it was, in essence, must "musicians be hired" (not may)
in order to constitute a "similar use" under section 1(e).
And finally, Marks found the compulsory licensing provision
of section 1(e) to be an exception to or a limitation of the general
policy in the Copyright Act of extending the protection to the
owner of the copyrighted composition. Apparently worried about
the prevalence of tape piracy, Marks holds:
It is the general rule that a proviso should be strictly construed to
the end that an exception does not devour the general policy which
a law may embody."
Using such strict construction, the court thereupon construed the
words "similar use" in the compulsory licensing provision as not
"authorizing" Magnetics to copy or duplicate the recordings orig-
inally authorized by Marks.
In summary, Marks sets forth no new reasoning or citation
of authority in ruling for the copyright owner and against the
pirate. The decision appears to be a mixture of earlier cases hold-
ing the same way. In particular, it adopts the views of Duchess
that "similar" does not encompass "identical" as well as the
Fame theory that "one must (may) go out and hire musicians."
B. Jondora
The remaining portion of this section discusses a decision
which held that section 1(e) does not prohibit tape or record
" Id. (emphasis added).
6 Id., citing Shilkret v. Musicraft Records, Inc., 131 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1942). Professor
Nimmer objects to this construction, saying "[tihis position appears to be tenuous in




piracy. The District Court of New Jersey in Jondora Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc. ,70 which was decided after
Duchess but before Marks, severely criticized Aeolian and
Duchess.7
The plaintiff/copyright owners in Jondora sued the defen-
dant/pirates for copyright infringement, and the pirates moved to
dissolve the preliminary injunction. The district court granted
the pirates' motion, and in essence, held that piracy is not prohib-
ited by section 1(e).
Jondora defined the legal issue as follows:
[Did Congress by the Copyright Act of 1909 grant to musical com-
position copyright holders the power to prevent third persons from
copying a particular performance of that composition, where (a)
with the copyright holder's permission, the performance has already
been fixed on a physical object capable of reproducing it, and (b)
the third person has complied with the compulsory license provi-
sions of the Act by filing and serving notices of intention and paying
royalties to the copyright holders?"
In resolving this issue, the court concluded:
It is my view that the Duchess opinion . . . erroneously inter-
prets the "compulsory license" provision of the Copyright Act. Sim-
ply stated, that court believed that because a musical composition
is copyrighted, the unauthorized reproduction of the performance
embodied in the sound recording of that composition is, and ought
to be, prohibited by federal copyright laws. But that clearly was not
the law when Duchess was decided. Neither performance nor record-
ing was copyrightable. It might have been unethical, or, in some
states, because there was a felt necessity for statutory intervention,
a crime to "steal" a recording of a performance and thereafter sell
it as your own. But clearly the licensee-manufacturer had no claim
under the Copyright Act. 3
Jondora supported its disagreement with Duchess by the fol-
lowing quote from Nimmer:
Assuming such a record pirate duly serves a notice of intent to use,
and pays the compulsory license royalties, the somewhat astounding
result is that as to those sound recordings fixed prior to February 15,
1972, he is not an infringer under the Copyright Act. The only por-
tion of that which he has recorded which is protectible under the
Copyright Act, with respect to sound recordings fixed prior to Febru-
ary 15, 1972, is the musical composition itself, and that he is author-
70 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972).
Id. at 578.
Id. at 577.
73 Id. at 580 (citations omitted).
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ized to use for recording purposes upon payment of the statutory
royalties. All of the other elements contained in the original record
which he has without authority duplicated are not copyrightable,
and hence his use of such other elements does not give rise to an
action for copyright infringement."
The court then discussed at length the new federal record
piracy act and supported its decision in favor of the pirate by
observing that Congress obviously did not intend section 1(e) to
prohibit tape piracy:
I also find persuasive defendant's argument that if Congress
had intended to make duplicators liable after October 15, 1971, for
infringement of musical composition copyrights, regardless of
whether the duplicator complied with the compulsory license provi-
sion, Congress could have simply amended § 1(e) by excluding from
the benefits thereof those making an "exact" or "identical" copy of
a pre-existing recording. Thus, if Congress had desired to make all
duplicators immediately liable for infringement of musical composi-
tion copyrights, it easily could have done so by restricting the com-
pulsory license privilege in some fashion. Instead, Congress created
a new copyright in the sound recordings of performances of copy-
righted musical works, effective, however, only with respect to per-
formances on recordings that were "fixed, published and copy-
righted" four months after the effective date of the 1971 Amend-
ment.75
The Jondora court supports its findings with reasonable pre-
cision by analyzing legislative intent and judicial precedents, and
by strictly interpreting section 1(e). Even though the decision is
rather lengthy, the specific holding of Jondora is that section 1(e)
of the Copyright Act of 1909 does not prohibit tape piracy and
that it, therefore, does not provide the composition copyright
owner the right to sue a tape pirate for copyright infringement.
The authors respectfully submit, in agreement with the dis-
sent in Marks,7" that Jondora correctly construed section 1(e)
with regard to a reasonable meaning of the words used in the
statute as well as to the possible legislative intent of Congress in
enacting section 1(e). While the authors abhor such sharp busi-
ness practices as record and tape piracy, they believe that the
problem should not be solved by court decisions which read into
351 F. Supp. at 580, quoting NIMMER § 108.4621 at 432-33.
7' 351 F. Supp. at 584.
7' Chief Judge Lewis stated in his dissent:
I am in complete accord with the views of Judge Lacey set forth in
[Jondora] .... I would affirm on this aspect of the case only.
497 F.2d at 291-92.
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the statute that which is not there or which distort the plain
meaning of the words used in the statute.
III. STATE ANTI-PIRACY REMEDIES
The purpose of this section is not to review the prolific litiga-
tion and commentary on the right of a state to protect record
manufacturers (as opposed to copyright holders) against piracy.7 7
A brief review of unfair competition and state anti-piracy stat-
utes, however, in relation to section 1(e) will present the remedies
available to the record manufacturer and not available to the
copyright holder.
A. Unfair Competition
At least seven states" enjoin record piracy by relying on the
theory of misappropriation as set forth in International News
Service v. Associated Press" ("INS"). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court80 in adopting the rule of INS stated the elements of misap-
propriation to be
[tihe defendant's use of the plaintiffs product, into which the
plaintiff has put time, skill, and money; and the defendant's use of
the plaintiff's product or a copy of it in competition with the plain-
tiff and gaining an advantage in that competition because the plain-
tiff, and not the defendant, has expended the energy to produce it.
The wrong is not in the copying, but in the appropriation of the
plaintiff's time, effort and money.A'
Tape pirates defend against an INS cause of action with
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,"2 and Compco Corp. v. Day-
" See, e.g., Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 49 (1969); Yankwich, Unfair Competition as an Aid to Equity in Patent, Copyright
& Trade-Mark Cases, 32 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 438 (1957); Note, Copyrights: States Al-
lowed to Protect Works Not Copyrightable Under Federal Law, 58 MINN. L. REv. 316
(1973); Note, Goldstein v. California: A New Outlook For the Misappropriation Doctrine,
8 U. SAN FRAN. L. Rlv. 199 (1973); Comment, Performers' Rights & Copyright: The
Protection of Sound Recordings From Modern Pirates, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 548 (1971).
"' See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970); NBC v. Nance,
506 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C.
App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 702, 181 S.E. 2d 600 (1971); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y. Supp. 2d 553 (Sup. Ct.
1964); CBS v. Custom Recording Co., 258 S.C. 465, 189 S.E.2d 305, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1007 (1972); Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163,
218 N.W.2d 705 (1974).
7' 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163, 218
N.W.2d 705 (1974).
Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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Brite Lighting, Inc.,3 by maintaining that the Supreme Court in
Sears and Compco overruled or severely restricted INS.
Sears and Compco held that unpatented mechanical devices
such as lamp fixtures and lamps may be sold freely even though
their designs are copied and that state unfair competition laws
have no effect on the sales. The Court concluded in Sears that the
purpose of the federal patent system was to promote invention
and to preserve free competition by securing a monopoly for a
limited time, and, therefore, under the supremacy clause, state
unfair competition laws could not be permitted to give perpetual
monopoly protection."
Tape pirates defend their actions by relying upon dicta in
Sears and Compco as it pertains to copyrights. They maintain
that to permit the record manufacturer to use the INS misappro-
priation doctrine is to give him a perpetual monopoly that is in
direct contradiction to the Constitution's mandate "to fix for
limited times." The issue became more complex with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Goldstein v. California."
In Goldstein the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
neither explicitly precludes states from granting copyrights, nor
grants exclusive authority in this field to the federal government.
Goldstein upheld a California tape piracy penal statute on the
basis that, until Congress acts, the states are free to provide pro-
tection without worry of federal preemption."8
After Goldstein, tape pirates defend against an unfair com-
petition claim by arguing that Goldstein in light of Sears and
Compco should be narrowly interpreted to include only statutory
enactments and not common-law adjudications. 8 The resolution
of this issue is not of concern for the present analysis of section
1(e) and the Marks case.
B. State Statutory Enactments
Even though section 1(e) was not the central issue litigated,
the case of International Tape Manufacturers Association v.
Gerstein 8 is of interest with respect to the present discussion.
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
376 U.S. at 230-31.
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
u Id. at 560.
11 Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163, 218
N.W.2d 705 (1974).
u 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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Gerstein was a class action suit by tape pirates against the Attor-
ney General of Florida. The pirates sought relief from future pros-
ecutions under a Florida anti-tape piracy statute by maintaining
that the statute was unconstitutional." Their claim was based on
the immunity found in the federal copyright laws. The court in
Gerstein agreed with the pirates and found the Florida statute
unconstitutional.
Gerstein observed that, in its opinion, the validity of INS was
severly eroded by Sears and Compco. The court relied on an oft-
quoted portion of Compco:0
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state
law may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying
would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, of
the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allow-
ing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright
laws leave in the public domain."
The Gerstein finding of the Florida anti-tape piracy statute
to be unconstitutional was essentially overruled when the Su-
preme Court in Goldstein upheld the constitutionality of a simi-
lar California statute.
The Supreme Court in Goldstein granted certiorari to review
Goldstein's conviction under a California statute making it a
criminal offense to pirate recordings of others. The California
statute protected owners of a master recording from piracy for an
unlimited duration. The Court eliminating any doubt that this
created a perpetual monopoly stated:
No limitation is placed on the use of the music, lyrics, or arrange-
ment employed in making the master recording. Petitioners are not
precluded from hiring their own musicians and artists and recording
an exact imitation of the performance embodied on the master re-
cording. Petitioners are even free to hire the same artists who made
the initial recording in order to duplicate the performance. In ess-
ence, the statute thus provides copyright protection solely for the
specific expressions which compose the master record or tape."
The Court discussed, in depth, the history, origin, and con-
stitutional objectives of the copyright clause and concluded that
both a national and a state copyright system can coexist without
conflict.
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 543.041 (1972).
Id. at 49.
376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
412 U.S. at 550.
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Although the Copyright Clause thus recognizes the potential
benefits of a national system, it does not indicate that all writings
are of national interest or that state legislation is, in all cases, unnec-
essary or precluded. The patents granted by the States in the 18th
century show, to the contrary, a willingness on the part of the States
to promote those portions of science and the arts which were of local
importance. Whatever the diversity of people's backgrounds, origins
and interests and whatever the variety of business and industry in
the 13 Colonies, the range of diversity is obviously far greater today
in a country of 210 million people in 50 States. In view of that
enormous diversity, it is unlikely that all citizens in all parts of the
country place the same importance on works relating to all subjects.
Since the subject matter to which the Copyright Clause is addressed
may thus be of purely local importance and not worthy of national
attention or protection, we cannot discern such an unyielding na-
tional interest as to require an inference that state power to grant
copyrights has been relinquished to exclusive federal control."
As we have seen, the language of the Constitution neither ex-
plicitly precludes the States from granting copyrights nor grants
such authority exclusively to the Federal Government. The subject
matter to which the Copyright Clause is addressed may at times be
of purely local concern. No conflict will necessarily arise from a lack
of uniform state regulation, nor will the interest of one State be
significantly prejudiced by the actions of another. No reason exists
why Congress must take affirmative action either to authorize pro-
tection of all categories of writings or to free them from all restraint.
We therefore conclude that, under the Constitution, the States have
net relinquished all power to grant to authors "the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings.""
In relation to section 1(e), Goldstein stated:
Petitioners do not argue that § 653h [the California statute at
issue] conflicts with [section 1(e)] ...
Assuming, arguendo, that petitioners' use of the composition
they duplicated constitutes a "similar use,".... We do not see in
these statutes the direct conflict necessary to render a state statute
invalid. 5
While the above statement is obiter dicta, it is interesting
that the Supreme Court upon a reading of section 1(e) implied
that pirate duplication is a permissable "similar use" under sec-
tion 1(e), and that the state anti-piracy statutes do not conflict
with section 1(e). The first implication is opposite to the interpre-
Id. at 556-57 (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 560.
Id. at 566, n.23.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
tation of "similar use" by the Tenth Circuit in Marks. In regards
to the second implication, Aeolian, as it pertains to the record
manufacturer, is overruled. In Aeolian, the manufacturer of re-
cords was found to have a "copyright" interest in his recording
which would support a claim of infringement against the pirate.
If this were viable law, then the California statute in Goldstein
would, of necessity, be unconstitutional and pre-empted under
the supremacy clause. The Court in Goldstein found no such
"direct conflict" thus overruling Aeolian by an assumption ar-
guendo.
In summary, Goldstein opened the door for states to provide
statutory protection against the tape pirate who duplicates an-
other's recording.
However, in view of the federal record piracy act, there ap-
pears to be a diminishing need for state statutory action in this
field since all records recorded after February 15, 1972, are pro-
tected by the federal act."
CONCLUSION
The status of the law regarding tape piracy depends on a
number of factors including the time the copies of the recording
were originally recorded, the place the act of piracy occurred, and
the person claiming a cause of action against the pirate.
With regards to a record manufacturer, the federal record
piracy act protects records that are first fixed, published and
copyrighted on and after February 15, 1972. Therefore, the status
of the law of piracy with respect to such recordings is well settled.
The pirating of such records is prohibited and the manufacturer
has a cause of action against the pirate.
Also, the law is well settled for recordings first fixed prior to
the federal record piracy act in those states having a record or
tape piracy act. In such states civil or criminal remedies may be
available for the record manufacturer against the pirate. In those
states not having anti-piracy statutes, unfair competition reme-
dies may be provided the record manufacturer under the INS
misappropriation doctrine. Some states, however, have adopted
neither the INS doctrine nor appropriate statutory remedies.
Therefore, in some states a pirate may legally duplicate the re-
cordings of a record manufacturer prior to February 15, 1972, on
"6 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2,
5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (1970).
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those recordings which do not have the required copyright notice.
With regards to the composition copyright owner who is also
the record manufacturer, it is clear that he has recourse to all of
the above listed remedies due to his role as record manufacturer.
The remedies of one who is only a composition copyright owner
under section 1(e) are unsettled.
The circuits are split as to whether section 1(e) provides the
owner of the composition copyright a right to sue for copyright
infringement or take any other legal action against a pirate.
Jondora held that the copyright owner does not have any such
right; the Marks, Duchess, Fame, and Aeolian courts support the
contrary view. The reasoning of Jondora was based on legislative
and judicial precedents as well as the observation that section
1(e) does not expressly prohibit piracy.
Duchess followed Aeolian and held that the term "similar"
does not include "identical" recordings. Therefore, since pirated
recordings are "identical," they are not a similar use permitted
by section 1(e). Fame and Marks agreed with the Duchess defini-
tion of "similar." The Supreme Court should accept the petition
for certiorari and settle the above conflict as to the construction
of section 1(e).
POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the writing of the above comment, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's decision in Jondora and held against the tape pirate." The
Third Circuit majority in Jondora adhered to the Marks and
Duchess definition of "similar use" and strongly emphasized that
duplicators or pirates do not "use" the composer's work at all. It is
a recording which is used. Rather than permit the use of a recording
of the composition, the statute only authorizes the use of the copy-
righted work, that is the written score. 7
Judge Gibbons, however, strongly dissented:
It is apparent that both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
attempted to provide a remedy which was not envisaged by the 1909
Act .... The Third Circuit should not follow like children of Hom-
elin their erroneous piping."
The Solicitor General filed the amicus brief requested by the
Supreme Court in the Marks case and recommended denial of
'a 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974).
'7 Id. at 395.
" Id. at 396, 401 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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certiorari. 9 In recommending denial of certiorari the Solicitor
General agreed with the Duchess, Marks, and Jondora reasoning
of "similar use" and further stated:
There is no conflict among the circuits, and, although "piracy" is
an important law enforcement problem, the importance of the issues
will steadily diminish. The construction of Section 1(e) is now im-
portant only with respect to recordings issued before February 15,
1972. The music on these discs and tapes will gradually become less
popular, and therefore less attractive to "pirates." 100
Although the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari,"' the au-
thors believe that their arguments concerning the judicial pro-
nouncements of Aeolian, Duchess, Marks, and, now, Jondora, as
well as the congressional intent in passing section 1(e), are still
valid.
" BNA, A-21, No. 210 (Jan. 9, 1975).
10 Id. at A-22.
101 Id.
SECURITIES
On the whole the decisions handed down by the Tenth Cir-
cuit last year relating to securities' will not change the law in this
circuit. Most actions commenced during the term involved al-
leged violations of section 10 and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.2 However, a few cases may clarify some earlier policy
statements of the court.
Notable in this past year was the case of Edina State Bank
v. Mr. Steak, Inc.3 That case may resolve the direct conflict be-
tween the federal securities laws and the Uniform Commercial
Code which arises when dealing with the transfer of restricted
securities. The Mr. Steak case is discussed at length in the final
comment of this section.'
I. DEFINITION OF A SECURITY-JOINT REAL ESTATE
VENTURE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION
Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973)
In Andrews v. Blue,' an action for rescission of a securities
transaction in which the plaintiff was to receive shares of a
merged corporation for his 20 percent interest in a real estate joint
venture with defendants, the Tenth Circuit held the transaction
did involve a security as defined in section 3(a)(10) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.6 The transaction did not qualify as a
private offering under section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 19331
and thus was not exempt from registration under section 5 of the
1933 Act.' The court upheld the plaintiff's right to recover under
the federal and state securities laws.
In holding that the plaintiffs 20 percent interest in the real
Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974); Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. MacKay, 491 F.2d
616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1996 (1974); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367
(10th Cir. 1973); Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1973),
petition for cert. filed 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. June 4, 1974) (No. 73-189); Hadsell v.
Hoover, 484 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1973).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78j(b) (1970).
484 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1974).
See p. 338 infra.
489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973).
15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1970).
7 Id. § 77d(2).
I Id. § 77e.
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estate venture was a security within the meaning of section
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 the court cited
with approval the test expounded by the Supreme Court in SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co. ,0 There the Court broadly defined a security
as:
A contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of a promoter or a third-party, it being immaterial
whether the shares of the enterprise are evidenced by formal certifi-
cates or by nominal interest in the physical assets employed in the
enterprise."
A major aspect of the venture in the Andrews case was in-
vestment, with an eye toward profits rather than management.
Despite a contract reference to plaintiff as a consultant, plaintiff
was a consultant in name only and defendants, the other partici-
pants in this venture, treated him as an outsider who had no
managerial authority. The court felt that this contract reference
to Andrews as a consultant did not deprive the relationship of its
character as an investment contract thereby making it a secu-
rity.'2
Defendants claimed that the issuance of shares to the plain-
tiff arising out of the merger was a private offering, and therefore,
exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933.11 The
court, in rejecting this argument, discussed the criteria developed
in the case of SEC v. Ralston Purina Co." In that case the Su-
preme Court was called upon to determine the meaning of the
term "public offering." In interpreting section 4(2)'" it concluded
that the transaction is exempt from registration only when an
offeree has had sufficient access to information similar to that
made available to the offeree in a registration statement. So con-
sidered, an offering is private when made "to those who are shown
able to fend for themselves."'" In Andrews, the Tenth Circuit
found that plaintiff did not have access to all relative information
regarding the offering. Furthermore, the court determined that
' Id. § 78c(lO).
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Id. at 299.
12 489 F.2d at 375.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
1 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
346 U.S. at 125.
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the defendants had induced plaintiff into the investment by ma-
terially misleading statements designed to depreciate the plain-
tiff's interest in the property and enhance the value of their own.' 7
The plaintiff had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these
statements. In addition, the court found that the small number
of shares issued and the restrictive legend on the face of the shares
were not, in themselves, sufficient to make this offering private. 8
Finally, the defendants claimed that the offering was exempt
from registration because they were neither issuers nor underwri-
ters and hence within the purview of section 4(1) of the 1933 Act."
The court found the defendants were issuers under section 2(11)
of the 1933 Act 20 because they were controlling persons of the
issuing corporation, and they were underwriters because they re-




Four Tenth Circuit cases during this term arose out of fraud-
ulent transactions and all were commenced alleging violations of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193422 and other
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
A. Hadsell v. Hoover, 484 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1974)
In an action by a purchaser of unregistered securities alleging
violations of the antifraud provisions against a seller who agreed
to repurchase the securities, the Tenth Circuit held, in Hadsell
v. Hoover,'2 3 that the repurchase agreement did not preclude the
buyer from maintaining an action under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.24 Defendant-appellant, while not
contesting the sufficiency or credibility of the evidence, argued
that there was no fraud involved in the sale of the securities. At
best, the defendant claimed there existed only an action for
breach of contract on the repurchase agreement.
In dismissing this argument, the court cited the broad reme-
dial purposes of the federal securities laws and earlier Tenth Cir-
cuit cases describing the requisites for an action under section
,7 489 F.2d at 373.
, Id. at 374.
15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970).
Id. § 77b(11).
21 489 F.2d at 375.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
484 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
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10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10(b)(5)
promulgated thereunder.2
B. United States v. MacKay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973)
In United States v. MacKay,"8 defendants, acting through a
corporation, devised and implemented a scheme to take control
of an insurance company and strip it of its assets for the fraudu-
lent purposes of purchasing its stock. The scheme was carried out
by use of a jurisdictional means, that is, the use of the mails or
other instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
In its decision, the Tenth Circuit discusses, in general, the
basis of fraud action under the federal securities laws." In its
discussion of a jurisdictional means, the court noted that it is
fundamental that an accused need not carry out the mailing or use
of the instrumentality of commerce. If he causes it to be carried out
by setting forces in motion which foreseeably result in the use of the
mails, his action is sufficient.8
Finally, the court reaffirmed the law in the Tenth Circuit in
regard to the truth or falsity of fraudulent statements: "The law
is that a statement made which is patently false or made with
reckless indifference to its truth or falsity can be equivalent to
intent to defraud." 9
C. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494
F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,30
an investor brought an action seeking damages against a broker-
age house for "churning" of her account. After noting that courts
are in general agreement that "churning" in this context consti-
tutes fraud,3 ' the Tenth Circuit held the 2-year statute of limita-
tions is not a bar to plaintiff's action claiming her broker engaged
in excessive trading of her account in order to generate commis-
sions. 2 As in the case of any action based in fraud, the statute
5 Id. § 78j(b).
491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 619.
n Id.
" Id. at 623.
- 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974).
31 Id.
12 The court held that "the Oklahoma two-year statute applies." Id. at 171. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. § 408(e) (1965) provides that "[n]o person may sue [for a violation of a
security law] more than two years after the contract of sale."
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starts running from the date of actual or constructive discovery
of the fraud, that is, when the plaintiff has become fully aware
that she has been victimized. In this instance, the court held that
because "churning" is conduct which is not common to the expe-
rience of the ordinary individual, the issue as to whether the
plaintiff in a case such as this is to be charged with knowledge is
essentially one of fact subject to determination by the jury. The
court allowed the plaintiff a trial on the question of when she
actually became aware of the "churning" activity, and further
held that the sophistication of the investor is an important con-
sideration in determining when the investor had knowledge of
this "churning."
D. Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974)
Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko 31 involved an action by the
corporate purchaser of all the stock in the second corporation
against the seller of the stock and the accounting firm, which
prepared the financial report in connection with the sale, of fraud,
negligence, and violation of the Securities Act of 1933.3 The
Tenth Circuit found the absence of any fraud on the part of the
defendant-seller and the accounting firm, and held that evidence
did in fact support a finding of fraud on the part of the purchaser.
This was basically an action for common law fraud in which
the plaintiff alleged violation of the federal securities laws. The
court found no conspiracy by either the seller or the accounting
firm to defraud or to violate the Securities Act, citing Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,8 and Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. , as the standard to be followed.
Finally, the court held that where the purchaser of securities
knew that the financial report of a corporation being prepared by
an accounting firm was being drawn for another potential pur-
chaser and where the purchaser did not show reliance on the
representations in the financial statement, the accounting firm
was not liable to the purchaser for fraud.3
Michael L. Corrigan
= 494 F.2d at 172.
- 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
" 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
474 F.2d 574 (10th Cir. 1973).
494 F.2d at 717.
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III. TRANSFER OF RESTRICTED SECURITIES
Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1974)
Price, who had been an employee of Mr. Steak, Inc. (Mr.
Steak), received 2,400 shares of unregistered Mr. Steak stock in
January 1969,' in a private placement,2 representing that he was
taking the stock for investment purposes. No restriction was
noted on the stock certificates and Price did not sign an invest-
ment letter.3 In April 1969, Mr. Steak filed a registration state-
ment covering 300,000 shares of its stock, but Price's shares were
not included in the statement. In March 1969, Price negotiated a
series of loans with the Edina State Bank (Bank). Those loans
were consolidated into a single $27,000 note dated May 5, 1969,
secured by Price's 2,400 shares of Mr. Steak stock.
In early June 1969, the Bank attempted to realize on the
collateral by turning over 1000 of the Mr. Steak shares to a broker
for sale. The broker sold the stock, remitting $37,000 to the Bank.
That amount was credited to Price's checking account which was
then debited in the amount of the outstanding loan. The $27,000
note was canceled and Price's loan account was closed.
When the broker presented the certificates to Mr. Steak's
transfer agent, Central Bank and Trust Company (Central),
transfer was refused. Central had received a stop-transfer notice
from Mr. Steak covering its shares issued in private offering. The
notice required Central not to register a transfer of those shares
without first notifying Mr. Steak and getting an opinion of coun-
sel that the proposed transfer would not violate the Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act).' The broker returned the stock to the
Bank, which reimbursed the broker out of its own funds.
The recitation of facts is taken from the opinion of the circuit court in Edina State
Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir. 1973), and Pre-Trial Order, June
14, 1971, and Record of Hearing, Feb. 7, 1972, in Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc.,
D.C. No. C-2611 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 1972).
A sale of securities is exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1971), if it does not involve a public offering, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (1971). Mr. Steak intended to qualify for that exemption with respect to Price's
stock. Stock issued under that exemption must be restricted in the hands of a private
offeree in order to insure that no public offering is involved. See text accompanying notes
25-30 infra.
I An investment letter and a notation of restriction on the stock certificate are factors
considered by the SEC in determining the availability of the private offering exemption.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5121 (Dec. 30, 1970); SEC Securities Act Release No.
33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). The precautions assist the issuer in preserving its exemption.
I The combination of the stop-transfer notice and the opinion of counsel are also
common practices by issuers seeking to protect their exemptions. Folk, Article Eight: A
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The Bank then requested that Price return the $37,000, but
he was unable to do so. Instead, he signed a new note, dated June
30, 1969, for $37,000, secured by the same 2400 Mr. Steak shares.
Price defaulted on the loan. The Bank attempted to register
transfer of the stock then, and again in April 1970, with no suc-
cess.5 By mid-1970, the value of the stock had dropped to $4.00
per share. In September 1970, the Bank sued Mr. Steak and
Central in Federal District Court of Colorado for damages for
wrongful refusal to transfer the stock under Article 8 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC).
Judgment in the district court was for the defendants. Judge
Chilson held that the disposition of the case was governed not by
the UCC but by the Securities Act, by which the federal govern-
ment had pre-empted the field. Since the refusal to transfer was
based on compliance with the federal law, defendants incurred no
liability under state law.
The judgment was reversed on appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.' The court relied on section 8-204 of
the UCC:
Unless conspicuously noted on the security, a restriction on transfer
imposed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective
except against a person with actual knowledge of it.'
Since the certificates contained no notation of restriction and
the court felt that the Bank had no knowledge of the restriction,
the Bank was allowed to recover. This finding is problematic in
two aspects:
(1) At the time the $37,000 note (the note on which the
action is based) was executed, the Bank had knowledge
of the restriction.
(2) There is no absolute right of recovery under section
8-204 for unnoted restrictions. The remedy is provided
by the common law and section 8-401(2), for which
Premise and Three Problems, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1379, 1399 (1967); Israels, Stop-Transfer
Procedures and the Securities Act of 1933-Addendum to Uniform Commercial
Code-Article 8, 17 RtrrERs L. REV. 158, 164 (1962).
1 The bank was informed that transfer would be registered if it would submit the
required opinion of counsel. An acceptable opinion was never tendered. Plaintiff's Exhib-
its 6-8, Defendants' Exhibits F & G, record, vol. H, at 23-25, 30-31.
Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1973).
This section of the UCC has been adopted without amendment in every state, 3 R.
ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-204:2 (2d ed. 1971).
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there are certain prerequisites not discussed by the
court.
These problems will be explored further in the body of this com-
ment.
The court then addressed itself to the pre-emption issue.
Disagreeing with the district court, it held that section 8-204 of
the UCC could and should be read in harmony with the federal
securities laws since there is no evidence of congressional intent
to prohibit state regulation in the area.' The court refused to
reach the questions of whether the contemplated transfer would
have violated the Securities Act and what effect such violation
would have had on the parties. Instead, the court simply held
that the Bank was entitled to damages under UCC section 8-204
and that recovery of such damages "is not violative of the federal
prohibition against transfer."9
Additionally, the court rejected defendants' contention that
the Bank failed to mitigate its damages as it could have by fur-
nishing the necessary opinion of counsel required to register
transfer of the shares while the price of the stock remained high.
Because the restriction on the stock was unnoted, and therefore
ineffective under section 8-204, the court held that the Bank had
no such duty to mitigate and was entitled to recover for its full
loss.
Presently, the Supreme Court has before it a petition for
certiorari in this case, filed by the defendants.'0 The Association
of Stock Transfer Agents, Inc., has petitioned for leave to file a
brief amicus curiae in support of the petition for certiorari. The
petitioners argue that the circuit court's decision places issuers
and transfer agents in an untenable position. When a request is
made for transfer of an unlegended security that is restricted
because of the Securities Act, they must choose between register-
ing the transfer and risking a violation of the Securities Act or
refusing to register transfer and thereby incurring liability for
refusal to transfer." This comment will discuss whether such a
See text accompanying note 41 infra.
487 F.2d at 645.
tO Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S.
June 4, 1974) (No. 73-1789).
1 Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 4, Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., petition
for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. June 4, 1974) (No. 73-1789); Brief for Stock Transfer
Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 9, id.
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dilemma is the necessary result of the laws governing securities
and what alternatives are available.
I. ARTICLE EIGHT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The purpose of Article 8 of the UCC is to render investment
securities freely negotiable.' 2 Section 8-204 serves this purpose by
denying effectiveness to any restrictions on transferability which
are not noted on the stock certificate, except against persons with
actual knowledge of the restriction.
A. The Knowledge Requirement
The Bank argued that the restrictions on the Mr. Steak stock
had no validity as to it because they were not noted on the certifi-
cates. The facts of the case indicate that the Bank had actual
knowledge of the restrictions on Price's stock when the final note,
which formed the basis of the suit, was executed.'3 Prior to June
30, 1969, the Bank had attempted to transfer the stock and
learned of the existence and nature of the restriction. Thus the
Bank had actual and full knowledge of the restriction, in which
case section 8-204 affords it no protection.'
4
Neither the district court nor the circuit court took the view
that the Bank had knowledge of the restriction. It is clear that
the Bank did not possess actual knowledge of the restriction prior
to June 1969.' 5 If the $37,000 note is viewed merely as a consolida-
tion of the previous loans, then it is arguable that the Bank lacked
the requisite knowledge, because a consolidation note does not
discharge the prior obligations and rights of the parties." In this
case, however, the new note was executed for a new obligation,
since money had changed hands in satisfaction of the old note
and the amount due was increased.' 7 Knowing that Price's finan-
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-105; § 8-101, Comment; § 8-105, Comment 1; Folk,
supra note 4, at 1379; Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper-Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Bus. LAw. 676, 678 (1958).
13 Record, vol. I, at 29. UCC section 1-201(25) does not define "knowledge" but does
distinguish it from "reason to know." The standard is clearly subjective. Adrian Tabin
Corp. v. Climax Boutique, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 210, 313 N.E.2d 66, 256 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608
(1974); McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tenn. 1973).
1, B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Tex. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1974); Norman v. Jerich Corp., 263 Ore.
259, 501 P.2d 305 (1972).
" Record, vol. I, at 27.
I American Trust Co. v. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau Inc., 207 F.2d
685 (2d Cir. 1953); Bowden v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d'406,
224 P.2d 713 (1950).
1 King v. Edel, 69 Ga. App. 607, 616, 26 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1943); Meinholtz v. Lam-
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cial condition was precarious, the Bank went ahead and accepted
a new note secured by the stock it then knew to be restricted.
Since the Bank then had actual knowledge of the restriction,
notation on the certificate was not necessary to make the restric-
tion effective. Factually, then, this case seems not to require dis-
cussion of conflict between the federal securities laws and the
UCC. Nevertheless, the courts have not resolved the dispute fac-
tually.
B. The Nature of Recovery
Since the Tenth Circuit took the view that the Bank did not
have knowledge of the restriction on the Mr. Steak stock, it
granted the Bank recovery under section 8-204 of the UCC. That
section, however, provides no remedy; it merely describes the
prerequisites for "effectiveness" of a restriction on the transfer of
stock. Where an issuer or transfer agent refuses to transfer stock
because it is restricted but that restriction is not effective under
8-204, Comment 1 to that section notes that a conversion has
occurred and "the issuer can be compelled to register the transfer
under the policy of Part 4 of this Article." If a purchaser desires
to recover damages rather than compel transfer, he must sue for
conversion or proceed under section 8-401 of the UCC.
A common law conversion is said to occur when an issuer
wrongfully refuses to register a requested transfer of stock."8 While
no clear definition of "wrongful" has developed under case law,
cases under section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the
predecessor of UCC section 8-204, indicate that a refusal to trans-
fer based on an ineffective restriction constitutes a form of con-
version." Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and sec-
tion 8-204 of the UCC have been interpreted as having the same
meaning.20
In this case, Mr. Steak contended that its refusal to register
the transfer was not wrongful because a transfer would have
pert, 101 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Mo. App. 1937); Elisberg v. Simpson, 173 N.Y.S. 128, 130
(1918); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dvorak, 199 N.W.2d 414, 416-17 (N.D. 1972).
IS Annot., 22 A.L.R. 2d 12 (1952); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Wilson, 101 Colo. 511, 75 P.2d
149 (1937); Holmes v. Birtman Electric Co., 18 Ill. 2d 554, 165 N.E.2d 261 (1960).
11 Age Publishing Co. v. Becker, 110 Colo. 319, 134 P.2d 205 (1943); Hulse v. Consoli-
dated Quicksilver Mining Corp., 65 Idaho 768, 154 P.2d 149 (1944); Doss v. Yingling, 95
Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930).
1 Irwin v. West End Div. Co., 481 F.2d 34, 38 (10th Cir. 1973); B & H Warehouse,
Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 517, 523 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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caused a violation of section 5 of the Securities Act.2 This line of
argument is discussed in detail in the treatment of UCC 8-401
below, but it should be noted here that a similar argument was
rejected in Texas under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. In
Prudential Petroleum Corp. v. Rauscher, Pierce & Co.,22 the cor-
poration was engaged in an offering under Regulation A of the
Securities Act.' In order to obtain SEC approval for that offering,
it closed its books as to transfers of previously-issued stock. As a
result, a transfer of previously-issued stock was refused although
the restriction was not on the certificates. The court permitted
recovery for conversion noting, however, that the refusal to trans-
fer was not wrongful. Seemingly, a refusal to transfer based on a
restriction that is ineffective under the statutes constitutes an
independent ground for an action for conversion.
In the fact pattern of Mr. Steak, the existence of an auto-
matic recovery for an unnoted restriction placed the issuer in the
unfortunate position of having to choose between two courses of
action both of which could attract liability. A transfer agent,
however, can incur no liability under the common law for a re-
fusal to register a transfer of stock.24 The Bank thus could not
recover against Central for conversion. Section 8-406(1)(b) of the
UCC changes that rule by imposing on a transfer agent the same
liability as that of an issuer. Since the Bank recovered against
Central, it must have been under the UCC.
The Bank was seeking the type of recovery granted in section
8-401(2):
Where an issuer is under a duty to register a transfer of a security
the issuer is also liable to the person presenting it for registration
... for loss resulting from . . . refusal to register the transfer.
The duty to transfer arises when the conditions in section 8-401(1)
are satisfied. The only requirement possibly not met in Mr. Steak
is found in section 8-401(1)(e). In order for there to be no duty to
transfer under that section, the transfer must in fact not be right-
ful and it must not be to a bona fide purchaser. Defendants in
Mr. Steak made the argument that transfer to the Bank (or its
21 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1971).
281 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
17 C.F.R. 230.251-63 (1974).
2, Under agency law, a transfer agent is only liable for breach of duty to his principal.
Mears v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 97 Cal. App. 2d 482, 218 P.2d 91, 92 (1950); Lenhart
Altschuler Assocs. v. Benjamin, 28 Misc. 2d 602, 215 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1961).
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purchaser) would not in fact be rightful because it would cause a
violation of the Securities Act.
Price received his stock in a private placement, exempt from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act under section
4(2) as a transaction not involving a public offering."8 If the SEC
finds that the transaction did involve a public offering, the ex-
emption will no longer be available and the issuer will have sold
securities in violation of section 5.26 A public offering is synony-
mous with a distribution, 7 and anyone who purchases from an
issuer with a view to distribution of a security is an underwriter."8
If the purchaser of a privately-placed security does not hold the
stock for a sufficiently long period, he is considered to have pur-
chased the security with a view to distribution, making him an
underwriter. 9 Thus the entire private offering loses its exemption
on an improper resale of some of the securities and anyone taking
part in that sale will have violated section 5.30
The stock involved in Mr. Steak was issued to Price in Janu-
ary 1969. The Bank attempted to transfer it in the summer of
1969 and again in the spring of 1970. Whether transfer at that
time would have caused a violation of section 5 can only be re-
solved by looking at the facts. The court did not reach this ques-
tion, and the necessary analysis is outside the scope of this com-
ment." Since the burden of proving the availability of an exemp-
tion is upon the party claiming the exemption 3 (in this case, the
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1971). See also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953);
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 850 (1967).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
"7 Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934); SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS
162 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wheat Report].
- 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
" United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., SEC Release No. 33-3825 (Aug. 12, 1957); Israels, Problems Incident to
the Use of Stop-Transfer Procedures, 18 Bus. LAW. 85 (1962).
1 SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1960); 4 L. Loss, SECURrrIEs
REGULATION 2657 (Supp. 1969).
"' Today, rule 144, 17 C.F.R. 230.144 (1974), would provide a method of resale that
would protect all involved parties. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5223 (Jan. 1, 1972);
SEC Securities Act Relase No. 33-5306 (Sept. 26, 1972). For discussion of permissible
resale of privately-placed stock outside of rule 144, see SEC Securities Act Release No.
33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), and Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 33-3825 (Sept. 20, 1957).
n SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); United States v. Custer
Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967). The Bank would have had to show
that Price was not an underwriter, thus entitling the Bank to transfer the shares without
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Bank) and the Bank never supplied the opinion of counsel re-
quested by defendants that would have indicated the availability
of the exemption, the court could have found that a transfer of
Price's stock would have caused a violation of section 5.33
The UCC does not specify what transfers are "in fact right-
ful" within the meaning of section 8-401(1)(e), but a transfer that
would cause a violation of the federal securities laws would ap-
pear not to qualify. One of the leading commentators on Article
8 has said that such a transfer "is hardly rightful. ' 34 However, the
only cases holding that a transfer which would cause a violation
of the Securities Act would be wrongful involved restrictions
which were noted on the certificates. 35 Clearly, such a transfer
would be wrongful, as would an attempt to transfer stock not
owned by the transferor. The word "wrongful" here should proba-
bly apply to the transfer itself and not the effect of the transfer.
That construction substantially weakens the contention that any
transfer that would cause a violation of the Securities Act is not
rightful.
In order to show that there is no duty to transfer under sec-
tion 8-401(1)(e), it is also necessary that the transfer not be re-
quested by a bona fide purchaser. For the purpose of Article 8, a
bona fide purchaser is one who purchases without notice of an
adverse claim. 36 A claim that a transfer would be wrongful is an
adverse claim, 37 and notice includes "reason to know" based on
all the facts and circumstances s.3 The determination of whether
registering them under a section 4(1) exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970), for a transac-
tion not by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.
3 Had a violation of section 5 been found, Mr. Steak would have lost its section 4(2)
exemption for the entire private offering and Central would have been liable as an aider
and abettor. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1960). The Bank could
also be a violator under the rule of that case, depending on its state of mind when it took
the pledge of stock. See Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Sargent, The Guild Films Case: The Effect of "Good Faith" in Foreclosure of Unregistered
Securities Pledged as Collateral, 46 VA. L. REv. 1573, 1578 (1960).
1 Israels, supra note 29, at 89. Israels makes the same point in 17 RUTGERS L. REV.
supra note 4, at 164.
" Kenler v. Canal Nat'l Bank, 489 F.2d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 1973); Garsarch v. Ormand
Indus. Inc., 346 F. Supp. 550, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Dean Witter & Co. v. Educa-
tional Computer Corp., 369 F. Supp. 757, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
"a UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-302. E.g., Miriani v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358
F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (N.D.Ill. 1973).
"7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-301(1). E.g., Dean Witter & Co. v. Educational
Computer Corp., 369 F. Supp. 757, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(25). E.g., Victory Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma
State Bank, 520 P.2d 675, 678 (Okla. 1973).
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the transferee is a bona fide purchaser will be a factual one, and
the facts 9 in this case tended to show that the Bank was on notice
of the possibility that Price's stock was restricted, despite Price's
representations otherwise."°
It is possible, then, that Central could have avoided liability
in this case by showing that the Bank had notice of the fact that
Price received his shares in a private offering and that a transfer
which would cause a violation of the Securities Act is a wrongful
transfer. The circuit court declined to reach this issue, but if it
had, it would have found little case law in support of Central's
position. Without this defense, Central was subjected to liability
for acts completely outside its control. Additionally, the defense
would never be successful where a purchaser or pledgee is without
notice of a restriction, because he would be a bona fide purchaser
entitled to transfer regardless of the wrongfulness of such trans-
fer.
The combination of the UCC and the Securities Act in situa-
tions such as that in Mr. Steak creates unacceptable results. Both
issuer and transfer agent must choose between liability under one
of the two acts. When state and federal law clash in this manner,
a question of pre-emption arises.
I1. PRE-EMPTION
When there is an apparent pre-emption issue, the courts
begin by looking at the purposes of the laws in question. The
Supreme Court has set up the process as follows:
Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal
statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially
a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two
statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether
they are in conflict."
" The officer handling the loan knew that Mr. Steak was a privately-held company
that was about to make a public offering. He was also knowledgeable in the securities field.
Record, vol. I, at 26-28.
,0 Perhaps it should be noted that the Bank considered Price "financially irresponsi-
ble" after July 1969. Record, vol. I, at 4, 24. No action has been taken against him even
though he remains liable on the $37,000 note and may also be liable for his misrepresen-
tations as to the restrictions on the pledged stock, Altman v. American Foods, Inc., 262
N.C. 671, 138 S.E.2d 526 (1964).
'1 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). In Mr. Steak, the court primarily
focused on congressional intent to pre-empt, 487 F.2d at 645-46, and found none. That
inquiry is relevant where "[bloth regulations can be enforced without impairing federal
superintendence of the field," id., which the court found here. There are, however, situa-
tions in which UCC section 8-204 and the Securities Act are not harmonious. See text
accompanying notes 43-46, infra.
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SECURITIES
There have been extensive statements of purpose by the legisla-
tures, courts, and commentators concerning both the UCC and
the Securities Act. Article 8 of the UCC has as its purpose the
promotion of free trading in securities, and in order to achieve
that aim it gives investment securities the attributes of negotia-
bility.42 The basic purpose of the Securities Act is to protect the
investing public by insuring that purchasers are fully informed
about the venture in which they are investing. 3
The Securities Act requires a registration statement and the
use of prospectus in the sale of securities in order to achieve the
Act's purpose." An exception from those requirements has been
granted for private offerings because the private offerees do not
require the protection of the Act.45 The exemption is closely cir-
cumscribed, however, to insure that the unregistered securities do
not get into the hands of uninformed investors, the persons the
Act was designed to protect. Since an issuer is liable if its
privately-placed securities are distributed to the public,4" restric-
tions on sales are imposed on those securities. These restrictions
exist at the time of the original issue of the stock and can be noted
on the certificates at that time. There are situations, however, in
which issuers will be unable to note the restrictions on the certifi-
cates.47 Whether restrictions are noted or not is irrelevant under
the Securities Act; when any restricted security is sold in viola-
tion of the Act, liability arises. The UCC's purpose of full negotia-
" See note 11 supra.
a SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); A.C. Frost
& Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941); Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp.
55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Israels, supra note 11, at -78.
,3 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1971).
' See note 24 supra; WHAT REPorr at 160.
'3 See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
For example, private placement restrictions may lapse after a few years and holders
of that stock may require the issuer to remove the legend from their certificates. SEC No-
Action Letter, May 22, 1970 (unpublished). At a later date, the issuer may make an
offering under Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. 230.251-63 (1974), and the SEC will then require
that the transfer books be closed as to the earlier-issued stock as in Prudential Petroleum
Corp. v. Rauscher, Pierce & Co., 281 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). The temporary
moratorium on transfer cannot be shown on the certificates.
Another troublesome situation arises when an issuer seeks to protect itself from sec-
ondary liability on a distribution by a control person by giving its transfer agent a stop-
transfer notice on stock registered to control persons. Such stock may well have been
acquired on the open market, making it very difficult for the issuer to get notice of the
restriction onto the certificates. This problem arose but was not resolved in Travis Inv.
Co. v. Harwyn Publishing Corp., 288 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a discussion, see
Israels, supra note 28, at 86-89.
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bility runs counter to the aim of the Securities Act in this situa-
tion. There is a potential conflict here that manifested itself in
the fact situation of the Mr. Steak case.
Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, a conflict
between a state and a federal law must be resolved in favor of the
federal law." The federal law will oust state law only to the extent
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the federal act. 9 According
to that formula, the conflict between section 8-204 of the UCC
and the Securities Act should be resolved by reading section 8-
204 as invalidating all unnoted restrictions except those placed on
securities in order to insure compliance with the Securities Act.
Arguably, the latter restrictions need not be noted on the certifi-
cate in order to be effective.
Farmer's Educational & Cooperative Union of America v.
WDA Y, Inc. ," supports the type of resolution made above. In that
case, the defendant permitted a political candidate air time in
compliance with the federal equal time law.5 As a result of the
candidate's broadcast, the defendant was sued for libel. The
court noted that WDAY was forbidden to censor a candidate's
remarks under the equal time law and also that the station ran
the risk of not having its license renewed if it denied air time to
all candidates. In other words, in order to keep from running afoul
of the FCC, WDAY had to give time to all candidates and allow
them to say whatever they chose. The court refused to "sanction
the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps crimi-
nal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute de-
mands of the licensee."52 As a result, the court read the equal time
statute as necessarily immunizing broadcasters from libel actions
arising out of candidates' remarks.1
3
In this case, the statute demands that the issuer keep its
unregistered stock out of the hands of the uninformed public. In
most situations, that requirement will not cause any problems
with state law because issuers do try to place a legend on their
restricted stock. Even where issuers cannot note restrictions on all
Is See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963);
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
"' Elliott v. Blumb, 356 F.2d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 1966); Dix v. Rodgers, 269 F.2d 84, 88
(2d Cir. 1959).
360 U.S. 525 (1959).
5' Id. at 526.




certificates,54 the Securities Act still requires that the stock not
be transferred in violation thereof, but state law says the restric-
tion is ineffective against anyone without knowledge of it. In order
not to frustrate the underlying purposes of the federal law, the
courts should give precedence to federal laws.55 In other words,
where an issuer or a transfer agent stands faced with the choice
that defendants in Mr. Steak had-transfer and be in violation
of the Securities Act or refuse to transfer and be subject to liabil-
ity under state laws-the courts should immunize them from
liability under state law for acting in consonance with the federal
law. This resolution will protect issuers and especially transfer
agents from liability where they cannot effectively control the
behavior that creates the liability, while at the same time leaving
the purchaser several paths of recourse against the person selling
him the restricted security.5 This is probably the best possible
judicial resolution of the case. It does, however, have the addi-
tional effect of immunizing issuers from liability for an unnoted
restriction when noting the restriction would have been a simple
task. The court in Mr. Steak may well have declined to find pre-
emption by the Securities Act in order to avoid the frustration of
the UCC. Unfortunately, the decision in Mr. Steak will lead to
equally frustrating and inequitable results in other fact situa-
tions.
III. CONCLUSION
The aim of Article 8, and section 8-204 in particular, was to
enable a stock purchaser to know what he was getting simply by
looking at the stock certificate. If issuers need to restrict their
stock, they are given the burden of making that restriction effec-
tive. In most cases, issuers will have no difficulty noting restric-
tions on their stock certificates and they should be responsible for
doing so. They should not be subject to liability on an unnoted
restriction when it is beyond their power to get legends onto the
necessary certificates. 7 Perhaps the ideal rule would be to immu-
nize issuers from liability for an unnoted restriction only when
See note 47 supra.
Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945).
56 The seller would incur potential liability on the underlying contract, as well as
liability for misrepresentation of the transferability of the stock under the theory of Alt-
man v. American Foods, Inc., 262 N.C. 671, 138 S.E.2d 526 (1964), and possibly under
rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1974). Also the seller will have breached his warranty that
transfer is rightful under UCC section 8-306(2)(a).
"7 See note 47 supra.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
they are diligent in noting restrictions whenever possible. In those
situations, the purchaser's recovery would have to be from the
seller, who failed to disclose the restriction. When a restriction is
unnoted due to the issuer's negligence, no immunity from UCC
section 8-204 would result. This rule would allocate liability on
the basis of fault and could easily be incorporated into sections
227 and 1603 of the American Law Institute's proposed Federal
Securities Code. Transfer agents should be completely immu-
nized from liability for refusal to transfer based on an unnoted
restriction, since they are not in a position to make sure that
restrictions are noted on the stock they handle. This rule would
have saved Central but not Mr. Steak in the instant case.
The rule that comes out of Mr. Steak makes it imperative
that issuers note all restrictions." Issuers with unlegended re-
stricted stock would be well advised to call in those certificates
and stamp them. Transfer agents would do well to demand in-
demnification agreements from issuers covering liability for un-
noted restrictions. The only way to be absolutely safe would be
to legend all certificates that might possibly be or become re-
stricted with a notation of that possibility. That course of action
would clearly frustrate the aims of the UCC by decreasing the
negotiability of investment securities, but that seems to be the
only way to avoid a potential liability about which the parties can
do nothing.
Mary-Ann Wilson
" State law will support issuers here in that it will require those who take stock
knowing it to be restricted to take legended certificates, General Dev. Corp. v. Catlin, 139
So. 2d 901 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962); Short v. Soil Builders Int'l Corp., [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).
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SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
Each year a number of Tenth Circuit decisions which the
Journal has selected for comment and analysis will subsequently
be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Throughout this issue
we have attempted to note cases for which petitions for certiorari
have been filed and what disposition, if any, has been made of
those petitions prior to our publication deadline. When the Su-
preme Court grants review to a decision of the Tenth Circuit and
an opinion is rendered, the Journal will utilize this section of the
Tenth Circuit Survey to comment on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. As a feature of this initial issue, we include comments on
two Supreme Court decisions from the last term treating cases
which originated in the Tenth Circuit.
I. CIVIL RIGHTS-TITLE VII-ARBITRATION IS NO BAR
TO EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO TRIAL DE NOVO IN FEDERAL
COURT IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SUIT
BASED ON SAME CLAIM
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
By THOMAS L. ROBERTS*
INTRODUCTION
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,' a unanimous opinion
authored by Mr. Justice Powell, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
a decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,2 and, in so
doing, set forth an important exegesis of the nature and character
of employment discrimination suits brought by private employ-
ees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Alexander comprehensively analyzes the relationship be-
tween federal courts and grievance-arbitration apparatuses typi-
cally included in collective-bargaining agreements. In general
terms the Court explored and contrasted formal and informal
* Member of Colorado Bar; Law Clerk to Judge Sherman G. Finesilver, United States
District Court for the District of Colorado; B.A., 1966, University of Iowa; J.D., 1974,
University of Denver.
1 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See generally Nash, Board Referral to Arbitration and Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver: Some Preliminary Observations, 25 LABOR L.J. 259 (1974); Oppen-
heim, Gateway & Alexander, Whither Arbitration? 48 TuL. L. REv. 973 (1974); Comment,
Civil Rights-Title VII-Prior Resort to Arbitration Under a Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment Does Not Preclude an Employee from Bringing Suit in Federal Court Under Title
VI-Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), 43 U. CiN. L. REv. 661 (1974).
2 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), aff'g per curiam 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1972), as amended.
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means of resolving labor disputes. Specifically, it held that prior
submission of an employee's claim of discrimination in employ-
ment to final arbitration pursuant to a nondiscrimination clause
in a collective-bargaining agreement does not foreclose prosecu-
tion of the same claim by a trial de novo in federal court under
Title VII.
In reaching this conclusion the Court stressed the important
function which Congress intended such suits to fulfill and clearly
manifested an attitude of judicial hospitality toward them.
Alexander thus represents a significant victory for potential Title
VII claimants not only in the Court's refusal to bar suit by an
employee who has attempted to preserve his rights through resort
to arbitration, but also in its strong language evincing a liberal
stance with respect to equal employment opportunity litigation.
Following a brief outline of the nature of a Title VII action
and a sketch of the factural background appearing in Alexander,
this comment will discuss the case as it was treated in the three
tiers of the federal court system.
I. TITLE VII ACTIONS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 prohibits those
employers within its purview from discriminating against any
employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.' Enforcement of the Act is left largely to private persons
who have the right to bring suit in federal court against their
employer if they believe themselves the victim of an unlawful
discriminatory practice.'
Prior to institution of an action in federal court, however, the
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 46 n.6, 59-60 (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
significantly changed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103
(1972). For the sake of convenience, all citations to the Act in this article are to the 1972
Act, unless otherwise indicated, despite the fact that the present case was instituted prior
to this amendment. The changes wrought by the 1972 Act, as to the character of the right
to sue conferred upon employees of private employers, are not relevant.
1 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e-2(a)(1) to (2) (Supp. II, 1972). Coverage of the Act extends to,
among others, private employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce who employ
15 or more employees for 20 or more weeks per year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. 11, 1972).
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(i) (Supp. II, 1972). The 1972 Act increased the power of
the EEOC to secure enforcement of Title VII by allowing it to file suits in its own name.
Id. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964). Despite this change, however, the fundamental
enforcement thrust still resides with individual complainants. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United
Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally, Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
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aggrieved employee must first submit his claim to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for investiga-
tion.8 The claim must be submitted within 180 days from the
occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act.9
If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that the res-
pondent company did, in fact, discriminate against the claimant
in an unlawful manner, it "shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion."' 0 If these informal ef-
forts fail to achieve a conciliation agreement which satisfies the
requirements of Title VII, the matter may thereafter proceed to
formal litigation. If the company refuses to accede to conciliation,
the EEOC itself may institute suit in its own name or merely
notify the claimant of his right to sue." If the employee-claimant
presents the obstacle to conciliation, the EEOC will terminate its
involvement and issue to the employee a "right to sue letter"
informing him of his right to file a civil action pursuant to Title
VII within 30 days from receipt of the letter.'2 If, as a result of its
investigation of an employee's charge, the EEOC is satisfied that
no reasonable cause has been demonstrated to believe the claim,
the employee still receives a "right to sue letter" and may file suit
within the specified period.
Thus a Title VII plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of his
rights in federal court regardless of what informal measures have
been taken by the EEOC prior to the filing of a complaint in
court. An EEOC finding of cause is not a jurisdictional prerequis-
ite. There are only two jurisdictional prerequisites to a Title VII
suit brought by an employee of a private company.' 3 First, the
employee must have filed his claim of discrimination with the
EEOC in timely fashion; and, second, he must have received the
statutory notice of his right to sue from the EEOC and have filed
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 11, 1972).
Id. § 2000e-5(e).
10 Id. § 2000e-5(b).
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This requirement has been codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.25,
1601.25b (1974).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970). The 1972 Act extended this period to 90 days. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. 11, 1972).
"2 The qualification, "employee of a private company," is necessary because the
jurisdictional prerequisites for suits brought by employees of governmental organization
are different. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. 11, 1972) which controls suits brought
against agencies of the federal government. The EEOC has no role in these actions; rather,
the initial charge must be filed with the Civil Service Commission.
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the federal complaint within the 30-day period. 4
Having reached federal court in proper fashion, a Title VII
private-employee plaintiff is entitled to a full-dress trial de
novo. 15 Remedies available under the Act are restricted to those
equitable in nature; injunctive, restitutional, and/or "any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."'" Consequently,
most courts have characterized Title VII suits as being equitable
in nature, concluding that monetary damages, compensatory or
punitive, are unavailable 7 and that there is no right to trial by
jury. 8 The matter is therefore tried to the court, sitting in equity,
with a full panoply of equitable remedies at its disposal.
In sum, an employee who feels himself the object of discrimi-
nation at the hands of his private employer need only file a charge
with the EEOC within 180 days from the happening of the event
complained of, and then, regardless of subsequent events (short
of a conciliation agreement to which he consents), he may bring
suit in federal court on the claim within 30 days from receipt of
the statutory notice of right to sue. He is then entitled to a trial
de novo on his complaint in equity.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black male, accepted a job with the
Gardner-Denver Company at its Denver, Colorado, plant in May
of 1966 as a maintenance worker.8 After having been with the
company for 2 years, he secured a position as a drill press operator
trainee in June 1968. He held this assignment until his discharge
from the company on September 29, 1969. As reason for Alexan-
der's release, the company informed him that his performance
" McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
" Id. at 799.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1972).
" See, e.g., Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Hawaii 1974); Howard v. Lockheed-
Georgia Co., 7 E.P.D. 9335 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 7 E.P.D.
9146 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Monetary relief is available under Title VII, but it is restricted
to back pay liability, a remedy which has been construed as restitutional and thus equita-
ble in nature. See generally, Comment, Back Pay for Employment Discrimination Under
Title VI-Role of the Judiciary in Exercising its Discretion, 23 CAT. U.L. REv. 525
(1974); Comment, Equal Employment Opportunity: The Back Pay Remedy Under Title
VII, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 379. Back pay liability is subject to strict time limitation, and the
maximum period for its award is two years prior to filing of the discrimination charge with
the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. H, 1972).
1 See Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Hawaii 1974); EEOC v. Laacke & Joys
Co., 7 E.P.D. 9258 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Sape & Hart, supra note 7, at 878.
1, This factual summary is, unless otherwise noted, taken from Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38-43 (1974).
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was substandard and unacceptable due to his excessive produc-
tion of defective parts which had to be scrapped. Alexander, how-
ever, regarded this explanation a pretext for the fact that he was
wrongfully terminated from employment.
The collective-bargaining agreement in effect between Alex-
ander's union and his former employer provided that if an em-
ployee felt that the company had breached the agreement to his
detriment, the worker had the right to lodge a grievance within 5
days of the alleged breach. On October 1, 1969, Alexander filed a
grievance, stating merely that he had been "unjustly" discharged
and omitting any reference to racial discrimination.
The collective-bargaining agreement contained a clause pro-
hibiting the company from discriminating against any employee,
inter alia, on the basis of race. Further, if a dispute could not be
resolved informally between the employee and the company via
the grievance mechanism, the controversy was to be submitted to
final and binding arbitration before an arbitrator jointly selected
and paid by the union and the company.
Union officials processed Alexander's grievance through sev-
eral stages of negotiation. At the last step in the prearbitration
phase, Alexander interposed a claim of racial discrimination. The
company denied this claim. The parties at loggerheads, the mat-
ter was submitted to arbitration. After the claim was referred to
an arbitrator but before a decision was rendered, Alexander filed
a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission due to an apparent lack of confidence on his part in
the arbitration process. The state commission promptly referred
the complaint to the EEOC. This occurred in November of 1969.
Subsequently, an arbitration hearing was held, and on December
30, 1969, the arbitrator ruled adversely to the grievant, conclud-
ing that Alexander has been "discharged for just cause" and mak-
ing no mention of the charge of discrimination.0
Meanwhile, on July 25, 1970, the EEOC completed its inves-
tigation of the charge and determined that the facts presented no
reasonable cause to believe that a Title VII violation had oc-
curred. Following receipt of his statutory notice of right to sue,
Alexander commenced a timely action in federal court.
" The district court found that the discrimination claim had, in fact, been raised in
the arbitration proceeding, despite the arbitrator's omission of any reference to it in his
decision. 346 F. Supp. at 1014, noted in the Supreme Court opinion at 415 U.S. 36, 43 &
43 n.4. But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., Civil No. C-2476 (D. Colo., Nov. 19,
1974) (unpublished opinion), where on remand the district court said the opposite.
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Thus, prior to his arrival in court, plaintiff Alexander had
submitted his claim of racial discrimination in employment to
two separate bodies, one private (arbitrator) and the other public
(EEOC). Both independently concluded that his claim was with-
out foundation in fact.
III. DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS
Alexander's action came before Judge Fred M. Winner of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado on a motion for
summary judgment filed by the defendant.2 The company
argued that plaintiff's voluntary submission of his discrimination
charge to binding arbitration, which resulted in a rejection of his
grievance, should preclude him from proceeding further in the
matter by court action and urged that the cause of action be
dismissed.
After disposing of preliminary matters," Judge Winner faced
this "vital and troublesome issue."23 Observing that prior to the
present action the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought relief in two
different forums, the court phrased the question presented in
terms of "just how many chances plaintiff should be afforded to
try to establish his claim of discrimination."24
Prior to undertaking analysis and discussion of "two diamet-
ric lines of authority ' 25 pertinent to the main issue, Judge Winner
excerpted generously from Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co.26 In
that case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when a
potential Title VII claimant submits his employment discrimina-
tion charge to grievance-arbitration procedures, the 180-day stat-
ute of limitations is tolled.27 If this were not so, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned, Congress' intent to place primary reliance on informal
and private means of resolving Title VII disputes would be frus-
trated. The court's reference to Culpepper therefore served to
2 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (1971).
22 Defendant also urged entry of summary judgment in its favor on two other grounds:
(1) that complaint was not filed within the 30-day period following notification of right to
sue from the EEOC, and; (2) that an EEOC finding of reasonable cause to believe the
charge was a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit which was absent here. Judge Winner
rejected the first ground in view of an extension of the time for filing the complaint
previously granted by the court. Defendant's second contention was held to be without








focus attention on the fact that Title VII was designed to empha-
size the role of informal methods of securing compliance with the
Act.
Judge Winner then quoted extensively from Hutchings v.
United Industries, Inc., 8 a case which held, on public policy
grounds, that "the federal courts cannot be divested of jurisdic-
tion of a Title VII action by any arbitration procedure under a
labor contract." 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals highlighted the dissimilarities between
grievance-arbitration founded upon contract and judicial pro-
ceedings based upon federal statute. These differences, the court
felt, compelled the inference that the filing of a grievance accord-
ing to the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement and the
filing of a judicial action do not constitute enforcement of an
indentical right in separate forums. Rather, the contractual and
statutory rights are of independent origin, and the enforcement
of one should have no influence upon the right to enforce the
other.30 Furthermore, the Hutchings court was of the opinion that
the structure and language of the Act clearly indicated that Con-
gress intended the federal judiciary, and not the EEOC or private
arbitrators, to be the final decisionmaker as to an individual's
rights under Title VII. The doctrine of election of remedies has
application only insofar as it might prevent a windfall to a plain-
tiff; it may be utilized only to avoid duplication of relief, not to
preclude court action altogether. Thus when a plaintiff has not
received adequate relief by means of arbitration, election of reme-
dies cannot be interposed to foreclose prosecution of the claim-
ant's federal statutory right of action.
The court then directed its attention to the antithetical view
as expressed in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.3 In this case the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that to allow an em-
ployee to bring suit under Title VII after he had unsuccessfully
submitted the same complaint to final arbitration "could sound
the death knell to arbitration of labor disputes" because a situa-
tion would be created in which "the employer, but not the em-
ployee, [would be] bound by the arbitration."" Having nothing
- 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
" 346 F. Supp. at 1015.
" 428 F.2d at 312-14.
31 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971)
(Harlan, J., not participating).
" Id. at 332 quoted in 346 F. Supp. at 1016.
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to gain but everything to lose in arbitration, employers, in the
Dewey court's opinion, would tend to ignore the process entirely.
Such result would run afoul of the well-established federal policy
which favors arbitration of labor disputes.
33
Noting that Dewey was affirmed by an equally divided Su-
preme Court, 4 Judge Winner embraced the case in its entirety,
and held that:
[W]hen an employee voluntarily submits a claim of discrimination
to arbitration under a union contract grievance procedure-a sub-
mission which is binding on the employer no matter what the re-
sult-the employee is bound by the arbitration award just as is the
employer. We cannot accept a philosophy which gives the employee
two strings to his bow when the employer has only one.n
The court reiterated Dewey's prediction that a contrary holding
would sound the "death knell" to arbitration. Arbitration which
would always obligate the employer but never the employee
would, in Judge Winner's colorful language, constitute "a trial
balloon for the employee, but a moon shot for the employer."3
This disparity would amount to preferential treatment of minor-
ity group members, a result, in the court's interpretation, prohib-
ited by Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
37
Alexander thus presented a question novel in this circuit.
Faced with an irreconciliable split of authority on the issue, the
court chose the viewpoint headlined by Dewey. Although the pos-
sible impact of the opposite view, the demise of arbitration alto-
gether, was perhaps overstated, the precedent chosen by Judge
Winner has certain appeal to notions of fair play and common
sense, especially when juxtaposed with the federal policy favoring
arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes. Also Dewey was
alluring in that the Supreme Court had failed to disapprove of it.
3 429 F.2d at 337.
- 402 U.S. 689 (1971). A Supreme Court affirmance by an equally divided opinion
is, of course, not authoritative as precedent, but binds only the parties before the court.
See 1B J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 0.402[2] at 119 n.26 (2d ed. 1974).
346 F. Supp. at 1019. Judge Winner goes on to say that "Congress has [already]
given the employee one and one-half strings under the Equal Employment Opportunity
procedure." Id. The "one-half string" referred to is the assistance from the EEOC to which
a claimant is entitled if the EEOC finds probable cause to believe that discrimination has
occurred. The metaphor chosen (to what conceivable use could one put half a bowstring?)
belies the importance of this resource to an aggrieved employee. To be sure, it represents
an advantage, and no doubt the court felt this extra edge sufficient to render further
unilateral aid to the employee unnecessary, if not downright unfair.
" 346 F. Supp. at 1019.
-7 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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In addition, the Dewey preclusion rule finds inferential support
in the fact that Congress clearly manifested an intention to rely
primarily on informal avenues of relief in the effectuation of the
goals of Title VII. No doubt these factors weighed heavily in the
decison of the Tenth Circuit to accord the case only summary
treatment on appeal.
Plaintiff Alexander appealed the district court's award of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant company. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (Hill and Barrett, Circuit Judges,
and Langley, District Judge, presiding) affirmed Judge Winner's
ruling in a per curiam opinion." Finding the trial court's memo-
randum opinion "exhaustive of the authorities and conclusive in
resolution of the issue," it merely affirmed the judgment "on the
basis of the trial court's opinion and order, as reported."39
In view of the brevity of the Tenth Circuit opinion, one must
look solely to the opinion entered by the district court in order to
ascertain the circuit's attitude toward the issue presented. The
court set forth a summary of the facts which preceded institution
of the plaintiffs federal suit. One can only guess that this was
intended to underscore the fact that plaintiff was afforded more
than one opportunity to gain relief before he entered the federal
courthouse. Apparently the court felt that two chances were
enough.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, holding that the statutory right to a trial de
novo afforded employees by Title VII cannot be divested by prior
submission of the same claim to binding arbitration pursuant to
an antidiscrimination clause contained in a collective-bargaining
agreement."0 In rejecting the rationale of the lower courts, the
Supreme Court manifested its determination to insure full play
to the Civil Rights Act in the employment arena.
Alexander comprehensively explores the function of Title VII
as reflected in the statutory language and legislative history and
examines its relationship to the arbitration process within the
realm of labor disputes in general. The opinion does not discount
the well-recognized importance of arbitration as a primary device
466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1210.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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in maintaining industrial peace; rather, it stresses Congress' in-
tended mission for Title VII in extirpating unlawful discrimina-
tory practices from employment.
The Supreme Court recited some basic principles bearing on
a Title VII action:
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those
practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Cooperation and voluntary compli-
ance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal.4'
Before allowing an aggrieved party to file suit in federal court,
Congress required that he first attempt to resolve his dispute
informally and provided opportunities for nonjudicial solutions
through establishment of the EEOC and through provisions
which permit utilization of other similar state and local agen-
cies. " These agencies, the Court noted, however, lack direct en-
forcement powers; therefore, it follows that "final responsibility
for enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts.
43
Congress conferred upon the courts broad authority to fash-
ion whatever equitable relief is deemed appropriate under the
circumstances of a particular case." Such remedial power re-
mains available despite a "no cause" finding by the EEOC.45 The
confluence of the courts' broad equitable powers and the fact that
EEOC disposition of discrimination charges has no jurisdictional
relevance led the Court to conclude that the power of the federal
courts to secure compliance with Title VII is "plenary.
4
The EEOC's authority under Title VII to investigate and to
conciliate is typically set in motion by charges of individual em-
ployees. Although the 1972 Act permits the EEOC to bring suit
in its own right, private suits continue to be the predominate
mode of Title VII enforcement efforts. Private actions fulfill two
functions simultaneously: "the private litigant not only redresses
' Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
42 Id. See also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
41 415 U.S. at 44. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 did grant the
EEOC authority to bring suit in its own name. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(fO(1) (Supp. H,
1972) and text accompanying note 12, supra. Despite this significant augmentation, Con-
gress declined to grant the EEOC direct enforcement power: it still cannot "adjudicate
claims or impose administrative sanctions." 415 U.S. at 44.
", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. H, 1972). See authorities cited note 19 supra, and
accompanying text.
41 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
11 415 U.S. at 45.
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his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional
policy against discriminatory employment practices."47
The Act is silent with respect to what bearing an arbitrator's
finding has on an employee's right to sue under Title VII. Thus,
the Court pointed out, "[t]here is no suggestion in the statutory
scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individ-
ual's right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction."48 The
statute does, however, make clear that federal courts are to have
plenary powers of enforcement as to Title VII and spells out the
jurisdictional prerequisites to suit.4"
Following this abstract of general principles, the Court ex-
plained its reasons for reversing the decision of the Tenth Circuit.
Legislation in the employment sphere, the Court explained, has
"long evidenced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping
remedies against discrimination."5 Title VII itself, said the
Court,
provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in
several forums .... (EEOC) . .. (state and local agencies) ...
(federal courts). And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum
does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legis-
lative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow
an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title
VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear infer-
ence is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than sup-
plant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment dis-
crimination. In sum, Title VII's purpose and procedures strongly
suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action
if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondis-
crimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement.'
The preceding quotation captures the essence of the Court's deci-
sion to part company with the lower courts on this issue. The
Court fleshes in its rationale through analysis of the trilogy of
notions which led the district and circuit courts to believe that
the opposite view was warranted: election of remedies, waiver,
and the federal policy which favors arbitration of labor disputes.
A. Election of Remedies
The Court summarily repudiated possible application of the
47 Id.
Id. at 47.
" Id. These requirements are: (1) that a timely charge of discrimination be filed with
the EEOC; and (2) that the charging party receive notice of his right to sue from the
EEOC and thereafter lodge his complaint seasonably.
,o Id.
11 Id. at 47-49 (citations and footnote omitted).
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doctrine of election of remedies, declaring it pertinent only when
an individual seeks remedies inconsistent in either a legal or fac-
tual sense.52 This concept could, therefore, have no relevance to
a situation in which an employee seeks to vindicate two separate
rights. In consenting to engage in grievance-arbitration proce-
dures, an employee pursues redress of a contractual right-as
signatory to a collective-bargaining agreement. In instituting liti-
gation under Title VII, on the other hand, an employee seeks
vindication of a statutory right-as a person within the class to
be protected by an act of Congress. Since the rights emanate from
different sources, they are separate and distinct. Pursuit of both
thus cannot constitute pursuit of inconsistent remedies.
The Court analogized this procedure to that for settling dis-
putes under the National Labor Relations Act. If a dispute entails
violations of both contractual and statutory rights, the National
Labor Relations Board is free to consider statutory claims, de-
spite the fact that an arbitrator may have previously considered
them in the guise of contractual rights. As the arbitrator and the
NLRB are complementary under this scheme, so are the arbitra-
tor and the federal court in the Title VII context.13
Unjust enrichment as a possible reason to require application
of the doctrine of election of remedies was also rejected. The
Court observed that provision to employees of a double opportun-
ity to seek relief against alleged discrimination will not lead to a
windfall on the part of a claimant. Unjust enrichment presents
no danger because courts, consonant with their equitable author-
ity, will doubtlessly structure relief to avoid duplication in a case
where a plaintiff has previously achieved some satisfaction in
arbitration. 4
B. Waiver
The concept of waiver was likewise discarded as having no
bearing on cases of this nature. The Court flatly pronounced that
"there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under
Title VII." 5" Characterizing the mandate of Title VII as absolute,
the Court concluded that to allow rights conferred by the Act to
be waived in the process of bargaining collectively "would defeat
"Id. at 49 n.ll.
"Id. at 50.




the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII."
Certain instances in which waiver can play a legitimate part
in the collective-bargaining process, however, were recognized by
the Court. Some statutory rights, e.g., the right to strike, are
waivable on a collective basis as a means of winning, in return,
economic benefits for the members of a bargaining unit. 7 Such
waivable rights are collective in character. Title VII guarantees,
by contrast, are individualistic in nature and concern "not major-
itarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities."58 As such, they are non-negotiable in the bargain-
ing process.
Even rights conferred by Title VII may presumably be
waived by an individual if the waiver occurs in connection with
a voluntary settlement. As with other civil rights, such waivers,
to be effective, must be both "voluntary and knowing."59 In no
event, however, can the individual's right to be free from discrim-
ination in employment be deemed waived merely by virtue of the
fact that the employee submitted his claim to binding arbitration
under an anti-discrimination clause of a collective-bargaining
agreement.
The limited role of the arbitrator in labor disputes suggested
to the Court further reason to reject the preclusion rule. The
arbitrator's responsibility is circumscribed. His duty is to fulfill
the intent of the parties through interpretation and application
of the collective-bargaining agreement from whence his authority
derives. Unlike a court he has "no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with the bargain between parties
... .,,6 Contractual rights are his only concern. If a bargaining
agreement duplicates rights created by Title VII, the arbitrator
must, of course, effectuate them in a proper case. In so doing,
however, he does not, nor cannot, usurp the jurisdiction of federal
courts to deal with them because the rights devolve from separate
origins. In a situation in which the agreement contains no protec-
tion against practices prohibited by Title VII, the arbitrator ex-
"Id.
AId. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 668 (1974), discussed in the section on Labor Law, supra at
272. See also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ala.
1974).
11 415 U.S. at 52 n.15.
0 Id. at 53.
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ceeds the scope of his authority if he attempts to enforce rights
of this kind, and the award becomes judicially unenforceable.6' In
short, if the agreement does not provide Title VII guarantees, the
arbitrator is powerless to recognize them. If the agreement con-
tains Title VII protections, the arbitrator is bound to enforce
them, but by doing so, he enforces contractual, not statutory,
rights. Despite the overlap, a federal court is not deprived of its
jurisdiction over the same claims.
C. Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration
The third ground apparently relied on by the district court
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was that allowance to the
employee of two opportunities to redress Title VII claims was
contrary to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes. If, for instance, the plaintiff in Alexander had secured
from arbitration an award beneficial to him, the defendant com-
pany would have been bound by the decision. The district court
felt that notions of fairness dictated that the same conclusiveness
should attach with respect to the employee's rights. The Court's
short answer to the district court's objection that the employee
has "'two strings to his bow when the employer has only one' "62
was that:
An employer does not have "two strings to his bow" with respect to
an arbitral decicion for the simple reason that Title VII does not
provide employers with a cause of action against employees. An
employer cannot be the victim of discriminatory employment prac-
tices .
3
Since employees, and not employers, are the only possible objects
of discriminatory employment practices, Congress understanda-
bly chose to afford them an extra measure of protection indepen-
dent from any rights won through bargaining collectively. The
employer has but a single set of rights-those contained in the
agreement. The employee, by contrast and at the behest of Con-
gress, has a dual set of rights-those contained in the agreement
and those contained in Title VII. When an employee files suit in
federal court he seeks not a review of the arbitrator's decision, but
to redress an independent statutory right.
The Court did not share the district court's apprehension
, Id., citing United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
AZ 415 U.S. at 54, quoting 346 F. Supp. at 1019.
' 415 U.S. at 54.
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that a rule which would render arbitration inconclusive as to the
employee, but not as to the employer, would "'sound the death
knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts.' ""' The Court
observed that the primary incentive remains for an employer to
enter into a collective-bargaining agreement containing an arbi-
tration provision in order to obtain from the union a no-strike
concession. This goal will ordinarily outweight intrepidations
which an employer might entertain with regard to possible in-
creased costs associated with providing employees an "arbitral
remedy against discrimination in addition to their judicial rem-
edy under Title VII." 5
Also, arbitral remedies against discrimination can perform
an important prophylactic function. If arbitration is fairly and
objectively executed, many employee discrimination complaints
will be resolved at this level, obviating the need for litigation.
Working out differences though arbitration can be done more
quickly and less expensively than through formal court action.
For these reasons, the Court declined to join in the district court's
pessimistic prophecy as to the likely ramifications of the "two
strings" non-preclusion rule.
D. Deferral Rule
As an alternative to their argument for a preclusion rule, the
respondent urged adoption of a stance intermediate between a
preclusion rule and an absolute rejection of it. The company sug-
gested that:
[Elven if a preclusion rule is not adopted, federal courts should
defer to arbitral decision on discrimination claims where: (i) the
claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-bargaining agree-
ment prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the suit
under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the
claim and to fashion a remedy."
Id., quoting 346 F. Supp. at 1019.
" 415 U.S. at 55. One commentator has suggested a further reason why Alexander
will not sound the "death knell" to arbitration:
[Tihe scope of the arbitration clause is subject to collective bargaining. The
employer can bargain for a clause expressly stating that racial discrminiation
claims are outside the scope of the arbitration clause and must be pursued
in some other appropriate forum.
Comment, supra note 1, at 667.
66 415 U.S. at 55-56 (footnote omitted). See Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d
54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972), where the court said that a federal court may, in limited circumstan-




According to this scheme, if the above conditions were satisfied
in a particular suit, the court could properly grant summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant-employer and dismiss the action.
In the Court's view, however, this rule would "deprive the peti-
tioner of his statutory right to attempt to establish his claim in a
federal court." 7 The deferral rule would be vulnerable to many
of the objections associated with the preclusion rule, and the
Court concluded that its adoption would detract from Congress'
intent to repose final authority for carrying out the dictates of
Title VII in the federal judiciary.
Recognizing that selection of forum necessarily determines
the scope of the right sought to be enforced, the Court made a
detailed analysis of the arbitral forum as compared to federal
court, pointing up the several ways in which arbitration as an
ajudicatory process falls short of the court's ability to protect
substantive rights. The limited nature of the arbitrator's role was
again stressed. He is bound by the intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in the collective-bargaining agreement; his competence
lies in the realm of "the law of the shop, not the law of the land."68
Many arbitrators are lay persons, not lawyers.69 In sum, the skill
and role of the arbitrator tend to render the arbitral forum inap-
propriate for the resolution of independent statutory rights ac-
corded by Title VII "whose broad language frequently can be
given meaning only by reference to public law concepts."70
As compared to the judicial forum the arbitration process is
subject to several structural weaknesses. Fact-finding in arbitra-
tion hearings is informal and less comprehensive, and the rules
of evidence and civil procedure have no application. Further-
more, the union's total control of the manner in which grievances
are instituted and processed and the concomitant risk that an
individual member's interests may be given short shrift for the
good of the collective also suggest the inappropriateness of arbi-
tration as a forum for ultimate determination of statutory rights.'
These factors all militate against approval of a deferral rule.
Nor was the Court receptive to the idea of a more demanding
deferral rule. "Judicialization" of the arbitration process would
deprive this forum of its cardinal advantages of comparative inex-
415 U.S. at 56.
U Id. at 57.
s Id. at 57 n.18.
70 Id. at 57.
Id. at 58 n.19.
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pensiveness and speediness in resolution of grievances. Court en-
forcement of a higher standard created by imposition of quasi-
judicial procedures upon the arbitration process would necessi-
tate a complicated review of almost de novo magnitude. Savings
of court time would therefore be insufficient to justify inherent
hazards to Title VII rights.
Finally, the Court noted the danger of a recoil effect asso-
ciated with the deferral rule. Employees who lacked complete
confidence in the arbitration procedure would tend to bypass it
altogether rather than risk an adverse finding which would be
conclusive of their rights in the judicial forum. As a consequence,
the proportion of grievances submitted to arbitration (and thus
susceptible to informal resolution) might diminish and cause a
correlative increase in litigation which would more than offset
possible savings of court time from utilization of the deferral rule.
E. Conclusion
After rejecting the preclusion and deferral rules as incompat-
ible with the nature and purpose of Title VII, the Court con-
cluded:
[T]hat the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and
the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can
best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully
both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a
collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title
VII. The federal court should consider the employee's claim de
novo. 12
This conclusion clearly establishes that Title VII actions brought
by private employees are to be heard de novo in federal court and
that whether the plaintiff has previously submitted his discrimi-
nation claim to arbitration shall have no bearing on his right to
file suit.
The Court finally stated that the "arbitral decision may be
admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court
deems appropriate."73 As a practical matter, this may weaken to
some extent the general proposition that arbitration shall not
influence the scope of litigation. However, the Court explicitly
refused to announce standards by which to determine the weight
of the arbitration record in a particular case and admonished
courts to be ever mindful that Congress has seen fit to provide
12 Id. at 59-60.
11 Id. at 60.
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discrimination claimants with "a judicial forum for the ultimate
resolution of discriminatory employment claims."74
In Alexander the Supreme Court declined to diminish the
potency of Title VII as a remedial device for employment discrim-
ination.
POSTSCRIPT
On remand plaintiff Alexander's action was tried de novo
before Judge Richard P. Matsch of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado.75 The court found that Alexan-
der's last position with the company, as a drill press operator
trainee, was one which required very careful and precise work.
During his tenure at this job Alexander received three written
warnings from his supervisor to the effect that his performance
was substandard. Customarily drill press trainees were dis-
charged from the company after two such warnings or else al-
lowed to transfer to another position which required less precision
in performance. Alexander's supervisor informed him of the pos-
sibility of transfer to a new job with the company. Alexander
chose not to seek a change of position; and after having issued
three warnings to him, the company terminated his employment.
Due to the fact that Alexander had only one supervisor during
this period (who was responsible for the issuance of all three
warnings), the court felt that the merits of plaintiff's claim de-
pended entirely on the question of whether that supervisor was
racially prejudiced in his supervision of the plaintiff's perform-
ance. The court concluded that he was not and therefore found
that plaintiff was "discharged from his employment with the de-
fendant company for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."7
Accordingly, the court ordered dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
and entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.
II. WELFARE-SOCIAL SECURITY ACT-AID TO
FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN- STANDARD
WORK EXPENSES DEDUCTION
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974)
INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Ascension Vialpando was found eligible for and was
Id. at 60 n.21.
7' Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., Civil No. C-2476 (D. Colo., Nov. 19, 1974) (un-
published opinion).
7 Id. at 5.
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receiving benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) prior to July 1, 1970. On that date a new Colorado
regulation was promulgated by the Colorado Division of Public
Welfare' which established a limit of $30 as the standard allow-
ance for work-related expenses. This regulation affected Mrs.
Vialpando adversely by significantly reducing her deduction from
net earnings for work-related expenses' thereby making her ineli-
gible for any of her previous AFDC benefits. 3 Mrs. Vialpando
brought a class action suit, Vialpando v. Shea,4 in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff
and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.' This
comment will examine the background of this case, and explore
why the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.'
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Originally passed by the Congress in 1935, the Social Secu-
rity Act 7 provides for federal money matched by state money to
be distributed to individuals determined to be in need of assis-
tance and fitting into one of the categories of need.' One of the
COLORADO DIVISION OF PUBLIC WELFARE, 4 STAFF MANUAL § 4313.13 (1970).
The effect of the new Colorado regulation on Mrs. Vialpando is shown by this table
taken from Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, Vialpando v. Shea, 475 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.
1973):
During and after
Before July of 1970 July of 1970
Mandatory Deductions $ 55.72 $ 55.72
General Work Expenses 15.00 15.00
Transportation:
Mileage 47.30 30.00
Car Payment 63.81 15.00
$181.83 $ 85.72
Plus Child Care Plus Child Care
Prior to July 1, 1970, Mrs. Vialpando was allowed to deduct $181.83 from her net earnings
as her actual work-related expenses; after July 1, 1970, she was limited to deducting only
$85.72. The loss of $96.11 of deductions caused her net earnings to be too high to qualify
for AFDC benefits.
' The benefits include cash benefits and eligibility for medical assistance under medi-
caid. See Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1970).
' Civil No. C-2449 (D. Colo., January 13, 1972).
' Shea v. Vialpando, 475 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1973).
' Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
' The provisions of the Social Security Act relating to AFDC are found at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-44 (1970).
' Old Age Assistance, id. § 301; Aid to Families with Dependant Children, id. § 601;
Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, id. § 801; Aid to the Blind, id. § 1201; Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled, id. § 1351.
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categories established under the Social Security Act is AFDC.
States are not required to participate, but if a state elects to do
so, its plan for administering the program must be approved by
the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW), and must meet certain requirements.9 If by later
alteration the state's plan fails to comply with Social Security Act
provisions, the Secretary of HEW, after notice and an opportun-
ity for a hearing, may refuse to furnish all or part of the federal
funds to the state.'0
State plans must comply with the provisions of section
402(a) (7) of the Social Security Act." That section requires that:
(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children
must ... (7) ... provide that the State Agency shall, in determin-
ing need, take into consideration any other income and resources of
any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent chil-
dren . . . as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the
earning of any such income. . ...,
This section operates in two ways: to determine eligibility and to
determine the amount of a grant of assistance.'3
The Colorado regulation implemented in July, 1970, and at
issue in the Vialpando case, read in part as follows:
For employment expenses such as transportation, special clothing,
union dues, special education or training costs, telephone, addi-
tional food or personal needs, etc., which are an obligation due to
the employment, an allowance of $30 per month is made for such
costs."
This regulation, which sets a standard allowance of $30 for work-
related expenses, was approved by the Secretary of HEW in July
' Among other things, the provisions of the Social Security Act provide that the state
program must permit application by all who wish to apply; that the state program must
be in effect in all political subdivisions of the state. Id. § 602(a)(1). The program must
insure efficient operation. Id. § 602(a)(5)(A). Assistance must be provided as far as prac-
ticable. Id. § 601. Aid must be provided with reasonable promptness to all eligible. Id. §
602(a)(10). The state of Colorado asserted that a standard work expense allowance was
the only feasible way to comply with all of these provisions.
I d. § 604.
Id. § 602(a)(7).
12 Id.
' CoLoRADo DMISION OF PuLIC WELFARE, 4 STAFF MANUAL § 4313.13 (1970). Gross
earned income is reduced by payroll reductions and work expenses to yield net income.
Net income is compared to state standards of need to determine eligibility for AFDC
benefits. The work expense disregard of § 402(a)(7) and the "earned income disregard"
of § 402(a)(8)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) are then applied in another formula to




1970. The impact of using a standard allowance for work-related
expenses other than mandatory payroll deductions, instead of
computing the actual work-related expenses, was to reduce the
amount of the grants to some applicants, or, as in Mrs. Vial-
pando's case, to make some applicants ineligible for assistance.
The issue which the district court confronted in the
Vialpando case was whether the Colorado regulation complied
with the requirements of the Social Security Act. The court did
not believe that it did and ordered Colorado to change the regula-
tion to include consideration of all individualized expenses in
determining eligibility for assistance. The defendant, the State of
Colorado, maintained throughout the appeals, however, that a
reasonable average ($30) sufficed to meet the requirements of the
Social Security Act.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONCERNS IN Vialpando
The Supreme Court, as did the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, closely examined the statutory provision in rejecting the
state's argument that the requirement to "take into considera-
tion" was satisfied by using a statistical average of actual expen-
ses of all AFDC recipients in the state. The Court read the provi-
sion to be structured so "that the phrase 'take into consideration'
modifies 'income and resources . . . as well as any expenses rea-
sonably attributable to the earning of any such income.' "'5 Thus
the "inescapable" conclusion" of both courts was that treatment
of expenses must be the same as treatment of income, that is, on
an individual basis.
The Supreme Court also examined the legislative history of
section 402(a)(7) and found that it confirmed the Court's inter-
pretation of the provision. Prior to 1962 state agencies were en-
couraged but not required to recognize special financial circum-
stances of employed assistance recipients. 7 By 1962 it was recog-
nized that if work expenses were not to be considered, they would
provide a disincentive to working, since work expenses reduce the
amount of money available for food, shelter, and clothing." Thus,
the clause "as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the
earning of any such income" was added to the section. 9 The
" Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 260 (1974) (emphasis by the Court).
Ie /d.
" See Social Security Board, Bureau of Public Assistance, State Letter No. 4 (April
30, 1942). See also HEW State Letter No. 291 (March 11, 1957).
" See S. RsP. No. 1589, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 1718 (1962).
" Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 185, 188.
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intent of Congress was to insure that all states take employment
expenses fully into account in determining need.
20
Finally the Supreme Court examined the administrative in-
terpretations associated with the Social Security Act. The De-
partment of HEW, while it did not view the use of maximum
allowance as acceptable,2' did view the standard based on averag-
ing acceptable and noted its use as advantageous administra-
tively.2 2 The Supreme Court, however, rejected administrative
efficiency or convenience as controlling in light of the statutory
command and the congressional purpose. 3
III. EFFECT OF Vialpando
While the conclusion of the Court might have been pre-
dicted, its importance lies in its effect. An attempt to extend the
use of statistically based standard amounts, as allowed in Rosado
v. Wyman,24 was checked by Vialpando. In Rosado the Supreme
Court approved the use of statistically based flat amounts for a
determination of a state standard of need, but in Vialpando the
Court clearly indicates that the grant of discretion given by Con-
gress to the states to determine eligibility for aid does not extend
to calculation of the amount of work-related expenses. Such a
grant of discretion must be expressly given.
The decision sustains the holdings of most lower courts that
had considered the issue,25 and it clarifies whatever confusion the
other courts had experienced when facing similar situations.
Conover v. Hall21 had upheld California's $50 standard allowance.
" See S. REP. No. 1589, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 1718 (1962).
2 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Adams v. Parham, Civil No.
16041 (N.D. Ga., April 14, 1972).
2 Id. The standard work expense allowance was claimed to have administrative ad-
vantages of
(a) reducing error;
(b) giving the recipient greater certainty as to the amount of the grant;
(c) reducing delay in computation and payment;
(d) reducing the use of subjective judgment by the individual in the posi-
tion of determining eligibility; and
(e) making a uniform statewide program possible.
416 U.S. at 265 n.13.
24 397 U.S. 397, 419 (1970).
n Anderson v. Graham, 492 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1973); Connecticut State Dept. of Pub.
Welfare v. HEW, 448 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1971); Campagnuolo v. White, Civil No. 13968 (D.
Conn., June 22, 1972); Adams v. Parham, Civil No. 16041 (N.D. Ga., April 14, 1972);
Williford v. Laupheimer, 311 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1969); County of Alameda v. Carle-
son, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 488 P.2d 953, 97 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 913
(1972).
n 28 Cal. App. 3d 676, 104 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1972).
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The decision was later vacated pending appeal in the California
Supreme Court. In X v. McCorkle" the Court had approved in
dicta (as the Supreme Court emphasizes) the $50 standard work
expense allowance of New Jersey.
CONCLUSION
Shea v. Vialpando represents the present Supreme Court's
need to solidly ground its welfare case decisions on clear statutory
construction and congressional intent. State discretion in imple-
mentation will not be presumed in an area clearly provided for
by the Congress.
Clear congressional intent was not found in New York State
Department of Social Services v. Dublino.28 In that case, welfare
plaintiffs attempted to show that the federally sponsored WIN
program preempted the New York Work Rules, but the court
found no evidence of such a congressional intent to preempt. The
court stated that "more would be required [than the apparent
comprehensiveness of the WIN legislation] to show the 'clear
manifestation of [congressional] intention' which must exist be-
fore a federal statute is held 'to supersede the exercise' of state
action." 9
Clearly, in Vialpando at least, we have an expression of in-
tent with which the court can feel comfortable.
Christine A. Gilsinan
r 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970).
" 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
" Id. at 408.
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I. JURISDICTION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT
A. A Constitutional and Historical Perspective
The judicial branch of the Federal Government was created
by article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution, wherein
the framers provided that:
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789,1 Congress established a sys-
tem of federal courts subordinate to the U.S. Supreme Court.
This judicial network consisted of 13 districts, each comprised of
one district court presided over by a district judge.2
These 13 districts were divided into 3 circuits, to be called
the eastern, middle, and southern circuits. 3 The circuit courts
were convened annually in each district and were presided over
by any two Justices of the Supreme Court in addition to the
district judge of that district. Any two of the three judges consti-
tuted a quorum, except that no district judge could sit in a case
of appeal or error from his own decision.4
The Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the circuit courts with:
(1) original jurisdiction in specified cases, concurrent with that
I Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
The original 13 districts were designated as follows: Maine District, New Hampshire
District, Massachusetts District, Connecticut District, New York District, New Jersey
District, Pennsylvania District, Delaware District, Maryland District, Virginia District,
Kentucky District, South Carolina District, and Georgia District. Id. § 2.
The eastern circuit consisted of the districts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and New York. The middle circuit consisted of the districts of New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. The southern circuit consisted of the
South Carolina and Georgia Districts. The districts of Maine and Kentucky were excluded
from these circuit designations. Id. § 4.
,Id.
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of the state courts; (2) exclusive original jurisdiction in cases
involving offenses cognizable under the authority of the United
States; and (3) appellate jurisdiction over final judgments en-
tered in the district courts.' Although the Judiciary Act gave the
circuit courts appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court actually
heard most of the appeals pursuant to its authority under article
III, section 2 of the United States Constitution.'
In 1891 Congress passed the Evarts Act,7 which changed the
structure and responsibilities of the circuit courts. This enact-
ment created nine circuit courts of appeals,' each presided over
by three judges.' The circuit courts of appeals were granted appel-
late jurisdiction to review all final decisions of the district courts
if such appeals were brought within 6 months after the entry of
the order, judgment, or decree sought to be reviewed.'0
The circuit courts of appeals were vested with the power to
issue writs" and to entertain timely appeals from interlocutory
orders." In certain cases, the decisions rendered by the circuit
courts of appeals were deemed to be "final." Such finality existed
in diversity cases, admiralty cases, cases arising under the patent
laws, cases involving revenue matters, and cases arising under the
criminal laws.' 3 However, the Supreme Court could review such
final decisions of the circuit courts of appeals by means of certior-
ari to the Supreme Court. 4
3 Id. §§ 11, 21, 22.
In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
The nine circuits and their official seats of court were established as follows:
First Circuit Boston
Second Circuit New York City
Third Circuit Philadelphia
Fourth Circuit Richmond
Fifth Circuit New Orleans
Sixth Circuit Cincinnati
Seventh Circuit Chicago
Eighth Circuit St. Louis
Ninth Circuit San Francisco
Id. § 3.
*Id. § 2.
Id. 9H 6, 11.
Id. § 12.
12 Id. § 7.
13 Id. § 6.
14 Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
was created by statute in 1929's and was allotted four judgeships.
It included the States of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Okla-
homa, Utah, and Wyoming." Additional judgeships for the Tenth
Circuit were authorized in 1949, 1961, and 1968, thereby bringing
the total current complement of the court to seven active judges.
At the present time, there are 11 judicial circuits"1 and 97
authorized circuit judgeships in the United States. Several cir-
cuits, including the Tenth, have requested Congress to authorize
additional circuit judgeships because of the increasing appellate
case load.'" In addition, committees 9 and study groups0 have
been established to analyze the existing appellate court system
and to recommend feasible structural changes. If viable recom-
mendations are derived from these committees, this could result
in significant legislative changes in the structure of the judiciary
" Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346.
6 The six states now comprising the Tenth Circuit were originally designated as part
of the Eighth Circuit under the Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
7 The 11 judicial circuits of the United States are constituted as follows:
District of
Columbia ...... District of Columbia
First .......... Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island
Second ........ Connecticut, New York, Vermont
Third ......... Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virgin Islands
Fourth ........ Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia
Fifth .......... Alabama, Canal Zone, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas
Sixth .......... Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee
Seventh ....... Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin
Eighth ........ Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota
Ninth ......... Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Wash-
ington, Guam, Hawaii
Tenth ......... Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming
IS See Appendix B infra for relevant statistical data.
" The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System was estab-
lished by Congress in 1973 and composed of 16 members appointed by the President, the
Chief Justice, and members of Congress. It is chaired by Senator Roman L. Hruska of
Nebraska, with Professor A. Leo Levin as staff director. The Commission was charged with
the responsibility of recommending appropriate geographic and procedural changes to
meet the Court's increasing demands. Upon completion of its assignment, the Commission
recommended dividing the Fifth and Ninth Circuits to relieve those courts of their heavy
caseloads. Pub. L. No. 92-489, § 1 (Oct. 13, 1972).
" A Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, chaired by Professor Paul
Freund, has investigated and recommended the creation of a National Court of Appeals,
which would function as an intermediate court between the 11 circuit courts and the
Supreme Court of the United States. Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court,
Creation of New National Court of Appeals Is Proposed by Blue-Ribbon Study Group, 59
A.B.A.J. 139 (1973)(excerpts from the report and recommendations of the study group).
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system. These innovations are possible because article III of the
Constitution authorizes Congress to vest judicial power in such
inferior courts "as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.""'
B. Cases Appealable to the Tenth Circuit
Federal appellate courts are, necessarily, courts of limited
jurisdiction. Therefore, the appellant must show that his case
satisfies the statutory jurisdictional requirements before the
Tenth Circuit will entertain his appeal.
The vast majority of cases appealable to the Tenth Circuit
are those in which a final decision has been rendered in one of the
eight federal district courts22 within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Tenth Circuit.?
In addition, every circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to enter-
tain appeals from all final and reviewable administrative orders
issued by such governmental agencies as the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission, the At-
omic Energy Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Power Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
24
Generally, a case is appealable to the Tenth Circuit only
when the decision rendered by the district court or administrative
agency is a final one. However, the courts of appeals have appel-
late jurisdiction over the following interlocutory orders:"
", Several judges and scholars have objected to the creation of such a mini-Supreme
Court, arguing that it would be in derogation of Article IlI of the Constitution. For an
indication of the conflicting contentions on this subject see Note, The National Court of
Appeals: A Qualified Concurrence, 62 GEo. L.J. 881 (1974); Stokes, National Court of
Appeals: An Alternative Proposal, 60 A.B.A.J. 179 (1974); Study Group on the Caseload
of the Supreme Court, Creation of New National Court of Appeals Is Proposed by Blue-
Ribbon Study Group, 59 A.B.A.J. 139 (1973) (excerpts from the report and recommenda-
tions of the study group); Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40
U. Cm. L. REv. 473 (1973).
" Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming each have one district court,
whereas Oklahoma has three district courts.
* 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
* In appeals from administrative agencies, the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit de-
pends in part upon whether the appellant resides within, maintains his principal place of
business within, or does business within, the circuit. Other important factors relating to
judicial review of agency determinations are contained within the statutes governing each
agency's operations. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1033 (1970); 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(c), 771 (1970);
26 U.S.C. § 7482(b) (1970).
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970).
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(1) Those granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in
the Supreme Court;
(2) Those appointing receivers, or referring orders to
wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish
such purposes, by directing sales or other disposals of
property;
(3) Those determining the rights and liabilities of the
parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final
decisions are allowed; and
(4) Judgments in civil actions for patent infringe-
ments which are final except for an accounting.
Under section 1292(b),2 1 when a district judge within the cir-
cuit has issued an interlocutory order which is not otherwise ap-
pealable, he may, within 10 days after entry of the order, certify
in writing to the court of appeals that such order involves a con-
trolling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order would materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation. The court of appeals will then determine whether to
permit the interlocutory appeal.
In addition to its jurisdiction to hear appeals from all final
civil and criminal decisions and from specific interlocutory orders
entered in the district courts, the Tenth Circuit has jurisdiction
to entertain appeals from decisions rendered in the U.S. Tax
Court and from proceedings in bankruptcy. The Tenth Circuit
also retains original jurisdiction under the All Writs Statute,27
which enables it to entertain petitions for writs of mandamus or
prohibition.
The Tenth Circuit has no power to directly review decisions
of state courts. Unless a case enters the federal judicial system
at the trial court level, either by an original proceeding or by
removal to federal court, it stays within the state court system.
Therefore, except for habeas corpus relief in federal court, the
Supreme Court presents the only possibility for substantive fed-
eral review of a final state court decision.
29
n Id. § 1292(b) [hereinafter cited as § 1292(b)].
" See id. § 1651 [hereinafter cited as All Writs Statute].
21 See id. § 1441.
n Indirectly, the Tenth Circuit reviews state criminal cases by review of habeas
corpus proceedings brought in federal district courts.
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT
A. Personnel
1. The Judges
Article m, section 1 of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that:
The Judges, hoth of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished dur-
ing their Continuance in Office.
Pursuant to its article Ill powers, Congress has enacted legislation
providing for the appointment, tenure, residence, and salary of
circuit judges.
By and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Presi-
dent of the United States has the power to appoint all circuit
judges.30 Each circuit judge remains in office for life ("during good
Behavior") and, throughout all of his active service, must reside
within the territory of the circuit for which he was appointed.3'
The circuit judges hear cases in such order and at such times
as the court directs.32 Most cases heard by the Tenth Circuit are
determined by three-judge panels, over which the judge with the
greatest seniority presides.3 The circuit judge in regular active
service who is senior in commission and under 70 years of age is
designated the chief judge of the circuit. 34 The chief judge over-
sees the administrative operations of the circuit and presides over
any panel on which he sits.
" There are a total of 97 active judges on the 11 circuit courts of appeal. The alloca-
tion of these judges is as follows:
D istrict of C olum bia ........................................... 9
F irs t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
S ec o n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
T h ird . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Fourth .......... .. ........................................ . 7
F ifth ...................................................... . 8
S ix th ......................................................... 9
S ev en th .... .. ... .... .... .. ... ..... .. ...... ... .. .... ..... .. ... 8
E ig hth ..................8.. .................................. 8
N in th . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
T e n th .. .................................................... 7
31 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
3 Id. § 46.
" Id. § 42. Each circuit is also allotted an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
who serves as "Circuit Justice" on an ad hoc basis. At the present time, Justice Byron
White is the Circuit Justice for the Tenth Circuit.
3 Id. § 45. Chief Judge David T. Lewis is presently serving in that capacity.
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A circuit judge may become a "senior circuit judge" when he
retains his office while retiring from regular active service. Any
circuit judge holding office during good behavior may elect senior
status after attaining the age of 70, having served as a federal
judge for at least 10 consecutive years, or after attaining the age
of 65, having served as a federal judge for at least 15 consecutive
years.u
The Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit is comprised of the
seven judges in regular active service.3" The chief judge of the
circuit presides over the Judicial Council and calls at least two
meetings of the Council each year in order to discuss the internal
operations of the court and to render all necessary orders for the
expeditious administration of judicial business within the cir-
cuit .31
To ease the case load of the judges on the Tenth Circuit, the
Judiciary Code allows the chief judge to designate a "visiting"
judge from another circuit,38 a senior circuit judge, 3 or a district
court judge0 to sit on a three-judge panel with members of the
Tenth Circuit. In addition, each of the active circuit judges is
authorized to hire a secretary and two law clerks to assist him in
carrying out his responsibilities."
To facilitate the effective administration of justice in the
Tenth Circuit, the Judicial Council has established nine commit-
tees, each comprised of two or three Tenth Circuit judges in regu-
lar active service. The names and functions of these committees
are as follows: (1) the Calendar Committee, which determines the
terms of court and the composition of each panel; (2) the Clerk's
Committee, which considers all substantive motions filed with
" Id. § 371. At the present time, there are three Senior Judges serving on the Tenth
Circuit. They are Judge Alfred P. Murrah, Judge John C. Pickett, and Judge Jean S.
Breitenstein.
" Id. § 332. The seven active judges currently serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit are Chief Judge David T. Lewis, Judge Delmas C. Hill, Judge Oliver
Seth, Judge William J. Holloway, Judge Robert H. McWilliams, Judge William E. Doyle,
and Judge James E. Barrett.
" The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chief Judge of each circuit, and one
District Judge appointed from each circuit comprise the Judicial Conference of the United
States. The Judicial Conference conducts a continuous study of the effectiveness of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and prepares a comprehensive survey of the case load
and operations of the federal courts. Id. § 331.
n Id. § 291.
39 Id. § 294.
,o Id. § 292.
" Id. § 712.
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the Clerk of the Court; (3) the Bail Panel, which passes upon bail
orders under the Bail Bond Act; (4) the Emergency Hearings and
Stays Panel, which considers the appropriateness of temporary
injunctions or stays pending appeal; (5) the Interlocutory Appeals
and Writs Panel, which determines whether to review an interlo-
cutory appeal and whether to grant a petition under the All Writs
Statute; (6) the Direct Criminal Appeals on Briefs Committee,
which writes the opinions in those criminal cases in which oral
argument is considered unnecessary; (7) the Direct Civil Appeals
on Briefs Committee, which decides those civil cases in which oral
argument is considered unnecessary; (8) the Environmental
Agency Panel, which hears preliminary motions in environmental
cases; and (9) the Rule 8 Committee, which determines all mat-
ters assigned to the summary calendar, including motions to af-
firm the judgment below or to dismiss the appeal, as well as
miscellaneous motions for leave to proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis or for certificates of probable cause.42
2. The Circuit Executive
When the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted, the individual
judges were the sole administrators of the judicial system. It was
not until 1939 that Congress created the Administrative Office,
which was designated to coordinate all aspects of court manage-
ment under a centralized authority located in Washington, D.C.43
The Administrative Office aided in the development of a more
administratively sophisticated judicial system. However, its loca-
tion in Washington, D.C. created a geographic and implementa-
tion gap between the centralized managerial function of the Ad-
ministrative Office and the actual daily operations of the federal
courts. Congress closed this gap by enacting the Circuit Execu-
tive Act on January 5, 1971."1
This recent legislation entitles every circuit court to appoint
a "circuit executive," an individual empowered to exercise ad-
ministrative control over all nonjudicial activities of the circuit
court of appeals in the circuit to which he is appointed. 5 The
circuit executive's statutory duties include: (1) planning, organiz-
42 For a further understanding of the role of these judicial committees in the context
of the appellate process, see Section III. infra.
43 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-11 (1970).
" Id. § 332.
The Tenth Circuit appointed its first circuit executive, Mr. Emory Hatcher, in
August of 1972. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(f) for the qualifications necessary to become a circuit
executive.
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ing, and administering a personnel system for all parajudicial
personnel in the court of appeals (with the exception of the
judges' immediate staffs); (2) procuring, maintaining, and dis-
posing of furniture and furnishings of the court; (3) maintaining
a modern accounting system for the receipt, custody, deposit, and
disbursement of all monies received by the clerk in his official
capacity; (4) conducting studies relative to the business and ad-
ministration of the court," and making recommendations to the
chief judge and circuit council for procedural improvements; (5)
acting as liason officer between the court of appeals and the Gen-
eral Services Administration with regard to the budget and mak-
ing budgetary requests; (6) compiling statistics and analyzing
statistical data prepared by the Administrative Office on the
business operations of the court of appeals; (7) evaluating all
forms used by the court and making recommendations for new or
revised forms; and (8) assisting the court in maintaining good
public relations.
3. The Clerk of the Tenth Circuit
The clerk of the court is appointed by the circuit judges
pursuant to federal statute.47 With the approval of the court, the
clerk may appoint necessary deputy clerks and clerical assistants
to aid in the effective administration of justice. The clerk and his
staff are responsible for the processing of an appeal, which in-
cludes docketing the case, assigning it to a calendar, considering
simple procedural motions, providing for oral argument, publish-
ing the court's final opinion, and issuing the court's mandate."
In accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the clerk of the court maintains a Docket Book in which he enters
all cases under their consecutive file numbers. In addition, all
papers filed with the clerk and all orders and judgments are en-
tered chronologically on the docket, showing the date each entry
" The Federal Judicial Center, created by Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29
(1970), is the main body responsible for conducting research and making studies of the
operations of the federal courts. At the present time, the Director of the Federal Judicial
Center is Judge Alfred P. Murrah, Senior Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. For an example of the comprehensive booklets prepared by the Federal Judicial
Center, see "Comparative Report on Internal Operating Procedures of the United States
Courts of Appeals," written by James E. Langner and Steven Flanders under the auspices
of the Federal Judicial Center.
,7 Id. § 711. Howard K. Phillips is the present Clerk of the Tenth Circuit. The Chief
Deputy Clerk is Robert L. Hoecker.
" For an understanding of the clerk's functions in the context of an actual appeal,
see Section Hm. infra.
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is made. 9 Since the clerk has custody of all court records and
papers, he must preserve a copy of every brief, appendix, and
printed paper which is filed with the court of appeals.50
The clerk is also responsible for preparing a calendar of cases
awaiting argument and, in placing cases on the calendar, he must
give preference to criminal appeals." After the order or judgment
of the court has been entered, the clerk serves notice of such entry
by mailing the opinion and order to all parties who participated
in the proceeding. 2
4. Staff Attorneys
Staff attorneys are the professional staff for the court of ap-
peals. Their duties differ from those of the law clerks to individual
judges and from those of the clerk of the court. The Tenth Circuit
currently has four staff attorneys. Their primary responsibilities
are: (1) reviewing all docketing statements and making recom-
mendations as to the calendar assignment for each case; (2) re-
searching and making recommendations as to the validity and
merit of petitions for writs of mandamus, petitions for interlocu-
tory appeals, motions for stays, and motions to affirm or dismiss;
(3) preparing memoranda and drafting proposed per curiam opin-
ions in Calendar D cases;53 (4) responding to letters and requests
from prisoners; (5) reviewing and recommending disposition of
petitions for rehearing in Calendar D appeals; (6) serving as
courtroom deputies; and (7) performing any additional duties
assigned by the chief judge of the court."
Not all of the circuits have staff attorneys55 and, even among
those which do, their role varies greatly from circuit to circuit.
The Tenth Circuit is probably in the forefront in having delegated
a broad range of duties and responsibilities to the staff attorneys,
thereby facilitating the expeditious disposition of the court's
caseload.




Summary appeals are assigned to Calendar D. The various Calendar designations
are explained in Section M. B. 6. infra.
" Further explanation of the role of the staff attorneys in the context of the appellate
process is contained in Section M. infra.
u The First Circuit has no staff attorneys. The Third Circuit has only one, and the
Second, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have only two staff attorneys.
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B. Admission to Practice Before the Tenth Circuit
An attorney arguing an appeal must be a member of the bar
of the Tenth Circuit. To be eligible for admission, the attorney
must be of good moral and professional character and must have
been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the
United States, the highest court of a state, another U.S. Court of
Appeals, or a U.S. District Court. 6
Admission is dependent upon filing an application which
contains the attorney's personal statement showing his eligibility
for membership. Thereafter, the Tenth Circuit will act upon the
application if it is presented by written or oral motion of a mem-
ber of the bar of the Tenth Circuit.
Upon admission to practice before the Tenth Circuit, the
attorney must pay a $15 fee to the clerk of the court. All admis-
sion fees received are held in trust by the clerk, who disburses
them in accordance with the directions of the chief judge for such
uses and purposes as will benefit the bench and the bar.57
Every member of the bar of the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals who is in good standing and who declares his intention in
writing is eligible to become a member of the Judicial Conference
of the Tenth Circuit. Membership in the Judicial Conference
entitles an individual to attend the circuit's annual meeting,
which is held for the dual purposes of considering the business of
the courts and recommending ways to improve the administra-
tion of justice within the circuit. 58
III. PROCEDURAL STEPS IN APPEALING A CASE TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
A. An Overview
The Judicial Code authorizes the Supreme Court and each
of the circuit and district courts to prescribe rules for the conduct
of its business. 9 In addition, the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to express
statutory authorization, 0 specify that each court of appeals "may
from time to time make and amend rules governing its prac-
0 FED. R. App. P. 46(a).
'" 10TH CIR. R. 4. See also 28 U.S.C. § 711(c) (1970).
" 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1970); 10TH Cm. R. 19. A registration fee of $25 to defray expenses
is collected from every member attending any session of the Conference.
5, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).
Id. § 2072.
[VOL. 49
1975 PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE TENTH CIRCUIT 387
tice."' In accordance with this authorization, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has promulgated its own Rules of
Court. These rules, as amended through October 24, 1974, are set
out in full in Appendix C to this article.2 The Tenth Circuit's
Rules of Court, together with the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, provide the procedural apparatus for appealing a case to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
A brief outline of each procedural step in the appellate pro-
cess, including the requirements of the applicable Federal and
Tenth Circuit Rules, can be found in the columnar chart ap-
pended to this article and designated Appendix A.
B. Step by Step Analysis
1. Filing the Notice of Appeal
When an appeal is permitted as of right from a district court
to a court of appeals,63 the appellant must file a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the district court. The notice of appeal must
designate the party (or parties) taking the appeal, the judgment
or order appealed from, and the court to which the appeal is
taken.4
In a civil appeal permitted as of right, the notice of appeal
must be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days
from the date of entry of the order or judgment from which the
appeal is taken. If the United States or a federal officer is a party,
the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days of
such entry. Assuming that a party has filed a timely notice of
appeal, any other party to the action desiring to appeal has 14
days from the date of the original notice within which to file a
notice of appeal.6"
In criminal cases the notice of appeal must be filed within
10 days from the entry of the district court's order or judgment.
When the government is authorized by statute to appeal in a
criminal case, it has 30 days after entry of judgment in which to
file a notice of appeal.
1FED. R. App. P. 47.
'3 The local Rules are available at the Clerk's Office, Room 469, in the Federal Court
House in Denver. The Tenth Circuit is planning to publish a handbook as a guide for
lawyers practicing in the Tenth Circuit. The handbook should be available by the summer
or fall of 1975.
63 In general, the district court's decision must be final before an appeal can be taken.
For other prerequisites to appealability, see Section I. B. supra.
FE. R. App. P. 3(a), (c).
' Id. 4(a).
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In all cases, the clerk of the district court will notify opposing
counsel that an appeal has been taken by mailing a copy of the
notice of appeal to counsel of record for each party to the litiga-
tion. In addition, the Tenth Circuit Rules require the clerk of the
district court to mail a copy of the notice of appeal, along with
the docket sheet, to the clerk of the court of appeals."6
It is important to remember that filing the notice of appeal
is a jurisdictional requirement. Thus, an appellant's failure to file
a timely notice of appeal affects the validity of the substantive
appeal. Although the court of appeals, upon good cause shown,
may extend the time period for performing a procedural act, it
generally will not enlarge the time prescribed for filing a notice
of appeal. 7
If there is no appeal as of right, a party may nevertheless seek
appellate review by filing a petition for permission to appeal. The
petition must be filed with the clerk of the court of appeals within
10 days after entry of the district court's order and it must include
proof of service on all other parties to the action in the district
court."8 Appeals by permission are authorized for appeals from
interlocutory orders in which the district court has certified that
an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate ter-
mination of the litigation. The petition for permission to appeal
must contain: (a) a statement of the reasons why there is a sub-
stantial basis for difference of opinion on the questions presented;
(b) a statement of the reasons why an immediate appeal is imper-
ative; and (c) a copy of the order from which the appeal is
sought. 9 Within 7 days after service of the petition, an adverse
party may file an answer in opposition. The petition and answer
are referred to the Interlocutory Appeals and Writs Panel, a com-
mittee composed of three circuit judges who review the conflict-
ing arguments and determine whether an immediate appeal
would be expeditious.
There is a similar procedure for appeals by allowance in
bankruptcy proceedings." The appellant must file a petition for
allowance with the clerk of the court of appeals within the time
" 10TH CIR. R. 5.
'7 FED. R. App. P. 26(b). Note, however, that the district court may extend the time
for filing the notice of appeal (for a period not to exceed 30 days) if a party is able to show
"excusable neglect." Id. 4(a), (b).
U Id. 5(a).
H See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) and Section I. B. supra.
7o See 11 U.S.C. §§ 47, 650, 898 (1970); FED. R. App. P. 6.
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prescribed for filing a notice of appeal. An adverse party may file
an answer in opposition within 7 days after service of the peti-
tion.7'
To obtain appellate review of a tax court decision, appellant
must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the tax court within
90 days after entry of the tax court's decision. If a timely appeal
has been filed by one party, any other party to the proceeding
may file a notice of appeal within 120 days after the decision of
the tax court has been rendered. 2
An appellant may seek review or enforcement of an agency
order by filing a petition for review of such order with the clerk
of the court of appeals within the time period prescribed by the
applicable statutes. The petition must contain a concise state-
ment of the proceedings in which the order was entered, the facts
upon which venue is based, and the particular relief requested.
After appellant's application has been filed, a respondent has 20
days within which to file an answer in opposition to the petition.
If the petition seeks to enforce an agency order and the respon-
dent fails to file an answer within the prescribed 20-day period,
judgment will be awarded for the relief prayed.
7 3
2. Filing Bond for Costs on Appeal
In all civil cases, unless exempted by law, the appellant must
file with the clerk of the district court either a $250 bond for costs
on appeal, cash, or other equivalent security. The purpose of the
bond is to secure the payment of costs if the appeal is ultimately
dismissed or the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Such
bond or equivalent security must be filed by appellant at the time
he files his notice of appeal.74
In a case where appellant has petitioned the court of appeals
for permission to appeal, a bond for costs must be filed within 10
days after the order granting permission to appeal.75 Similarly,
when the circuit court grants an appellant's application for a stay
pending appeal, it may condition such grant upon the appellant's
filing a bond or other appropriate security in the district court.7




75 Id. 5(d), 6(d).
76 Id. 8.
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3. Ordering the Transcripts
Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, appellant
must order from the court reporter a transcript of those parts of
the proceedings which he deems necessary for inclusion in the
record. If the entire transcript is not to be included, appellant
must file and serve on the appellee a statement of the issues
which he intends to present on appeal and a description of the
parts of the transcript which he intends to include in the record."
If the appellee wishes to designate other parts of the transcript
for inclusion in the record, he must file (within 10 days after
receiving appellant's designations) a statement of the additional
parts of the transcript which he wishes to include. At the time of
ordering, the parties must make satisfactory arrangements with
the reporter for payment of the cost of the transcript."
The court urges the parties to order the necessary parts of the
transcript immediately after filing the notice of appeal and, if at
all possible, to enter into stipulations that will avoid or reduce the
size of the transcript on appeal. Court reporters are required to
give preference to the preparation of transcripts in criminal cases.
However, in any case, if a party files a motion for extension of
time to file the record based on the ground that the reporter's
transcript has not been completed, the court of appeals will not
entertain the motion unless it is supported by an affidavit by the
reporter setting forth the pending cases in which other transcripts
have been ordered from the reporter, the estimated dates on
which such transcripts will be completed, and the reasons why an
immediate extension is imperative. The affidavit must also in-
clude a statement that the district judge who tried the case has
approved the granting of such an extension."
4. Filing a Docketing Statement
Within 30 days after appellant has filed a notice of appeal,
he is required to file a docketing statement with the clerk of the
court of appeals. The docketing statement must contain the fol-
lowing: (1) a statement of the nature of the proceeding; (2) the
date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed and the date
of filing of the notice of appeal; (3) a concise statement of the
relevant facts of the case; (4) the questions presented on appeal;
Id. 10(b).
' Id. See Rules 10(c) and (d) for the requisite procedures to follow when a transcript
is either unavailable or deemed to be unnecessary by the parties.
" 10TH CIR. R. 12.
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(5) a list of authorities in support of appellant's contention (but
no argument on the law); and (6) a statement as to whether
appellant desires oral argument. Appellant should attach to his
docketing statement a copy of the judgment or order sought to be
reviewed, a copy of any opinion or findings, a copy of the docket
sheet from the lower court, and a copy of the notice of appeal. The
docketing statement should be submitted along with the $50 fil-
ing fee required by the Rules of Court.80.
The Tenth Circuit is presently the only federal appellate
court which requires submission of a docketing statement in ad-
vance of the filing of briefs. The docketing statement has been
effective in enabling the court to maintain control over all pend-
ing cases and to identify at the initial stages of the appellate
process which cases involve complex or multiple issues and which
merit less of the court's time and attention. In addition, the dock-
eting statement facilitates early identification of appeals involv-
ing jurisdictional defects such as non-appealable orders, untimely
notices of appeal, or lack of statutory jurisdiction in the trial
court.
5. Filing the Record on Appeal
The record on appeal is comprised of the original papers and
exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript of the trial court
proceedings, and a certified copy of all docket entries in the case.
These papers and documents are compiled by the clerk of the
district court and then transmitted to the clerk of the court of
appeals. Transmission of the original record is effected when the
clerk of the district court forwards the record to the court of
appeals with a notation of the date of transmittal and an inscrip-
tion on the record of the word "original."'"
The record on appeal must be transmitted within 40 days
after the filing of the notice of appeal. For good cause shown, the
district court may extend the time for transmission of the record
if the request for extension is made within the time originally
prescribed. However, the district court may not enlarge the trans-
mittal time more than 90 days beyond the filing of the notice of
appeal.82
If the appellant fails to cause timely transmission of the re-
cord, an appellee may file a motion in the circuit court to dismiss
0Id. 7.
11 FED. R. APP. P. 10, 11.
" Id. 11.
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the appeal. Such motion must be accompanied by a certificate
of the clerk of the district court showing the date and substance
of the judgment or order appealed from, the date on which the
notice of appeal was filed, and the expiration date for transmis-
sion of the record.
83
The Rules of Court for the Tenth Circuit require each volume
of the record to provide an index of the documents contained
therein. However, the record on appeal should not include prelim-
inary papers such as notices of hearings, summonses, notices to
take depositions, subpoenas, trial briefs, or certificates of service,
unless such documents are in issue.
84
6. Calendar Assignment and Docketing the Appeal
Immediately after the docketing statements have been filed,
they are reviewed by the staff attorneys for calendar assignment.
After individually considering the depth and complexity of the
issues presented, the staff attorneys confer with the clerk of the
court and, under the supervision of the chief judge, assign each
case to the appropriate calendar.
85
Although the criteria used in making calendar assignments
are necessarily somewhat subjective, the following factors are
generally taken into consideration: (a) the complexity and num-
ber of issues presented; (b) the novelty of the issues presented
(i.e., whether the case is one of first impression in the Tenth
Circuit); (c) the length of the record on appeal; (d) the number
of parties and cross-appeals involved; and (e) the applicability of
recent Supreme Court decisions.
Rule 9 of the Tenth Circuit Rules provides for four calendars,
designated A, B, C, and D. The A Calendar is the court's general
calendar. Appeals assigned to it generally proceed in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. In general, Calen-
dar A cases involve either multiple parties, multiple issues, or
complex questions of law.
Calendar B is the court's accelerated calendar. In general,
criminal appeals as well as civil appeals involving fewer or less
complex issues are assigned to Calendar B. It should be empha-
sized, however, that the assignment of a particular case to the A
or B Calendar is a procedural classification only and does not
u Id. 12(c).
" 10TH Cm. R. 6.
u See id. 9.
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reflect an opinion by the court as to the importance or substantive
merit of the issues raised.
If a particular case initially assigned to Calendar A or B
appears to be appropriate for disposition on the briefs alone, the
docket sheet is marked with a blue tag and, as soon as the briefs
are filed, they are carefully examined in order to determine
whether the case should be reassigned to Calendar C for submis-
sion without oral argument. The C Calendar is utilized for cases
involving clear-cut issues for which oral argument would be su-
perfluous. Cases initially assigned to Calendar C are submitted
to a three-judge panel for a determination as to whether the Cal-
endar C assignment was appropriate. The two Tenth Circuit pan-
els which decide all Calendar C cases are the Direct Criminal
Appeals on Briefs Panel and the Direct Civil Appeals on Briefs
Panel. If the panel agrees with the Calendar C assignment, it then
decides the case and issues a per curiam opinion.
Calendar D is the court's summary calendar. Cases are as-
signed to Calendar D if it appears from the docketing statement
that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal or if the
issues raised are manifestly insubstantial. Appeals by state and
federal prisoners from denials of post-conviction relief are gener-
ally assigned to Calendar D if summary affirmance or dismissal
appears warranted. Each case assigned to Calendar D is reviewed
by a staff attorney who prepares a memorandum setting forth the
factual background, the issues, and a recommendation for dispo-
sition of the case. This memorandum, along with the record on
appeal, any papers or motions filed, and a proposed per curiam
opinion or order, are forwarded to the Rule 8 Panel, the three-
judge committee which decides all Calendar D cases. After read-
ing the record and the staff attorney's memorandum, the Rule 8
Panel may decide either that summary affirmance or reversal is
appropriate, whereupon a per curiam opinion is filed or an order
entered, or that the parties should prepare briefs and oral argu-
ments, whereupon the case is reassigned to the A or B Calendar.
Certain types of matters are assigned to the "Miscellaneous
Calendar." These include: (1) original petitions for extraordinary
relief filed by prisoners (e.g., habeas corpus, mandamus); (2) pe-
titions for review of interlocutory orders pursuant to section
1292(b); (3) cases in which the notice of appeal was not timely
filed; and (4) bail or bond motions in cases which have not been
docketed. Prisoner appeal cases which are manifestly defective
are also assigned to the "Miscellaneous Calendar." These defects
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generally involve either the absence of a certificate of probable
cause, which is a condition precedent to an appeal by a state
prisoner,"6 or a denial of leave to proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis or a certification by the district court that a federal
prisoner's appeal is not taken in good faith. 7 If the Rule 8 Panel
determines that the substance of the prisoner's appeal is lacking
in merit, then a staff attorney prepares an order denying the
prisoner relief. However, if any member of the Rule 8 Panel deter-
mines that relief should not be summarily denied, the prisoner's
case is transferred to the D Calendar.
As soon as a case has been assigned to any calendar, the
parties are notified of the assignment by a letter from the clerk
of the court. In Calendar A and B cases, the clerk's letter advises
counsel of the applicable time periods for filing briefs, reproduc-
ing the record, and, in some Calendar A cases, preparing an ap-
pendix. In cases assigned to Calendar D, counsel are advised by
letter that the court is considering summary affirmance or dis-
missal and that the parties have been given 15 days within which
to file a memorandum in support of or in opposition to such
summary action.
After the docketing statement has been reviewed, the record
on appeal has been filed, and the docket fee ($50) has been paid,
an appeal is docketed under the title given to the action in the
district court, with the name of the appellant identified as such. ss
A case may be docketed promptly upon receipt of the record from
the district court even though the clerk has not yet received either
the docket fee or the docketing statement. In these cases, the
parties are so notified and, if the docket fee and docketing state-
ment are not received within 40 days from the filing of the notice
of appeal, the clerk may dismiss the cause without further no-
tice."
7. Filing Motions
Within 10 days after appellant has filed the record on appeal,
under Rule 8 an appellee may file a motion to dismiss or a motion
to affirm, supported by appropriate argument and authorities. 0
N FED. R. App. P. 22.
Id. 24.
Id. 12(a).
"f 1tH Cm. R. 14.
The screening procedure (set forth above) has to a large extent obviated the need
for Rule 8 motions, since those cases in which the issues raised are manifestly insubstan-
tial or which involve a jurisdictional defect are initially assigned to the D Calendar for
[VOL. 49
1975 PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE TENTH CIRCUIT 395
A successful motion to dismiss must show that the circuit court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Because its purpose is
to indicate jurisdictional defects, a motion to dismiss may be filed
at any time. However, a motion to affirm must be filed within the
10-day period. To be successful, it must show that the question
raised on appeal is so manifestly insubstantial that further argu-
ment is unwarranted. The appellant has 15 days after receipt of
appellee's motion within which to file a response.' All of the
moving papers are reviewed by the Rule 8 Panel, which enters an
order either granting or denying the requested motion."
Motions for a stay or injunction pending appeal must ordi-
narily be made in the first instance in the district court. If relief
in the district court is not practicable or if the district court has
denied the application for stay, a motion for such relief may be
filed with the clerk of the court of appeals. The motion must
include the relevant parts of the record as well as a statement of
the facts relied upon, the specific relief requested, and the reasons
for such request. If the facts are subject to dispute, the motion
must be accompanied by supporting affidavits. A response may
be filed in opposition within 7 days after service of the motion.9
The motion and response will be considered by the Emergency
Hearings and Stays Panel, a committee composed of three circuit
judges who determine whether injunctive relief pending appeal is
appropriate. If an injunction is granted, the panel may condition
such relief upon the filing of a bond or equivalent security. 4
In criminal cases, a convicted defendant may file a motion
for release pending appeal. Again, the motion must be made in
the first instance in the district court. If the district judge refuses
to grant the release, he must state in writing the reasons for his
decision. Thereupon, the court of appeals will consider the mo-
tion for release based upon the papers, affidavits, and portions of
the record which the parties present. In these cases, however, the
summary affirmance or dismissal. However, when a jurisdictional defect or a frivolous
appeal is not apparent either from the docketing statement or from the record, a motion
under Rule 8 can be used to identify such defects. It should be added though that, because
of the initial screening procedure, the court rarely grants a Rule 8 motion to affirm in a
Calendar A or B case and such motions are generally not viewed with favor.
f10TH CiR. R. 8.
3 Id. 9. See the applicable procedure for cases assigned to Calendar D under Section
HI. B. 6. supra.
n FED. R. App. P. 8, 27. The court generally will not allow oral argument on a motion.
Id. 8, 18.
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defendant bears the burden of establishing that he will not flee
or pose a danger to the community. 5
Most other motions filed with the clerk of the court of ap-
peals are reviewed by the Clerk's Committee, which is comprised
of two circuit judges. However, the clerk of the court is given
discretionary authority to act upon unopposed procedural mo-
tions requesting (a) to extend the time for performing an act; (b)
to make corrections in briefs or papers; (c) to supplement the
record; (d) to consolidate appeals; (e) to extend the time for filing
a petition for rehearing (not to exceed 15 days); (f) to file briefs
in excess of the maximum number of pages permitted; and (g) to
substitute parties. The clerk's action on such motions is subject
to review by the circuit court." However, unless otherwise ordered
by the court, routine procedural orders are deemed entered at the
time that the nature of the order and the name of the clerk are
written on the docket sheet. 7
8. Writing and Filing Briefs
In Calendar A cases appellant must serve and file his brief
within 40 days after the filing of the record. The appellee then has
30 days after service of appellant's brief within which to serve and
file his own brief. Appellant may serve and file a reply brief
within 14 days after service of appellee's brief.91
In Calendar B cases, the appellant must file his brief within
21 days after filing the record on appeal. The appellee has 21 days
after service of the appellant's brief within which to file a brief.
Appellant's reply brief may be filed within 15 days after service
of the appellee's brief.9
Since cases are not reassigned to Calendar C until after the
briefs have been filed, counsel in these cases follow the briefing
procedures applicable to Calendar B.
No briefs are filed in cases assigned to the D Calendar since
these matters are subject to summary disposition. However, the
parties are advised that, within 15 days, they may submit a mem-
orandum addressing the merits either in favor of or in opposition
to such summary action."9 0
'5 Id. 9.
10tH Cm. R. 11.
' Id. 13.
" Id. 9. It should be noted here that, when service is by mail 3 days are added to the
prescribed time periods. FED. R. APP. P. 26(c).
" 10TH Cm. R. 9.
I0 Id.
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In the Tenth Circuit's Rules of Court, the parties filing briefs
in A and B Calendar cases are advised that they should have the
briefs typed on 81/2" x 11" opaque, unglazed paper rather than
produced by typographic printing. This reduces the parties' costs
without detracting from the substance of the appeal.'"' The Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure require typed briefs to be dou-
ble spaced and not to exceed 70 pages in length (35 pages for the
reply brief). if covers are used on the briefs, the cover of the
appellant's brief should be blue; that of the appellee's, red; that
of an intervenor or amicus curiae, green; that of any reply brief,
grey; and that of an appendix, white. 02
The Tenth Circuit requires the preparation of an appendix
only in Calendar A cases in which the record on appeal exceeds
300 pages.'0 3 The appendix is a condensation of the record. It must
be filed simultaneously with appellant's brief and should contain
the following: (1) the docket entries in the proceedings below; (2)
any relevant portions of the pleadings, charge, findings or opin-
ion; (3) the judgment, order, or decision of the lower court; and
(4) any other parts of the record to which the parties wish to
direct the attention of the court. 04 If the parties cannot agree as
to the contents of the appendix, within 10 days after the date on
which the record is filed, the appellant must serve on the appellee
a designation of the parts of the record which he intends to in-
clude in the appendix along with a statement of the issues in-
tended for review. If the appellee wishes to include other parts of
the record in the appendix, he has an additional 10 days within
which to serve his own designation upon the appellant. Unless the
parties otherwise agree, the cost of producing the appendix is to
be paid initially by the appellant unless the parts of the record
designated for inclusion by the appellee are unnecessary for a
determination of the issues presented.' 5
Except in those Calendar A cases where the record exceeds
300 pages, appellant's brief in all Calendar A and B cases is to
be submitted solely with the record on appeal and the appellant
is in fact prohibited from filing a condensed appendix except with
the permission of the circuit court.'00 This procedure should be
101 Id.
M0' FED. R. App. P. 28, 32.
103 lOi- CIR. R. 10(b).
I" FED. R. App. P. 30(a).
113 Id. 30(b). If there is a dispute on this matter, it may be submitted to the Clerk's
Committee for resolution.
I" 10THi Cm. R. 9, 10.
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changed. Since reproduction of the record is unnecessarily costly,
and since reading the record monopolizes an unwarranted
amount of the judge's time, the Tenth Circuit should require the
parties to condense the record to the bare minimum necessary for
a complete understanding of the questions raised on appeal. This
would serve two purposes: (1) narrowing the appeal to the essen-
tial issues, and (2) conserving a limited commodity-the judge's
time.
The organization and contents of the briefs are of paramount
importance since a good brief is potentially the most effective
means of persuading the court. All briefs must contain a table of
contents, a table of cases, a statement of the issues, a statement
of the case, an argument, and a short conclusion stating the pre-
cise relief sought. To be effective, a good brief must also be persu-
asive and succinct, with an accurate and objective account of the
relevant facts as well as a clear and well-reasoned discussion of
each point of law, supported by appropriate references to the
record. Only the cases which are clearly relevant should be cited
in the brief. Reference to several good cases, including a discus-
sion of the facts to show how they are analogous, is far more
persuasive than a profusion of citations. Quotations should be
used sparingly and only when both the quotation itself and the
case from which it is taken are clearly on point. Except in unu-
sually complicated cases, briefs which present numerous issues
run the risk of becoming too diffuse. The brief writer should al-
ways aim for the jugular, seeking with clarity and simplicity the
precise arguments which will be dispositive of the case.
9. Oral Argument
The Clerk of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit will
notify the parties well in advance of the time and place for oral
argument. Most oral arguments are heard in Denver, which is the
seat of the Tenth Circuit. On occasion, however, the court con-
venes in other cities within the circuit, including Oklahoma City,
Wichita, Cheyenne, and Santa Fe.' °0
In Calendar A cases, the appellant and the appellee are each
allowed 30 minutes for oral argument. °8 In Calendar B cases,
each side is allowed 15 minutes for argument.' 9 No oral argument
is allowed in either C or D Calendar cases.
,07 See 28 U.S.C. § 48 (1970).
"I FED. R. APP. P. 34.
10 10Tm CIR. R. 9(b)(6).
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The oral argument is an important part of the appellate pro-
cess. Although it serves a somewhat different purpose, the oral
argument should complement the written brief. The function of
the brief is to provide a lucid and well-reasoned discussion of the
facts and the law. The function of the oral argument is to demon-
strate to the court that the outcome which counsel advocates is
legally sound.
Appellant's opening statement should include the nature of
the case, the crucial issue or issues on appeal, and the precise
nature of the relief sought. The opening statement must strive to
catch the judges' attention in the first few minutes so as to lay
the groundwork for a persuasive presentation of the substantive
argument. Appellant should then state the relevant facts objec-
tively and succinctly, including only the evidence which specifi-
cally pertains to the issues to be argued. The points of law dis-
cussed should be narrowed to those which are essential to the
questions presented or dispositive of the appeal.
The order and content of appellee's argument must be flexi-
ble since he does not know in advance what points the appellant
will cover and what the reaction of the judges will be to appel-
lant's argument. Appellee may wish to commence his argument
by answering some questions which the court had addressed to
the appellant and to which appellant's answers were at variance
with appellee's views. In addition, appellee may wish to restate
the important facts of the case if appellant's statement of the
facts was inaccurate or distorted in any way.
In delivering an oral argument, counsel for both the appel-
lant and the appellee should utilize the techniques of good public
speaking, addressing the court clearly, loudly, and at an intelligi-
ble pace. Each lawyer should have such complete command of
the facts, the record, and the law of the case that his presentation
will allow him to maintain constant flexibility, depending upon
the frequency and direction of the court's questioning.
10. The Court's Opinion
The court does not write an opinion in every case. Disposition
without opinion does not mean that the case is considered unim-
portant. It does mean, however, that no new points of law were
involved in making the decision.110
The Tenth Circuit writes nearly 700 opinions per year."' Of
,,o Id. 17(a).
See Appendix B infra.
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these, the opinions selected for publication in the Federal Re-
porter are only those which involve: (a) cases of first impression;
(b) conflicts with the decisions rendered by other federal appel-
late courts; (c) interpretation of decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States or the highest court of a state; (d) new
federal constitutional or statutory issues; or (e) diversity of citi-
zenship cases in which a new or unique proposition of state law
has been expounded."'
The Tenth Circuit does not publish its opinions either when
the decision reached is dependent upon the particular facts pre-
sented and involves no legal issues not previously decided (by the
Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court of the United States) or
when the outcome (in a diversity case) is based upon established
state law."' The Tenth Circuit has made a concerted effort to
publish only those opinions which would make a contribution to
the vast expanse of legal literature. This is in accord with the 1972
recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States
which requested the circuit courts to establish narrow guidelines
for the selection of opinions warranting publication."4
A recent amendment to the Tenth Circuit's Rules of Court
provides for mandatory publication of the court's opinions in
cases where an opinion has previously been published by a dis-
trict court, an administrative agency, or the tax court. However,
the judges have the discretionary authority in such cases to desig-
nate for publication only the court's final judgment, without pub-
lishing the reasoning of the court."5
The panel of judges which heard and decided a particular
case will determine whether the opinion written in that case is to
be designated "Not For Routine Publication." Prior to the adop-
tion of a recent amendment to the Tenth Circuit Rules of Court,
unpublished opinions were not allowed to be cited or advanced
as precedent in any proceedings before the Tenth Circuit. How-
ever, the amendment to the Rules permits these unpublished
opinions to be cited as precedent, even though they are unre-
ported and therefore not uniformly available to all of the par-
ties."'
,,2 10TH Cm. R. 17(d).
" Id. 17(e).
" See charts reproduced in Appendix B infra showing the number of published and
unpublished opinions written by the Tenth Circuit.
M,5 10rH Cm. R. 17(f), adopted by the court on October 24, 1974.
" 10TrH Cm. R. 17(c) was amended by the court on October 24, 1974.
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In this author's. opinion, the amendment to allow citation of
unpublished opinions is commendable. However, it seems mani-
festly inequitable for certain parties (for example, United States
attorneys) to have greater access to the increasing number of
unpublished opinions decided every month by the Tenth Circuit.
One proposal to correct this inequity and, at the same time, to
maintain the Tenth Circuit's standards for publication would be
to allow the judge or panel of judges that has written an opinion
designated "Not For Routine Publication" to write a brief synop-
sis or syllabus of that decision. Only the synopsis would be sent
to West Publishing Company for publication in the Federal Re-
porter. In this manner, the unpublished opinions would be in-
dexed both by chronological order and by subject matter. Since
the syllabus would occupy merely one-half or one-quarter of a
page in the Federal Reporter, the circuit would be maintaining
its policy of publishing only those opinions which the court con-
sidered necessary for publication while enabling counsel in subse-
quent lawsuits to find reference to all of the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sions (including those with unpublished opinions) in the normal
course of legal research. If the syllabus of a case appeared to be
on point, an attorney could request the clerk of the court to send
him a copy of the unpublished opinion.
If adopted, this proposal would serve (a) to equalize the ac-
cess to this court's unpublished opinions; (b) to establish a logical
system of indexing the court's unpublished opinions; and (c) to
maintain the Tenth Circuit's philosophy of limiting the publica-
tion of opinions to those deserving the special attention of the
Bench and Bar.
11. Entry of Judgment
Following receipt of the circuit court's opinion, the clerk pre-
pares, signs, and enters the judgment in the docket. On the date
judgment is entered, the clerk mails a copy of the opinion and
judgment to all parties, with notices of the date on which the
judgment was entered."7
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a money judgment in a
civil case is affirmed, the interest allowed by law is payable from
the date the judgment was entered in the district court. If the
district court's decision is modified or reversed on appeal, the
amount of interest allowed will be contained in the instructions
"I FED. R. App. P. 36.
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to the district court at the time of the issuance of the mandate."'
12. Bill of Costs
Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dis-
missed or the judgment is affirmed, costs are taxed against the
appellant, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by
the court. If the lower court's judgment is reversed, costs are
taxed against the appellee unless otherwise ordered." 9
The costs of printing or producing necessary copies of briefs,
records, and appendices are taxable at a rate equal to the actual
cost, but not higher than $9.50 per page of standard typographic
printing or $4.50 per page of offset printing or $.20 per page of
xerox or similar process. Taxable costs are authorized for 15 cop-
ies of an appendix and 30 copies of any brief. If additional copies
are needed to serve upon counsel, the cost of these additional
copies will be taxed at $.05 per page.'20
A party desiring such costs to be taxed must file an itemized
and verified bill of costs within 14 days after the entry of judg-
ment. The bill of costs must contain a printer's itemized state-
ment of charges, if any, as well as proof of service on opposing
counsel.'
2 '
13. Petition for Rehearing
Within 14 days after the entry of judgment, a party may file
a petition for rehearing. The petition must state with particular-
ity the points of law or fact overlooked or misapprehended by the
circuit court.'2
No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless
requested by the court. Oral argument in support of the petition
is generally not permitted. If a petition for rehearing is granted,
which is infrequent, the court may restore the case to the calendar
for reargument or resubmission 23
A petition for rehearing by the court en banc must also be
made within 14 days after entry of judgment. The Tenth Circuit
will not entertain a petition to hear the case en banc unless a
judge in regular active service or a judge who was a member of
"i Id. 37.
" Id. 39(a). Any dispute as to the payment of costs may be submitted to the panel
of judges who heard oral argument in the case.
' 10TH Cm. R. 18.
, FED. R. App. P. 39(c); 10TH Cm. R. 18.
"2 FED. R. App. P. 40(a).
In Id.
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the panel that rendered the decision requests the court to vote on
whether to grant a hearing en banc.14
A hearing en banc will be granted only when a majority of
the circuit judges in regular active service desire to hold such a
hearing. In general, hearings en banc are not favored and
ordinarily will not be ordered except when consideration by the
full court is necessary to maintain uniformity of its decisions or
when the case involves a question of exceptional importance.' 5
14. Issuance of Mandate
The appellate court's mandate issues 21 days after the entry
of judgment. A timely petition for rehearing will stay the man-
date until disposition of the petition. If the petition is denied, the
mandate will issue 7 days after entry of the order denying the
petition." 6
The mandate is essentially a transmittal letter sent from the
Clerk of the Tenth Circuit to the clerk of the lower court, advising
the lower court to carry out the instructions of the appellate
court. The mandate contains a copy of the judgment entered, a
copy of the Tenth Circuit's opinion, and any directions as to the
payments of costs. The issuance of the mandate effectuates the
judgment entered by the circuit court.
15. Motion for Stay of Mandate
In any case in which the circuit court's final judgment or
decree is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of cer-
tiorari, a party may seek a stay of the mandate pending his peti-
tion for certiorari to the Supreme Court.'1 The motion for stay
may be granted by the circuit court or by a Justice of the Su-
preme Court, but the stay may be conditioned upon the giving
of a bond or other security. If the aggrieved party fails to apply
for a writ of certiorari or fails to obtain an order granting his
application or fails to make his plea good in the Supreme Court,
he may be answerable for all damages and costs sustained by the
other party by reason of the stay.Ia
Upon the filing of a copy of an order of the Supreme Court
denying the petition for writ of certiorari, the mandate will issue
immediately. 121
'12 Id. 35(b), (c).
Id. 35(a).
Id. 41(a).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (1970).
'2 Id.
"' FED. R. APP. P. 41(b).
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Because of the increasingly large number of unsuccessful pe-
titions for certiorari in criminal cases, the Tenth Circuit's Rules
provide that the mandate will not be stayed in criminal cases
unless the appellant makes a showing that his petition for certior-
ari is neither frivolous nor filed merely for a delay. The Tenth
Circuit employs a similar presumption against the stay of man-
date in connection with affirmed orders of the National Labor
Relations Board and in other cases where the circuit court be-
lieves that the only effect of a petition for certiorari to the Su-
preme Court is pointless delay.'
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court
A party to a civil case may file a petition for writ of certiorari
with the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court at any time within 90
days after the entry of judgment.' In criminal cases, the time
period for filing the petition is 30 days after the entry of judg-
ment. '3
For further information concerning the procedural require-
ments for appealing a case to the Supreme Court, the reader is
referred to the Rules of Court of the Supreme Court of the United
States, which is available at the Clerk's Office in Washington,
D.C. 33 as well as in many law libraries.
IV. CONCLUSION
As indicated in the foregoing pages of this article, an attorney
appealing a case to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit must be familiar with the requirements of the Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as the Rules of Court
of the Tenth Circuit. The summarization and consolidation of the
applicable federal and local rules contained herein as well as the
procedural time chart (set out in Appendix A) are intended to
serve as a workable guide for the practitioner.
1* 10TH Cm. R. 16.
,3, 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
'" U.S. SuP. CT. R. 22.
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APPENDIX B
The charts and graphs printed below were prepared from sta-
tistical data compiled by the United States Administrative
Office in accordance with its statutory duty to examine the
dockets of the federal courts and to collate such statistical
information.
I. TENTH CIRCUIT







II. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TERMINATIONS
DISPOSED OF AFTER HEARING OR SUBMISSION
FISCAL YEAR 1973
DISPO AFTER
TOTAL HEARING OR PERCENTAGE
TERMINATIONS SUBMISSION
ALL CIRCUITS 15,112 9,779 64.7
D.C. 1,288 601 46.6
FIRST 370 223 60.2
SECOND 1,462 958 65.5
THIRD 1,281 723 74.7
FOURTH 1,676 1,168 69.6
FIFTH 2,871 2,092 72.8
SIXTH 1,239 745 60.1
SEVENTH 1,088 630 57.9
EIGHTH 821 556 67.7
NINTH 2,140 1,347 62.9
TENTH 876 736 84.1
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TABLE IV
APPEALS COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
FISCAL YEARS 1961 AND 1969 THROUGH 1974 BY CIRCUITFi ..Ya
rtioad Toer 1974 7
Circuit 1961 1969 1970 1 1971 1972 1973 19's 961 .1973
Filed
All r it........ 4,204 10,248 11,662 12,788 14,535 15.629 16,436 291.0 5.2
Diltrirt of Columbi. ..... 527 1.094 1,127 1.055 1.168 1.360 1.243 135.9 -8.6
Firot .................... 146 221 277 383 421 401 387 165.1 -3.5
Second ................... 674 1,263 1.43 1,423 1.317 1,709 1,802 167.4 5.4
Third . .............. 334 671 1.053 1.100 1.179 1,197 1,216 264.1 1.6
Fourth ................. 250 1.090 1.166 1,211 1.399 1.573 1,462 484.8 .7.1
Fifth ................... 630 1,763 2,014 2,316 2,864 2,964 3.294 422.9 11.1
Sixt ...... 340 868 911 1.015 1,248 1.261 1.335 292.6 5.9
Seventh ...... 328 712 854 902 999 1.117 lO06 231.1 -2.8
igh 2................ 246 440 589 713 798 821 995 304,5 21.2
Nlnth, ................... 443 1.494 1.585 1,936 2,258 2,316 2.697 508.8 16.5
Tenth.................... 286 624 743 734 884 910 919 221.3 1.0
All circuits ........ 4.049 9,014 10,699 12,368 13,82B 15,112 15.422 280.4 2.1
Dinint of Colubia ..... 518 896 1.025 1,013 1.001 1.288 1,310 152.9 1.7
Firt ................... 172 207 277 750 385 370 420 144.2 13.5
S8-d ................... 663 932 1.177 1.571 1,593 1.462 1,819 174.4 24.4
Third ................. .. 309 596 702 1,105 1.201 1.281 L,216 293.5 -5.1
FOur th................ 242 1.092 1.127 1,050 1.391 1,676 1,201 396.3 -28.3
Fifth . ............... 509 1.606 1.891 2,289 2,662 2.871 2.713 433.0 -5.5
Sixth .............. .. 324 947 1.004 1.001 1,098 1.239 1,207 272.5 -2.6
Seventh ................. 320 591 806 792 882 1,0e8 1.110 246.9 2.0
9ih9 55................. 243 406 554 703 797 821 918 277.8 11.8
Ninth .................... 470 1,110 1,524 1,725 1,968 2,140 2.551 442.8 19.2
Tent .................... 239 631 61
2  
769 850 876 957 243.0 9.2
Pending end of fiscal ye-r
All circuits ..... 2,375 7,849 8.812 9,232 9.939 10.456 11,470 382.9 9.7
District of Columbi ...... 262 909 1.011 1,053 1,220 1.292 1,225 367.6 -5.2
First .................... 51 97 97 130 166 197 164 221.6 -16.8
Seond ................... 386 939 1.105 957 681 928 911 136.0 -1.8
Third .................... 169 515 866 861 839 755 755 346.1 -
Fourth ................... 100 617 656 817 825 722 983 883.0 36.1
Fifth .................. 400 1.284 1.407 1.434 1,636 1.729 2,310 477.5 33.6
Sixth .................... 215 582 489 503 653 675 803 273.5 19.0
Seventh .................. 148 617 665 775 892 921 897 506.1 -2.6
Eighth .................. 130 369 404 414 415 415 492 278.5 18.6
Ointh .................... 372 1.471 1,532 1,743 2.033 2,209 2.355 533.1 6.6
Tenth .................... 142 449 580 545 579 613 575 304.9 -6.2
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TABLE V
CASES UNDER SUBMISSION MORE THAN THREE
MONTHS AS OF JUNE 30, 1974
More than More than More than 9
3 but 6 but months but More
less than less than less than than
Circuit Total 6 months 9 months 1 year 1 year
Total .......... 291 175 80 22 14
District of
Columbia ........... 58 30 21 3 4
First ............... -.. ..
Second .............. 2 2
Third ............... - - -
Fourth .............. 7 6 1 -
Fifth ............... 74 52 18 3 1
Sixth ............... 22 11 II -
Seventh ............. 57 39 8 7 3
Eighth .............. 6 4 2 - -
Ninth ............... 62 28 19 9 6
Tenth ............... 3 3 - - -
Total as of j 3
March 31, 1974 ..... 303 222 30 33 18
United States
Court of Claims
as of June 30, 1979. 1 1
as of March 31, 1979. - -
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TABLE V
NATURE OF SUIT OR OFFENSE OF APPEALS FROM THE U. S. DISTRICT COURTS
FILED IN THE US COURTS OF APPEALS
DURING THE FISCAL YEARS IRR.1974
Change
Fatal T ear 1974 1974
Total cases ..............




0. 6. defe da t ...............
Cotact actiocs ...........
Real pperty actioc .......
To tio ................
Habeas corpis .............
Pc iaooer cicil rights ...
Other prisocer petitions....
Selective Service Art ...
Social secicity.lw.. .







Ant itr s - - -.................
Habeas cos.......*'*........
Priisorer riol tights .......
Other prisoer petiti s ....
h r . ........ .........
P tent*......................
All other ...................









Total crimiral cases .....
H icide .......................
Robbery :od birglary ..........
Larceny and theft .............
Embeesleneot a.d frsud........
A theft ....................






8.52B 19.661 1 10,798 1 12,379 1 13.329 113.491 58.2 1 1.2
6.020 7,031 7,601 8,399 8.876 9,424 56.5 6.2
1,823 2,167 2,367 2,604 2,704 3.267 79.2 20.8
351 337 363 399 388 510 45.3 31.4
39 31 29 45 34 45 15.4 32.4
92 93 U1 30 66 95 3.3 41.9
38 36 34 3U 22 
62 63.2 161.6
44 54 67 83 75 92 86.4 9.3
138 126 153 163 191 226 63.6 18.3
1.472 1,830 2,004 2,205 2,316 2,757 87.3 19.0
95 107 155 138 129 156 64.2 20.9
23 44 19 45 51 40 73.9 21.6
127 145 119 162 165 163 28.3 -. 2
403 539 474 504 579 684 69 7 16.1
168 225 261 234 261 261 38.8
36 39 53 53 47.2'
79 E4 99 113 106 225 184.8 109.3
- 66 145 B6 14 6 -90.95 -
101 133 130 210 197 246 143.6 27.5
191 247 220 260 217 237 22.0 9.4
265 270 346 412 550 690 160.4 25.5
4,197 4,834 5,234 5,795 6,172 6,157 46.7 -0.2
2.750 3,379 3.697 4,053 4,483 4.521 64.4 0.8
107 109 91 132 113 163 52.3 44.2
210 207 191 262 701 319 51.9 16.3
364 632 604 991 953 1.118 207.1 17.3
84 236 227 131 190 256 204.8 34.7
1 197 1.319 1,261 1,319 1,301 1.084 -9.4 _16.7
(2) 311 349 478 472 51.8 1.3
211 303 '1 56 49 46 -35.2 -0.6
158 155 236 226 260 235 46.7 -9.6
130 124 134 117 144 114 -12.3 -20.0
289 294 371 470 614 714 147.1 16.3
1.215 1,233 1,286 1,499 1.468 1.527 25.7 4.0
632 605 665 789 779 864 36.7 10.9
488 514 562 610 620 605 24.0 -2.4
95 114 59 100 69 5 -38.9 -15.9
232 222 251 243 221 109 -53.0 -50.7
65 51 77 25 119 73 12.3 -3.7
51 59 54 65 74 22 _56.9 70.3
15 21 22 7 5 1 -
101 91 96 146 23 13 -87.1
2,508 2,660 3,197 3.980 49453 4.067 62.2 -8.7
45 51 66 76 97 46 2.2 -52.6
498 452 500 515 518 435 _12.7 16.0
177 170 248 261 268 223 26.0 -16.8
252 204 285 288 369 392 55.6 6.2
208 206 180 178 179 164 21.2 -7.9
369 395 565 820 1.271 1.328 259.9 4.5
( U) ( ) 7R 162 165 145 85.9, -12.1
(5) 173 246 215 258 49.1 20.0
295 244 261 324 214 95 -53.1 -55.6
754 938 841 1,10 1,158 991 30.1 _15.3
'Peroe:t not calculated share b.se is 25 or less.2
Iocluded in other prasoner petitioos.
Percest change 193: 0cr 1970.
.Inlrded a.All othe.
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TREND OF HEARINGS HELD IN US. COURTS OF APPEALS
BY CIRCUIT 1970 TO 1974
Fiscal Year 1974
over
Circuit 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1973
Total 5,411 5,816 5,748 6,555 5,978 - 8.8
District of
Columbia .......... 576 417 367 381 410 7.6
First ............... 166 155 175 190 183 - 3.7
Second .............. 675 774 735 883 810 - 8.3
Third ................ 341 419 422 361 355 - 1.7
Fourth .............. 322 331 346 352 382 8.5
Fifth ............... 738 848 702 778 804 3.3
Sixth ............... 633 624 705 733 652 -11.1
Seventh ............. 378 482 517 667 627 - 6.0
Eighth .............. 351 405 441 500 413 -17.4
Ninth ............... 885 988 912 1,266 991 -21.7
Tenth ............... 1. 346 373 426 444 351 -20.9
TABLE X
HEARINGS HELD IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,
FISCAL YEARS 1973 and 1974
Fiscal Year 1973 Fiscal Year 1974
By panels By panels
Circuit Total En banc of the court Total En banc of the court
Total ..... 6,555 23 6,532 5,978 49 5,929
District of
Columbia ...... 381 3 378 410 8 402
First .......... 190 - 190 183 - 183
Second ......... 883 - 883 810 - 810
Third .......... 361 2 359 355 2 353
Fourth ......... 352 1 351 382 2 380
Fifth .......... 778 4 774 804 29 775
Sixth .......... 733 2 731 652 652
Seventh ........ 667 3 664 627 - 627
Eighth ......... 500 5 495 413 3 410
Ninth .......... 1,266 1 1,265 991 5 986
Tenth .......... 444 2 442 351 - 351
TABLE XI
IMPACT OF STATE PRISONER PETITIONS ON FILINGS IN
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
BY CIRCUIT, FISCAL YEAR 1974
Filings
Preet Pereot ecrludiog
State of total of filigs state
prl"ner 1 Total prisoner
Cireuit petitioos 1973 1974 fillngs 1973 1974 petitions
Total .......... 1,603 100.0 100.0 16,436 11.7 9.8 14.833
District of
Colu-bi ........... 7 0.7 0.4 1,243 0.9 0.6 1,236
First ............... 36 1.9 2.2 387 8.5 9.3 351
Second .............. 103 5.2 6.4 1,802 5.6 5.7 1,699
Third ............... 80 6.2 5.0 1,216 9.4 6.6 1,136
Fourth ........... 428 34.8 26.7 1,462 40.6 29.3 1.034
Fifth.. .. 358 18.7 22.3 3.294 11. 10.9 2,936
Soth ..... 152 9.3 9.5 1,33 13.5 1. 4 1,183
Seenth ..... .92 6.9 5.7 1,06 11.3 8.S 994
EIJhth.....10 2.8 6.2: 995 6.3 70.1 895
Nioth ............... )60 6. 7 10.0 2,697 5.3 ,.11 2,537
Teth .............. 57 6.9 5.4 919 14.0 9.5 832
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TABLE XII
APPEALS FILED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
FISCAL YEARS 1962 THROUGH 1974
Number of judge- Appeals Increase in
ships as of appeals
Fiscal year June 30 Filed Terminated Pending pending
1962 ....... 78 4,823 4,167 3,031 656
1963 ....... 78 S,437 5,011 3,457 426
1964 ....... 78 6,023 5,700 3,780 323
1965 ....... 78 6,766 5,771 4,775 995
1966 ....... 88 7,183 6,571 5,387 612
1967 ....... 88 7,903 7,527 5,763 376
1968 ....... 97 9,116 8,264 6,615 852
1969 ....... 97 10,248 9,014 7,849 1,239
1970 ....... 97 11,662 10,699 8,812 963
1971 ....... 97 12,788 12,368 9,232 420
1972 ....... 97 14,535 13,828 9,939 707
1973 ....... 97 15,629 15,112 10,456 517
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Adopted November 13, 1972
(As Amended Through October 24, 1974)
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RULE 1
NAME, SEAL AND PROCESS
(a) The name of the Court is, "United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit."
(b) The seal shall contain the words, "United States" on
the upper part of the outer edge; and the words, "Court of Ap-
peals", on the lower part of the outer edge, running from left to
right; and the words, "Tenth Circuit", in two lines, in the center.
(c) Writs and process of this Court shall be under the seal
of the Court and signed by the clerk.
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RULE 2
QUORUM AND PROCEDURAL ORDERS BY A SINGLE
JUDGE
(a) If at any time a quorum shall not attend on any day
appointed for holding court, any judge who attends may adjourn
the court from time to time, or if none of the judges attend, the
clerk may adjourn the court from day to day. If, during a term
after a quorum has assembled, less than that number attend on
any day, any judge attending may adjourn the court from day to
day until there is a quorum, or may adjourn without fixing a
definite day.
(b) Pursuant to Rule 27(c), Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, the Chief Judge may make any necessary interlocutory
order relating to any unassigned case or proceeding pending in
this court preparatory to the hearing or decision thereof and may
act on any applications filed pursuant to Rules 8, 9(b), 22(a) and
22(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. In assigned cases,
the active circuit judge of the panel present in the circuit having
precedence as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 45(b) may make any such
necessary interlocutory order and may act on any such applica-
tions filed pursuant to Rules 8, 9(b), 22(a) and 22(b), Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RULE 3
CLERK
(a) The Clerk's Office shall be in the quarters provided for
that purpose at 469 United States Courthouse, Denver, Colorado
80202. Telephone Number (303) 837-3157.
(b) The clerk shall, before he enters on the execution of his
office, take an oath in the form prescribed by Section 951, Title
28, and Section 3331 of Title 5, United States Code. He shall
account for all funds that may come into his hands as clerk, and
he or his deputies shall attend the sessions of the court.
(c) See Rule 45, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for
other duties of the clerk.
(d) The clerk may permit attorneys admitted to practice
before this court to withdraw original records on appeal for a
reasonable period.
(e) In case of the temporary absence of the clerk, the chief
deputy clerk shall act in his stead.
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RULE 4
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS
(a) Admission to the Bar of this court shall be governed by
the provisions of Rule 46, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The fee for admission shall be $15.00, payable to the clerk as
trustee. All funds received from such applications shall be held
in trust by the clerk and disbursed by him at the direction of the
Chief Judge for such uses and purposes as will benefit the bench
and the Bar. The clerk shall render annually to the Judicial
Council of the Circuit an accounting of all such funds held and
disbursed by him.
(b) In cases appealed to this court in which an indigent
party was represented by counsel appointed by order of the trial
court, such appointment shall remain in full force and effect until
appointed counsel is relieved of the duties of his appointment by
order of this court.
(c) All attorneys, immediately upon filing a case in this
court or entering an appearance in a case in this court, shall
obtain from the clerk the necessary forms for admission upon
written motion and shall promptly execute and return them so as
to obtain admission to practice before this court. No attorney who
has appeared in a case in this court may withdraw from it without
consent of the court.
RULE 5
SERVICE OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
In every case appealed to this court the clerk of the district
court shall promptly mail a copy of the notice of appeal to the
clerk of this court, together with a copy of the docket containing
all entries in the case through and including the notice of appeal.
RULE 6
RECORD ON APPEAL
(a) At or before the time the record on appeal is transmit-
ted, as provided in Rule 11, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
it shall be fastened together securely in one or more volumes.
Each volume shall have a cover page in the following form:
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(b) Each volume of the reporter's transcript, if any, shall be
a separate volume of the record on appeal and need not be in-
dexed or repaginated if it contains a complete reporter's index
and reporter's pagination. The pages of each volume of the re-
porter's transcript shall be securely fastened at the left side and
not at the top.
(c) The pages of the record on appeal other than reporter's
transcripts containing appropriate reporter's pagination shall be
numbered consecutively.
(d) Each volume of the record on appeal except volumes of
the reporter's transcript shall contain, immediately following the
cover page, an index of documents contained in that volume. In
addition, the volume containing the pleadings shall contain a list
of each reporter's transcript included in the record on appeal and
the volume in which it is contained, and a list of each exhibit not
suitable for inclusion in a volume of the record on appeal.
(e) The record on appeal transmitted to this court shall not
include summonses, notices of hearings, notices to take deposi-
tions, subpoenas, certificates of service or briefs unless a party to
the appeal shall request their inclusion in writing, identifying
specifically the documents to be included.
(f) The clerk of the district court, when forwarding the re-
cord shall clearly mark the original copy with the word "ORIGI-




(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of appeal in the
district court, the appellant shall file and serve on all other par-
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ties to the appeal a docketing statement which shall contain:
(1) A statement of the nature of the proceeding.
(2) The date of the judgment or order sought to be
reviewed; the date of any order respecting a motion pur-
suant to Rule 50(b), Rule 52(b), or Rule 59, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and the date the notice of
appeal was filed.
(3) A concise statement of the case containing the
facts material to a consideration of the questions
presented.
(4) The questions presented by the appeal, ex-
pressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but
without unnecessary detail. The statement of questions
should be short and concise and should not be repeti-
tious. General conclusory statements such as, "the
judgment of the trial court is not supported by the law
or the facts" will not be accepted.
(5) A list of cases believed to support the conten-
tions of the appellant. Argument on the law shall not be
included.
(6) A statement as to whether or not counsel de-
sires to orally argue the case.
(b) The appellant shall attach to his docketing statement
a copy of the docket sheet of the court from which the appeal is
taken, a copy of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, a
copy of any opinion or findings, and a copy of the notice of appeal.
(c) Ten copies of the docketing statement shall be filed, in
typewritten form, accompanied by a docket fee of $50.00. (See
Rule 14(b) of these Rules.)
(d) In administrative review and enforcement proceedings
the docketing statement shall be filed and served in the manner
set forth above within the time allowed for filing the record of
administrative proceedings.
(e) Based upon the docketing statement, the case will be
assigned to a calendar in accordance with Rule 9 of these Rules.
RULE 8
MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
(a) Within ten days after the record on appeal has been
filed in this court, the appellee may file a motion to dismiss or a
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motion to affirm, supported with appropriate argument and au-
thorities. Where appropriate, a motion to affirm may be united
in the alternative with a motion to dismiss. The motion shall be
filed together with three copies and proof of service. Motions to
affirm will not be accepted if filed subsequent to the ten-day
period, except by order of court for good cause shown.
(1) The court will receive a motion to dismiss any
appeal on the ground that the appeal is not within the
jurisdiction of this court.
(2) The court will receive a motion to affirm the
judgment sought to be reviewed on the ground that it
is manifest that the questions on which the decision of
the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need
further argument.
(b) A motion to dismiss or affirm shall be filed with the
clerk in conformity with Rule 27(d) and Rule 32(b), Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure. The clerk shall give notice to the appel-
lant of any motion filed pursuant to this Rule.
(c) The appellant shall have 15 days from the date of re-
ceipt of the motion to dismiss or affirm within which to file a
response opposing the motion, addressing the merits. Such re-
sponse, together with three copies and proof of service, shall be
filed with the clerk. Upon the filing of such response, or the expi-
ration of the time allowed therefor, the record on appeal, together
with the motion and response, shall be distributed by the clerk
to the court for its consideration. The time for filing briefs shall
be tolled pending the disposition of the motion to dismiss or
affirm.
(d) After consideration of the papers distributed pursuant
to the foregoing paragraph, or on its own motion after notice to
the parties, the court will enter an appropriate order.
Whenever the court, after reviewing an appeal, concludes
that manifest error requires reversal or vacation of a judgment or
order of the district court, or remand for additional proceedings,




The clerk shall maintain Calendars A, B, C and D and the
Chief Judge shall assign each case to one of such calendars after
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a review of the docketing statement submitted under Rule 7. The
clerk shall promptly notify each party of the assignment made.
(a) Calendar A cases shall proceed in accordance with
Rules 28, 30, 31, 32, 34 and 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, and Rule 10, or Rule 15 where applicable, of these Rules.
Only 14 copies of briefs are required to be filed with the clerk.
The court prefers the alternative method of preparation of briefs
on 8-1/2" x 11" opaque, unglazed paper as set forth in Rule 32,
rather than typographic printing.
(b) Calendar B cases will be accelerated and shall proceed
as follows:
(1) Within 21 days after filing the record on ap-
peal the appellant shall file an original and nine copies
of his brief, typewritten on letter-sized paper, and shall
serve such brief on all other parties to the appeal.
(2) Within 21 days after service of the appellant's
brief the appellee shall file an original and nine copies
of his brief, typewritten on letter-sized paper, and shall
serve such brief on all other parties to the appeal.
(3) The appellant may file an original and nine
copies of a reply brief and serve such brief on all other
parties to the appeal within 15 days after service of the
appellee's brief.
(4) Except as stated herein, briefs shall be pre-
pared in accordance with Rules 28 and 32, Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
(5) The appeal will be heard on the original record
with copies supplied in accordance with Rule 10, or Rule
15 where applicable, of these Rules. A condensed record
or appendix may be used only with the permission of the
court.
(6) Each side will be allowed 15 minutes for oral
argument. In all other respects oral argument shall be
governed by Rule 34, Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure.
(c) Calendar C assignments will be made after the briefs of
the appellant and appellee are filed. A special panel of the court
will screen cases that have been assigned to Calendar B. If the
panel is of the opinion that oral argument would not be of mate-
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rial assistance to the court in its ultimate determination of the
issues presented, it shall direct the clerk to inform the parties of
the reassignment to Calendar C and that the case will be submit-
ted to the court for disposition on the merits without oral
argument.
(d) Calendar D cases shall consist of those cases in which
a motion to affirm or dismiss has been filed pursuant to Rule 8(a)
of these Rules and those in which notice has been given pursuant
to Rule 8(d) of these Rules that the court is considering summary
action on its own motion.
(1) Within 15 days after receiving notice that the
court is considering summary action pursuant to Rule
8(d) on its own motion, the appellant may file in quad-
ruplicate and serve on all parties to the appeal a memo-
randum addressing the merits, opposing such summary
action.
(2) The appellee may simultaneously file in quad-
ruplicate and serve on all parties to the appeal a memo-
randum addressing the merits supporting summary
action.
(3) The same procedure and form as the preced-
ing two paragraphs will be followed in those cases where
manifest error is noted by the court pursuant to Rule
8(d), except that the appellee may oppose and the ap-
pellant may support summary action.
RULE 10
REPRODUCTION OF THE RECORD AND APPENDIX TO
THE BRIEFS
(a) In all civil cases in which the record on appeal including
portions of the trial transcript and exhibits shall contain 300
pages or less, except accelerated cases [See Rule 9(b)(5)], the
appellant shall file at the time of filing his brief the original and
three copies of the record on appeal in lieu of preparing an appen-
dix (similar to Rules 6 and 15 of these Rules). Such copies may
be reproduced by any duplicating or copying process capable of
producing a clear black image on white paper.
(b) In civil cases in which the record on appeal exceeds 300
pages, the appellant will prepare an appendix in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Counsel are advised that the court prefers the appendix proce-
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dure set forth in Rule 30(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
to the deferred system set forth in Rule 30(c), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
(c) All criminal appeals will be heard on the original record,
regardless of the number of pages, with copies to be prepared in
accordance with the applicable paragraphs of Rule 15 of these
Rules.
(d) All references in the briefs shall be to the original record
when the record is used in lieu of an appendix.
RULE 11
MOTIONS
The clerk of this court is authorized in his discretion and
subject to review by the court to act for the court upon the follow-
ing motions when unopposed:
(a) Any motion for extension of time to file a pleading or
perform an act required by Rules 11, 12, 24, 29, 30, and 31, Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure, or Rules 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12
of these Rules.
(b) Motions to make corrections in briefs or pleadings.
(c) Motions in civil cases to extend the time for filing peti-
tions for rehearing for no longer than 15 days.
(d) Motions to supplement or correct records or to incorpo-
rate records on former appeals.
(e) Motions to consolidate appeals.
(f) Motions for leave to file briefs or petitions for rehearing
in excess of the number of pages permitted by Rules 28(g) and
40(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(g) Motions for leave to file briefs and petitions for rehear-
ing in typewritten form.
(h) Motions to substitute parties.
RULE 12
TRANSCRIPTS
(a) Notwithstanding the requirement of Rule 10(b), Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure, that transcripts of proceed-
ings, if necessary, be ordered from the court reporter within ten
days after filing the notice of appeal, parties are nevertheless
urged to order, from the appropriate court reporter, any necessary
transcript immediately after the filing of the notice of appeal or,
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in criminal cases, immediately after the meeting between counsel
on appeal and the clerk of the district court referred to in Rule
15(a) of these Rules. In many instances a transcript is unneces-
sary and contributes to delay and expense. Counsel shall en-
deavor to enter into stipulations that will avoid or reduce
transcripts.
(b) Court reporters shall give preference to the preparation
of transcripts in criminal cases for transmittal within the initial
40-day filing period of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. The transcript of criminal trials shall omit the examination
of jurors and all opening and closing remarks unless their inclu-
sion is specifically requested by counsel.
(c) No motion for extension of time to file the record on
appeal on the ground that the reporter's transcript has not been
completed will be entertained unless supported by an affidavit
from the responsible reporter setting forth the pending cases in
which such reporter has transcripts ordered, the estimated dates
on which such transcripts will be completed, the reasons an ex-
tension is necessary in the case in which the request is made, a
statement that the request for extension has been brought to the
attention of, and approved by, the district judge who tried the
case, and a statement of counsel that satisfactory arrangements




Unless otherwise ordered by the court, routine procedural
orders shall be deemed entered upon the making of an appropri-
ate docket entry by the clerk describing briefly and succinctly the
nature of the order and the name of the judge or judges directing
its entry or, when entered pursuant to Rule 11 of these Rules, the
name of the clerk.
RULE 14
DISMISSALS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
(a) When an appellant in either a docketed or non-docketed
appeal fails to comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure and the Rules of this court, the clerk shall notify the appel-
lant or his counsel that upon the expiration of ten (10) days from
the date thereof the appeal will be dismissed for want of prosecu-
tion, unless prior to that date appellant remedies the default.
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Should the appellant fail to comply within said ten (10) day
period, the clerk shall then enter an order dismissing said appeal
for want of prosecution, and shall issue a certified copy thereof
to the clerk of the district court as and for the mandate. In no case
shall the appellant be entitled to remedy his default after the
same shall have been dismissed under this Rule, unless by order
of this court.
(b) Notwithstanding Rule 12, Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the clerk is directed to docket every appeal promptly
upon receipt of the record from the district court even though the
docket fee has not been paid or a docketing statement has not
been received. Notice of the filing shall be sent to all parties. If
the docket fee and/or docketing statement referred to in Rule 7,
have been requested and are not received within 40 days of the
filing notice of appeal, or such further time as the court may
order, the appeal may be dismissed immediately and without
further notice.
RULE 15
FORMA PAUPERIS AND CRIMINAL APPEALS
(a) Each district court clerk, immediately after the filing of
a notice of appeal in a criminal case, shall summon counsel for
both parties to his office for the purpose of accomplishing the
designation, as provided in Rules 10 and 11, Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, of the record on appeal, including both the
contents of the clerk's record and the reporter's transcript. If
counsel reside at considerable distance from the clerk's office, the
clerk, by form letter sent them immediately after the filing of a
notice of appeal, shall urge them to promptly designate the re-
cord; and suggest the use of the telephone for a conference be-
tween them.
For the benefit of the reporter in preparing the transcript,
designation should indicate whether or not-
(1) proceedings on motions,
(2) voir dire interrogation of prospective jurors,
(3) opening statements,
(4) closing arguments, and
(5) instructions,
are to be included within the transcript.
(b) In forma pauperis appeals the clerk of the district court
shall prepare an original and three copies of the record on appeal
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in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6 of these Rules. Pro-
vided, however, that an original and one copy of any reporter's
transcripts prepared at government expense will be transmitted
to this court and in addition, the clerk of the district court will
transmit the certified copy of the transcript filed by the reporter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b).
(c) All criminal appeals will be prepared in accordance
with the preceding paragraph except that the appellant, rather
than the clerk of the district court, shall be responsible for the
filing of the appropriate copies of the record at the time of filing
his brief.
(d) An original and nine copies of briefs and petitions for
rehearing in typewritten form, on letter-sized paper, shall be filed
and one copy shall be served on each party separately represented
in all forma pauperis and criminal appeals.
(e) Except as stated herein, briefs shall be prepared in ac-
cordance with Rules 28 and 32, Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
(f) If, after an adverse decision by this court in a direct
criminal appeal, a review is to be sought in the Supreme Court
of the United States, the attorney shall promptly advise the ap-
pellant, in writing, of his right to seek review and, if requested in
writing, shall prepare the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
RULE 16
STAY OF MANDATE
Whereas an increasingly large percentage of unsuccessful
petitions for certiorari have been filed in the circuit in criminal
cases in recent years, in the interests of minimizing unnecessary
delay in the administration of justice mandate will not be stayed
hereafter in criminal cases following the affirmance of a convic-
tion simply upon request. On the contrary, mandate will issue
and bail will be revoked at such time as the court shall order
except upon a showing, or an independent finding by the court,
or by a judge of the hearing panel, of probable cause to believe
that a petition would not be frivolous or filed merely for delay.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3148. The court, or a judge of the hearing panel,
may revoke bail before mandate is due.
A comparable principle will be applied in connection with
affirmed orders of the N.L.R.B., and in other cases where the
court believes that the only effect of a petition for certiorari would
be pointless delay.
VOL. 49
1975 PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE TENTH CIRCUIT 433
RULE 17
OPINIONS
(a) It is unnecessary for the court to write opinions in every
case. The disposition without opinion does not mean that the case
is considered unimportant. It does mean that no new points of
law, making the decision of value as a precedent, are believed to
be involved.
(b) After argument when the court determines that one or
more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a
matter submitted to the court for decision: (1) that a judgment
of the district court is based on findings of fact which are not
clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence in support of a jury ver-
dict is not insufficient; (3) that the order of an administrative
agency is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; and (4) that no error of law appears; the court may in its
discretion and without written opinion enter either of the follow-
ing orders: "AFFIRMED. See Rule 17(b)", or "ENFORCED. See
Rule 17(b)".
(c) The court or a panel thereof will determine when an
opinion shall be published and will direct the clerk accordingly.
The direction will appear on the face of the opinion. Unpublished
opinions, although unreported and not uniformly available to all
of the parties, can nevertheless be cited, if relevant, in proceed-
ings before this or any other court. Counsel citing same shall serve
a copy of the unpublished opinion upon opposing counsel.
(d) Situations where publication shall occur include (1)
conflicts with decisions of the Tenth Circuit or other federal ap-
pellate courts; the interpretation of decisions of the highest court
of a state or the Supreme Court of the United States; (2) new
federal constitutional or statutory issues; and (3) diversity cases
in which a new or unique proposition of law is expounded.
(e) Situations where publication should not occur include
(1) cases where the outcome depends on facts and presents no
legal issues not previously decided by the Tenth Circuit or by the
Supreme Court of the United States; and (2) diversity cases
where the outcome depends on established state law.
(f) When an opinion has been previously published by a
District Court, any administrative agency or the Tax Court, this
Court's opinion, memorandum, or order disposing of the appeal
or petition shall be designated for publication. If a majority of a
panel has written a disposition in such a case which would not
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ordinarily be published, a separate page shall be added to the
disposition designating for publication only the dispositive judg-
ment or order of the court.
RULE 18
PRINTING COSTS
The cost of printing or otherwise producing necessary copies
of briefs and appendices shall be taxable as costs at a rate equal
to the actual costs, but not higher than $9.50 per page of standard
typographic printing or $4.50 per page of offset or similar process,
or 20 cents per page of Xerox or similar process.
Taxable costs will be authorized for 15 copies of an appendix
and 30 copies of any brief. Where additional copies are needed to
serve upon counsel, costs will be taxed for such additional copies
at five cents per page. The rates specified will apply to the cover,
index and body of briefs and appendices.
Verified bills of costs submitted to be taxed should contain
the printer's itemized statement of charges.
RULE 19
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
(a) Pursuant to Section 333, Title 28 U.S.C., there shall be
held annually, at such time and place as the Chief Judge shall
designate, a conference for the purpose of considering the busi-
ness of the courts and advising means of improving the adminis-
tration of justice within the circuit.
(b) The Judicial Conference shall be composed of:
(1) All circuit and district judges of the Tenth
Circuit.
(2) Every member of the Bar of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit who is in good standing and
who shall declare in writing his intention to become a
member of the Conference, provided that a member of
the Bar who, after having become a member of the Con-
ference, shall absent himself from two successive an-
nual sessions of the Conference without leave of the
Chief Judge shall cease to be a member of the Confer-
ence.
(c) The circuit executive shall be the secretary of the Con-
ference, shall be responsible for all records and accounts of the
Conference, and shall perform such other duties pertaining to the
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Conference as the Chief Judge or the Judicial Council of the
circuit shall require.
(d) The circuit executive shall provide a form for accept-
ance of membership in the Conference to all active members of
the Bar of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit who reside
within the circuit and shall maintain a list of membership in the
Conference.
(e) During the Conference the circuit and district judges of
the Tenth Circuit shall meet to discuss matters affecting the
dockets and the administration of justice in each of the judicial
districts of the circuit. The Chief Judge of each district shall
report on the condition of judicial business in his district and
shall make his recommendations with respect thereto. All other
meetings of the Conference shall be open to all members of the
Conference and shall be devoted to a program designed to im-
prove the administration of justice in the Tenth Circuit. All mem-
bers of the Conference may participate in the discussions and
deliberations. The Conference may take appropriate action on
any matter presented to it.
(f) A registration fee of $25.00 shall be collected from each
member of the Conference attending any session of the Confer-
ence. The sum so collected shall be used under the direction of
the Chief Judge to defray the expense of the Conference. The
Circuit Executive shall keep an account of all collections and
disbursements and shall make a report thereof to the Judicial




The law library of this court shall be open to all members of
the Bar of this court but books and materials may not be removed
from the library without permission of the librarian.
RULE 21
APPLICABILITY OF RULES
These Rules shall become effective November 13, 1972, and
shall govern in all cases where the cause is docketed or petition
for review or enforcement is filed November 13, 1972, or there-
after. The revised rules of this court effective January 1, 1970,
shall remain in effect as to all cases where the cause is docketed
or petition for review or enforcement is filed prior to November
13, 1972.

